Podcast

Sea Control 515 – A New Age of Naval Power with Dr. Alessio Patalano

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By Jared Samuelson

Dr. Alessio Patalano joins the program to discuss his article for TIME, “The New Age of Naval Power.” Alessio is a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Download Sea Control 515 – A New Age of Naval Power with Dr. Alessio Patalano

Links

1. “The New Age of Naval Power,” by Alessio Patalano, TIME, March 5, 2024.  

Jared Samuelson is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Jim Jarvie.

Red Sea Topic Week

Basing U.S. Ships in Nearby Waters to Counter Threats in the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Michael D. Purzycki

American missile strikes on Houthi forces threatening shipping in the Red Sea show the Navy’s importance in protecting one of the busiest trade routes on the planet. Aggression by Iran and its proxy forces throughout the Middle East shows no signs of abating. In light of this reality, the Navy’s workhorses, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, likely look forward to more action in the region as their construction continues thirty years on. Despite countering China in the Indo-Pacific becoming the primary focus of maritime strategy and deterring Russian aggression, the U.S. still benefits from maintaining a naval presence in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula.

Getting vessels to the Red Sea and other bodies of water east of the Suez Canal is resource- and time-consuming. For example, it takes approximately 20 days for an aircraft carrier homeported in San Diego to reach the Middle East. Moreover, any vessel from the Pacific Fleet deployed to the Middle East will not be available to protect American interests and allies in the western Pacific. Should China invade Taiwan and the U.S. find itself needing additional destroyers, America’s ability to patrol the Red Sea would be severely limited.

U.S. vessels can also sail from the East Coast, crossing the Atlantic and the Mediterranean before transiting through the Suez Canal; however, American access to the canal is not guaranteed. Egypt’s economy is far from stable. In March 2024, Egypt accepted a multibillion-dollar bailout from the International Monetary Fund to decrease its large national debt. Furthermore, despite being a longstanding U.S. ally receiving over $1B a year in aid from Washington, Egypt’s military is increasingly reliant on Russia for its weaponry. Meanwhile, a $28.5B surge of Chinese money in 2018 and 2019 made Egypt the number one Arab recipient of Chinese investment.

These factors make Egypt vulnerable to pressure from America’s rivals. For example, Egypt may face another wheat shortage, as it did in the early stages of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russia could offer Egypt food aid in exchange for denying the U.S. access to the Suez Canal. Similarly, China could seek to pressure Egypt via “debt trap diplomacy,” placing the country deep in debt with the promise of relief if Cairo ceased being friendly to Washington. When sending vessels eastward through the canal, the U.S. Navy needs a backup plan.

The need for a U.S. naval presence in and around the Red Sea, combined with the uncertainty of America’s ability to regularly send vessels to that region, portends the basing of U.S. vessels in or around the Fifth Fleet area of responsibility. First, a willing host country must be found. While the Navy’s Task Force 59 demonstrated the ability of unmanned vessels to perform certain tasks in countering Iranian naval forces, the need to confront the Houthis, future Iranian proxies, or similar threats on land points to destroyers as the weapons of choice. Basing destroyers in the region rather than rotating them through would demonstrate the U.S. is committed to protecting global trade and confronting Iran’s threats to it, even as it sees the Indo-Pacific as the Navy’s primary theater in the coming years. It would also reduce transit times, increasing responsiveness while preserving hull service life.

The Navy need not be alone in basing forces in this part of the world. In a Brookings Institution paper, “How to Be a “Cheap Hawk” in the 2020s,” defense expert Michael O’Hanlon advocated basing U.S. Air Force tactical fighter squadrons in the Middle East, including Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. This would help the U.S. deter Iranian aggression without the burden of rotating Air Force F-15Es or F-35As to the Gulf from other regions, incurring significant logistical burdens with each rotation. The basing of naval vessels is complementary to this logic.

