Not surprisingly, Beijing broke its 2018 agreement with the Vatican and is taking steps to ensure Chinese Communism as the one and only religion in China, and the Chinese Communist Party as its one and only church and clergy.
Two years ago, this author on CIMSEC forewarned of a fracturing Vatican-Beijing deal. On September 21, 2018, to the surprise of many, Pope Francis signed a confidential agreement giving Beijing effective control over who chooses church leaders inside China. The faithful, particularly the 12 million Catholics within China, largely viewed the settlement as a risky proposition based on a flawed understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many believed then that the ill-advised accord would be yet another episode of Beijing making hollow promises to buy more time and space to strengthen its positions and weaken the Church’s positions for future political advantages and eventual contract defaults.
How right they were. By 2021, China broke the controversial deal despite perfunctorily renewing the agreement the year before. Beijing also steadily deepened and widened its oppressive “sinicization” campaign against the Christian faith (with an estimated 90 million Christians within China) as well as other perceived threats to CCP ideology like Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Falun Gong. Party officials assert that Christianity can only exist in China when it is concordant with Chinese culture, which they define as the incontrovertible doctrine of the CCP. As such, Christianity cannot co-exist in Communist China.
The religious persecution in China presents a spiritual and political dilemma for the Vatican. The question becomes: How should the Holy See respond? With continued willful blindness in the wishful hope of Chinese benevolence or with determined resolve akin to Pope (Saint) John Paul II’s spirited crusade against Soviet Communism? The geostrategic conditions may be right for the latter. Otherwise, Pope Francis risks further alienating persecuted Chinese Catholics and disillusioned Catholics at large; exacerbating the growing perception of his acquiescence to Beijing’s national will; and ceding papal moral authority through his silence on human rights in China.
Fractured Deal (Contract Defaults)
Having secured the Vatican’s unwitting assistance in weakening the Chinese Catholic Church (largely driven underground), CCP Chairman Xi Jinping quietly and incrementally reneged on the commitments. Last November, shortly after speciously renewing the 2018 deal, Beijing issued Order No. 15, comprised of new administrative rules for religious affairs to include a nondescript article for establishing a “Chinese process” for the selection of Catholic bishops in China after May 1, 2021. The new policy makes no proviso for any papal role in the selection process, not even a papal right to approve or veto pontifical appointments in China, a key concession to the Vatican in the 2018 agreement.
The new rules mandate the clergy to “adhere to the principle of independent and self-administered religion in China.” The specific language complies with a longstanding passage in the membership pledge of the so-called Chinese Patriotic Catholic Church (CPCC), which all Chinese clergy are required to sign. In practical terms, they must now be autonomous from the Vatican. The new rules also require that CPCC-aligned clergy support the CCP and promote “social harmony” by which Beijing means conformity with the Party’s thinking. Rule enforcement is assured by a statute directing that those entering religious vocations “be regulated through strict gatekeeping, verification of identity, and registration.” Registration is managed by a national database of certified (vetted) clergy whose ecclesiastical behavior is governed by a rigid social system of rewards and punishments. In other words, the new rules aim to transform Christianity into another political and social apparatus of the CCP.
To date, the Vatican has kept quiet and not publicly commented on Beijing’s duplicity. Dealing with China is a risky game because the CCP does not play by the established rules or social norms. Beijing often makes empty promises to achieve its short-term objectives and buy time and space to set the conditions to realize its long-term goals. Beijing accordingly honors bilateral agreements to the extent that they serve its ends. Beijing has no qualms about breaking its end of a bargain after the other party has fulfilled its obligations.
Flawed Papal Assumptions
The Vatican wrongly assumes that Beijing’s public acknowledgment of pontifical authority matters in Communist China and falsely hopes that the Catholic Church will eventually have greater influence and freedom in church affairs within the authoritarian Chinese state. Church leaders, like many secular contemporaries, still cling to the discredited political theory (flawed policy assumption) that China’s economic rise and concomitant social development will eventually lead to democratic reforms. They simply do not understand the true nature of the CCP and underestimate and underappreciate its foremost priority – the survival of the Party. The CCP will not tolerate anyone or any organization (institution) undermining its ruling legitimacy and authority as evidenced by its unrelenting driveto ensure everyone is loyal to the atheist CCP before anything else.
Church leaders inexplicably still do not acknowledge (or perhaps conveniently ignore) the philosophical dichotomy between Catholic and CCP doctrines. The authoritative role of the Church as both a religious and temporal power providing spiritual guidance to the masses will always challenge Beijing’s authoritative rule that holds there is a natural harmony of universal order. In effect, conflict exists over who should be responsible for developing humanity in China, underscored by CCP officials stating that “Christianity does not belong in China.”
All in all, Beijing believes that Chinese Communism is the one and only true religion in China, and the CCP is its one and only church and clergy. For the Party, all religious issues have a bearing on “social harmony, ethnic solidarity, and national security” and therefore all religions within China must adapt themselves to the socialist society and by extension to the CCP doctrine. The “sinicization” of religions is part of a larger effort to reinforce the “CCP’s control over all aspects of Chinese life to include religious faith, culture, and public discourse.” Those deemed threatening to the Chinese state are sent to “political sessions” for reprogramming as part of the CCP’s crackdown on unsanctioned religious activity.
Papal Considerations
The geostrategic conditions may be right for a more assertive Vatican. The international community is wary and resentful of China’s complicity in the global coronavirus pandemic, and therefore, more attentive to the genocide of the Uyghurs, suppression of Hong Kong, intimidation of Taiwan, predatory loan practices (Belt Road Initiative), opportunistic vaccine diplomacy, and aggression in the South China Sea.
Moving forward, the Vatican would be prudent to consider the following 10 measures to impose costs and deny benefits to Beijing for violating the conditions and principles of the 2018 agreement. Otherwise, inaction risks rewarding bad behavior and encouraging more bad behavior.
Publicly call out Beijing for its broken promises. Take and hold the information high ground by dictating the strategic narrative, seizing the strategic initiative, and exercising strategic clarity. Respond strongly, unambiguously, and credibly to the expected Chinese backlash of diplomatic, media, and information operations activities. Prepare for potential Chinese overreactions like a nationwide crackdown of the Catholic faith in China (more closure of churches, increased imprisonment of clergy, formal ban on worship, etc.). Highlight the damaging overreach to underscore the CCP as a repressive state that persecutes all perceived threats to its authoritarian rule. Undermine the carefully cultivated Chinese image (brand name) as a benevolent global power that respects human rights. Underscore the blatant hypocrisy.
