Call for Articles: Transforming the Marine Corps

Submissions Due: May 13, 2022
Topic Week Dates: May 23-27, 2022
Article Length: 1,000-3,000 words
Submit to: [email protected]

By Dmitry Filipoff

The ongoing transformation of the Marine Corps has become more controversial. A new working group of senior retired Marine Corps generals is reportedly engaged in opposing initiatives of the incumbent Commandant, General David Berger. These initiatives are aimed at modernizing the Marine Corps for modern great power competition, as expressed in key documents such as the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, and the tentative manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). These initiatives have been implemented through the divestment of legacy force structure, among other lines of effort, and are characterized as a return to the maritime identity of the USMC. 

What are the merits of these operating concepts and their associated force structure, including EABO, stand-in forces, and Marine units equipped with more missiles and sensors instead of heavier armor and cannon artillery? Are these concepts fit to meet modern threats, and if so, how best to proceed with implementation?

If these concepts are not fit to meet modern threats, especially China, then what should the Marine Corps do instead? Do the Marine operating concepts and force structure of preceding decades effectively meet the challenges of today and tomorrow? Or should the Marines move in a different direction, and if so, what should that look like? What scope and pace of change is necessary?

Authors are invited to answer these questions and more as we debate the merits and implementation of the ongoing transformation of the Marine Corps. Send all submissions to [email protected].

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: A Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher deploys into position aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 16, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Maj. Nick Mannweiler, released)

Exercise Tradewinds 2022: Mexico’s and Belize’s Time to Shine

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command”  

Multinational exercise Tradewinds 2022, the Caribbean’s premier military exercise, will be co-hosted by Belize and Mexico and will take place on May 7-21, 2022. This is a great opportunity to promote greater interoperability among the two host nations, the United States, and Canada, as well as partners from the greater Caribbean.

Tradewinds 2021 and 2022

Tradewinds is a U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)-sponsored combined joint exercise aimed at enhancing the collective ability of regional constabularies and defense forces to combat transnational criminal organizations as well as conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR).

Tradewinds 2021 took place in Guyana, which had also helped boost U.S.-Guyana relations at a time when Venezuela’s territorial ambitions have grown. About 1,500 U.S. military, partner nation security, and civilian personnel participated in Tradewinds 2021, in addition to platforms like U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Winslow W. Griesser (WPC-1116).

As for Tradewinds 2022, the upcoming exercises are still in the planning stage. The Mexican Naval Secretariat (Secretaria de Marina: SEMAR) has already held a meeting in Quintana Roo with representatives from Tradewinds participants in order to plan the maneuvers – Mexico will organize the naval portion of the maneuvers while Belize will be in charge of the land-based operations. Parallel to Tradewinds, the multinational exercise North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI)  2022, between the navies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States, will also take place.

At the time of this writing, there are no reports about which land, naval, and aerial assets will be deployed by the participating navies in Tradewinds 2022. It can be expected that the co-hosts, Belize and Mexico, will deploy a significant number of units, including patrol vessels, interceptor vessels, and maritime patrol aircraft, not to mention personnel like marines. Approximately 1,500 personnel, civilian and military, will participate, representing 20 nations, in addition to the co-hosts and the United States.

A Great Opportunity for Mexico

This author has covered Tradewinds previously for CIMSEC in “Tradewinds 2018 and the Caribbean’s Maritime Security Challenges”, an article that highlighted the importance of these maneuvers for the region. A retired senior officer from the Dominican Republic’s navy explained to CIMSEC that Tradewinds is “an excellent way to increase interoperability between defense forces and security agencies throughout the Caribbean.” The retired officer added that Tradewinds has a history of being “successful at promoting communication, training against organized crime, [and] carrying out HA/DR operations” between the participating agencies and forces.

For the Mexican navy, Tradewinds 2022 presents a unique opportunity not only to promote interoperability between the other participants, but also to demonstrate the service’s capabilities to organize large multinational exercises. Anecdotally, Tradewinds 2022 will be the first time that Mexico co-hosts these exercises since they commenced in 1984. In an interview with CIMSEC, Christian J. Ehrlich, director of Mexico’s Institute for Strategy and Development Research and the founding director of the Riskop consultancy company, explained that Tradewinds is an ideal opportunity for Mexico, particularly the navy, to “continue the evolution of its doctrine. By this I mean expanding the service’s operations from mostly coastal activities to achieving greater capabilities.” For example, Tradewinds will help Mexico “evolve and evaluate its current command and control doctrines regarding this type of operation,” Ehrlich noted.