The deployment of U.S. destroyers to Naval Station Rota, Spain, for more than a decade provides an example of the value of a similar deployment east of Suez would bring. While their primary mission is missile defense, protecting NATO members against potential Russian attack, their proximity to North Africa and the Levant provides availability for contingency operations. For instance, they may perform missions similar to the anti-Houthi strikes, or to quell a resurgent Islamic State. Pleased with the capabilities provided by the arrangement, the Navy is increasing the number of destroyers based in Rota from four to six. The question of where American ships should be based is difficult to answer. Several possibilities present themselves, all of which have pros and cons. Perhaps the most glaring issue is that all the countries discussed below are within range of Iran’s ballistic missiles, some fitted with maritime seekers to target ships. While this is an issue worth considering, the benefits of nearby basing account for almost every contingency other than full-blown war in the region. Discussed below are four potential host countries.

United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)

The U.A.E. has major ports potentially available for basing U.S. ships. For example, Jebel Ali is the Navy’s busiest foreign port. Political factors work in the Navy’s favor. The U.A.E. and Bahrain were among the first Arab countries to sign the Abraham Accords, ending their longstanding non-recognition of Israel. It is also part of I2U2, a multilateral partnership consisting of India, Israel, the U.A.E., and the U.S. While not primarily a security partnership, it can facilitate security cooperation between countries whose interests sometimes align.

Security may be an issue in the U.A.E., especially regarding China. The U.A.E. collaborated with China to provide domestic network services, acquire drones, and develop artificial intelligence systems. In 2021, China was forced to abandon constructing a major facility in the U.A.E. after the U.S. alleged that it had military purposes. Before the U.S. decided to base warships in U.A.E. ports, it would need to ensure the U.A.E. took strong measures to prevent China from compromising its utility.

Oman

Oman may offer the best geographical location. It is close enough to the Iranian coast and the Red Sea so that U.S. ships based there could quickly transit between them. Tying Oman to the U.S. through basing, and possibly with a major non-NATO ally status attached, could make up for the fact that Oman has refused to sign the Abraham Accords. Furthermore, the United Kingdom operates a major military presence in Oman, offering a chance to further Anglo-American cooperation on Middle East security threats.

On the other hand, Oman has worked for many years to maintain good relations with Iran and the U.S. It may refuse to be forced to choose between one or the other. The fact that the U.S. used Omani facilities does not mean that the interests of Omanis and Americans are aligned.

Kenya

If the U.S. is looking for a location more suitable for operations in the Red Sea than for countering Iran, Kenya would be a good choice. The country has the potential to be an important partner for the U.S. in and beyond Africa, and its international actions in recent years have frequently been conducive to American interests. In 2022, Kenya’s ambassador to the United Nations gave a stirring condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine. More recently, Kenya signed a deal with Haiti to allow Kenyan police officers to serve as peacekeepers in the troubled Caribbean country. A presence in eastern Africa can also help the U.S. counter China in the western Indian Ocean. Also, as with Oman, the United Kingdom maintains a military presence in Kenya, which the U.S. could potentially build on for Anglo-American cooperation in Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific security efforts.

A drawback is that Kenya is further away from the Red Sea than Oman. Thus, while basing destroyers there could help counter threats in the Red Sea, it may do little to help deter Iran in the Persian Gulf. Also, Nairobi may not want to place itself firmly in Washington’s corner, as there would still be times when it wanted to maintain good relations with Moscow and Beijing.

India

If the United States wants to make India a major partner in its efforts to balance China throughout the Indo-Pacific, basing U.S. ships on India’s western coast would help while offering a location to enter the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea. India is already a major U.S. defense partner, a status similar to a major non-NATO ally. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), of which India is a member, emerged in recent years as an important theater for security cooperation by powerful democracies to balance China. Tightening security cooperation while basing naval forces in southern Asia to counter Iranian threats nearby would be of great benefit.

There are several risks to this idea. India is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security forum that includes Russia and China. India probably does not want to stray too far from good relations with Russia, still a major arms supplier. It would also not want to pigeonhole itself as a U.S. ally, despite its worries about China’s rise threatening its interests. Also, France is pursuing major arms sales with India. Drawing India too close to the U.S. could threaten to scuttle the French deal, potentially repeating the kerfuffle over the AUKUS security partnership.

