Moving Toward A Holistic, Rigorous, Analytical Readiness Framework

Redefining Readiness Topic Week 

By Connor S. McLemore, Shaun Doheney, Philip Fahringer, and Dr. Sam Savage

On April 24th, 1980, eight American helicopters heavily laden with special forces and their equipment launched from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz operating in the Arabian Sea. They flew northeast into the Iranian desert to rendezvous with refueling aircraft in order to attempt a rescue of 52 hostages taken in 1979 from the American Embassy in Teheran. The operation, Eagle Claw, ended in disaster: a dust cloud kicked up by aircraft propellers and helicopter rotor blades caused one of the helicopters to collide with a refueling aircraft and explode, killing eight U.S. personnel and wounding several others. Yet the mission had already been aborted prior to the collision. During the flight to the refueling site, three helicopters suffered equipment failures, leaving just five able to continue the mission. Mission go/no-go criteria required at least six helicopters to continue, and the order from the president to abort the mission was passed. The tragic collision occurred when aircraft were attempting to transfer fuel in order to depart Iran after the mission was already cancelled.

Helicopter capability to support Eagle Claw was quantifiable based on historical helicopter failure data, and yet prior to the mission, it was not quantified. The Holloway Report, which detailed the results of the investigation into the mission’s failure, laid bare how the number of helicopters sent was a major contributing factor to the early mission abort, and recommended that more helicopters should have been sent. Using basic probability theory and known helicopter failure rates, the mission had an estimated probability of 32 percent that there would not be six helicopters ready at the refueling site. Former President Jimmy Carter said in 2015, when asked if he wished he had done anything differently as president, “I wish I’d sent one more helicopter to get the hostages, and we would have rescued them, and I would have been re-elected.” Yet over 40 years later, the same underlying military readiness shortfalls that prioritized availability over capability for those helicopters remain largely unfixed.

April 24, 1980- Three RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters are lined up on the flight deck of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS NIMITZ (CVN-68) in preparation for Operation Eagle Claw. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

The urgent need for changes to the military’s existing readiness framework has been called for by General Charles Brown, the chief of staff of the Air Force, and General David Berger, the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. In their recent War on the Rocks article, they describe the necessity of a better analytical framework for the joint force to better assess balancing operational costs of existing forces with investment costs to modernize and replace those forces. The two service chiefs point out, “Our current readiness model strongly biases spending on legacy capabilities for yesterday’s missions, at the expense of building readiness in the arena of great-power competition and investing in modern capabilities for the missions of both today and tomorrow.” In order to address that problem, they call for “a framework for readiness” and “a more precise understanding of risk — to what, for how long, and probability.” Our team at Probability Management, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit dedicated to improving communication of uncertainty and risk, wholeheartedly agrees.

Achieving the service chiefs’ vision of a better analytical framework will require changes to both the qualitative and quantitative underpinnings of the existing readiness system. To improve the quantitative parts, we recommend the implementation of a supporting data framework that is capable of informing probability-based capabilities assessments by making the Defense Department’s readiness data more flexible, visible, sharable, and usable.

Diagnosing the Problem

The readiness system contributes to unquantified capabilities of combinations of military assets, zero-risk mindsets in combatant commanders, and requirements that are excessive. These problems must be addressed in any future readiness system. It is unreasonable to expect service chiefs to push back on requirements from combatant commanders if discussions around the capabilities of combinations of military assets are purely subjective. We make no claim as to what acceptable capability thresholds should be; however, we must point out that even if the service chiefs and combatant commanders were in complete agreement on a threshold, without a way to quantify the probability of achieving it, requirements will probably remain excessive. Requirements supported with too many or not enough forces leads to imbalanced risks and costs. Why pay to achieve a 99.9 percent chance of success when a 90 percent chance of success is adequate? Conversely, why risk a 10 percent chance of failure when a 99.9 percent chance of success is required? The existing readiness system does not support thinking in these terms.

Fixing the limitations of the existing readiness system is not purely a data challenge. However, too many problems with the existing military readiness system are a direct result of the ways in which Defense Department data is being collected, stored, and communicated. We do not advocate for the military readiness system to remove subjectivity from all readiness calculations – the readiness system should always endeavor to support the service chiefs in assessing what is meaningful, not just against what is measurable. However, subjectivity supported by systematic estimates of probability is likely to outrun subjectivity alone. The existing readiness system is simply not capable of providing military leaders with timely, fully-informed systemic probabilistic estimates of mission capabilities.

