Category Archives: Wargaming

Wargaming

Do You Have To Do “Analysis” To Call It A Wargame? Actually, No.

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By BJ Armstrong and Marcus Jones

“If my career were ahead instead of behind me, I should endeavor to the extent of my ability, and at the earliest opportunity, to acquire as thorough a knowledge of the principles of the art of war as possible, and should neglect no opportunity to train myself in their application by playing competitive war games.” –Admiral William Sims, 1921

With enemy destroyers approaching from the southern end of the Philippine archipelago, the commander faced a critical decision: Should he launch a risky strike with his dwindling VLS weapon supply, or chart a course eastward to evade and regroup in the vast Pacific for a future battle?

This scenario was the challenge for a Midshipman Fourth Class, serving as the commander of American forces in a recent wargame hosted by the Naval Academy Wargaming Society in collaboration with Bancroft Hall’s training program. Facilitated by CDR Ken Maroon, PhD, these combat scenarios in and around the contemporary South China Sea have become a staple of Saturday mornings in the Wargaming Lab beneath Mahan Hall. Acting as part of a makeshift Maritime Operations Center, Naval Academy Plebes in this scenario not only reinforced their professional knowledge of American naval forces, but also grappled with the complexities of naval decision-making and critical thinking in a dynamic, high-pressure environment.

Phil Pournelle’s recent article “Does it Matter if You Call It a Wargame? Actually, Yes,” calls on CIMSEC readers and the larger military and national security community to consider the taxonomy of how we think about the events that are commonly called “wargames.” He offers vital distinctions and a way to think about the teleology of exercises that often fall into a rather large kitchen sink. However, there is an important element of the wargaming enterprise which is overlooked, when the focus is only on analysis and the operations research outcomes that good wargames can provide, but not their education value.

Educational wargaming is not merely an exercise in concept development in the upper reaches of command. It is a crucible for forging the decision-making skills, adaptability, and intellectual overmatch required for contemporary naval challenges in the earliest stages of a young officer’s development. Wargaming, particularly at the pre-commissioning level, transforms the learning experience by engaging participants in narrative-rich, synthetic environments that mimic the pressures of real-world decision-making. Drawing on historical precedents and recent innovations, we see a central role of wargaming in cultivating the next generation of naval leaders at the U.S. Naval Academy. 

More Than Concept Development and Analysis

Since the 19th century, wargaming has been an invaluable educational tool for the U.S. military. Early efforts, including Kriegspiele at U.S. Army schools after the Civil War, were followed by Lieutenant McCarty Little’s development of a wargaming curriculum in the early years of the U.S. Naval War College. Later, the interwar games conducted there shaped the strategies and tactics for victory in the Pacific during World War II and were transformative not only because they tested operational concepts but because they prepared commanders for the cognitive and emotional challenges of command. This historical precedent underscores the enduring value of wargaming in creating synthetic experiences that sharpen the mind for future crises.

In the 21st century as they did then, these efforts offer a low-cost, low-risk environment for naval professionals to test tactics, strategies, and operational concepts, shape their knowledge of past and contemporary military scenarios, and condition their decisions within them. At USNA, a host of recent initiatives have laid the keel of our midshipmen’s knowledge of the maritime world and established their understanding of the core concepts of American seapower.

The Naval Academy is doubling down on the educational value of wargames through Saturday morning battalion training sessions, the activities of the student-led Wargaming Society club, wargame scenarios in history department classrooms, and the incorporation of wargame modules into the new Maritime Warfare (NS300) course taught by the Professional Development Department.

The resurgence of wargaming in military education over the past decade underscores its value in achieving an intellectual overmatch against today’s potential adversaries. In 2015, then Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus described wargaming as invaluable for testing new ideas in a low-risk environment. Former Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger later emphasized that wargaming is essential for practicing decision-making against a thinking enemy, while then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown highlighted the role of wargaming in adapting continually to a shifting global strategic landscape. ​Despite this, current military education often delays wargaming exposure until mid-career, resulting in missed opportunities for developing decision agility and professional competency from the outset of a naval professional’s development.

Introducing wargaming at the pre-commissioning level lays the groundwork to address the Department of the Navy’s admitted deficiency in wargaming literacy at the operational and strategic levels of war. By introducing the practice of wargaming as early as possible in an officer’s development, we cultivate a mindset that embraces complex, multi-layered, competitive decision-making and innovative thinking about enduring military problems and concepts. Early exposure also mitigates later-career reliance on professional civilian wargamers and facilitates the operational integration of wargaming principles into military organizations. This in turn enhances the role and value of wargaming later in officers’ careers.

Laying the keel with early wargaming experiences embeds key cognitive attributes in young officers, preparing them to think deeply and creatively about history and its relation to contemporary warfare. The initiatives at USNA introduce midshipmen to the complexities of naval decision-making early in their careers, fostering the critical thinking and adaptability essential for future operational challenges. By embedding these skills at the pre-commissioning level, USNA prepares its graduates to contribute meaningfully to advanced wargaming processes later in their careers.

Wargaming as Interdisciplinary Thinking and Applied History

The educational program at USNA is admirably multidisciplinary, with particular focus on the study of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Integrating wargaming into this educational framework puts specific aspects of STEM education into context, demonstrating how these disciplines contribute to the multi-domain operations of today’s Joint Force. For example, understanding hypersonic technology’s impact on military operations or how cyber capabilities enable traditional land, sea, and air operations provides a deeper and broader understanding of modern warfare. Additionally, wargaming offers invaluable practical applications for the disciplines of math and economics by highlighting the central role of risk and probability in the adjudication at the heart of wargame processes, allowing midshipmen to apply theoretical concepts to real-world strategic and tactical scenarios.

Done well, educational wargaming serves as a form of applied history, offering midshipmen a unique way to engage with historical events, processes, causation, and outcomes. By building and working through historical scenarios, students develop a deeper understanding of the complexity and contingency of historical decision-making, amplifying their growth as leaders at every level. Midshipmen learn to ask the hard questions and wrestle with complex answers in ways that apply both to thinking about the past and reasoning through the operational and strategic challenges of the present.

Critical thinking and decision-making skills are, of course, buzzwords of the moment in higher education generally and officer development especially. More than just asking hard questions, however, thinking critically involves being willing to explore disruptive and alternative ideas. The process of designing, playing, and analyzing wargames requires students to think strategically, anticipate opponents’ moves, and make quick, informed decisions under pressure. These skills are directly transferable to real-world military and civilian leadership roles, where effective decision-making can have significant consequences. Of course, poorly designed scenarios can reinforce false assumptions or oversimplify complex realities, leading to flawed conclusions. As Peter Perla warns, the danger lies in creating narratives that are emotionally compelling but factually misleading.