This is not an exhaustive list of possible host nations. While each of these suggested locations has drawbacks, unconventional thinking by the Navy is called for when confronting asymmetrical threats like the Houthis. The Indo-Pacific’s status as the major region of American maritime engagement does not mean the U.S. can afford to ignore the Red Sea. Finding ways to tackle both at once is a goal worth pursuing.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

Featured Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Truxtun (DDG 103), top, operates in the Red Sea, May 1, 2023, while supporting the Department of State’s efforts to evacuate U.S. citizens and others from Sudan.

Red Sea Topic Week

Naval Interoperability and NATO’s Naval Presence: Lessons from the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By CDR Augusto Conte, Spanish Navy, and Gonzalo Vázquez

In the latest Notes to the CNO series run by CIMSEC back in September 2023, we argued that in an increasingly contested and complex maritime environment, “the next Chief of Naval Operations must strive to find new ways to capitalize on allied capabilities to succeed at sea.” A few weeks later, Hamas’ attack on Israel set the scenario for what has now become one of the most serious maritime crises in decades, further highlighting the need to capitalize on allied naval capabilities to build a more credible deterrent posture and protect our collective interests at sea.

Over the last six months, the spillover of the conflict’s consequences into the Red Sea region has seen the Yemen-based Ansar Allah (the Houthis) launch an unprecedented campaign of attacks against maritime commercial shipping. The notorious impact of their actions has once again underscored the need to strengthen naval interoperability among allied navies, including the development of high-intensity naval capabilities, as well as the need to deepen naval coordination between the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at a higher level – in a way that the efforts and resources of both can be maximized.

Red Sea Crisis Overview

Since October 2023, Houthi attacks against commercial shipping have greatly deteriorated the security environment in the Red Sea, prompting leading shipping companies like Maersk or CMA CGM to redirect their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope – a decision translating into an increase in costs and transit times. Between October 31st and November 15th, Ansar Allah claimed six missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on Israel’s Eilat, though their weapons lacked the range to strike deep into Israel. They have also sought to disrupt Israeli shipping with UAVs and cruise missiles, and on November 19th, several militants used a helicopter to board and seize an Israeli-owned cargo ship transiting the Red Sea.

With the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023, the collective effort of several nations to deter aggressions has not managed to suppress completely Houthi efforts. The combined naval assets from the US, UK, France, Italy, and Germany have successfully neutralized several threats, managing to shoot down UAVs, intercept missiles, disable small hostile speedboats, and destroy unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). Additionally, at least one unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has been eliminated by these multinational forces.

In spite of these efforts, attacks have not been entirely stopped. Weeks after the launch of Prosperity Guardian, the European Union initiated Operation Aspides in mid-February, its own naval deployment focused on safeguarding maritime traffic in the region. Aspides, however, discarded the option of carrying out attacks against land targets from its inception, limiting it to escorting vessels across the region and providing missile defense when necessary.

The enhanced maritime security presence seeks to deter further attacks by the Houthi rebels in Yemen against commercial vessels transiting vital shipping lanes. It demonstrates a coordinated international commitment to maintaining freedom of navigation and protecting crucial maritime trade routes in the strategic Red Sea area. Altogether, these efforts by allied navies to mitigate the negative consequences of Houthi attacks with their deployments to the Red Sea offer valuable strategic and operational lessons to NATO. From among them, this article aims to focus on the crucial importance of allied maritime interoperability and the need for it to be constantly exercised and properly maintained.

The evident proliferation of enemy firepower over the last years has directly resulted in the growth of hostile sea denial capabilities, including in the increasingly-contested littorals. The Red Sea crisis provides further evidence to the argument that in spite of current revitalization efforts and the desire to strengthen their high-intensity naval capabilities, NATO navies remain under-resourced and under-prepared to meet the existing challenges to their individual and collective interests at sea. Furthering this point are the words of Jérome Henry, commander of the French FREMM Aquitaine, following their forced abandonment of the Red Sea region in April:

“We didn’t necessarily expect this level of threat. There was an uninhibited violence that was quite surprising and very significant. [The Yemenis] do not hesitate to use drones that fly at water level, to explode them on commercial ships, and to fire ballistic missiles.”