A principal problem with the existing system is that metrics associated with readiness requirements are routinely measured as “ready or not.” Once a unit meets a defined level of performance, the unit is declared “ready.” However, even when units are “ready,” it is often vague as to what they are ready for and when. Additionally, the percentages used in current readiness metrics cannot easily be aggregated by mathematically defensible means. For example, a notional requirement could be that at least 80 percent of unit systems must be ready. If a unit with 90 percent of its systems ready reports as “ready,” and pairs with a dissimilar unit at 70 percent and reporting “unready”, the combined capability of the two units to support a given mission at an uncertain future time is unclear. Fundamentally, the existing military readiness system cannot be used to quantitatively predict probabilities of mission success at uncertain future times for portfolios of dissimilar assets.

When joining readiness levels of dissimilar units, the lack of a mathematically defensible readiness framework results in important issues being distorted or lost, leaving little coherence for understanding the capabilities of the joint force at the operational or even strategic levels. Because joint force capabilities required by combatant commanders are not being credibly quantified, and because the service chiefs, who are tasked with providing ready and capable military forces to combatant commanders pay to support those requirements, the combatant commanders have little incentive to ask for fewer forces than are needed. Additionally, combatant commanders are responsible for requesting capabilities that cover their missions now, not several years in the future. Why would they risk failure by not requesting enough forces, especially considering they aren’t paying for the forces they receive? Combatant commanders are simply doing their jobs when they prioritize getting more forces in their theater now over future capabilities. Yet this is clearly a problem because marginal improvements to fulfil near-term requirements may be coming at enormous cost to important future capabilities.

DoD is not being hindered by a lack of enough data. Rather, it is hindered by an inability to see and make use of the data it collects in its many vast, opaque, stovepiped databases. Today, most military readiness data arrives in the form of historical records and subject matter expert opinions. An ideal future military readiness data framework should be able to better use that existing data while also enabling the continuous and increasingly automated collection and sharing of additional data sources that are authoritative, timely, clean, and contain useful information. Yet it is simplistic to think it will be possible to efficiently apply advanced data science techniques such as simulations, regression, machine learning, and artificial intelligence on data that is not easily visible, sharable, and usable. The lack of the appropriate data framework prevents a readiness framework from being informed by timely, visible, usable data. Fundamentally, there is no format today that allows for the efficient sharing of datasets in DoD, and much time is being wasted figuring out what data is available, if it contains useful information, and then transforming it manually so that it can be used for analysis.

A New Framework

A real gap lies in the ability of DoD to quantitatively measure what makes military units combat effective (vice combat available) and the associated costs of those capabilities. We propose the military adopts a uniform data framework that could be used within and across military services and systems to better quantify readiness predictions both now and in the future, such as providing timely estimates of the probability that helicopters will not be capable for a given mission, and to better communicate risks, such as the probability of an important mission failing because not enough helicopters are being sent. Such a data framework would allow for better sharing and employment of existing data, resulting in better quantitative metrics, leading to better cost and risk tradeoff discussions among decision-makers. This could be used to allow decision-makers to see forward in time as well with capability outcomes generated continuously through the use of large military datasets. This will allow data sources and models to evolve over time, resulting in improving probability-based capability predictions that would go a long way toward supporting the outcomes Generals Brown and Berger propose. A new approach can allow planners, commanders, and decision-makers to speak the same language to communicate, “How ready are units for what?”

Probability Management has long advocated for improvements to the quantitative underpinnings of the military readiness framework, and detailed technical explanations and example use cases for the data framework we recommend can be found in our published technical articles. In our work, we describe the underlying problems of the existing framework, and describe necessary steps if the joint force is to adopt a “holistic, rigorous, analytical framework to assess readiness properly,” as the service chiefs rightly demand.

In straightforward terms, the data framework is best explained as the standardized representation of the readiness of military assets in the form of columns of data with statistical dependence between columns preserved. Unlike data in the existing framework, these columns of data can then be straightforwardly rolled up to probabilistically estimate the capabilities of groups of dissimilar assets operating in uncertain environments. This data framework can be used to improve military readiness reporting systems broadly by conveying the probability of achieving specified levels of availability and capability for specified missions now and at uncertain future times. We believe the limits of the existing system do not result from the limitations of math, but rather from the limits of the data structures employed in readiness calculations. In contrast, our framework supports simple and straightforward arithmetic, while transparently carrying along probabilistic information that may be extracted when required.

