Category Archives: Readiness

Readiness

If the U.S. Navy can’t Repair Ships in Peacetime, how will it do so in War?

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By Michael Hogan

Introduction

The Navy has well-documented issues with building warships. Less discussed, but equally important, are issues with repairing the ships it already has, which jeopardizes its ability to meet its own goal of sustaining a across all platforms. As the Navy focuses on preparing for a great power conflict potentially, the Navy needs to improve not just its peacetime ship repair capability but also expand its capacity to account for wartime repair requirements. While the issues facing the U.S. shipbuilding industry are complex, and it will take time to expand shipbuilding capacity for large combatants, the U.S. shipbuilding sector does have a robust capacity to build smaller vessels that can improve the U.S. Navy’s repair capabilities. In fact, there are 125 private U.S. shipyards that are capable of building small vessels needed for repair and salvage. The United States needs to prepare now for battle damage repair by investing in repair ships, and learning lessons from recent emergent repairs and the last major war it fought at sea.

Historical Precedent: World War II

A potential war with China will be fought mostly in the Pacific theater, which forces the United States into a major logistical challenge due to the tyranny of distance from the homeland. During the last great power naval conflict, the U.S. Navy learned the importance of battle damage repair for sustaining a distant fight. One important component of victory in the Pacific was the work of naval auxiliaries that supported combatants, generally organized in Service Squadrons. Initially equipped with just oilers and other logistics platforms to replenish warships, fleet commanders realized the importance of deploying repair assets, especially fleet and salvage tugs, with these service squadrons to provide at-sea capabilities for recovering damaged vessels.

Fleet tugs, often cited in historical accounts, were essential in rendering salvage services. These tugs towed damaged vessels to areas where repairs could be made, often preventing the permanent loss of ships. The absence of fleet tugs at the Battle of Midway likely foreclosed the fate of the precious aircraft carrier USS Yorktown, as the Navy had not yet fully grasped the vital importance of salvage tugs in saving battle-damaged ships. Similarly, the carrier USS Hornet, destroyer USS Porter, and cruiser USS Atlanta were lost largely due to inadequate salvage capabilities.

As the importance of tugs became clear during the war, they were used extensively throughout the Pacific campaign to save ships, allowing temporary repairs and enabling them to return home for more permanent fixes. The United States invested heavily in this capability during the war, building more than 200 tugs and over 40 rescue and salvage ships. Floating drydocks also played a crucial role, enabling the Navy to make the repairs necessary to restore ships to seaworthiness—even if only temporarily—so they could return to the United States for more extensive repairs. When ships could not be saved, salvage vessels stripped valuable repair parts, ensuring that forward-deployed ships had access to critical resources. The ability to recover damaged ships and clear sunken vessels from ports was vital to maintaining momentum in the American island-hopping campaign, extending the time that ships could remain on station.

USS ABSD-6 repairing USS South Dakota (BB-57) in Guam after an accidental explosion on May 6, 1945, while rearming from USS Wrangell (AE-12). (U.S. Navy photo)

Current State of the Salvage Fleet

Today, the U.S. Navy’s salvage fleet is far less robust than the one that was essential to winning the Pacific campaign. After the Cold War, the Navy dramatically downsized its auxiliary ship fleet, reducing the number of vessels from 113 in 1994 to 52 in 1997, including the decommissioning of nearly all tenders. Currently, Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates only three ocean-going tugs, two rescue and salvage ships, and two submarine tenders, with the newest of these vessels commissioned in the mid-1980s. In contrast, China, the pacing threat of the United States, has 30 tugs, 46 rescue and salvage ships, and 12 tenders between its navy and rescue and salvage bureau.