Accept responsibility for the ill-advised deal and take steps to regain the trust and confidence of the many disillusioned faithful. Be again that “shining city upon the hill” – the undisputed spiritual authority and moral compass for the 1.2 billion Catholics across the globe. Take to heart the proverb “evil triumphs when good men do nothing.”
Apply pressure asymmetrically to keep Beijing off-balanced. Expand diplomatic ties with Taiwan and encourage more diplomatic recognition from the other countries. Give more economic aid to developing countries to promote good governance and increase their resiliency and resistance to Chinese malign influence. Expect and prepare for Chinese asymmetric counter-pressures across the diplomatic and economic realms. Strengthen cybersecurity posture and take active measures to counter likely cyber-espionage of diplomatic communications and cyber-attacks on infrastructure and financial systems.
Take counsel from informed strategic thinkers like retired Cardinal Joseph Zen, the much-respected former archbishop of Hong Kong who intimately understands the true nature of the CCP and has fearlessly challenged them for decades. Identify, develop, and empower the next Cardinal Zen(s). Do not select (propose) candidates based on Beijing’s preference or political expediency. Rather, select bold and resolute spiritual leaders that will guide and shepherd the flocks within China and the greater Indo-Pacific.
Use the papal pulpit for strategic communications. Beijing will employ public diplomacy, media, social media, and information operations (United Front) to control the narratives. Reciprocate in kind but maintain the moral high ground. Be clear, resolute, and consistent in public and private statements. Do not make statements that send the wrong strategic signal to Beijing. Avoid defeatist statements like the “Church has no positive contribution to make in Hong Kong.”
Follow in Pope John Paul II’s footsteps and launch a “global revolution of the spirit” to actively confront Chinese Communism. Partner with political, economic, and social leaders and organizations to persuade, and when necessary, compel China to become a responsible and contributing stakeholder in the international community. One promising collaborative opportunity may be Washington’s growing campaign to counter Beijing by highlighting its blatant violations of democratic rights. U.S. President Biden can frame the geopolitical contest as a confrontation of democratic values, while Pope Francis can frame the socio-theological contest as a confrontation of moral values. Both leaders and their allies and partners can and should stand up against this “model of authoritarian repression that China seeks to impose on the rest of the world.”
Conduct a papal tour of and periodic visits to Asian countries with large Catholic populations (China, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, and India). Exhort regional governments, rally the faithful, and marshal a consensus of like-minded state and non-state actors to dissuade China from trying to change the global status quo and undermine the rules-based liberal international order that has provided global security and prosperity for over 70 years.
Form a religious coalition (communion) of persecuted faiths in China. Unify collective actions to highlight the many Chinese human rights violations. Initiate and sustain a global “name and shame” campaign against Beijing and any state and non-state actors that support and enable China’s bad behavior.
Be wary of Chinese “sharp power” to infiltrate and undermine Vatican politics, while furtively promoting a positive image of China and misrepresenting or manipulating information to engender favorable policy outcomes from the Holy See.
Be wary of future Chinese settlement offer(s). Do not rush again into negotiations or settle too early. Vatican negotiators would be well-served to heed Chinese promises privately made across the negotiating table and assurances publicly given in the open press. Beijing often gives expedient guarantees during negotiations but rarely offers much that is substantive and enduring in the end. Signing an agreement is merely the start of the real negotiationsfor the Chinese. Demand transparency (full public disclosure). Publish the entire signed agreement, not just the summary as Beijing has insisted in the past. Be mindful of the adage “fool me once, shame on you…fool me twice, shame on me.”
At the end of the day, Beijing does not seek win-win, they seek win-lose; and when it comes to the battle for the heart and soul of the Chinese people, there can only be one winner – the CCP.
Tuan Pham is a widely published strategic thinker and strategist with over 20 years of experience in the Indo-Pacific. The views expressed here are personal and do not reflect any positions other than his own.
Featured Image: A worshipers waves the flag of China as Pope Francis leaves following the weekly general audience at St. Peter’s square in the Vatican in June. (Photo AFP)
Navy Doctrine on Planning for Maritime Security Operations is Inadequate
“Military planning is essential to everything that naval forces do.”1 If the Navy intends to successfully conduct maritime security operations (MSOs), it needs to be able to effectively plan for them. That planning is particularly essential at the operational level—namely, the level of command linking tactical missions with national strategic guidance.2 Navy planning is conducted in accordance with doctrine, specifically the Navy Planning Process (NPP). This section, after discussing foundational issues such as the nature of operations in the maritime security realm, summarizes the NPP and identifies inadequacies in the particular component of the process most impacted by planning for maritime security missions: mission analysis, as informed by staff estimates.
1. The need for operational-level thinking and planning for MSOs
A tactical action or mission is one aimed at accomplishing a single major or minor tactical objective.3 An example of a tactical maritime security mission is carrying a law enforcement official from a partner nation aboard a U.S. warship on a single occasion to provide that official a means of enforcing his nation’s fisheries laws. Such a mission is individually useful to the United States in promoting a stable rules-based order at sea and in establishing itself as the “partner of choice” for that nation in an era of great power competition at sea. It is episodically useful to that partner nation as well in deterring or interdicting violators of its fisheries laws, therefore helping to preserve an important natural resource and source of national income, which enhances its stability.
The effect of such a mission is dramatically enhanced if it is conducted as part of a major operation or campaign as opposed to a one-off, “whack-a-mole” activity. Performing this activity as part of a campaign or major operation leads to concerted activities that are “proactive and anticipatory rather than simply reactive, and are issue-centered rather than incident-centered.”4 Both Till and Vego teach us that “operational warfare at sea is the only means of orchestrating and tying together naval tactical actions within a larger design that directly contributes to the objectives decided by strategy.”5 Vego brings this maxim into the maritime security realm, opining that operational-level thinking and concepts “are absolutely necessary for the most effective use of one’s combat forces not only in a high-intensity conventional war but also in operations short of war.”6 The need for operational-level thinking and planning holds true for lower-threshold MSOs as well.