The basic approach, democratized and standardized by Probability Management, does not forecast the future with a single number, for example, “on average a helicopter is operable 75 percent of the time,” but instead models many possible futures for each helicopter using cross-platform data standards. In terms of Operation Eagle Claw, consider eight columns of data with 1,000 rows each, with each column of data representing one helicopter. Every row represents a different possible future, with a one in a row if the aircraft is up and a zero if it is down. Each row will have on average 750 ones and 250 zeros. The total number of operable aircraft out of the eight is represented in a ninth column summing each of the original eight columns row by row. When the original Eagle Claw assumptions are entered into this framework, of the thousand elements in the ninth column, about 320 (32 percent) would have fewer than the six required for the mission, indicating a 32 percent chance of failure. These sorts of row-by-row calculations, known as vector operations, are trivial in virtually any software platform today, so the open standard framework could be used to enable chance-informed decisions across any other existing or future readiness software platforms.

When the readiness of an asset is represented as a column of thousands of “ready or nots,” then units can be combined in a row-by-row sum to provide a column of assets available in each of 1,000 futures. This approach, long used in stove-piped simulations, becomes a framework by simply storing simulated results in a database and making them sharable.

For example, suppose the DoD is choosing between two aircraft systems, A and B. They are both operational 75 percent of the time, but A is 5 percent cheaper than B. We might pick A to save money. But suppose that system A goes down at random 25 percent of the time, and system B is guaranteed to be operational for 7.5 flight hours and then require 2.5 hours of maintenance. Traditional readiness metrics based on averages can’t detect the difference between A and B, except on cost. But for missions requiring less than 7.5 flight hours, system B is vastly superior, because you can arrange to have 100 percent of the fleet in action. The added predictability may be well worth the 5 percent cost premium. For missions over 7.5 hours, system B is worthless, as no aircraft will be ready. With System A, however, a few planes will survive the long mission. So again, we should be asking “how ready for what,” where “how ready” may be interpreted as “what are the chances?” Chance-informed capability decisions would allow the Defense Department to quantify cost today versus the chance of adverse events tomorrow.

Conclusion

The adoption of this new data framework for military readiness would go a long way toward achieving the quantitative underpinnings necessary to support the service chiefs’ vision and it can be used to fix the fundamental problem they call out: the “gold-plating” of existing force requirements at the expense of future capability. Additionally, the framework we propose is merely a data standard, not requiring any particular software implementation, is not proprietary, is available at no cost to the government, and does not require the wholesale elimination of the existing military readiness system; it can expand upon the existing system and be implemented incrementally. It is not designed to eliminate subjectivity from a commander’s readiness calculations, nor should it. A more structured readiness approach that explicitly acknowledges uncertainty is complementary to subjective estimates. Commanders will still need to make decisions subjectively based on myriad factors, including their own risk tolerance.

Combining the predicted risks of a portfolio of dissimilar assets occurs commonly in the commercial sector. Our approach has long been widely used in applications in financial engineering, insurance, and many other industries. It has been applied to portfolios of oil exploration projects at a global energy firm and portfolios of risk mitigations at a large utility. We are confident that our approach is both straightforward to understand and simple to use without specialized software or mathematical training. For example, using the same data framework we propose the military adopts for its readiness system, Probability Management taught modern portfolio theory, a complicated subject that involves evaluating the predicted returns of financial portfolios, to West Oakland Middle School eighth graders in 2017. The students quickly understood the framework and employed it effectively, and we are confident that military personnel will be able to easily employ it in the area of military readiness.

Our proposed data framework is already adopted by commercial organizations in sectors as diverse as healthcare, energy, and defense to quantitatively support decisions and mitigate risks. Lockheed Martin, Pacific Gas & Electric, and Kaiser Permanente are incorporating the framework to better assess the likelihood of critical outcomes in terms of probabilities of success and failure based on historical performance and future predictions.