As analyst and retired naval officer Brent Sadler notes in U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century, there are no large floating dry docks capable of repairing Ohio-class submarines and large surface combatants—despite their critical role in post-accident recovery, such as the repair of the USS San Francisco after its grounding in 2005. Floating drydocks provide a mobile repair capability, allowing significant repairs to be conducted in locations where permanent infrastructure does not exist, such as forward deployed bases during a regional conflict. This results in the US Navy either needing to bring the damaged vessel back to one of the homeland drydocks, which are already at capacity with modernization and maintenance, or lease a floating drydock from private industry. The Navy must also rely on chartered commercial heavy-lift ships to move damaged vessels, such as when the USS Cole had to be transported to Pascagoula for repairs after the 2000 terrorist bombing.

(Jan. 27, 2005) Apra Harbor, Guam:  USS San Francisco (SSN 711) in dry dock to assess damages sustained after running aground approximately 350 miles south of Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Mark Allen Leonesio)

Recent Incidents and Issues

The U.S. Navy has not faced significant battle damage repairs since the 2000 terrorist bombing of USS Cole, the closest a U.S. Navy ship has come to combat damage in the last 30 years. Nevertheless, repair issues during recent forward-deployed collisions, allisions, and groundings mark a good approximation of what to expect, albeit on a smaller scale. Minor repairs following a collision, such as USS Jacksonville in 2013, can be made pier side, even in foreign ports, with the assistance of a submarine tender. Although, as noted above, the tender capacity has been drastically reduced in recent years. With public shipyards operating near capacity, however, more significant collision repairs require trade-offs.

Following two 2017 surface collisions in the Pacific, USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald both required extensive repairs prior to their return to service. McCain was repaired in Yokosuka at Ship Repair Facility-Japan vice bringing it back to the U.S. for repairs. Fitzgerald, on the other hand, was contracted out to Huntington Ingalls Industries shipyard in Pascagoula, MS. Both ships required leasing a heavy lift transport to their repair destination, like Cole. The grounding of the USS Connecticut in 2021 offers a different trade-off. After colliding with a seamount, the submarine remained at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard from December 2021 to July 2023, until entering dry dock for her previously scheduled Extended Dry-docking Selected Restrictive Availability (EDSRA), where the repairs would be made. In this case, Connecticut was “lucky” that the incident occurred close to a scheduled maintenance period.

The guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald sits in Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan, for repairs and damage assessments, July 13, 2017. The USS Fitzgerald sustained damage during a June 17 collision with a merchant vessel, resulting in the deaths of seven Sailors. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Christian Senyk)

Even if the U.S. Navy added the recommended salvage tugs and floating drydocks, the navy’s shipyards are already stretched beyond their limits with planned modernization and maintenance. For example, faced a prolonged and costly repair timeline when the submarine’s fiscal year (FY) 2016 overhaul was canceled to accommodate ballistic missile submarine and aircraft carrier maintenance, losing its dive certification in 2017. Only in early 2024 was a contract signed to begin the overhaul, nine years after its last deployment, with expected completion in 2029 at the cost of $1.17 billion. The loss of operational capability, crew experience, and the daily upkeep costs over almost 15 years could add up to be more detrimental than the price tag itself, especially when the fleet is already straining to meet operational demands.

At a time when Congress is focused on getting newly built submarines delivered promptly, the inability to use one that the U.S. Navy already owns is unacceptable. These types of delays will only become more commonplace in a conflict without expanding our salvage and repair capabilities.

Congress has shown that it is willing to address such shipyard issues, for example, allocating, but this is focused on producing new construction submarines for the U.S. Navy and the AUKUS agreement. The 2018 investment in the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan was important but it is over budget and behind schedule, and the chronic delay in ship repairs remains. In FY21 and 22, less than 40 percent of ships completed maintenance availabilities on time.

All these shortfalls come during planned, peacetime maintenance periods. If the U.S. Navy needs to make repairs to battle damage in a major conflict, they do not have the salvage capabilities to conduct repairs at sea or forward deployed, they do not have the industrial base to support the additional work, and they do not have the open shipyard space to put the damaged ships. To make U.S. ship repair shortcomings worse, China has more than 200 times more capacity for shipbuilding, including a large commercial capacity, that can likely be repurposed in time of conflict for repairs.