Allied Interoperability in an Increasingly Contested Maritime Environment

NATO defines interoperability as “the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.” In the naval realm, one of the main obstacles often underscored in this regard are the different types of warships, command and control (C2) systems, weapons systems, etc., which complicate the integration efforts. Yet, as the Alliance itself suggests, “interoperability does not necessarily require common military equipment. What is important is that equipment can share common facilities and is able to interact, connect and communicate, exchange data and services with other equipment.”

The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) introduces a prominent concept in terms of interoperability: “Integrated Deterrence.” This approach involves combining various capabilities (economic, diplomatic, military, among others) to persuade adversaries of the high costs that any aggression against the United States or its allies would entail. It reflects a national security perspective that increasingly considers factors beyond the purely defensive realm. It encompasses several aspects: multi-domain integration, multi-regional integration, full-spectrum integration, inter-agency integration, and most importantly, allied integration. But more importantly, it also promotes collaboration and coordination with allies in areas such as investments, capability development, and technological and economic strategies, among others, to strengthen deterrence and collective defense capabilities.

Houthi attacks have proven to be manageable by allied navies, with the U.S., France, Italy, and the UK successfully intercepting a high number of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) – a first in naval history – and kamikaze UAVs. The performance of these ships’ crews, some of which have had to endure extended deployments away from home in their commitment to protecting freedom of navigation, has been commendable. Nevertheless, such performances have also shown that many of the current and near-future challenges to NATO’s maritime posture demand a collective response in order to be properly addressed; and they cannot be managed only by a small number of members.

Crisis management operations have been one of the central commitments of allied navies for almost two decades, and one of the pillars of the Allied Maritime Strategy. On certain occasions, these operations have revealed shortfalls in participating navies’ capabilities and preparedness. For example, NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 “quickly revealed mismatches and critical capability shortfalls in the alliance.” Throughout the duration of Operation Unified Protector, “it became clear that only the US possessed the capability to execute a fully-fledged SEAD/DEAD (suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses) campaign,” underlines Sebastian Bruns.

Unlike 2011, though, NATO has not formally launched an operation in the Red Sea, with the U.S. deciding to launch Operation Prosperity Guardian under the auspices of the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Task Force 153 instead. Still, the failure to deter the Yemen-based terrorists from attacking merchant vessels in the vicinity of Bab El-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea has shown the U.S. cannot (and it should not) do it alone.

The nature of modern threats, including the use of ASBMs for the first time in history, the resurgence of Somali piracy in the Horn of Africa, and the significant proliferation of enemy firepower have reminded NATO navies that the existing challenges in and around the Alliance’s maritime neighborhood will demand closer cooperation among its naval services to properly manage the mix of high-intensity and low-intensity naval tasks to be carried out. To succeed in doing so, the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) stand out as a valuable tool with the potential to allow for important developments.

Strengthening Allied Interoperability at Sea

Current NATO naval exercises, including the ongoing Steadfast Defender 24, offer additional opportunities to strengthen ties in naval warfare-related tasks, but interoperability needs to be trained and developed on a more regular basis and at a deeper level. Aside from the current deployments to the Red Sea, where several NATO navies are operating simultaneously, other potential avenues for doing so include the deployment of NATO warships in U.S. deployments –especially with its CSGs– and the SNMGs.

To maintain credible deterrence, allied navies must modernize their naval capabilities, especially in areas such as air and missile defense, electronic and cyber combat systems, and sea-based force projection capabilities. Such modernization must be done in close coordination among allies to maximize interoperability, addressing common shortfalls such as the inability to reload at sea (a problem which, as previously mentioned, recently forced French FREMM Aquitaine to abandon the region after running out of munitions). It is crucial that NATO and its allies work to develop updated joint naval doctrine and tactics to meet emerging threats in the littoral environment. This includes the integration of swarm capabilities, missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and information operations, among others. A robust joint doctrine would lay the foundation for true naval interoperability. Something resemblant to the Cold War days’ Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRKFLTLANT) to develop it and provide a forum where allied navies can regularly exercise their high-end naval warfare should also be considered.