The data framework we propose is generic and is easily tailored to new-use cases and industries, including to an improved military readiness framework. The expectation is that if our approach were applied in a military readiness context, it would support a better analytical framework for the joint force and allow better assessments. This would help better balance operational costs of existing forces with investment costs to modernize and replace those forces. Through this framework, military leaders would have a more practical understanding of the tradeoffs within military readiness and better manage the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Mr. Connor McLemore is a principal operations research analyst for CANA Advisors and the Chair of National Security Applications at ProbabilityManagement.org. He has over 12 years of experience in scoping, performing, and implementing analytic solutions. He holds Masters’ degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and is a former naval officer and graduate of the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) with numerous operational deployments during 20 years of service. 

Shaun Doheney is a Senior Data and Analytics Strategy Consultant for a large global company with experience as a Chief Analytics Officer for an Inc. 5000 company. He is a retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel who has conducted, participated in, or led a whole host of analyses and evaluations across major Department of Defense decision support processes. He is the Chair for the Military Operations Research Society’s Readiness Working Group and the Chair of Resources and Readiness Applications at ProbabilityManagement.org. 

Mr. Philip Fahringer is a Fellow and Strategic Modeling Engineer for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics with 35 years of combined military and defense applied research in analytics and decision support. He holds a Master’s degree Operations Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and in Strategic Studies from the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and he is a former naval officer with numerous operational deployments and strategic planning assignments during 20 years of service. 

Dr. Sam L. Savage is Executive Director of ProbabilityManagement.org, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit devoted to the communication and calculation of uncertainty. The organization has received funding from Chevron, Lockheed Martin, General Electric, PG&E, Wells Fargo and others, and Harry Markowitz, Nobel Laureate in Economics was a founding board member. Dr. Savage is author of The Flaw of Averages: Why We Underestimate Risk in the Face of Uncertainty (John Wiley & Sons, 2009, 2012), is an Adjunct Professor in Civil and Environmental Engineering at Stanford University and a Fellow of Cambridge University’s Judge Business School. He is the inventor of the Stochastic Information Packet (SIP), a standardized, auditable data array for conveying uncertainty. Dr. Savage received his Ph.D. in computational complexity from Yale University.

Featured Image: NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN (May 3, 2021) – U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 164 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to take off from the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8) in support of Northern Edge 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jeremy Laramore)

Redefining Readiness Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC will be featuring submissions sent in response to our call for articles on redefining readiness.

Debates about readiness can take on many forms. What scenarios and threats should forces be ready for, and along what timeframes ? How do we measure readiness through subjective and quantitative perspectives? How do we accept risk and tradeoffs in readiness as commitments are balanced against the health of the force? Readiness policy holds sway over myriad elements of national strategy and the administration of armed forces, and it remains to be seen how readiness will be calibrated to meet the demands of great power competition. 

Below are the articles and authors being featured, which may be updated with further submissions as Redefining Readiness week unfolds.

Moving Toward A Holistic, Rigorous, Analytical Readiness Framework,” Connor S. McLemore, Shaun Doheney, Philip Fahringer, and Dr. Sam Savage
Proficiency Versus Effectiveness: What Readiness Is Not,” by Jesse Schmitt
Just Say No: Defining New Force Allocations for Effective Commitments,” by Michael D. Purzycki
Sea Control 254 – Defining Readiness with Admiral Scott Swift (ret.),” by Jared Samuelson

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (April 29, 2021) – Two F/A-18 Super Hornets assigned to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11 launch from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Erik Melgar)

Sea Control 252 – Bordering on Crisis with Brian Wilson and Nora Johnson

By Jared Samuelson

Defecting Soviet sailors, possible contamination from explosions in Chinese port facilities, and deadly lemons! How do the U.S. and Canadian governments organize a whole-of-government response to a threat originating in the maritime domain? Brian Wilson and Nora Johnson join the podcast to discuss Maritime Operational Threat Response, the U.S. response, and Maritime Emergency Response Protocol, its Canadian counterpart.

Download Sea Control 252 – Bordering on Crisis with Brian Wilson and Nora Johnson

Links

1. “Bordering on Crisis: Overcoming Multiagency Crisis Coordination Challenges,” by Brian Wilson and Nora Johnson, New York University Press, 2021.
3. “The Defection of Simas Kudirka,” by Tom Dunlop, Martha’s Vineyard Magazine, December 1, 2005.

6. “Lemons Caught in a Squeeze,” by Paul Blustein and Brian rnes, The Washington Post, September 10, 2004. 

Jared Samuelson is Executive Producer and Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].