To maximize their educational value, wargames must strike a careful balance between realism and abstraction, ensuring that participants grapple with the uncertainty and complexity of real-world operations without succumbing to simplistic or sanitized portrayals. Moving forward, wargaming activities at the Naval Academy must remain engaged with the Fleet’s contemporary posture and challenges, lest the practice of wargaming become abstract and fall into irrelevance.

Charting a Course on the Severn

Wargaming has a long history on the banks of the Severn River, though perhaps not as long as in Narragansett Bay. In the 1930s and 1960s, Naval Academy professors developed wargames for class use to enhance historical and contemporary understanding. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Academy relied on computer-based Navy Tactical Game (NAVTAG) to provide valuable opportunities for professional development and competition between companies and classes. The NAVTAG provided both educational and training simulation opportunities to the Brigade, but was sunset because of lack of financial and technical resources with the end of the Cold War.

In 2020, the Naval Academy Museum and History Department launched a wargaming initiative which created two main lines of effort. For a few years the History Department offered an experimental historical wargaming class, where midshipmen intensively studied an historical scenario and developed a wargame based on it. Concurrently, the Combat Action Lab was established, an Extra-Curricular Activity (ECA) today called The Wargaming Society, for Midshipmen to engage with the practice in an informal, midshipman-led setting. These efforts have developed over four years to include professional development events on Saturday mornings and the introduction of contemporary wargaming problems as the crowning experience in the new Maritime Warfare course. Efforts to bring these and other multidisciplinary lines of effort together, with the necessary resourcing and organizational structure, offer much promise for a robust future wargaming enterprise at USNA.

When today’s naval professionals and veterans think of wargaming, they often map it to operations research analysis, Pentagon decision-making, and mid-to-senior career development. There is great value in the analytical games, as described by CDR Anthony LaVopa in his recent article “Building Warfighting Competence: The Halsey Alpha Wargaming Experience,” and in their staff and war college level use. But, wargames are ‘story-living experiences’ that transcend traditional methods of teaching and analysis at all levels of seniority and experience including at the precommissiong level. By immersing participants in synthetic environments where decisions have tangible consequences, they provide a powerful means of cultivating the intellectual and emotional resilience essential for leadership in today’s demanding operational environments. As the U.S. Naval Academy continues to expand its wargaming initiatives, it is laying the keel for a generation of officers prepared to confront the uncertainties of a rapidly changing strategic landscape.

Captain Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, PhD is an Associate Professor of War Studies and Naval History and the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Dr. Marcus Jones is an associate professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy.

The thoughts and opinions expressed by the authors of this article are offered in their personal and academic capacities and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the U.S. Navy or any government agency. 

Featured Image: U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Jan. 1, 2013) An F/A-18C Hornet of the Warhawks of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 97 launches from the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kenneth Abbate/Released)

Wargaming

Building Warfighting Competence: The Halsey Alfa Wargaming Experience

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A shorter version of this piece was originally published by the Surface Navy Association. This longer adaptation is published with permission.

By CDR Anthony LaVopa, USN

During my early days as a Department Head on USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), my Executive Officer advised me to reach out to Professor Jim FitzSimonds and the Halsey Alfa group at the Naval War College. He urged, “Pick their brains and absorb everything you can.” At that time, I had no idea how profoundly this exposure to the Halsey Program would refine my understanding of tactical, operational, and strategic topics. I did not anticipate the extent to which it would challenge my knowledge and assumptions about U.S. capabilities, tactics, and force employment, as well as those of our adversaries. My participation in the Halsey Alfa program, which has focused on war with China for more than 20 years, became one of the most significant and impactful learning experiences of my career. I believe this critical, analytical, and educational opportunity should be mandatory for every unrestricted line officer in the Navy.

With the addition of the Halsey Bravo Program, focused on conflict scenarios with Iran, the Halsey Program leverages subject matter experts and employs continuous free-play, iterative wargaming to educate students. Running three, ten-week wargames each year, the Halsey Program has completed more than one hundred wargames combined across both Alfa and Bravo since 2003. This large base of wargaming experience has created a wealth of valuable insight on operational warfighting, with OPNAV, flag officers, and senior leaders regularly consuming outputs from the Halsey program.

After commanding USS Hurricane (PC 3) and serving at OPNAV N96, I recognized that participating in the Halsey Advanced Research Program (ARP) at the Naval War College was essential before returning to sea and assuming command. I sought to challenge myself in every aspect as a naval officer and warfighter, aiming to sharpen my operational eye – and bring that mindset to my next command. The Halsey program is vital for cultivating the critical thinking and tactical skill required for pacing the rapid evolution of modern naval warfare. By effectively bridging theoretical knowledge with practical application through rigorous wargaming, it prepares naval and joint officers to navigate the complexities of high-end conflict against a peer competitor. 

Why Wargame?

Replicating real-world conflict, especially at the high end, is inherently challenging. Wargaming stands out as one of the most time-tested and effective methods for doing so, offering a realistic way for naval officers to practice their craft. It fosters critical thought and discussions about capabilities, limitations, theater geography, the strengths and weaknesses of allies and partners, and the dynamics of fighting peer competitors, making it the premier method for simulating warfare. In contrast, exercises conducted at sea or with other branches of the Joint Force, allies, or partners typically capture only limited aspects of high-end conflict within a carefully controlled environment. Warfare is inherently complex, involving the integration of multiple domains and intricate kill chains. At its core, warfare requires a deep understanding of technology and the creative application of that knowledge to defeat adversaries. Wargaming serves as an effective framework for exploring these complexities. Successful war planning, operational execution, and future systems acquisition should hinge on relevant combat information, accumulated operational experience, and the conclusions reached in series of wargames.

Wargaming facilitates essential discussions on assessing risks to both force and mission. When introduced in a joint and partnered environment, it helps dispel myths and inaccurate assumptions – inherently dangerous beliefs and variables when discovered “in contact.” Analysis of exam data from new students in the Halsey Program reveals that many officers lack sufficient knowledge of domain integration and have even less familiarity with competitor systems and capabilities.

Wargaming is unlike any other game. There are no simple rules for either side and no pre-defined outcomes. There seem to be three major areas in wargaming that I have observed after almost two years in the Halsey Program: the operational environment (the game board) which is driven by the strategic context of politics and a desire to contain conflict, the friendly and opposing forces (the game pieces), specifically what forces exist and how they move, and the third area is the rules of force interaction (combat assessment factors). The brilliance of the Halsey experience is that politics, policy, bureaucracy, and other factors are also discussed, but at the end of the day, the game’s outcomes are driven by what is technologically possible. The results can help inform policymakers, acquisition professionals, and naval commanders on what the art of the possible could and should be.