2. How the U.S. Navy conducts operational-level planning
“The characteristics of today’s complex global environment have created the conditions where the U.S. Navy must be prepared for a wide range of dynamic situations;” furthermore, “the nature of modern naval operations—which must span from open ocean to deep inland—interlinks continuously with other services, countries, and means of national power, and it often places the lowest tactical commander in critical strategic roles, necessitating that a thorough planning process be used.”7 For these reasons and more, the Navy has created a formalized planning process, the NPP, that is optimized for planning at the operational level.8 The NPP is designed to ensure that the employment of forces is linked to objectives, and integrates naval operations with the actions of the joint force. Accordingly, the terminology, products, and concepts in the NPP are consistent with joint planning, joint doctrine, and are compatible with other services’ doctrine.9
To accomplish its purpose, the NPP establishes sequential, iterative procedures to, in turn, progressively analyze higher headquarters tasking(s); to craft a mission statement; to develop and analyze courses of action (COAs) against projected adversary COAs (in some cases adversaries could be forces of nature or other emerging non-military threats); to compare friendly COAs against the commander’s criteria and each other; to recommend a COA for decision; to refine the concept of operation; to prepare a plan or operation order (OPORD); and to transition the plan or order to subordinates tasked with its execution. The NPP organizes these procedures into six steps, shown in Figure 2 below, which provide commanders and their staffs a means to organize planning activities, transmit plans to subordinates, and share a critical common understanding of the mission. The result of the NPP is a military decision that can be translated into a directive such as an operation plan (OPLAN) or OPORD.10
Figure 2 – NPP depiction in NWP 5-01, 1-4
Military planning through utilization of the NPP is not a scientific or mechanistic process, but instead employs aspects of both science and art. The science involves such tangible aspects as disposition and number of ships, aircraft, weapons, supplies, and consumption rates, as well as the interplay of operational factors, such as time and space, that affect employment of the naval force. The art of military planning, on the other hand, is more conceptual. Operational art is defined as the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risk.11 Through the application of operational art, the commander and staff identify the objectives and outline the broad concept of operations (CONOPS).
Dealing with the Unique Aspects of MSOs in the NPP
1. The unique aspects of MSOs
MSOs lie at the uncomfortable nexus between maritime law enforcement and naval warfare.12 According to Professor Till, operational art is not optimally employed to plan for the activities the world’s navies are actually having to conduct on a day-to-day basis, such as campaigns against piracy, narcotics or human smuggling and terrorism, patrols against human smuggling, or fishery protection.13 The reason for this, Professor Vego informs us, is that “[a]pplication of operational art in operations short of war is much more complicated than in high-intensity conventional war” due to a highly diverse and unpredictable operational environment, the dominant role of nonmilitary “force” factors in determining objectives, and human “space” predominating over geography.14 And, as we have seen, Professor Luke recognizes such a significant difference between MSOs and combat at sea that he felt the need to propose an entirely new theoretical paradigm, that of legitimacy, to reflect the unique “fundamentals and tenets that distinguish peacetime activities from warfare.”15 These unique fundamentals and tenets (which will be referred to as “factors” or “aspects”) include, as we have already seen, a “broad and growing array of legal regimes, treaties, and sources of authority that need to be fully appreciated, understood, and leveraged for success.”16
Figure 3 – Luke’s regime of authority for action perspective
This understanding of the fundamental uniqueness of MSOs is not solely the province of theorists; it is recognized in doctrine as well. Specifically, Appendix A of the NPP—the only section of the NPP that directly addresses maritime security operations—refers to the “many facets” of maritime security, and states that “each maritime security activity is unique.”17 As the following discussion will show, this doctrinal assertion is not complemented by guidance to planners on how to account for and accommodate the unique aspects of MSOs that are so critical for operational success.
2. Where those unique aspects are best dealt with in the NPP
The unique aspects of MSOs are best dealt with in the mission analysis phase of the planning process, as informed by relevant staff estimates. Mission analysis, as the first step of the NPP, is “the foundation for the entire planning process.”18 When performed correctly, it provides the who, what, when, where, and why for the planning staff, and makes the development of the how possible. A non-exclusive list of topics an effective mission analysis should address includes:
The tasks the command must complete for the mission to be accomplished;
The purpose of the mission and tasks assigned;
The limitations that have been placed on our own forces’ actions;
The forces/assets available to support the operation;
Additional assets required to support the operation;
Gaps of knowledge that inhibit planning; and
The various risks.19
Mission analysis leads to the delivery of a briefing to the commander and subsequent commander’s planning guidance. The briefing ensures the commander and staff have a common understanding of the overall situation, mission, intent, and planning guidance that facilitates COA development (the how).
The more unique, ill-defined, and unfamiliar the situation being analyzed, the greater the need to more closely examine the problem before or in conjunction with mission analysis.20 This close examination is accomplished by means of staff estimates. An estimate is a detailed evaluation of how factors in a staff section’s functional area or subordinate commander’s warfare area potentially impact the operation or mission.21 The estimate consists of significant facts, events, and conclusions based on analyzed data.22 Staff estimates provide a current status and an assessment of the ability of the command to meet the requirements of the assigned mission while identifying shortfalls and potential issues, as well as strengths and advantages. Every functional staff area has a responsibility to create and maintain a staff estimate.23 Types of estimates generated by maritime staffs include but are not limited to: (1) operations estimate; (2) personnel estimate; (3) intelligence estimate; (4) logistics estimate; (5) communications estimate; (6) civil-military operations estimate; (7) information operations estimate; and (8) special staff estimates (e.g., legal, public affairs, medical).24 The legal estimate is especially critical to MSOs.25
3. Existing doctrine related to conducting mission analysis and crafting staff estimates in MSOs is inadequate
Although existing planning doctrine correctly identifies operations short of war as challenging, different, and unique, it does not provide much in the way of guidance to planners on how to deal with these qualities. NPP Appendix A.2.3., while stating that the NPP is “well suited to support all aspects of sea control and power projection,” acknowledges that some “minor accommodations” may have to be made to the NPP when planning MSOs due to the fact that “[m]ost maritime security operations will entail a requirement for cooperation with or subordination to a multinational partner or civil law enforcement body to ensure the process is compatible with the expectations of the partners.” Though Appendix A.2.3. provides some guidance on mechanisms for effecting such cooperation—reciprocal exchange of liaison officers to participate in planning for multinational operations, for example—it is entirely silent on the issues raised by such cooperation, and regarding exactly what “minor accommodations” need to be made to the mission analysis to account for such cooperation. As for the legal estimate, which Appendix A.2.3. identifies as being “especially critical to a maritime security operation” which will “drive the concept development as well as rules of engagement or rules for use of force,” there is no further guidance on what, specifically, should be considered to take into account the unique aspects of MSOs.26
The Stability Operations Manual provides a bit more guidance, though nothing that can be considered holistic or detailed.27 Since MSOs are a subset of stability operations overall, and since both MSOs and stability operations are maritime operations short of war, the manual’s guidance may be of some utility in conducting the mission analysis for MSOs. The manual specifies that issues such as whether involved nations are UNCLOS signatories, the existence of maritime territorial disputes, the identification of “appropriate public and private international maritime laws,” and important cultural and other considerations should all be considered during the mission analysis phase of stability operations.28 Though somewhat of an improvement from the very sparse guidance in the NPP, this list still only exists in anecdotal, not systematic form, and is unclear about why the listed items are important, and what about them should be the subject of mission analysis.