The U.S. Military In Competition: Supporting Effort One

By Ryan Ratcliffe

“Ultimate excellence lies…in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.” Sun Tzu

“America is back,” proclaimed President Joe Biden in his first address to the Department of State. “Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy,” he continued, declaring that the United States would repair its alliances and reengage the world to confront global challenges. Speaking to the department that had recently published its comprehensive assessment of relations with China and called for a revival of U.S. foreign policy, the President’s words were likely well received. 

Designed to serve as a modern-day “long telegram,” The Elements of the China Challenge reveals the Chinese Communist Party’s aim to revise world order, highlighting many of the Party’s malign and coercive activities designed to achieve its subversive ambitions. The authors of this seminal work, the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, conclude by calling for the United States to refashion its foreign policy around the principles of freedom and to reserve the use of military force for when all other measures have failed. 

Diplomacy will certainly be fundamental in addressing the China challenge, but returning it to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy will not occur overnight. Decades of systemic decline have reduced U.S. diplomatic capacity and left the military as the more prolific instrument of national power. Therefore, until the Department of State completes the transformation it requires and returns to primacy, the Department of Defense will need to shoulder some of the burden in answering the China challenge. One such element that the Department of Defense should assist with is countering actions in the gray zone. 

The gray zone is the “contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare,” and it includes actions taken to achieve relative geopolitical gains without triggering escalation. So, despite the U.S. military’s preeminence as a joint fighting force (or, more likely, as a testament to it), state actors like the Chinese Communist Party are pursuing and achieving success in the gray zone. These revisionist actors purposefully avoid armed conflict in an effort to evade the lethal arm of U.S. foreign policy, challenging traditional assumptions of strategic deterrence. Left unchecked, these gray zone victories will gradually amass into a direct threat to U.S. national security; this makes it well within the military’s purview to orient on the gray zone. 

To help counter the gray zone strategy the Chinese Communist Party regularly uses, the U.S. military should consider non-traditional approaches to competition. Such creative military support would buy U.S. diplomacy time to rebuild its capacity for securing freedom, while still avoiding armed conflict. This article offers a framework for achieving this non-traditional support from the U.S. military: First, the United States should leverage its military manpower to legally support non-military competition activities. Second, the U.S. military should establish a forward-deployed headquarters to command and control the military’s involvement in competition. Finally, the senior military officer in this competition-focused headquarters should be charged with synchronizing operations in the information environment.

Providing Military Support to Competition

Although there are many definitions, competition is generally viewed as fundamental to international relations. To effectively compete, though, one must develop a thorough understanding of the competition. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the pinnacle of Sun Tzu’s “win without fighting” maxim is not determining the fate of a battle before it is fought; the true measure of excellence is to never even do battle because one’s aims were wholly achieved without conflict.

Recognizing that its competitors seek to achieve their revisionist aims below the threshold of armed conflict, the U.S. military must adapt its deterrence strategies to counter illegal gray zone operations. Deterrence by denial, defined as elevating the probability of operational failure, likely has a greater chance of succeeding in the gray zone than deterrence by punishment, such as taking retaliatory action. To effect deterrence by denial in the gray zone, the U.S. military should enable its interagency and international partners to counter the illicit activity that often underpins gray zone strategies.

Countering malign behavior has many faces: U.S. allies upholding their own sovereignty, partner nations protecting their economic livelihood, and the U.S. government imposing economic sanctions are all examples of ways to achieve competition’s strategic ends. In spite of their critical role in opposing illicit gray zone activities, though, the agencies that confront malign behavior often lack the manpower to reach the point of taking action. Manning shortfalls, exacerbated by the expansive size of the Indo-Pacific, leave the U.S. military’s interagency and international partners unable to muster adequate back-end support for their efforts, such as maintaining robust intelligence pictures or gathering actionable evidence of malign activity.

The U.S. Department of Defense, on the other hand, is more adequately manned for the task of competing in the Indo-Pacific. For example, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command alone has approximately 375,000 military and civilian personnel assigned to its area of responsibility. In contrast, the U.S. Department of State employs only 70,000 individuals throughout the world, and the New Zealand Defence Force is just over 15,000 strong. So, while the U.S. military’s interagency and international partners lack the manpower to identify and track gray zone activity, nearly two decades of asymmetric conflict has left the U.S. military manned, trained, and equipped to provide precisely the type of back-end intelligence and logistical support its partners require. Any manpower that the U.S. military contributes to these partners is likely to have outsized impacts on their ability to compete and counter gray zone actions.