Many visitors to the Halsey spaces often ask whether the U.S. wins or loses. They are looking for a definite answer and a “recipe card” for success. Although winning or losing is complex based on which metrics and objectives each side is given, the true gold mine of insight in more than twenty years of Halsey wargaming is the set of identified factors that most strongly influence the prospects of red or blue victory in particular domains. These combat interactions between forces are the most complex because the net assessments between red and blue entities are often game-specific and dependent upon a personal point of view – realistic or optimistic. This is not to suggest that a wargame is wholly subjective, but rather it can be limited in effectiveness based on the limits of player knowledge and experience, as well as the control team’s ability to understand and adjudicate force interactions based on known and proven capabilities. A singular and biased viewpoint has the potential to impact the entire game, from the conduct of the game, to the adjudication of force interactions, and the outcomes reached.

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Nov. 18, 2015) Guided-missile destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class P. Sena/Released)

The essence of a wargame lies in the assessment process itself. This process cannot occur in isolation or in small groups lacking transparency, especially when security classification limits collaboration. An inclusive discussion, conducted at the appropriate classification level, is essential for shaping game assumptions and determining outcomes. It is crucial to recognize that the fleet and joint force primarily operate at the Secret level. While some individuals may have access to higher classification programs and capabilities, a “black box mentality” should not dictate wargame results. This mentality can introduce significant uncertainty and unwarranted optimism, leaving players unable to assess the validity of the capabilities in question. In both wargames and real-world operations, players must prioritize managing uncertainty to enhance mission effectiveness while maintaining acceptable risk to force. Exquisite capabilities that are not integrated with more common tactics or are not adequately trained can be detrimental, providing a false sense of confidence that may ultimately cause more harm than good.

Often, military capabilities are viewed in a sterile, non-human way—as mere technologies tied to specific platforms delivering defined effects. This perspective fails to capture the reality of warfare, where human intuition and judgment, shaped by years of experience, drive tactical and operational decisions. Wargaming can illuminate the asymmetrical technological advantages of different sides, but it also offers crucial insight into the human element of decision-making, especially in complex, full-spectrum warfare. The experience should immerse players in mental, emotional, and psychological stress as they pursue their objectives and help them understand how this stress influences operational decision-making.

Many assume that peacetime rules and Command and Control (C2) structures will function effectively in future conflicts, yet skepticism persists, particularly regarding the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) model. Originally designed to defend carrier strike groups and their air wings, the CWC has marginally evolved but remains the default structure for operations—prioritizing capital ship defense to hopefully enable offensive power projection. However, if the carrier and air wing are removed from the equation, what C2 structure best supports a transition to an offensive campaign at sea? A key objective of wargaming is to explore the relationship between technology and human decision-making and test alternatives. This skillset cannot be developed in just a few days, it requires weeks or months of dedicated study of adversarial capabilities, employment methods, and C2 processes to understand how best to counter capabilities or change our own. In essence, effective wargaming not only challenges our assumptions about military operations, but also cultivates the critical thinking and adaptability needed to navigate the complexities of future conflict.

The Essence of the Halsey Program

The Halsey program’s core values are an absolute allegiance to reality and a deep skepticism of both technological and operational capabilities – by all sides – that have not yet been proven in peer combat. These values align well with the lessons of history and how unproven capabilities introduce major uncertainty and risk when high-end combat finally takes place. Another core value of the program is developing deep expertise in capabilities of rivals. It is challenging to distill nearly two years of experience into a few pages, but the opportunity to spend dedicated time every day reading and learning about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its components (Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force) has been professionally rewarding, and I believe beneficial as I turn my focus to returning to sea in command.

PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Wuxi attached to a unit under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou)

Unfortunately, I am in the three-percent club at the Naval War College. Less than three percent of the in-residence, non-international graduates each year can be involved with the Halsey programs, specifically the ability to wargame at the classified level. Unclassified wargames can achieve some of the critical thinking effects of a classified wargame, but are not sufficient to effectively assess real-world strategy and combat outcomes. It is perplexing that during a time of heightened tensions with the Chinese Communist Party, specifically regarding claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea, that almost 97 percent of my peers from the Naval War College can go through a year’s curriculum of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at the Navy’s premier strategic and operational center of excellence with only limited classified discussions, no requirement to conduct net assessments at the classified level, nor conduct any classified wargames.

The ongoing analysis and education in the Halsey program, facilitated by continuous wargames, have revealed several key trends. The trends are applicable at the operational level of war – meaning, the potential success of a tactical-level engagement is overshadowed by the effect at the operational level of a campaign. The reason these trends are significant is that unlike many other wargames, Halsey only games two years into the future. This prevents a series of “perfectly executed acquisition cycles” from impacting the game. The students go to war with the military we already have.

Two of the largest trends I have observed include the decreasing relevance of the aircraft carrier and tactical aircraft based within 2,000nm of the fight, as well as hardkill cruise and ballistic missile defenses. There was an inflection point that occurred somewhere around the mid-2010s that triggered the decreasing relevance of these U.S. capabilities and tactics based on advances in PLA missile technology.

However, the two largest trends I have observed for increasing relevance are penetrating ordnance rather than penetrating platforms, and passive missile defenses. In his July 2012 Proceedings article “Payloads Over Platforms: Charting A New Course,” then-CNO Admiral Greenert clearly articulated the necessity to shift our focus to payloads, specifically decoupling platform development from payload development.1 That shift has yet to occur, and while our peer competitor continues to turn out one anti-ship weapon after another, we are still struggling to bring meaningful, offensive, anti-ship payloads into the fleet on a relevant timeline.

Wargaming Must Lead to a War Mindset

The primary expectation of a wargame is to produce quantifiable evidence of whether the employed technology effectively achieved desired outcomes. However, the most critical aspect is ensuring these results reach the appropriate levels to influence the fleet more broadly. Rarely if ever are the findings from the Global series of wargames communicated at the tactical level within the fleet, even as we strive for a “warfighting first” mentality.

As part of the Halsey program, we brief every Prospective Executive Officer (PXO), Commanding Officer (PCO), and Major Commander (MCO) course at the Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) in Newport, Rhode Island. The consistent feedback from these classes is, “I wish someone in the fleet was sharing this information. Why aren’t we using it?” Despite challenging students to critique our analyses, not one has been able to find fault in over twenty-five briefings, supported by more than twenty years of continuous gaming and learning.