In a 2019 Proceedings article titled “Rebuild Allied Maritime Interoperability”, its authors provided a number of reasons for which NATO must focus its efforts in strengthening naval interoperability, focusing on the role that the U.S. Navy can play in leading such efforts. In their view, “for the U.S. Navy, including allied ships enables it to close gaps between U.S. and NATO tactics, techniques, and procedures and to adapt a firmly U.S.-oriented battle rhythm to NATO standards and platforms.” The deployment of both the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier groups to the Gulf of Aden and the eastern Mediterranean, would have been a great opportunity for doing so.

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are another important instrument with which to develop and exercise naval interoperability. Yet, much of their potential remains untapped, pending an update that moves them from their post-Cold War structure and missions towards a stronger emphasis on high-intensity naval warfare. SNMGs’ deployments over the past decades have been a good instrument to maintain a certain level of interoperability, but the scope of their missions has been limited to activities in the lower-end of the intensity spectrum. Moreover, their size shrank notably during the two decades following the end of the Cold War, leaving them with “sluggish participation rates” that are insufficient for the current strategic challenges that NATO is now facing at sea. As  CNA analyst Joshua Tallis has argued on more than one occasion:

“In this time of high tension, very few combatants are attached to the alliance’s two major standing naval groups. As of mid-December, three combatants formed Group One […] Only two combatants comprised the Group Two. This is not an overwhelming force presence […] Rather, it is a shadow of the alliance’s historic approach to maritime security.” 

Operation Prosperity Guardian has effectively demonstrated that NATO navies are no longer able to deter their adversaries as they did back in the 1990s and early 2000s. Nor would an operation as Desert Storm be feasible today given the current state of NATO air and naval assets. Therefore, lessons from the Red Sea provide a helpful lens to re-examine the current missions and structure of the SNMGs, suggesting a much-needed structural shift to reduce their focus on low-intensity and constabulary missions and enhance the development of high-intensity naval capabilities while seeking a higher number of ships available to be deployed.

As part of that shift, the challenges associated with operating in a contested littoral environment, as is the Red Sea at this moment, have also brought back timely lessons on littoral warfare. According to US Naval War College professor Milan Vego, “a blue-water navy now faces much greater and more-diverse threats in the littorals than in the past. This is especially the case in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf.” Even in the absence of a submarine threat that requires ship crews to devote part of their efforts and assets towards anti-submarine warfare (ASW), allowing them to focus almost exclusively on anti-air warfare, Red Sea operations indicate future littoral warfare campaigns will become increasingly demanding.

As ascertained by Jennifer Parker and Royal Australian Navy’s Vice Admiral Peter Jones, “littoral operations not only demand a prominent level of Combined and Joint interoperability, but also stress the need for an integrated approach to operations.” The likely potential for swarm attacks with both UAVs and USVs (the latter featuring in the Black Sea) has made the littoral an even more contested space, and demands stronger efforts to adapt the SNMGs so that NATO navies can be able to manage such kinds of threats in the near future. Although in the case of the Red Sea they have mostly come as UAV attacks that allow for their effective destruction, there have been several instances in which warships have had to rely on their Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) to down the drones. It is worth asking, then, what would happen should these mishaps take place when facing a combined swarm attack of UAVs and USVs that overwhelms the ship’s defenses. It is also worth asking whether the SNMGs would be in a position to fight off an attack of such characteristics.

Moving Forward

In short, the Red Sea crisis has reminded the world once again about the importance of maritime commercial connectivity for the global economy. It has, together with the ongoing naval war in the Black Sea, reminded NATO navies that the challenges of this “maritime century” will require bigger and stronger navies, capable of deploying together and addressing threats against them in a joint fashion, including in the highly contested littorals.

Moving forward, Houthi rebel attacks on commercial shipping traffic in the Red Sea are bound to intensify as part of the Iranian response to the Israeli attack on Damascus. The crisis in the Red Sea could escalate, further affecting crucial maritime trade routes and jeopardizing freedom of navigation in the region. In this regard, the relationship between the EU and NATO has been the subject of debate in Europe, especially with regard to the development of the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and its cooperation with NATO.

Integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches should be a common goal for NATO allies. We must work together in the Red Sea, with both operations from the EU and NATO, to increase our interoperability and build a truly integrated deterrent. This will require the EU’s soft power influence, but above all, it will require NATO to develop more robust high-intensity naval warfare capabilities, working closely together with the SNMGs (although something resemblant to STRKFLTLANT should also be seriously considered).