NAMSI has similarly become a key initiative that is helpful to the three participating navies. In his written testimony for a 2012 hearing at the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, then-U.S. Coast Guard Deputy for Operations Policy and Capabilities Rear Admiral William Lee described NAMSI in the following way:

“[The exercise] provides an operational relationship between SEMAR, NORTHCOM, the Government of Canada, and the Coast Guard and coordinates standard procedures for communications, training, procedures, and operations. Since the inception of NAMSI in December 2008, there have been 24 joint cases yielding 62,816 pounds of narcotics seizures.”

While it remains unconfirmed whether this is the first time that NAMSI and Tradewinds are occuring simultaneously, in any case, this presents a great opportunity for Caribbean defense forces. As Ehrlich explained, while these two exercises are different, the themes are generally similar, as their aim is to prepare personnel to face similar threats. “The other participants of Tradewinds can observe the NAMSI maneuvers and learn about the agreements [between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.]. This could lead to greater interoperability between Caribbean states following the NAMSI model,” he added.

Finally, Tradewinds 2022 will ideally lead to greater interoperability and connections between the Mexican navy with fellow navies and coast guards from the English-speaking Caribbean. While the Mexican navy has sent platforms to previous iterations of Tradewinds, and diplomatic relations are overall cordial, there is a lack of close navy-to-navy relations. Hopefully, Tradewinds 2022 can be the stepping stone for change and stronger naval relations between these services. “The objective of Tradewinds is to increase ties between the English-speaking Caribbean with Canada, Mexico and the United States. [The latter three countries] already have various defense protocols and agreements to promote interoperability,” Ehrlich noted, adding that Tradewinds 2022 could lead to a common doctrine among the participants.

Tradewinds and SOUTHCOM

SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard have numerous defense initiatives with Caribbean forces, like Shiprider agreements, transfers of naval technology, and regular bilateral exercises. For example, Freedom-variant littoral combat ship USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) and Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) Coast Guard offshore patrol vessel HMJS Alexander Bustamante conducted maritime maneuvers on February 9.

What makes Tradewinds 2022 particularly important for SOUTHCOM is that these will be the first major exercises that the Command will help organize under the leadership of Army General Laura Richardson, its new commander. General Richardson has already met with Central American and Caribbean defense commanders; during the 2022 Central American Security Conference, held in early February in Belize, the general noted that she looked forward to “discuss[ing] disaster relief and regional security challenges, and strategiz[ing] about how we can leverage annual exercises like Tradewinds and CENTAM Guardian to show just how Integrated and Intertwined we are.” Therefore, Tradewinds will be a great opportunity for the new SOUTHCOM commander to examine how her Command and U.S. partners in the Caribbean work together in the field.

The waters of the Caribbean are far from peaceful—well-known security threats include combating drug trafficking, as well as piracy and human trafficking. There are also environmental crimes like illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing as well as efforts to improve joint responses to natural disasters, which are becoming deadlier and more destructive due to climate change. Hopefully, Tradewinds 2022 will continue to increase interoperability and strong ties among the Caribbean nations, both island states as well as the mainland, to prepare the region to better face common threats together.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. The views expressed in this article belong to the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: Multinational vessels participating in exercise Tradewinds 2021 conduct a photo exercise (PHOTEX) off the coast of Guyana June 18. Tradewinds 2021 is a U.S. Southern Command sponsored Caribbean security-focused exercise in the ground, air, sea, and cyber domains, working with partner nations to conduct joint, combined, and interagency training focused on increasing regional cooperation and stability. (Credit: U.S. Southern Command)

Beware Buyer’s Remorse: Why the Coast Guard Needs to Steer Clear of the LCS

By Joseph O’Connell

With all the negative publicity surrounding the Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) program, it would seem self-evident the Coast Guard has no interest in acquiring the LCS as a hand-me-down.1 However, with the recent publishing of “In Dire Need: Why the Coast Guard Needs the LCS,” a newly found interest in acquiring problematic navy platforms may be growing and deserves to be judged on its merits.2 The central thesis proposes the U.S. Coast Guard acquire decommissioned LCSs from the U.S. Navy, remove the installed combined diesel engine and gas turbine (CODAG) plant, and install a direct drive diesel. While the proposal is noticeably light on details of propulsion layout (it is unclear if the new layout would have one diesel per water jet or use a splitting/combining gear arrangement), it relies upon the Coast Guard’s historical precedents of accepting old navy ships and converting CODAG plants into direct diesel drives. The concept merits an analytic look to determine if the primary conclusion, that acquiring recently decommissioned LCS’s in lieu of commissioning new Off-shore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) has the potential to save scarce Coast Guard dollars, holds true. To do so, a rough exploration of what this program would achieve and at what cost must be compared to OPC designs and costs.