Merely encouraging a war-focused mindset with words alone is insufficient. For the average sailor or officer, “war” often translates to routine maintenance, administrative tasks, or unit-level certifications. We need to create opportunities for sailors to think critically about war and wargaming, fostering discussions that lead to meaningful training and education. While deploying units participate in the culminating month-long event known as COMPUTEX (Composite Unit Training Exercise), this is arguably the sole instance during a 36-month Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) where they experience a challenging tactical environment at the high-end, combined arms level. Aside from that fraction of sailors who are about to deploy, many other shoreside sailors have little access to tools for practicing their high-end warfighting skills at the operational level of war.

If the Naval War College is truly the Navy’s premier center for strategic and operational excellence, its wargaming results must permeate all levels of fleet education. The fleet-wide curriculum across all training commands should be adaptable to incorporate continuous updates on tactics and technology from both U.S. forces and peer adversaries. Without this integration of knowledge and a mindset focused on preparing for war, the outputs of the Halsey program and the Naval War College risk becoming merely PowerPoint presentations of good ideas, wargaming outcomes, and recommendations to commanders. In a 1912 Proceedings article, “The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” Captain W. McCarty Little writes, “In the game of war, the stake is life itself, nay, infinitely greater, it may be the life of the nation, certainly its honor. We are its champions: what sort of a figure shall we cut when, at the tournament, the trumpets sound the charge, and it is found that we have neglected to practice in the joust.”2

For me, returning to the fleet means applying my Halsey experience from day one, just as I did during my previous command tour. I view everything through a warfighting lens. On Hurricane, I encouraged my sailors to understand the significance of their daily actions from this perspective. When we faced degraded equipment, the focus was not just on repairs but on understanding the implications for warfighting capability. This empowered my crew to prioritize effectively and raise issues that did not align with our warfighting culture, enabling me to address concerns that might otherwise be seen as mere resource drains. Returning to sea, I will expect the wardroom and CPO mess to share this mindset as we prepare our ship and crew, highlighting the essential distinction between leadership and management – leading people versus managing equipment and process. This warfighting focus at the unit level is as crucial now as it was on December 7, 1941.

The Right Players on the Field

During the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, the Naval War College used a Halsey program-like approach to educate its line officers through continuous wargaming. This academic effort was coupled with fleet exercises to trigger changes to tactics and produce realistic war plans. Due to this structure and effort, nearly all the Navy’s flag officers graduated from the wargaming programs during the interwar period. It was essentially a requirement for flag rank. These programs provided a critical forum for testing and socializing warfighting concepts into naval officers over weeks or months, rather than the handful of days typical of current large-scale games.

Ultimately, the model used in the interwar years was successful because the players involved in the game respected reality and were willing to make significant changes in the face of changing technology and operational concepts. These wargames brought Navy leadership together around common frameworks for understanding fleet battles and theater campaigns, frameworks that proved integral to the Navy’s success in WWII. One of Admiral Nimitz’s most famous postwar quotes argued that the rigorous and repeated Naval War College wargaming had ensured “nothing that happened during the war was a surprise…except the kamikaze tactics.”3

Unfortunately, this model has long been abandoned by the Naval War College and the fleet, with classified wargaming now relegated to the fringes of naval education. In his January 2013 Proceedings article, Naval War College Professor Milan Vego wrote that, “The Navy’s readiness and ability to fight and win at sea depends on the quality and skills of its top commanders and their staffs—yet it does not send many promising officers to attend the resident program at Newport, Rhode Island’s, Naval War College. Today’s Navy officer corps’ knowledge and understanding of naval theory and military history is far from adequate.”4 The Halsey program is helping to turn the tide, but at a small and inadequate rate.

The ability to further scale the Halsey program is limited by the number and quality of the war college faculty and the ability to accurately assess complex game moves. The rudder needs to be put hard over as we prepare for high-end conflict against a peer competitor, potentially within this decade. The rapid advances in warfare represent a double-edged sword to be leveraged or victimized by. The knowledge and experience I have gained as a student in Halsey has been invaluable – and has set a course of continual learning that will endure when I depart Newport. Daily discussions with officers, faculty, and guest flag and general officers have enhanced my experience at the Naval War College beyond expectation. It is this experience that continues to drive my thirst for knowledge, understanding, and research. It drives me to share what I know with wardrooms, ready rooms, and everyone with whom I interact. In the spirit of CNO Admiral Franchetti’s “more players on the field,” the Navy also needs the right players on the field. The Halsey program prepares naval and joint officers to be the right players on the field for when it matters most.

Commander Anthony LaVopa graduated from the U.S. Naval War College in March 2024 as a Halsey Alfa Fellow. He commanded USS Hurricane (PC 3) and is the Prospective Executive Officer (P-XO) for USS Bulkeley (DDG 84).

The opinions expressed are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of the U.S. Navy or any other entity of the U.S. government.

References

1. Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” Proceedings 138 (July 2012), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/july/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course.

2. W. McCarty Little, “The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” Proceedings 38 (December 1912),

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1912/december-0/strategic-naval-war-game-or-chart-maneuver

3. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz speech to U.S. Naval War College, 10 October 1960, Folder 26, Box 31, RG15 Guest Lectures, 1894–1992, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport RI; quoted in John M. Lillard, Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for WWII, PhD dissertation, George Mason University, 2013, 1.

4. Milan Vego, “Study War Much More,” Proceedings 139 (January 2013), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/january/study-war-much-more.

Featured Image: PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Wuxi attached to a unit under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou)

Wargaming

Does it Matter if You Call it a Wargame? Actually, yes.

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By Phillip Pournelle

Much of what the Department of Defense calls wargaming is not actually wargaming and this abuse of nomenclature has real consequences. Wargame-like activities, if conducted properly, are necessary and valuable, but the Department needs to do a better job of differentiating between true wargames, and wargame-like activities. Understanding the types and styles of wargames and wargame-like activities, when which is appropriate, what they look like, and what they can do for you is critical. Without a proper understanding of what a wargame is, and what it is not, the Department of Defense risks wasting money, time, and talent. It has become is all too common that a group of people together having an unstructured conversation is referred to as a “wargame,” and then the sponsor claims to be better prepared for having done it. Such claims are tautological, self-serving, and do not advance organizational learning.

Over the years, the analytic and wargaming community has developed a set of tools with known standards and expectations. Leadership in the Department of Defense should familiarize themselves with them because government sponsors control the larger analytic ecosystem. Better informed customers and sponsors will be able to responsibly choose designers and events appropriate to their purpose and thus generate good strategies.