The Constraint-Restraint-Enabler-Imperative (C-R-E-I) Model Introduced and Explained
According to Professor Till, “[d]efective doctrine is quite clearly the high road to defeat [while] effective doctrine is a very significant force multiplier.”29 As this article established earlier, the U.S. Navy will be expected to successfully engage in day-to-day MSOs along the full spectrum of violence including, increasingly, lower-threshold constabulary operations. Such operations are complicated and unique, and need to be effectively planned at the operational level through employment of the NPP and its embedded operational art principles. However, guidance is sparse on exactly how planning for such unique operations is supposed to occur. The C-R-E-I model for crafting appropriate staff estimates as part of the mission analysis is meant to fill this lacuna. While it is impossible to set out a cookie-cutter list of every item that should be considered in the staff estimate for the planning of a maritime security operation, consideration of applicable constraints, restraints, enablers, and imperatives applicable to a particular MSO spans the universe of authority-based considerations that ultimately determine the legitimacy of such operations. The model is discussed below:
Constraints are obligations that prohibit an operation from occurring at all, or prohibit certain activities or outcomes during the course of an operation. Constraints may derive from international obligations a state has chosen to accept, or from domestic sources such as a constitution or legislative enactments. In the United States, a constitutionally-derived constraint is the Fifth Amendment’s admonition that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” which serves as a direct prohibition against gathering evidence against a person through compulsive means such as torture. An example of a legislatively-derived constraint is the Posse Comitatus Act, which (along with derivative instructions and directives) prohibits the armed forces in the Department of Defense from directly engaging in law enforcement operations. As for constraints that derive from the international obligations to which a state chooses to subject itself, examples of relevance in the maritime security realm include the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits a nation from returning an individual to a nation where that individual would face a threat of loss of life or freedom, or of torture; the prohibition in UNCLOS Article 73(3) of criminal prosecution of individuals violating a fisheries law in a state’s EEZ; or the customary international law principle, embodied in UNCLOS Article 92(1), that flag states enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over their ships on the high seas—a principle that conversely constrains all other nations, absent unusual circumstances, from asserting any jurisdiction as a matter of right over a foreign vessel in that maritime zone.
Restraints are factors or conditions that limit the scope or range of permissible activities during a maritime security operation. They derive from the same sources as constraints. An example in the U.S. of a domestically-derived restraint is the reservation of authority within the Coast Guard chain of command, which manifests itself in the requirement that subordinate units must obtain a “statement of no objection” from higher authority before acting in certain circumstances. A restraint that derives both from domestic and international sources is the limitation on the use of force for constabulary purposes to the minimum force reasonable and necessary under the circumstances to accomplish a law enforcement mission. Restraints that derive from the international law of the sea include the limitation embodied in UNCLOS Article 27 on criminal prosecution of vessels and crew engaged in innocent passage, and restrictions on the right of hot pursuit such as the requirement that it be continuous and uninterrupted, and the extinguishment of that right once the pursued vessel enters a foreign territorial sea.
Enablers: Perhaps the most important (in terms of mission success) of the four-part analytical framework for preparing the staff estimate for MSOs are enablers. Enablers promote the successful conduct of a maritime security operation, notwithstanding the challenges imposed by constraints, restraints, and imperatives. Like constraints and restraints (and, as we shall see, imperatives), enablers can derive from international or domestic sources. Examples of enablers at the international level include flag state consent to foreign law enforcement activities aboard a flagged vessel on the high seas, which may be provided on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, or through standing consent memorialized in an international agreement; the declaration by a state of an EEZ, which is a necessary precursor for it to exercise its sovereign rights as set out in UNCLOS Article 56 and to enforce those rights as provided in UNCLOS Article 73; regional agreements that promote cooperative security measures such as the sharing of monitoring, control, and surveillance data or the establishment of regional intelligence fusion centers to combat transnational organized crime; bilateral agreements that enable direct law enforcement support such as the carriage of shipriders from one nation aboard an enforcement vessel of another nation; and extradition treaties to allow interdicted suspects to be repatriated to another nation for prosecution. An example of an enabler with both international and domestic components is adoption by both a flag state and a port state of generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices such as those established by the SOLAS Convention, which enables authorities of the port state to conduct an examination of a foreign vessel in its internal waters to ensure its compliance with these standards. Domestic enablers include the enactment of legislation and regulations that authorize desired maritime activities; the establishment of domestic architecture that permits a law enforcement matter to be taken all the way from detection through prosecution (i.e. to achieve a “legal finish”); and the establishment and utilization of mechanisms to coordinate the activities of various government agencies or ministries to achieve a common, agreed-upon outcome.
Imperatives are obligations that mandate certain activities in the maritime realm. Examples of imperatives with both an international and a domestic component in the maritime realm include the obligation embodied in UNCLOS Article 98 to go to the assistance of persons lost or distressed at sea; the affirmative obligations of the flag state to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters” over ships flying its flag, as detailed in UNCLOS Article 94; the affirmative obligation in UNCLOS Article 61(2) on states to “ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation;” the flag state’s obligation to ensure compliance by flagged vessels with conservation and management measures (CMMs) enacted by regional fisheries management organizations; the affirmative duty to cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic by sea on signatories to the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention; and carrying out any affirmative obligations in UN Security Council resolutions.