It should be clarified that supporting competition cannot detract from the U.S. military’s lethality, a unique capability it alone provides. Therefore, like any effective strategy, efforts to counter gray zone operations should be focused on the most important and attainable objectives. Careful consideration should be given to preserving the “means” of the U.S. military to protect national security: its combat power. However, supporting competition and retaining combat power are not mutually exclusive. For example, many of the skills required to perform maritime governance, such as fusing multi-source intelligence data or finding and fixing maritime vessels, directly translate to combat operations. Activities supporting competition can and should be used to build operator proficiency, while simultaneously contributing to deterrence by demonstrating credible military power in the region.

A Competition-Focused Command

To synchronize the U.S. military’s support to competition and maintain awareness of the collective risk acceptance, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command should consider establishing a competition-focused headquarters west of the International Date Line. This headquarters would provide the unity of command required to develop the foreign, joint, and diplomatic partnerships needed to compete with a state actor seeking to undermine regional stability. 

Some will view a headquarters west of the International Date Line as incurring too much risk of escalation, but the opposite is more likely true. The U.S. military will be unable to deter illicit gray zone activities without accepting some risk, as a willingness to accept risk demonstrates commitment to one’s adversary. Accepting greater risk does not mean the United States should condone or take wanton action, though, as disparate or conflicting actions could elevate the risk of unintentional or inadvertent escalation. Instead, risk acceptance should be carefully considered for the confluence of the U.S. military’s efforts to support competition. Establishing a forward headquarters, then, directly addresses the issue of risk: it would demonstrate commitment to the United States’ competitors while maintaining a complete picture of the military’s support to competition, thereby decreasing the risk of escalation.

The ideal structure for this organization would be a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) led by a senior civilian, with a 3-star general or flag officer serving as deputy, and possessing a cabinet of experienced foreign policy advisors and liaison officers. To ensure a “forward mindset”, the CJIATF should be positioned in Guam, Australia, or Palau, and staffed by a mix of deployed and permanent personnel. Such a construct will provide responsive command and control for regional competition, increasing the U.S. military’s ability to support competition while freeing other units to maintain their focus on conventional mission sets and traditional strategic deterrence.

There are many factors that make a CJIATF the ideal choice to serve as the nexus of military support to competition. First, joint task forces provide a “single mission focus” with the ability to “integrate forces…in a dynamic and challenging political environment.” They also foster “de facto interdependence” through an environment of mutual reliance on their members’ contributions. The “combined” and “interagency” modifiers emphasize the need to include a wide variety of partners within this joint task force—partners that should range from U.S. government agencies to a host of international liaison officers.

To effectively navigate the complex requirements of providing military support to external entities, the CJIATF should employ a blend of traditional and novel concepts. For example, the “by, with, and through” approach translates well to competition. Although more commonly associated with armed conflict, this approach offers an outline for orchestrating interagency and international cooperation: The CJIATF strives for actions performed by its partners, with the support of U.S. forces, and through a legal and diplomatic framework. Such an approach would allow the U.S. military to support a wide range of partner actions, while still abiding by international law and applicable U.S. Code. 

Competition demands exactly the kind of interagency and international cooperation that a joint task force promotes. As the stakes of competition continue to rise with tensions following suit, detailed integration between the military, government agencies, and partner nations remains the best hope for diminishing the risk of conflict. Avoiding conflict while preserving the rules-based international order should be considered success in today’s competition, and a CJIATF is uniquely capable of supporting this objective.

Information-Related Synchronization

In addition to enabling partner actions, the CJIATF will need to grapple with the fact that all competition efforts are inexorably tied to the information environment. Instant communication and weaponized social media offer ample opportunity for competitive exploitation, and they present considerable risk of inadvertent escalation. Additionally, misinformation and deep fakes now offer low-cost means to wreak societal havoc with ambiguous attribution. 

Despite some documented success, the United States has struggled to develop a unified understanding of information operations. Difficulty preventing exploitation, such as Russian interference in U.S. elections or Chinese industrial espionage, creates a perception of information vulnerability—a setback the United States must rectify. To fix this, consideration of information operations needs to move from garrison staff, academia, and think tanks to the operational realm. The role of every warfighter has changed: You are no longer simply “doing land operations, you’re doing an information operation in the land domain.” 