This article will briefly describe different types and styles of wargames and wargame-like activities, when they are appropriate, what they look like, and what you get out of them (and just as importantly, what you don’t get out of them). It is focused on wargaming and analysis in support of the Department of Defense, not wargaming for education or entertainment.

Wargaming and Strategy

Defense analytic wargaming’s purpose is to assist in the development of good strategy. Thus, we should first examine what good strategy looks like and how wargame-like activities and wargaming can assist in the development of strategy. Defined by Richard Rumelt a good strategy is:

“…in the end, a hypothesis about what will work… A good strategy has at a minimum, three essential components:

  • A diagnosis of the situation
  • The choice of an overall guiding policy
  • And the design of coherent action.“

Consequently, a good strategy goes beyond the minimum elements of “ends, ways, and means” described in most defense strategy textbooks. And, as many can attest to, the enemy has a vote. Accordingly, a good strategy contains a crucial element:

“In general, strategic leverage arises from a mixture of anticipation, insight into what is most pivotal or critical in a situation, and making a concerted application of effort… the most critical anticipations are about the behavior of others, especially rivals.”

When a military service, or other organization, claims they have “wargamed” a concept, it implies they have followed the best practices described in Joint Publication 5-0; a series of iterative games against thinking opponents in a cycle of research to develop a good strategy. In essence, they have subjected the concept in question to a clash of competing hypothesis (theories of victory) in a dialectic crucible and conducted follow up analysis. To have done less than this means such a label conveys a false imprimatur, but unfortunately it happens all the time.

Often concepts are not ready for wargaming because they lack the essential components of a good strategy. Conducting a wargame on a strategy like this is a waste of time, talent, and resources. Before bringing in teams to participate in wargames or wargame-like activities concepts should be assessed using Structured Analytic Techniques, Intelligence Analysis, Liberating Structures, and Red Teaming techniques to diagnose the situation and divine an effective overall guiding policy. To use an American football analogy, the new coach of a team needs to take a hard look at his playbook with coaches and coordinators over the summer to determine if the playbook will be effective against the other teams in the league before the the season starts. 

Definition Wars

While some experts do not believe the exact definition of wargaming matters, those of us who deliver wargames to sponsors in the Department of Defense and other government agencies in support of developing good strategy strongly believe that discussions over ontology and taxonomy are extremely important. Correct taxonomy ensures the right tool is employed to address the right question. Wargame sponsors need to understand the full set of tools available and when to use them because they control the larger analytic ecosystem.

There is a general consensus within the defense professional community regarding what wargame is. The Joint Staff offers a definition for the Department of Defense: “Wargames are representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions.”

The Joint Staff has identified best practices for wargaming in JP 5-0. Wargaming is most effective when it involves the following elements:

1. A well-developed, valid Course of Action
2. People making decisions
3. A fair, competitive environment (i.e., the game should have no rules or procedures designed to tilt the playing field toward one side or another)
4. Adjudication
5. Consequences of actions
6. Iteration (i.e., new insights will be gained as games are iterated)

Other wargaming professional publications agree that the critical elements of a wargame are: factions in conflict or competition (live competitors), people making decisions, and revealing the consequences of those decisions. Talking vaguely about what you might do and not making choices undermines the entire point of a wargame. When wargames are properly done, they provide the participants a synthetic experience to enable an understanding of the perspective of other and thus to anticipate the actions of others, especially rivals, and the range of outcomes which can occur. Wargame-like analysis that does not meet these criteria can still be valuable, but it is important to recognize where it falls short and work toward designing a true wargame if that is the required level of analysis.

Table Top Exercises

Returning to our football analogy, having a playbook and a roster of players does not mean you are ready to play a game, and certainly not a championship. The quarterback and the receivers must know the routes which will be run. The linemen must know which play employs pass-blocking or rush-blocking, etc. Each element of the team must understand a play in order to execute it properly. The team’s walk throughs and practices are our wargame-like events and just as the coach can increase the difficulty until the team is conducting a full scrimmage, game designers can increase the complexity of wargame-like activities until the concepts and the players are ready for a clash with a professional red team.

Continuing our football team analogy, preparation begins with the players talking through the plays in the locker room on a chalkboard, which is akin to a Table Top Exercise. A table top exercise is a facilitated discussion of a scripted scenario in an informal, stress-free environment that is based on current applicable policies, plans, and procedures. A table top exercise is an informal, discussion-based session in which a team discusses their roles and responses during an emergency, walking through one or more example scenarios. The hypothetical situation is introduced, and the team members talk through what the response should be. A good table top exercise will employ maps and other visualizations to enable the participants to have a common understanding of the scenario and the actions of others in their organization. The key value of a table top exercise is to bring together participants from disparate organizations (e.g., Allies, Inter-Agency) to discuss how to coordinate whole of government(s) responses, identify who has jurisdictions, permissions, and authorities. The table top exercise is a wargame-like activity and the most common for many organizations which claim to conduct wargames.

Some table top exercises, such as those conducted by the Joint Staff J-8 Studies, Analysis and Gaming Division (SAGD), RAND corporation, and other organizations, will include the perspective of opposition forces (Red Team) represented by the intelligence community or professional emulation teams. But, the Red team in these cases is a minority member and does not have the full agency of action accorded to the collective Blue team.

Table top exercises are appropriate in a qualitative assessments of strengths and weaknesses. The key value of the table top exercise is to engage all stakeholders in a facilitated discussion to clarify inconsistencies and interpretations and determine if there are coherent policies and procedures. But, they are not appropriate to calculate outcomes as Red does not have full agency of actions nor is there an assessment of how effective any action would be, much less in the face of opposing actions and they do noy convey a full understanding of the risks and consequences of selected courses of action.

So, while a table top exercise is not a wargame, it is a valuable wargame-like activity which tests if a strategy is designed with coherent action known among its stakeholders and in some cases a perspective on the reaction of the opposition.

Rehearsal of Concept

Once our football team has talked through each of their actions in a play on the chalkboard and are now headed to the field to see if they can execute the plays, without opposition, essentially a rehearsal. A rehearsal is a session in which a staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. Commanders use this tool to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the concept of operations and commander’s intent. A Rehearsal of Concept drill is a dry walk-through of a plan between a commander and their subordinates ensuring a shared understanding of the plan. Conducting a rehearsal of concept drill will enable a team to execute their elements of a concept within a game or exercise. Further the rehearsal of concept drill is likely to reveal elements of the concept or the execution plan which require additional refinement.