At a time when multiple sources of instability with the potential to escalate combine with other low-intensity but still demanding challenges, NATO must strive to build up its deterrent posture and leverage the naval capabilities currently available under a collective effort. For such purposes, allied naval interoperability must be thoroughly exercised and evaluated. If properly assessed and examined, all lessons drawn from naval actions in the Red Sea will provide valuable input on how to readapt NATO’s naval forces for a renewed era of great power competition and to better cope with the threats present in the Alliance’s maritime backyard.

CDR Augusto Conte is a submarine and electronic warfare officer serving as a senior analyst with the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. He has served as Commanding Officer of the Patrol Vessel Formentor, Executive Officer of the Galerna-class submarine S-72 Siroco, and as Deputy Director of the Navy Submarine School.

Gonzalo Vázquez is a junior analyst with the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought.

Featured image: The guided-missile destroyer USS Mason sails alongside the Japanese destroyer Akebono in the Gulf of Aden, Nov. 25, 2023. The USS Mason is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the Middle East. (Image credit: Petty Officer 3rd Class Samantha Alaman.)

Red Sea Topic Week

Panda Express: A Proposed Convoy Operation in the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Clay Robinson

It was a sunny morning with calm seas on March 6, 2024, a fine day for sailing the tranquil waters of the Gulf of Aden. The crew of M/V True Confidence, however, were on edge: less than 10 hours before, their ship had come under attack from a Houthi-launched Iranian missile. Through sheer luck, the missile missed its intended target, and the ship continued its westerly journey bound for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At 11:34 AM, the crew’s luck ran out: another Houthi missile ripped through the deck house, exploding in a massive fire ball that set the bridge ablaze.1 Two innocent civilian mariners were killed and four more critically injured. The captain ordered the fifteen surviving crew to abandon ship, leaving it adrift and in flames, yet another victim of the Houthis’ senseless and indiscriminate violence. 

Red Sea Fast Pass: Chinese Opportunism

Even as the tumultuous situation in the Red Sea takes ever more deadly and dangerous turns, China continues to sit idly by and reap the economic and diplomatic benefits thanks to the Houthis’ Iranian patronage and their own calculated self-interest. While much of the world’s shipping has been forced to take longer and more expensive routes to avoid Houthi missiles in the Red Sea, Chinese shipping continued virtually undisturbed, protected as it were under a modern day “non-aggression pact” between China and Houthi forces.2 However, just a few days after the Houthis granted this assurance to China that their ships would not be targeted in exchange for political support, on March 23, 2024, a Houthi missile struck the Chinese-owned M/V Huang Pu.3 Houthi spokesmen were unusually tight-lipped4 after this attack, likely the result of severe chastisement behind the scenes by both China and Iran, and will take extra efforts to avoid targeting Chinese shipping in the future.

It is not clear yet whether this Houthi attack should be attributed to an administrative oversight, missing that M/V Huang Pu’s ownership had recently transferred to China. Or perhaps the Houthis were targeting another vessel nearby. Either way, the safest place to transit the Red Sea is now onboard Chinese-owned ships.

The combination of the Houthi’s public agreement with China to not target their shipping and the likely private reprimand after striking the M/V Huang Pu sets up a scenario whereby Chinese shipping will be getting a free pass through the Red Sea. That provides China a significant competitive advantage at the precise moment its economy is starting to falter. There is a way, however, to both remove that advantage and force China to abide by its international obligations.

The time has come to exact a cost on this unbridled Chinese opportunism.