The LCS: Built for Speed

One of the driving requirements for the LCS acquisition was “sprint” speeds in excess of 40 knots.3 Such speeds effectively ruled out traditional propellers as prime movers with water jet systems taking their place.4 The Coast Guard does not and has not operated large vessels with water jet drives, and significant propulsion inefficiencies exist when operating these drives at lower speeds (Fig 1).5,6 Because of the governing physics behind water jets, they are rarely used in vessels that normally operate under 30 knots. While re-engining itself may be a cost effective way to gut the newly minted cutters of an expensive gear issue, it does not solve the propulsion issue of low speed water jet operation.

Figure 1: Achievable propulsive coefficient for propulsors applicable to high speed monohulls

For argument’s sake, we can assume that the Coast Guard would re-engine the LCS with a comparable engine to the  two 7,280 KW fairbanks diesels planned for the OPC, with a total combined brake horsepower (BHP) of 19,520. Using publicly available data points on the LCS speed power curve, and understanding its cubic nature,5 we see this would deliver an underwhelming 15 to 20 knots at flank speed. And while 15-20 knots may be acceptable for legacy Coast Guard operations, it does not match the OPC’s promised 22+ knots or the fuel efficiency and lower operating cost of the OPC’s designed loiter drive.7 Because of the water jet propulsion system, an additional operating cost for the Coast Guard LCS would be fuel and maintenance. Water jets are terribly inefficient at low-medium speeds and would consume 20-50% more fuel than the OPC at similar speeds.5,6

Additionally, as evidenced by the national security cutter speed operating profile, the Coast Guard rarely uses high end speeds, with the majority of UW time spent loitering after a bust—mostly position keeping with light load conditions on the plant.8 This has resulted in numerous main diesel engine (MDE) maintenance issues for the WMSL fleet,9 and presumably would be the case if the LCS was adopted as well. The OPC was designed with this operational speed profile in mind and has a planned low speed electric loiter drive. This drive will reduce light load conditions that degrade engine life and capability. Additionally, the low speed loiter drive lengthens the cutter’s endurance by limiting fuel consumption, frequently a reason for cutters to return to port for brief stops for fuel (BSFs). Given the slower speed and higher fuel consumption, the LCS would be thoroughly outcompeted by an OPC in the majority of Coast Guard mission sets. Without the loiter drive, the Coast Guard LCS would have high speed diesels powering 4 water jets, exposing both systems to increased degradation due to low operating speeds.

Shiphandlers Be Warned

Not only would these franken-cutters be fuel inefficient, slower, and expensive to maintain, they would also be significantly more difficult to maneuver. Without the traditional rudder control surface, the LCS utilizes moveable waterjets to achieve both propulsion and steering—a layout with which Coast Guard deck watch officers are unfamiliar. With a new lower speed prime mover supplying power to the waterjet, it is safe to assume that the water volume flow rate would drop, decreasing the effectiveness of the jets for maneuvering. This increases the potential for catastrophic collisions, unplanned maintenance periods, and high repairs costs that familiar and more trusted rudder systems mitigate.

A final, unaddressed concern is the aluminum hull of the Independence variant, originally adopted to lighten the vessel to make sprint speeds more achievable. Aluminum is unsavory for a potential naval combatant due to its low melting point. The USS Belknap fire demonstrates why shipbuilders generally prefer to avoid aluminum.10 Given the Coast Guard’s growing role in great power competition and the risks associated with blue water naval operations, an aluminum hulled vessel, powered by diesels driving a water jet, sounds about as unappetizing a cutter as could be built.

The True Cost of Re-Engining

The one remaining argument in favor of Coast Guard LCS adoption is its relative cost to the OPC. Current projections indicate an OPC will cost on average $411 million per hull.7 Taking a big picture analysis, including anticipated operating costs and operational effectiveness, we can make a clear assessment of scrapping the OPCs in favor of recycling the LCS. On the face, it seems that it would be more cost effective to re-engine an existing hull rather than build one from scratch. On average, to re-engine a cutter would require an extensive dry dock period—approximately 12+ months per hull.11 This estimate is based upon current re-engining times for the legacy Famous-class cutters that are undergoing an electrical grid upgrade, with new ship service diesel generator (SSDGs) installations taking roughly seven months. Given the bureaucratic processes of transferring control of a ship from the Navy to the Coast Guard, compounded with the engine and gear replacement availability, we can safely assume the first OPC, if not the first few, will have been delivered by the time an LCS would be operational. Given that there is no time delivery advantage for either platform, but significant speed, maneuverability, maintainability, age of hull at delivery and endurance advantages for the OPC the cost savings must be substantial to consider the LCS as meriting adoption.