Explanations and Caveats
Users of the C-R-E-I Model must avoid unnecessary quibbles about the appropriate characterization of a particular factor of importance to an MSO. For example, reasonable minds may differ as to whether the rule that, “[t]he right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect”30 is a constraint or a restraint. The correct answer is that it does not matter. As long as utilization of the C-R-E-I model forces planners to identify, in a structured manner, the rule set regarding the type of vessels that may be used to engage in hot pursuit (assuming in this hypothetical that this is of significance to the intended MSO), then it has improved mission analysis and therefore the prospect for success of the intended MSO.
While the identification and analysis of applicable constraints, restraints, enablers, and imperatives relating to an intended MSO is a vitally important function, it is only the first step. Such identification and analysis can also be used to shape an MSO by converting undesired constraints, restraints, and imperatives into enablers. For example, a constraint such as prohibition against boarding a foreign vessel on the high seas can turn into an enabler through advance consent by a flag state to the conduct of desired high seas activities in advance of an MSO. The point is that authority-based factors are not static or immutable, and in fact can and should be actively shaped into enablers to promote operational success.
Another point about the model is that it is authority-, not capability-based. Such matters as vessel and crew endurance, vessel speed and other capabilities, transit times, etc., are not unique to MSOs and are not directly addressed by this model. However, proper utilization of the model significantly impacts capabilities-based planning considerations. For example, limitations (constraints or restraints) inherent in the use of force regime applicable to an intended MSO that are exposed during mission analysis should drive commanders to ensure, not only that the crews of vessels that will participate in the MSO are properly and adequately trained, but also that the vessels and crews are properly equipped with the means to lawfully employ force if required. As another example, if mission analysis reveals that a partner nation has a domestic legal requirement (an imperative) that suspects must be brought before a magistrate within 24 hours of interdiction, the operational commander must ensure that assets employed in an intended MSO have the capacity to comply with that requirement, or else the “legal finish” to the operation may be jeopardized.
Finally, as a follow-up to proper training, while this model is conceived for operational-level commanders and planners, mission commanders must also be facile in their ability to identify, understand, and react to relevant constraints, restraints, enablers, and imperatives. This indicates the need for robust professional military education and continued pipeline training for mission commanders and their support personnel. That training and facility should include clear lines of communication from tactical commanders to operational commanders and their staffs. As Advantage at Sea reminds us, “[a]ctivities short of war can achieve strategic-level effects.”31 The consequences of tactical commanders failing to understand constraints, restraints, or imperatives they encounter, or failing to properly exploit enablers, are too dire not to demand facility with the C-R-E-I model at the tactical level as well.
Conclusion
The C-R-E-I model builds upon and endorses Professor Luke’s legitimacy theory for thinking about maritime operations short of war as being the only theoretical model that recognizes the essence of their uniqueness and singularity. It follows his linkage of legitimacy to authority (see Figure 3), but provides granularity to authority-based considerations by parsing them into constraints, restraints, enablers, and imperatives. It also “operationalizes” his theory by providing a concrete model for planners to employ during the stage of the planning process most suited to consideration of the unique features of MSOs: the mission analysis phase of the NPP. Without such a disciplined and systematic approach by planners more accustomed to planning for combat operations at sea, there is the ever-present “danger of warfighters falling back into doctrine designed for combat—‘heavy metal thinking’—in such things as peace operations where such thinking is not appropriate.”32
This failure of planning has numerous potential negative operational consequences, including, but not limited to, legal challenges against aspects of the underlying operation that could impact the “legal finish.” Though admittedly not in the lower-threshold constabulary realm, federal lawsuits brought by aggrieved parties in United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-authorized interdiction actions are indicative of the nature of potential legal challenges across the spectrum of operations short of war. These include Tarros v. United States, in which the plaintiff sought damages related to the “blockage and diversion” of his vessel that occurred pursuant to UNSC. Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), and Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, in which the plaintiff sought damages due to the wrongful death of his fishing vessel’s master and the negligent destruction of his vessel resulting from the rescue of a fishing vessel by U.S.-NATO forces enforcing UNSC Resolutions.33 Though these suits were unsuccessful, other challenges in European and international courts arising from lower-threshold constabulary operations have been successful, and serve as a harbinger of legal consequences that could result in improperly planned MSOs conducted with or on behalf of allies and partners.34
Beyond legal challenges, other potential consequences of improper planning for MSOs include career ramifications throughout the chain of command and ill will or even a diplomatic incident with an ally or partner. All of these potential consequences run counter to Advantage at Sea’s admonition to the Naval Service to “partner, persist, and prevail across the competition continuum,” and could lead to failure to achieve the strategic objective of prevailing in day-to-day competition. Adoption and application of the C-R-E-I model should ensure that thinking and analysis are properly focused on the “fundamentals and tenets that distinguish peacetime activities from warfare,” which will greatly enhance the prospects of success of the MSO being contemplated and, ultimately, of the strategy enunciated in Advantage at Sea.
Capt. (ret.) Andrew Norris works as a maritime legal and regulatory consultant, and has been retained to create and teach a new five-month maritime security and governance course for international officers at the U.S. Naval War College. He retired from the U.S. Coast Guard in 2016 after 22 years of service. Prior to attending law school and joining the Coast Guard, Capt. (ret.) Norris served in the U.S. Navy as a division officer aboard the USS KIDD (DDG-993) from 1985-1989. He can be reached at +1 (401) 871-7482 or [email protected].References
[1] Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01, Navy Planning (Ed. December 2013), 1-1.
[2] Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century: Fourth Edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 159-160.
[3] Milan Vego, “Operations Short of War and Operational Art,” Joint Forces Quarterly 98 (3rd Quarter 2020): 38-49, 43.
[4] Till, Seapower, 458.
[5] Till, Seapower, 162.
[6] Vego, “Operations Short of War,” 38.
[7] NWP 5-01, 1-2.
[8] “Optimized” does not mean “exclusively” – “Through the NPP, a commander can plan for, prepare, and execute operations from the operational through the tactical levels of war.” NWP 5-01, 1-4.
[9] NWP 5-01, 1-5 – 1-6.