(October 31, 2000) The semi-submersible ship M/V Blue Marlin carrying the damaged USS Cole. (U.S. Navy photo)

The Way Ahead

To address these deficiencies in repair and salvage capabilities, the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, and Congress must learn from recent incidents and the lessons of World War II. First, the Navy should implement the recommendations from the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on ship repair, such as “developing a ship industrial base strategy that aligns with the National Defense Industrial Strategy.” As part of this, the Navy needs to examine all emergent repairs spurred by modern incidents starting with USS Cole to identify gaps in planning and capabilities, and the root causes of delays. This should include where salvage and repair ships were needed and unavailable. Any needed infrastructure or platform investments, such as forward-deployed floating drydocks, should be forwarded to Congress for supplemental funding. Immediate investments in these capabilities will bolster the U.S. Navy’s ability to better perform peacetime maintenance while building capacity to absorb battle damage repair in future conflict.

Second, Congress should pass the bipartisan SHIPS for America Act, providing 10 years of funding to boost the commercial shipbuilding industry and the merchant marine. This will help to provide more shipbuilding and repair capability and capacity throughout the United States in the event of future conflicts, and train qualified personnel for the MSC that mans and operates the Navy’s repair and salvage fleet. The combination of short- and long-term investments will turn the tide on the U.S. Navy’s repair capabilities before ships are lost, while sustaining them for decades to come.

Third, the Department of Defense needs to recognize ship repair as equal to shipbuilding when prioritizing funding. Ship repair is a subset of some of the Secretary of Defense’s 17 FY26 budget priorities, and a priority of the CNO’s Navigation Plan. Repairing ships already in Navy service reduces the effect of problems in shipbuilding. Finding ways to repair ships quicker increases public shipyard capacity, but this alone is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to create its own surge capability for the desired increase in naval fleet size and invest in private industry surge capability that can be optioned in case of added battle damage repair. Allocating the requisite funding to improve capacity and capability now will better prepare the U.S. Navy for great power conflict.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy faces a growing challenge in maintaining a combat-ready fleet. It was lucky when a recent collision between the USS Harry S Truman and a merchant vessel outside the Suez Canal required only minor repairs before the carrier could return to sea. If the Navy is to meet the demands of a major conflict, it must prioritize not only shipbuilding but also ship repair and salvage capabilities. The lessons of the past are clear—effective battle damage repair and salvage can mean the difference between victory and defeat. This means not just adding to the capacity to repair current ships but also building capacity for the larger fleet of the future and creating a surge capacity for times of conflict. By addressing these gaps now, the United States can ensure the Navy is prepared for whatever the future holds.

Michael Hogan is a Commander in the United States Navy and a career submarine officer with tours aboard both fast attack and ballistic missile submarines, most recently as Executive Officer of USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (Blue). He is currently the Senior U.S. Navy Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.

Featured Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) departs Pier 9 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka, Dec. 1, 2017 to proceed to anchorage in Yokosuka Harbor aboard heavy lift transport vessel MV Transshelf in order to make underway preparations. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Benjamin Dobbs)

Readiness

Are You Ready for This? Properly Defining Joint Readiness

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By C. Travis Reese

“Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparedness for a possible future one.” MCDP-1 Warfighting

Defense of the nation is a never-ending task. It is achieved by balancing readiness for today’s threats and tomorrow’s challenges. The relationship between current and future readiness is not a clean demarcation but a part of a continuum. Yet, when it comes to having a prepared force, the ambiguity around how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines readiness is muddying the prioritization between current threats and future modernization efforts. Actions in Ukraine are reinvigorating how DoD leaders evaluate preparedness for conflict. This makes the current era as important a time as any to understand how to assess overall readiness and the requirements to manage risk as the force prepares to address a peer adversary.

What would a better method of defining institutional readiness look like? In a nutshell, it would require DoD to establish an easily understood criteria for institutional readiness. This will allow co-equal comparison between the current and future to manage the risk between investment and divestment as it applies to the transition between the “as is” force and the future “to be” force. Why? Because as the character of war inevitably evolves it is necessary to know and develop those first principles of readiness that enable DoD to succinctly identify needed changes. This must be done in advance of when those changes may seem likely so that the wrong force is not maintained beyond its absolute utility and the current force is not undermined in its preparedness when disruption is not needed.