While it is difficult to accurately forecast the cost of re-engining and gearing a 3,500 ton combatant, we can estimate a range that may be useful for comparison to new construction. Using a standard maintenance dry dock for the WMSL—a similarly sized vessel—as a baseline, we can put a lower threshold of $1 million per month, with roughly a 12 month availability estimated, and the engines themselves costing upwards of $1 million each.11Assuming the gear replacement equipment will run similarly expensive, we reach an optimistic $20 million, and a more conservative $40 million per hull. Regardless, either estimate is less than 10% of the cost of a new OPC, validating the original assumption that retooling an LCS to take the berth of an OPC would be more affordable. The second major driver of hull machinery and electrical (HM&E) cost is the age of the hull, as vessels age they become relatively more expensive to maintain, given that the first LCS was laid down in 2005, commissioned in 2008, the Coast Guard would be paying upwards of $40 million a hull for a 15+ year old ship that would be expensive to operate, difficult to maneuver, slower, and less reliable than the planned OPCs.

After a brief overview of the true costs for the Coast Guard to adopt the LCS, it becomes painfully clear that they would be woefully inadequate to replace the planned OPCs. While true that this path would be substantially less expensive in the immediate future, it would be a Faustian bargain, resulting in the Coast Guard operating expensive and ineffective cutters. Such cutters would only serve to weaken the Coast Guard medium endurance fleet. With the shifting geopolitics of today’s world, the U.S. Coast Guard cannot afford to trade well designed affordable cutters for recycled Navy hulls.

Lieutenant Joey O’Connell has served aboard two Coast Guard cutters as an engineer. He is currently a Medium Endurance Cutter (MEC) port engineer, planning and overseeing depot-level maintenance on the aging MEC fleet. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and two masters degrees—one in naval architecture and the other in mechanical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

References

[1] https://news.usni.org/2021/01/19/navy-calls-freedom-lcs-propulsion-problem-class-wide-defect-wont-take-new-ships-until-fixed

[2] https://cimsec.org/in-dire-need-why-the-coast-guard-needs-the-lcs/

[3] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcs-requirements.htm

[4] https://www.marineinsight.com/naval-architecture/understanding-water-jet-propulsion-working-principle-design-and-advantages/

[5] Applied Naval Architecture; R. B. Zubaly Publisher, Cornell Maritime Press, 1996 ; ISBN, 0870334751, 9780870334757.

[6] Marine Propellers and Propulsion. J. S. Carlton, Elsevier Press, 1994

[7] https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/Offshore-Patrol-Cutter/

[8] https://ingalls.huntingtoningalls.com/our-products/nsc/

[9] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-218

[10] https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/uss-belknap-collided-aircraft-carrier.html

[11] A Guide to Ship Repair Estimates in Man-hours (Second Edition), Butterworth-Heinemann, 2012, ISBN 9780080982625, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-098262-5.02001-1.

Featured Image:  The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) underway conducting sea trials off the coast of Southern California in February 2013.  (Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James R. Evans/Released)

Naval Wargaming SITREP: Join our First Community Fight Night This Friday

By Dmitry Filipoff

This Friday, April 8th, from 730-830pm (Eastern Time), CIMSEC’s dedicated naval wargaming server will be gathering for our first ever community fight night. Join us to play and spectate naval wargames, especially Nebulous Fleet Command. We will be facing off in head-to-head multiplayer matches, with players pitting their custom fleets against one another in contested matches. Join us this Friday to play and spectate naval wargaming on our growing community server, and make sure to get a glimpse of the action down below.

Join our public CIMSEC Wargaming Discord server here.

A salvo of missiles breaks through flak defenses to land devastating hits on a light cruiser.

A fleet under missile fire closes to short range to bring lasers to bear on an immobilized enemy light cruiser while deploying chaff and point defenses.

Heavy cruiser RICK Heart of Tempest floating in space, heavily damaged and combat ineffective after an intense exchange of railgun fire.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: Author screenshot of Nebulous Fleet Command.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.