[10] NWP 5-01, 1-4.
[11] NWP 5-01, 1-2.
[12] Kraska and Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law, 2.
[13] Till, Seapower, 165.
[14] Vego, “Operations Short of War,” 44. Professor Vego also correctly advises that the process of determining the Desired End State in operations short of war is “far more complex and elusive” than in a high-intensity conventional war. Ibid.
[15] Ivan Luke, “Naval Operations in Peacetime: Not Just “Warfare Lite,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 10-26, 15.
[16] Luke, “Naval Operations in Peacetime,” 11.
[17] NWP 5-01, Appendix A.2.3.
[18] NWP 5-01, 2-1.
[19] NWP 5-01, 2-2.
[20] Ibid.
[21] NWP 5-01, Appendix K-1.
[22] NWP 5-01, App. K.3.1
[23] NWP 5-01, 2.3.3.
[24] NWP 5-01, Appendix K.2.1.
[25] NWP 5-01, Appendix A.2.3.
[26] In fairness, Appendix N of NWP 5-01 does provide some further guidance for the legal estimate generally, but this guidance is generic to all operations and is not focused on the unique aspects of MSOs.
[30] The Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (UNCLOS), Article 111( 5.).
[31] Tri-Service Maritime Strategy “Advantage at Sea,” 17 December 2020, 6.
[32] Till, Seapower, 165.
[33] Tarros v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 997 F. Supp. 2d 307, 308–09 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d, 777 F.3d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2015). These and more are discussed in Brian Wilson, “The Turtle Bay Pivot: : How the United Nations Security Council Is Reshaping Naval Pursuit of Nuclear Proliferators, Rogue States, and Pirates,” Emory International Law Review 33, issue 1 (2018): 1-90.
[34] See Brian Wilson, “Human Rights and Maritime Law Enforcement,” Stanford Journal of International Law 52, no. 2 (July 2016): 243-319.
Featured Image: Maritime Operational Planners Course at the U.S. Naval War College (Credit: www.usnwc.edu)
Chirayu Thakkar joins the program to discuss acceptable solutions and a raft of complications for Mauritius, the UK, India, and U.S. interests in the Chagos archipelago.
From 1923 to 1940, the United States Navy, sometimes in cooperation with other services, conducted 21 large-scale exercises known as Fleet Problems. These exercises were critical in developing tactics and operational concepts, along with the plans for platform development and acquisition crucial to the fleet’s success in the Second World War. Former Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Scott Swift, recognized the important role played by the Fleet Problems in developing and training the fleet and revived them as a core component of fleet level training in 2016.
One of the most noteworthy exercises conducted by the U.S. Navy between the World Wars was Fleet Problem IX. Conducted in January 1929 in the waters off Panama, the primary purpose of the exercise was to evaluate the Panama Canal Zone’s vulnerability to attack from the sea. However, its place in history comes from the demonstration of the offensive potential of the aircraft carrier and airpower delivered from the sea. Yet Fleet Problem IX also demonstrated the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to what are today referred to as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats.
In fact, the nature of the threats to the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers displayed during Fleet Problem IX are all too familiar to modern-day strategists wrestling with the difficult problem of how to cope with the increasingly sophisticated and diverse A2/AD systems fielded by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Western Pacific. The primary difference between 1929 and today is the sophistication and range of the weapon systems themselves, not the broader nature of the threats. Fleet Problem IX serves as an excellent starting point for understanding the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to the A2/AD threat.
A Fleet Problem IX
Fleet Problem IX was a truly massive exercise. Participating units included 67 percent of the aircraft carriers, 72 percent of the battleships, 38 percent of the cruisers, 68 percent of the destroyers, 40 percent of the submarines, and over 52 percent of the Navy’s combat aircraft, including planes from the Marine Corps. U.S. Army ground forces and aviation units participated as well. Fleet Problem IX assigned the Blue Force to defend the Pacific side of the Panama Canal while the Black Force was charged with attacking it.
The difference between Fleet Problem IX and previous exercises was the inclusion of modern large aircraft carriers. Previous exercises had included the small carrier USS Langley along with surface ships acting as stand-ins for carriers, but Fleet Problem IX included the two new and massive carriers USS Lexington and USS Saratoga.
Saratoga served as the centerpiece of the attacking Black Fleet along with nine battleships, a light cruiser, 36 destroyers (plus six constructive), and eight submarines (plus four constructive). To defend the Canal, the defending Blue Force assembled an impressive A2/AD system composed of USS Lexington, four battleships (each representing a division of three ships), five light cruisers, 29 destroyers, and 24 submarines, plus 5000 troops from the Army’s Panama Division, and approximately 50 land-based aircraft of all types and three seaplane tenders with attendant amphibious patrol planes.
Vice Admiral William V. Pratt, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Battle Force and a future CNO, commanded the Black Fleet. The fleet began the operation at Magdalena Bay, Mexico roughly 3,200 miles northwest of Panama. Pratt authorized Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves onboard Saratoga, escorted by the light cruiser USS Omaha, to separate from the main force of battleships and make a high-speed run to the Galapagos Islands, and launch a surprise air attack on the locks of the Panama Canal from the southwest while the main task force made a direct approach from the northwest.
Before 0500 hours on January 26, Saratoga, operating 140 miles offshore, launched an 83-plane strike against the Panama Canal. The rest is written in the lore and mythology of naval history. Shortly before 0700 hours, Saratoga’s aircraft arrived over their targets, surprising the Canal Zone’s sleepy defenders, and executing what would have been a crippling strike on the Canal’s Miraflores and Pedro Miguel Locks and Army facilities at Fort Clayton and Albrook Airfield.
General Fleet movements and dispositions during Fleet Problem IX, January, 1929. Graphic by CIMSEC staff, background map via Google Maps. Click to expand.
The offensive potential of the aircraft carrier was clear. Vice Admiral Pratt statedafter the exercise, “I believe that when we learn more of the possibilities of the carrier, we will come to an acceptance of Admiral Reeves’ plan which provides for a very powerful and mobile force.” The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Mark Wiley said, “No single air operation ever conducted from a floating base speaks so eloquently for the advanced state of development of aviation as an integral part of the Fleet.” Pratt even honored Saratoga and her crew by transferring his flag to the carrier for the return to the United States.1
USS Saratoga (CV-3) at anchor off Panama following Fleet Problem IX, March 9, 1929. (Naval History and Heritage Command photo)
However, while the overall truth of the statements by Admirals Wiley and Pratt is beyond dispute, Fleet Problem IX also displayed the vulnerability of aircraft carriers in addition to the offensive potential of sea-based airpower. This is because while Saratoga’s aircraft did launch a successful attack on the Panama Canal, the Blue defenders’ A2/AD system had its own share of victories.