The connection between competition and information makes the CJIATF’s responsibilities inherently information-centric. Therefore, in addition to enabling its partners to compete, the CJIATF must also synchronize information operations in support of competition. This focus on gaining advantage in the battle for information dominance makes the CJIATF’s senior military officer a logical choice to serve as the first Joint Force Information Component Commander (JFICC).

The JFICC is a novel approach to the battle-tested functional component commander construct. Commanders designate a subordinate functional component commander to establish unity of command and unity of effort for operations in a specific domain (i.e., there are normally separate component commanders for operations on land, at sea, in the air, etc.). This type of domain-specific synchronization is precisely what the United States needs to overcome its previous setbacks in the information environment. Additionally, operations can have significant effects in the information environment regardless of the domain they are executed in, and the inverse is also true: Actions in the information environment can have real-world impacts in physical domains

To manage this cross-domain interaction, the JFICC needs to synchronize the projected effects of all efforts in the region. This robust requirement, combined with the move towards all-domain operations, means the JFICC must be able to deploy their information-related capabilities as a demonstrable force, in line with the forces operating in the other domains. They will then need the authority and capacity to mass this force in support of decisive action. Designating the CJIATF commander as the JFICC directly addresses this requirement by placing “the responsibility and authority for execution of the decisive [information] tasks under a commander vice under a staff officer.”

Although it is non-doctrinal for a joint force commander to serve as a functional component commander, there is some precedent for this: A Special Operations Joint Task Force commander may also serve as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander. Comparing special operations forces with information-related capabilities turns out to be rather effective, as neither “own” physical battlespace, neither historically have a dedicated service component, and both often operate below the level of armed conflict.

Any future JFICC will likely be faced with an extraordinarily complex all-domain problem, and will be able to directly impact national strategic objectives. Experience is the best teacher, and the U.S. military should capitalize on the opportunity to advance its ability to operate in the information environment by employing the first JFICC below the threshold of armed conflict. Doing so will provide valuable insight into the dyad of operating in the physical domain and information environment simultaneously—a fundamental challenge of all-domain operations. 

Competition is Not a Nine-to-Five Job

To realize its strategic aims, the United States must make a concerted effort to align its means and ways to achieve its ends, building upon its strengths while improving its deficiencies. Supporting interagency and international partners where command and control resides with a new headquarters commanded by a novel functional component commander presents formidable challenges, but it is precisely the economy-of-force option the United States needs to better compete now. This structure aligns with strategic guidance from the highest levels of the U.S. Government, and it could eventually serve as an example for other theaters to emulate, such as U.S. Africa Command.

Finally, a subtle but crucial aspect of implementing this construct is that it acknowledges the gray zone operating environment for what it is: a contest of wills without violence. Left unchecked, these gray zone strategies could lead to a Tzu-esque defeat of the rules-based international order before Clausewitzian force is ever used. With this recognition, the U.S. military must shift its approach to competition from a “nine-to-five” business model and begin applying effort commensurate with traditional military operations.

Utilizing the U.S. military to support competition will likely be difficult and often uncomfortable. Additionally, establishing another forward-deployed headquarters will require both personal sacrifice and significant monetary commitment, and appointing a new functional component commander will challenge traditional military thought. There is, however, something much worse than these changes: failure to levy the existing force against today’s challenges with the hope that tomorrow’s force will be more capable of achieving success. Hope is not a viable course of action when national security is at stake.

As put forth in The Elements of the China Challenge, the United States needs to mobilize the global forces who ascribe to the existing world order and are willing to defend it, keeping one aim in mind: securing freedom. The forward-mindset and combined, interagency nature of this supporting approach will do exactly that: ensure the United States’ efforts align with and support the strategic interests of its partners in the Indo-Pacific. This paradigm shift could be the rallying cry that unites a constellation of allies and partners to form the whole-of-society approach this contest will require. The time for action is now; the world order we know depends on it.

 Major Ryan “Bevo” Ratcliffe is an EA-6B Electronic Countermeasures Officer and a Forward Air Controller in the United States Marine Corps, currently assigned to I MEF Information Group. He will begin pursuing a Master of International Public Policy from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in August 2021.  

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.

Featured image: A JH-7 fighter bomber attached to a naval aviation brigade under the PLA Northern Theater Command taxies on the runway with drogue parachute during a flight training exercise in early January, 2021. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Duan Yanbing)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.