Panda Express: A Proposed Convoy Operation

The idea is simple: vulnerable multinational commercial vessels would closely shadow Chinese ships as they transit safely past Houthi missile launchers in a convoy-type operation. The Houthis, knowing their targeting is lacking, would refrain from shooting lest they accidentally hit a Chinese ship and anger both Beijing and Tehran. The U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces or the European Union Naval Forces’ Operation Aspides are the most obvious candidates to organize such a convoy – nicknamed Panda Express – but arguably it could be self-organizing or organized under an alternative multinational coalition. The shipping industry could institute a loosely organized program to surreptitiously appropriate passive escort of commercial vessels by Chinese vessels sharing the same shipping lanes. In short, these vessels will shadow Chinese vessels at a safe but proximate distance such as to keep the Chinese vessel between them and the direction of the Houthi missile threat. A limited handful of multinational commercial vessels will transit under the shield of the security that each of the Chinese vessels enjoy, taking advantage of a reliable and predictable, yet passive escort courtesy of China.

The current situation (Figure 1) consists of multinational commercial vessels transiting independently under the impressive but less-than-omnipresent protection of the multinational warships participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides. These warships endeavor to intercept Houthi missiles and attack drones targeting commercial shipping.

Figure 1: Status quo of Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Author graphic)

A brief vignette will serve as an example of what Panda Express might accomplish. Prior to a southbound transit of the Red Sea, a multinational commercial vessel will loiter temporarily at the southern end of the Suez Canal, awaiting the passage of another southbound Chinese vessel. This will occur ostensibly every few hours as an average of over five Chinese vessels transit the Suez Canal per day.5 The multinational vessel will then take station on the starboard quarter of the Chinese vessel at a safe distance, but in close proximity such that a sort of passive, perhaps even unwitting, screen of the vessel by the Chinese vessel will occur (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Panda Express concept. (Author graphic)

Some might argue that Panda Express would put innocent civilian mariners at risk by shadowing Chinese merchant vessels, and from a practical standpoint, that threat would exist. But therein lies its value as a deterrent because the Houthis have already stated that they will not attack Chinese shipping. As the two vessels reach the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, air defense vessels of Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides can provide a more robust ability to detect and engage any Houthi missile that might be close enough to discern the multinational vessels from the Chinese one. Once through the western reaches of the Gulf of Aden and outside the threat area, the vessel can once again resume navigating independently.

Panda Express leverages opportunities fomented by China for both a protective and influence advantage. This concept is not an evaluation of the technical aspects of a possible tactical advantage on a notional battlefield. Assessments would need to be made about just how close these vessels would have to transit near their Chinese escorts to achieve sufficiently low levels of probability hit (PH) or probability of kill (PK) for inbound Houthi missiles. Similarly, there would be limits to how many vessels could safely transit in company with each Chinese vessel. This concept is rather about taking advantage of the deterrent value of the present situation and using it as a way to exact diplomatic costs on China for sticking to its opportunistic agenda in the Middle East. This is a way to erode China’s economic and diplomatic advantages by highlighting China’s malign opportunism and providing safe passage through the Red Sea. Panda Express is a low cost, legal, and pragmatic way to compete with China.

What will Panda Express accomplish? This escort tactic would begin to serve as a strategic deterrent against Houthi attacks in three ways. First and foremost, the risk of the Houthis accidentally hitting a Chinese vessel while targeting other vessels one would be too great, and it would deter attacks on any ships traveling in close company with Chinese ships. Additionally, Panda Express could reduce the strain on the contingent of warships supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides that are spread very thin by helping to better position these assets in order to more efficiently focus their layered defense on the places where they can be most effective. Lastly, diplomatically, China could be held accountable for malign hedging behavior and an opportunistic silent partnership with Iran. Panda Express could drive China to increase pressure on Iran to rein in all Houthi attacks, not just prevent attacks on Chinese vessels.

How long could Panda Express be sustained? There are risks to be sure, but most are worth accepting. China might stop sending its ships through the Red Sea, but this is extremely unlikely. The Suez Canal and Red Sea serve as the primary route for China’s westward shipments of goods, including around 60% of its exports to Europe, representing one-tenth of the Suez Canal’s annual traffic.6 China cannot afford to avoid the Red Sea route altogether.

The maritime shipping industry can determine that the cost of loitering at the entrances to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to wait for Chinese escort are too high. Yes, loitering temporarily for a few hours costs some money, but it is also likely to be far less than transiting around the Capes of Africa.

All this cat and mouse activity on the high seas might lead to collisions between vessels, but these are professional mariners with years of experience plying these waters. They can handle it. And, if Chinese ships were to be instructed to somehow attempt to disrupt this passive escort program, it will only cost them more in time and money.