The Blue Forces scored their first successes on January 25 when Blue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets detected Saratoga and Omaha as they approached the launch point from the direction of the Galapagos Islands. The Blue commander, Vice Admiral Montgomery Taylor, deployed two groups of destroyers to cover the approaches to Panama and at 1613 hours on January 25 the destroyer USS Breck struck paydirt when it found Reeves’ carrier.
Breck was quickly dispatched by USS Omaha and by gunfire from Saratoga herself, but she managed to send a position report. Two hours later the light cruiser USS Detroit found the carrier and her escorting cruiser. While Detroit suffered the same fate as Breck, the Blue defenders were now aware of Saratoga’s location and course and the fact that she was operating independently of the main Black Fleet.
While Saratoga was still able to launch her strike against the Panama Canal the next morning, less than two hours after her planes were in the air, she encountered three battleships from the Blue Fleet. With no aircraft aboard to defend her she was ruled sunk by gunfire. For good measure, shortly afterwards a Blue submarine fired a spread of four torpedoes against Saratoga at 1200 yards and she was declared sunk for the second time in less than an hour.
An hour later, planes from Blue’s carrier, USS Lexington, arrived and attacked as Saratoga was recovering aircraft from the strike against the Panama Canal. The exercise umpires determined she would have at least been badly damaged. Saratoga and her crew were spared a fourth “sinking” when Blue torpedo bombers from VT-9, operating out of the seaplane base at Balboa, attacked their own carrier, Lexington—an easy mistake given that the two sister carriers were only separated by 12 miles at the time.
The U.S. aircraft carriers USS Lexington (CV-2) (top), USS Saratoga (CV-3) (middle), and USS Langley (CV-1) (bottom) moored at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington (USA), in 1929. (Photo via U.S. Navy National Naval Aviation Museum)
Saratoga’s experience with the Blue Force defenders during Fleet Problem IX highlights the dangers of attacking a diverse and layered A2/AD defensive system. No single aspect of Vice Admiral Taylor’s ISR and defensive networks were sufficient, but the varied and multilayered nature of the system he deployed ensured some degree of success. Blue’s reconnaissance aircraft failed to find Saratoga, but Taylor’s scouting destroyers filled the gap and the Blue Fleet’s submarines were on the prowl as well.
After she was detected, it is possible any one of the varied attacks against Saratoga would have failed. Saratoga had a 12-knot speed advantage over the battleships that “sank” her on January 26. Perhaps she could have run from them and it is entirely possible the submarine torpedoes fired at her would have missed. Rear Admiral Reeves himself claimed that in wartime he could have run from Vice Admiral Taylor’s forces and taken the loss of his air group as acceptable casualties in exchange for damaging a strategic target, but peacetime safety requirements necessitated remaining in position to recover his aircraft.
Theoretically, Lexington’s aircraft should not have been able to attack Saratoga because Lexington herself had run afoul of the Black Fleet’s battleships the day before but was only ruled “damaged” by the umpires in order to maintain her participation in the game. However, had Lexington been knocked out of the game on January 25, then VT-9’s torpedo bombers would not have mistaken her for Saratoga and likely would have attacked their intended target instead. The point is the redundant nature of the ISR network and A2/AD system deployed by the Blue Force meant that to get within range of the Panama Canal, Saratoga entered a hornets’ nest of threats where her detection and destruction were highly likely, if not guaranteed.
Lessons for Today
Submarines, surface ships, and land and carrier-based aircraft were all part of a sophisticated A2/AD system assembled by the Blue Fleet during Fleet Problem IX. That each of these capabilities administratively sank or damaged USS Saratoga at different points during Fleet Problem IX demonstrates the value of a multi-faceted and layered A2/AD system for opposing aircraft carriers. It is therefore not surprising that each of these capabilities form components of the A2/AD system that China is developingto oppose the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific should conflict ensue.
China’s PLAN is an increasingly modern and flexible force capable of conducting a wide range of peacetime and wartime operations at expanding distances from the Chinese mainland. With an overall battle force of over 360 ships, including more than 130 major surface combatants and more than 60 submarines, along with its own aviation arm of more than 300 land- and sea-based aircraft of all types, the PLAN is the largest navy in the world. However, it is as an A2/AD force organized, trained, and equipped to oppose U.S. combat operations in East Asia and the Western Pacific that the PLAN is at its most dangerous.
Just as a Blue Fleet submarine claimed USS Saratoga during Fleet Problem IX, PLAN submarines would be at the forefront of any Chinese attempt to deny key operating areas in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy. The PLAN submarine fleet consists of 50 conventionally-powered and six nuclear-powered attack submarines, 44 of which are armed with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), including eight Russian built Kilos armed with the SS-N-27B (120nm range) and 36 Song, Yuan, and Shang-class submarines armed with the 290nm range YJ-18.
It is no accident that a submarine administratively “sank” USS Saratoga during Fleet Problem IX or that the same aircraft carrier was heavily damaged and “mission killed” twice by Japanese submarines in 1942. Submarines have always presented a substantial threat to aircraft carriers, and with sophisticated long-range missiles and patrol patterns reaching out into disputed waters in East Asia and the Indian Ocean, often within range of U.S. assets, PLAN submarines represent a formidable threat to American aircraft carriers today. Combined with the multilayered ISR assets of an A2/AD network, submarines could be cued to launch long-range anti-ship missile salvos from unexpected vectors and at much lower risks to themselves compared to a closer-range torpedo attack.
While surface ships are not normally thought of as a threat to aircraft carriers due to the long reach of the carrier’s air group, that paradigm may be changing. During Fleet Problem IX and during the 1920s in general surface gunfire was a threat to aircraft carriers due to the short range of carrier aircraft and the lightness of their weapons. Even during the Second World War surface ships occasionally caught carriers, such as HMS Glorious, flat-footed. However, today it is the long range of the missiles employed by some surface ships that make them a threat to aircraft carriers, particularly in the opening stages of a conflict before before ships have had a chance to transition from an open deterrence posture to a more evasive wartime operating pattern.