There are several variations of the rehearsal. The Sketch Map Rehearsals is a drill to help subordinate leaders visualize the commander’s intent and concept of operations. A Command Post Exercise is a training exercise that may be conducted in garrison or in the field. It’s the most common exercise used for training staffs, subordinate, and supporting leaders to successfully plan, coordinate, synchronize, and exercise command and control over operations during missions.

The rehearsal of concept drill, and its variants, will ensure the team has a coordinated plan which they can execute and assists in designing a strategy with and overall guiding policy and coherent action. As players demonstrate proficiency in the plan, experienced game designers and referees will introduce complications to see how brittle or robust the plan is in the face of friction. Like adding scrimmage players to a football team’s practice, game professionals will add murphy-isms, such as weather, washed out roads, accidents, injuries, missed communications, and other random (but not enemy induced) elements of friction. However valuable, a rehearsal of concept is still not a wargame. Like a football rehearsals, a rehearsal of concept lacks a thinking opponent ready and determined to undermine the concept and its components.

Wargaming

Our football coach has assessed his playbook, assigned players to their roles, had them walk through their part of the plays, then rehearsed the execution of the plays with greater challenges and scrimmages. Now his team is ready to play against opposition. In the same manner, the best practice is to subject a concept or strategy to Red Teaming and other analytic efforts, then conduct a table top exercise, then a rehearsal of concept before playing in a wargame against the thinking opponent. In our experience, attempting to play an immature concept or strategy with a team unfamiliar with the concept in a game leads to frustration and waste of resources, time, and talent.

Alternatively, a series of wargames is the acid test, a dialectic clash of opposing theories of victory against a thinking opponent. At the heart of this iterative process is a thinking opponent grappling with the mechanics of execution of competing plans or confounding your plan with a judo throw. William McCarty Little, who helped bring naval wargaming to the Naval War College in its early years, once argued that “the great secret of its power lies in the existence of the enemy, a live vigorous enemy in the next room waiting feverishly to take advantage of any of our mistakes, ever ready to puncture any visionary scheme, to haul us down to earth.” 

Fully exploring the consequences of the game and properly set the narrative of what occurred will require adjudication of the actions of the competing sides. Such adjudication will require implicit or explicit models or techniques to be defensible in and after the game. The adjudication techniques can be in the collective minds of the participants (Matrix Game), an expert or group of experts (Free Kriegspiel), or baked into the rules (Rigid Kriegspiel). A good game designer will select rules for a game, or elements of a game, based on our understanding of the phenomena the competition is occurring in and revise them in iterations of gaming and analysis, which should include other analytic techniques.

Rigor Versus Detail

When assessing the proper use of wargame-like events and various types and styles of wargames, do not mistake excessive detail for rigor.

Wargames are a shared experiential narrative that can have a powerful impact on participants, shaping the organizational learning of those who employ it. Therefore, it is crucial the game be founded in reality; using “valid knowledge of the environment.” If not, we risk conveying negative learning to a large group of people and sowing confusion potentially for years to come. It has been said: “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.” Wargame designers should follow the advice of Ms. Virginia “Robbin” Beall, the former lead operations analyst on the Navy staff, when she admonishes wargames must, like the Hippocratic Oath, “do no harm” and avoid conveying improper assumptions which set in the participants’ minds. For example, in one wargame, air-to-air refueling aircraft delivered the same amount of fuel to aircraft regardless of the range of the tanker from its home base. This exaggerated the effects of air power in the wargame, the minds of the participants, and the results.

A good wargame designer will design the game to address decisions the players are expected to make at the level of the role they are playing, and avoid detail for its own sake. There is no reason why the staff of a joint operational command should be involved in details of tactical units.

Conclusion

Much of what the Department of Defense calls wargaming is not actually wargaming, and that matters. These various “not-wargaming” exercises are still valuable as long as we recognize what we are doing and consciously select the appropriate tool in the strategy development process. Using an immature concept or strategy, or forcing a team who is not familiar with it, into a proper wargame is a waste of time and talent. On the other hand, a table top exercise is insufficient to test a strategy to see if it contains the elements of a good strategy, particularly the anticipations of the actions of rivals. The Department of Defense and other agencies must expect a proper level of rigor in its series of games in a Cycle of Research. Actual wargames require: A well-developed concept of operations (theory of victory); people making decisions; a fair, competitive environment; adjudication; consequences of actions; preferably in an iterative cycle of game and analysis.

When someone says they have wargamed a concept, that should mean, they have gone through this specific process and not that they only completed a simple table top exercise, or a rehearsal of concept. The widely used table top exercise is a wargame-like event, a necessary but not sufficient step in the process of acid testing a good strategy or concept. In these dangerous times the Department cannot afford to be complacent and be satisfied with a “good conversation,” but must actually grapple with the opposition in a synthetic environment, where the organization can learn without risking it all. Failing to wargame properly in advance may mean having to learn in actual combat and risk it all.

Phillip Pournelle served in the United States Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer, planner, and Operations Analyst for 26 years. He is an analyst, strategist, wargame designer, and science fiction author working at Group W. He has a master’s degree in operations analysis from the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps officers assigned to the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conduct a wargaming scenario aboard Amphibious Assault Ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), Oct. 22, 2021. (USMC photo by Cpl. Yvonna Guyette)

Wargaming

Wargaming the Future: Educating the Fleet in Multi-Dimensional Warfare

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By LT Jack Tribolet

Educational wargaming is underutilized and possesses the potential to teach warfighters intricate modern doctrine and force capabilities. Historically, analytical wargaming has functioned as a critical tool for military leadership, offering insights into force capabilities and aiding decision-making through experiential learning. Yet, within the US Navy and Marine Corps, the potential of digital or electronic wargaming as an educational platform for junior officers and Midshipmen remains largely untapped. Traditional tabletop wargames, once favored by older generations, fail to engage the younger, digitally-raised cohort and instead cater to a niche community. Statistics speak volumes— about 80 percent of Generation Z and Millennials play video games and average around seven hours of weekly gametime—highlighting the opportunity for a new generation of wargames. This data underscores a missed opportunity in leveraging simulator-based educational wargaming for the 21st-century Navy and USMC. The capacity to craft a sophisticated, educational, and enjoyable physics-based simulator exists, and it is incumbent upon the Navy and USMC to embrace this modern technology for Professional Military Education (PME) and junior officer training.