China: A Silent Partner in the Axis of Insecurity

Is Panda Express worth it? Some points to consider: Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed they hold very little sway over Iran, and by extension the Houthis; however, several key factors seem to indicate otherwise, and China’s opportunistic fingerprints are all over the Red Sea crisis. China asked Iran to rein in the Houthis.7 China is not alone in asking Houthis to cease the attacks.8 Yet, the Houthis publicly stated only Chinese and Russian ships have a free pass.9

China knows its ships are safe, too. Despite having a significant naval presence in the region, China has kept its Naval Escort Task Force (NETF) out of the Red Sea, choosing instead to loiter in the safer waters of the eastern Gulf of Aden. In late February, the Chinese Defense Ministry denied the 46th NETF deployment is related to the Red Sea crisis and reiterated that it is a “regular escort operation.”10 That none of these NETF vessels are needed in the Red Sea to ensure the safe passage of Chinese shipping is proof China knows its vessels are exempt from Houthi attack.

China does indeed have influence over Iran and, by extension, the Houthis in what has now become an “Axis of Insecurity.” Panda Express would reduce the likelihood of new attacks like that on M/V True Confidence and M/V Huang Pu and put direct pressure on China to either explain to the court of international opinion why shadowing Chinese vessels is a safe tactic, or influence Iran and the Houthis to end their aggression in the Red Sea altogether. Either way, China loses, and the rest of the world wins. It’s time to order Panda Express.

Commander Clay Robinson is a retired surface warfare officer and antiterrorism/force protection specialist. He has worked for the U.S. Department of Defense since 2017 as a strategic planning specialist and is currently an Adjunct History Instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College. He served on board the USS Russell (DDG-59), USS Laboon (DDG-58), and USS Nitze (DDG-94), and commanded Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron One (MCAS-1).

Endnotes

1. Jonathan Saul, “Ship evacuated after first civilian fatalities in Houthis’ Red Sea attacks,” Reuters, March 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07/.

2. Sam Dagher and Mohammed Hatem, “Yemen’s Houthis Tell China, Russia Their Ships Won’t Be Targeted,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/china-russia-reach-agreement-with-yemen-s-houthis-on-red-sea-ships

3. Luther Ray Abel, “Chinese Tanker Struck by Houthi Missile,” National Review, March 24, 2024, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/chinese-tanker-struck-by-houthi-missile/

4. Heather Mongilio, “Chinese Tanker Hit with Houthi Missile in the Red Sea,” USNI New, March 24, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/03/24/chinese-tanker-hit-with-houthi-missile-in-the-red-sea

5. “Suez Canal Blocking Could Hike Freight Fees between China and Europe If Not Cleared Soon: Analyst,” Global Times, March 24, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219372.shtml.

6. Amr Salah Mohamed, “China’s growing maritime presence in Egypt’s ports and the Suez Canal,” Middle East Institute, November 3, 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-growing-maritime-presence-egypts-ports-and-suez-canal.

7. Parisa Hafezi and Andrew Hayley, “Exclusive: China presses Iran to rein in Houthi attacks in Red Sea, sources say,” Reuters, January 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/china-presses-iran-rein-houthi-attacks-red-sea-sources-say-2024-01-26/.

8. Burak Bir, “24 countries condemn Houthi attacks in Red Sea,” Anadolu Agency (AA), January 24, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/24-countries-condemn-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea/3117236.

9. “China and Russia Get a Free Pass Through Houthis’ Red Sea Blockade,” The Maritime Executive, January 23, 2024,

https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-and-russia-get-a-free-pass-through-houthis-red-sea-blockade.

10. Zhao Ziwen, “Why China’s Red Sea diplomatic mission is unlikely to stop Houthi shipping attacks,” South China Morning Post, March 4, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253641/why-chinas-red-sea-diplomatic-mission-unlikely-stop-houthi-shipping-attacks.

Featured Image: Photo of the MV True Confidence after it was struck by a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the western Gulf of Aden, March 6, 2024. (Photo courtesy U.S. Central Command)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.