The PLAN currently possesses over 120 corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers armed with long-range ASCMs, along with approximately 60 fast missile patrol combatants. Included in this impressive array of surface combatants is the new Luyang III-class guided missile destroyer equipped with a ship-launched variant of the YJ-18 and the new Renhai-classguided missile cruiser also equipped with the YJ-18 and potentially a long-range anti-ship ballistic missile in the future. That a surface task force of the PLAN operated in the Central Pacific in January and February 2020 suggests the PLAN intends to use its ASCM-armed ships to expand its A2/AD envelope to guarantee its maritime security. The need to do so was stated by the PLAN’s Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhang in April 2009, “Only when the Chinese navy goes beyond the First Island Chain, will China be able to expand its strategic depth of security for its marine territories.”2
Blue Force land- and carrier-based aircraft were a substantial part of Vice Admiral Taylor’s A2/AD system during Fleet Problem IX and they play a substantial role for the PLAN today. The PLAN fields five regiments of JH-7 maritime strike-fighters armed with the YJ-83K ASCM, two regiments of long-range H-6 bombers capable of employing the supersonic YJ-12, and one regiment of modern Russian-built Su-30MK2 Flanker strike-fighters equipped with the Kh-31 air-to-surface missile. The PLAN also operates two aircraft carriers and is building a third.
Potential loadouts for Chinese H-6K/N bombers. Click to expand. (Graphic via H I Sutton)
While the PLAN’s two operational carriers are less capable offensive strike platforms than U.S. Navy carriers due to their ski jump launching mechanism instead of catapults, PLAN carriers could still play a key role in its A2/AD system. This is because even with airborne tanking, land-based Chinese fighters would still be hard-pressed to establish a persistent presence hundreds of miles from the Chinese mainland and provide cover for surface ships and long-range maritime strike aircraft. However, carrier-based fighters could provide air defense to PLAN surface ships and bombers, enabling them to get within weapons range of U.S. Navy carriers.3As demonstrated by Fleet Problem IX, the success of an A2/AD system is based on redundant and complementary capabilities as opposed to any one single silver bullet.
In addition to the PLAN’s air, surface, and subsurface capabilities, another key component in China’s A2/AD systems are the land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) of the PLA’s Rocket Force (PLARF). A modern and extremely long-range take on an old maritime defensive system, coastal artillery, these weapons present an A2/AD threat unimaginable in the 1920s. The first ASBM fielded by the PLARF is the 810nm range DF-21D, operational since 2010. A new system, the DF-26 with a range of 2,100nm, is in the process of becoming operational and will be able to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers operating east of Guam.
Chinese DF-26 ballistic missile launchers. (Photo via Xinhua)
Fleet Problem IX also demonstrated the necessity of effective ISR to an A2/AD system. Vice Admiral Taylor deployed an array of ships, submarines, and reconnaissance aircraft to ascertain the movements of the Black Fleet. China is doing the same today in the Western Pacific. PLAN surface ships regularly patrol East Asian waters, and their operating areas are expanding into the Central Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Also patrolling regional waters are cutters from the China Coast Guard (CCG, like the PLAN the world’s largest) and numerous ships from local Chinese Maritime Militia forces. China has also launched new surveillance satellites that will bolster its maritime domain awareness.
It is possible if not likely that during a time of tension or in the run up to a crisis that U.S. Navy carrier strike groups operating in the Western Pacific will be shadowed by Chinese tattletales from the PLAN, the CCG, or Maritime Militia and could perform a similar role as the Blue Fleet destroyer that relayed the position of Saratoga. PLAN submarines will also play a substantial ISR role during any conflict and the PLAN’s growing fleet of special mission aircraft based on the Y-8/Y-9 airframe satisfy key maritime patrol and ISR requirements.
A crucial element of this overlapping ISR system of systems is the land-based skywave over-the-horizon radar (OTH), a growing array of reconnaissance satellites, and civilian maritime monitoring systems that contribute to China’s maritime situational awareness. The PLA’s weapons require a robust and redundant OTH targeting capability to be employed at long ranges. China’s investment in ISR along with the necessary command and control systems is designed to provide essential targeting information to airborne, surface, sub-surface, and land-based systems.
Conclusion
Fleet Problem IX—an exercise conducted almost a century ago—is still instructive for naval strategists, tacticians, and planners today. While it is remembered, and rightly so, for demonstrating the offensive potential of the aircraft carrier, it also demonstrated their vulnerability, particularly when the adversary presents an opposing carrier fleet with a multi-layered A2/AD system consisting of complementary capabilities.
During Fleet Problem IX, the Blue Force commander Vice Admiral Taylor devised such a system to oppose the Black Fleet in defense of the Panama Canal. Today, China has built and is steadily improving a similar system in the Western Pacific. However, the overall design and construct of China’s A2/AD system of today is hardly much different than that developed and deployed by Vice Admiral Taylor for Fleet Problem IX. It is in this way that studying Fleet Problem IX provides enduring lessons for understanding the anti-access dilemma.
Daniel J. Kostecka is a senior civilian analyst for the U.S. Navy and has worked for the Navy for 16 years. He has also worked for the Department of Defense and the Government Accountability Office. He was an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and recently retired from the Air Force Reserves with the rank of lieutenant colonel and over 27 total years of commissioned service. Mr. Kostecka has a bachelor of science in mathematics from The Ohio State University, a master of liberal arts in military and diplomatic history from Harvard University, a master of arts in national security policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, and a Master of Science in strategic intelligence from National Intelligence University. Mr. Kostecka is also a graduate of Squadron Officer School, the Air Command and Staff College, the Air War College, and Joint Forces Staff College. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
Endnotes
[1] Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt – A Sailor’s Life. Washington, DC: Naval History Division, 1974, pp 275.
[2] Cai Wei, “Dream of the Military for Aircraft Carriers,” Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan, 27 April 2009.
[3] Cui Changqi, Ed, Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in the 21st Century, Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2002.
Featured image: Battleships and other ships of the U.S. Fleet at anchor in Panama bay on 26 February 1929 at the completion of that year’s fleet problem. Photographed from USS Lexington (CV-2).