In the Fall of 2023, the University of Southern California’s Naval ROTC program embarked on a year-long initiative to introduce Midshipmen to the complexities of the Taiwan problem set. This scenario-focused education requires a significant understanding of naval and amphibious operations and is ideal for incorporating wargames. USC’s educational program blends discussions, lectures, and essential reading materials, such as James R. Holmes’ Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (2018), which enabled the students to have an in-depth discussion with Dr. Holmes via Zoom regarding Taiwan. However, it is worth noting that this initiative provides only an introductory-level education for Midshipmen and would benefit immensely from the addition of fleet-integrated educational wargaming.

Historical instances, such as the development of War Plan Orange prior to the Second World War, demonstrate how effective analytical wargaming can be when mixed into scenario decision-making. Yet, no standardized efforts were made to prepare junior officers similarly. The Naval War College and officer training pipelines did not see the value in educating junior officers like senior officers. However, even though junior officers do not require the same analytical gaming experience as fleet commanders, they can benefit enormously from exposure to educational wargaming to introduce them to various topics. As a learning tool, wargames can train the participants in force capability and doctrine, provide terrain familiarization, and offer opportunities for decision-making development. Additionally, they challenge the participants mentally, stimulating and driving sophisticated problem-solving and decision-making. As a tool, variables can be added or subtracted to increase/decrease game complexity, allowing for infinite theoretical scenarios.

Updating the naval officer training curriculum should not be difficult. The United States Naval Academy (USNA) and Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) promulgate curriculum guiding Professional Core Competencies (PCCs) roughly every three years that govern “the foundational standards of ‘officership’ by delineating core competencies required of all officer accession programs.”1 Whispers of a new competency for basic instructional wargaming exist, but even if included in the 2024 PCCs, this will require significant time and resources to train unit Officer Instructors to run educational games proficiently. Additionally, few ROTC courses have extra time, and an already burdened weekly schedule leaves little for adding extra training on top of current requirements for Midshipmen. To the collective groan of students and instructors alike, adding wargaming to officer training will necessitate a standalone time slot in weekly schedules, rather than shoehorning wargaming into existing time. Furthermore, Officer Instructors will need professional training to standardize implementation and enable cross-unit competition.

The Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfighting at Marine Corps University (MCU), who are pioneering educational gaming for MCU students, example one potential source of training for Officer Instructors. MCU could integrate with the biannual three-week Teaching in Higher Education (TiHE) course for incoming NROTC instructors, and allow them to reach the hundreds of Sailors and Marines who commission through NROTC each year. Moreover, standardization of training and the games played across ROTC programs is paramount to enable cross-unit integration and competition. Competition in wargaming events would incentivize performance and further stimulate Midshipmen education. The Government Accountability Office recently recommended that the Navy and Marine Corps “evaluate the costs and benefits of developing standard wargaming education and qualifications for wargaming personnel.” Consequently, the services must establish wargaming as an Officer Instructor (OI) qualification to standardize and enhance training pipelines through educational gaming.2 This qualification could mimic the newly introduced Warrior Toughness program, which has gradually become part of the Fleet through accession pipelines. After rotating through ROTC the cadre returning to the Fleet could broaden wargaming initiatives at the unit level, gradually fostering a culture shift towards embracing wargaming more extensively across the services.

However, if the Navy and Marines want to capture the attention of a new generation, they must develop an educational but entertaining multi-dimensional physics-based simulator to maximize the application of 21st-century technology. Tabletop wargaming, while valuable, is not sufficient. Tabletop gaming offers an immediate but temporary avenue for educational learning at a remarkably affordable investment. Straightforward tabletop problem-solving games can be completed within a brief timeframe, ranging from twenty to thirty minutes. An illustrative example is the microgame “Call Sign,” which concentrates on carrier combat and introduces singular variables, showcasing how these games can efficiently impart knowledge and skills, but these games are insufficient to meet the needs of the ROTC curriculum and lack the potential of digital games.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored a study on the value of video games, which concluded that “people who play video games are quicker at processing information” and that only “ten hours of video games can change the structure and organization of a person’s brain,” therefore tying informational learning to entertainment has a remarkable potential to increase retention. Most importantly, education must be balanced with entertainment, meaning accurate force capabilities and doctrine must coincide with quality graphical rendering of the action and include regular updates. Simulating forced decision-making with minimal time and minimal information provides invaluable experience for future military decision-makers. Furthermore, an in-depth military simulator would require knowledge of blue force design and doctrine, cultivate warrior skillsets, and increase tactical acumen. A competitive gaming culture amongst recruits and service members will ensure the longevity of such a program.

Effective strategy games blend a minimal initial learning curve but increase in depth and complexity while remaining re-playable due to variety. Like traditional board wargames, turn-based games necessitate a fundamental understanding of force design and doctrine. Conversely, real-time strategy (RTS) games demand swift decision-making, compelling players to act within a restricted timeframe. Modern games often integrate these two approaches, allowing players to oversee larger forces strategically in a turn-based mode while enabling detailed control over individual units during confrontations. This amalgamation of turn-based and RTS elements harnesses the educational advantages of understanding force dynamics while providing experiential learning through decision-making, offering a holistic approach to strategic gaming.

One potential commercially available wargame is Command: Modern Operations. However, this game suffers from being overly complex, detracting from the entertainment value of the equation as it requires many hours of instruction to play. Unfortunately, no commercially available modern strategic video game fits this balanced role, and most avoid contemporary conflict scenarios and instead focus on fictional Cold War scenarios. For example, naval-centric Cold Waters (2017) and land-centric WARNO (2022) display well-researched military simulators exhibiting the capabilities of Cold War-era forces. The success of Cold War-era simulators remains undeniable, as the developers of Cold Waters have showcased an upcoming impressively modeled new game, Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age. The cost of developing a modern video game ranges from $10,000 to millions. However, the DoD could drastically cut this cost by leveraging an already created modern simulator, such as WARNO, funding this successful team and providing experts to modify a pre-created simulator to reflect modern force capabilities.

An LRASM salvo attack is launched against a PLA Navy Carrier Strike Group in the wargame Command: Modern Operations. (Video via Emerging Threats Group Youtube Channel)

Furthermore, the official Navy/USMC stamp on a military simulator would draw outsized attention from the private market, serve as a potent recruitment tool, and create a competitive outlet for Midshipmen and officers. The Navy has already worked to capitalize on the popularity of video games by creating an E-Sports team, which is run by the Navy Recruiting Command. Yet, an official strategy simulator would draw further interest through military recognition by connecting to modern youth in the popular video game dimension. In the US alone, the strategy game market revenue reached $14.88 billion in 2022, exhibiting a significant market share of overall games. Ultimately, the success of a military simulator hinges on player enjoyment and support; popular strategy games such as Starcraft II maintain over a five million monthly player count despite being a decade old. In comparison, WARNO only sold 213,000 copies so far, as it lacks competitive depth.

Warsaw Pact and NATO forces compete in combined arms maneuver warfare in the wargame WARNO. (Video via VulcanHDGaming Youtube Channel)

Unfortunately, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has outpaced the US in competitive digital wargaming, recognizing its potential for education since the early 2000s. Notably, since 2017, the PLA has organized national wargaming competitions, boasting more than 20,000 participants in 2019 alone. Emphasizing the educational aspect, the PLA actively encourages military simulator usage to instruct on force design changes and to promote military affairs to the civilian population. Initially, the PLA benefitted enormously from mimicking US civilian market military simulators, but has since shifted to domestic-made strategy games, such as Mozi Joint Operations Deduction System, which enables military members to fight simulated battles with Chinese equipment. Additionally, the PLA copied popular US titles, such as Call of Duty, to create their own first-person shooter, Glorious Mission, to “improve combat skills and technological understanding” in military members.3 Wargaming has evolved into an integral part of PME for the PLA, gaining widespread popularity even amongst the civilian population. This exemplifies a dimension where the PLA initially imitated the US military, strategically leveraged the US private sector, and ultimately leapfrogged US capabilities to outperform the US military in PME.

A salvo of Soviet P-500 Bazalt anti-ship missiles (NATO reporting name: SS-N-12 Sandbox) is fired by a Slava-class cruiser against a U.S. Cold War-era surface action group in the upcoming wargame Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age. (Work-in-progress developer video via Not Sure Youtube Channel)

Damien O’Connell, the founder of the Warfighting Society, recently penned an article, “Progress and Perils: Educational Wargaming in the US Marine Corps,” on The Maneuverist blog, which delineated implementation issues for fleet-wide educational gaming. He outlines five obstacles to greater implementation of wargaming in the operating forces: “(1) confusion about what educational wargaming is and is not, (2) skepticism of its value, (3) ignorance of its successful use, (4) limited time, (5) aversion to nerd culture, and (6) ignorance of how to integrate wargames into training and education plans.”4 The Navy and USMC must not conflate educational gaming with analytical wargaming. Decision-making opportunities and force design instruction found in basic wargames will answer any confusion surrounding wargaming and its value and demonstrate its successful use to any observing critics. However, overcoming issues related to time and integration will demand a substantial initial investment and revised time requirements through curriculum standardization. Aversion to “nerd culture” stems from a historical stigma against board gaming, shared even by video gamers; this dislike can be easily solved by tapping into the voracious appetite for video games.

A secondary benefit of creating wargame literate junior officers would positively boost the ability of time-proven analytical gaming and thus improve force design and doctrine. The early introduction of wargames will create “a bigger pool of individuals who are exposed to the principles of wargaming, allowing the DOD to cast a wider net when looking for qualified individuals to build, run, and analyze games,” and in turn, increase the performance of future professional analytical wargaming.5 Furthermore, the over-reliance on civilian-run wargames has created a capability deficit among military personnel, because fewer are trained in how to run and manage wargames.6 This culture change could imitate the drastic success of the Prussian officer corps, which spawned avid wargamers such as General von Moltke—the Prussian army chief of staff—who expanded the use of wargaming under his leadership. As a result, the Prussian military dominated the European continent in the 19th century and forged a dominant military doctrine that lasted a century. Unsurprisingly, “many countries attributed the battlefield success of Moltke and the Prussians to the integration of wargaming in their army.”7

Junior officer education needn’t be limited to monotonous PowerPoint displays or exclusive to PME. Wargaming presents a straightforward remedy for a complex educational challenge and should not be dismissed as an after-school activity. If the US military aims to regain the edge against the PLA in critical thinking and education, it must create a finely tuned educational military simulation video game. Furthermore, the potential for training will exponentially grow as technology such as virtual reality becomes more readily available. The Navy and USMC must stay ahead of the educational curve, set the foundation for a future sophisticated Ender’s Game-like military simulation or Star Trek’s morality-testing unwinnable game, the Kobayashi Maru, and turn science fiction into reality. Existing tabletop games may temporarily suffice but must be formally integrated into the curriculum and eventually replaced by digital simulations. The value of multi-domain educational learning from wargaming cannot be overstated. Moreover, increased interaction with younger generations through a popular Navy-endorsed video game could help draw in technology-oriented recruits. The Navy and USMC must embrace 21st century technology and adapt it to benefit instruction for foreseeable near-peer threats. No military aviator argues against the extensive use of flight simulators in modern instruction; this attitude must be broadened to the entire Fleet.

LT Jack Tribolet flew the MH-60S Knighthawk with HSC-26 out of Norfolk. He currently serves as an Officer Instructor teaching at the University of Southern California and is the nationwide NROTC Course Coordinator for the class Seapower & Maritime Affairs.

References

1. Officer Professional Core Competencies, United States Naval Academy, Naval Service Training Command, April 2019, iv. https://www.netc.navy.mil/Portals/46/NSTC/cmd-docs/manuals/2019%20Officer%20Professional%20Core%20Competencies%20(PCC)%20Manual.pdf?ver=2020-08-06-111416-387#

2. Government Accountability Office, Defense Analysis:Additional Actions Could Enhance DOD’s Wargaming Efforts, April 24, 2023, 32. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105351.pdf

3. Kania, Elsa B. and McCaslin, Ian Burns. Learning Warfare From the Laboratory—China’s Progression in Wargaming and Opposing Force Training. Washington DC, MD: Institute For the Study of War, September 2021, 18. Learning Warfare from the Laboratory ISW September 2021 Report.pdf (understandingwar.org)

4. Damien O’Connell, “Progress and Perils: Educational Wargaming in the US Marine Corps,” The Warfighting Society, Updated 25 December 2023. Progress and Perils: Educational Wargaming in the US Marine Corps By Damien O’Connell (themaneuverist.org)

5. Hunter, “Immerse Early, Immerse Often,” 38.

6. Kyleanne Hunter, “Immerse Early, Immerse Often: Wargaming in Precommissioning Education,” in Forging Wargamers: A Framework for Professional Military Education, ed. Sebastian J. Bae (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2022), 31.

7. Appleget, Jeff, et al. The Craft of Wargaming: A Detailed Planning Guide for Defense Planners and Analysts. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2020, 53.

Featured Image: A Soviet surface warship under attack from Harpoon missiles (Developer work-in-progress screenshot of wargame Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age, via