Readiness is the purpose behind the process

The core concern of DoD leaders is the readiness of the force, both for current and future challenges. Talk of concepts, manpower, capability, acquisition, forward basing, etc. are attributes and features of one great concern: readiness. There is no common definition of readiness across DoD, but there are some frameworks to help understand the components of current readiness and generating future readiness. The Components of Institutional Readiness diagram provides one example:

The Components of Institutional Readiness Diagram represents a framework to help understand the components of current readiness and generating future readiness.

Components of Institutional Readiness

Current readiness is enabled and assessed through the items on the left side of the chart and focused principally within the 5 year time frame of the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) (or military budget to the laymen). It is actual and real, not conceptual for which existing assets are committed as determined in the global force management and annual joint assessment process as key activities. It is the writ of commanders (both providers and employers) to assess their forces and identify gaps in capability and capacity based on existing theater Operations Plans (OPLANS). OPLANS are approved through the appropriate chain of command from Combatant Commanders to the Secretary of Defense and clearly identify the approach to engage current threats. They are evaluated through exercises and war games that test and revise the plan to maintain pace with an adversary and not a “past tense” frame of the problem or mission. These are “fight tonight” operations that current forces train to accomplish.

Future readiness is created through the components on the right side. It is largely conceptual in nature and framed through approved scenarios that represent plausible interpretations of future events relative to likely threats. Scenarios are evaluated through a qualitative wargaming process testing concepts, policies, or decisions or a quantitative process of modeling and simulation objectively replicating the environment with testable and repeatable variables and conditions. Both analytic methods when filtered through a net assessment enable discovery of gaps that may impact the future readiness of the force to succeed against future threats. War games and experimentation are used to examine the hypothesis of the future operating environment proposed in the scenarios and evaluate attributes of potential solutions. The results then are extrapolated to the requirements that inform the development of future concepts and their supporting capabilities.

The Iron Triangle of Capabilities, Threats, and Resources

The sustainment of the “as is” force and the creation of the “to be” force is framed by the balance of capabilities, threats, and resources. Different entities within DoD, based on their responsibilities, usually adopt one of the variables as their dominant lens and position. Those viewpoints are not, nor should they be, exclusive since they must be informed by inputs from the other two variables to have any context or meaning at all. Building a thing for a thing’s sake with no appreciation of why or with how much is anathema in any sense, let alone for a military application. Typically, in DoD capabilities are the lens of Services as force developers and force providers. Threats are the focus of the combatant commands as well as the Intelligence Community. Resources (especially money) are the dominant viewpoint of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff given their statutory duties in that regard. There are nuances within that, but that is the organized tension within DoD, which, when managed in collaboration vice competition can be highly effective.

To reconcile those points of view as they apply to future force design, a scenario-based analysis through wargaming or simulation is conducted. The scenario does not dictate the outcome but rather fuels the context to identify the balance between the three variables. Truly useful scenarios are agnostic of solution but present the plausible framework to consider problems and identify the attributes of potential solutions usually within a given timeframe of consideration. Good scenarios allow the introduction of any range of options or approaches. Scenarios for any military context should look and feel like military plans and orders. This realism helps to distinguish the difference between using current means and practices or adopting future ones. Scenarios must be accompanied with a thorough explanation of the factors and ideas that form their creations so they can be modified as needed with new data or plausible projections. Managed iterations of scenarios help to show an evolution of thinking and learning about future problems.

Scenarios that are suitable for wargames at the Department-level to identify future gaps and challenges are the result of interactions among three entities. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy provides an understanding of the desired “ends” from the National Defense Strategy (NDS) with amplifying detail through the defense planning guidance and framework defense planning scenarios. The Services with interaction from the Joint Staff create a model of the Joint Force applied to the scenarios, giving structure to the potential “ways” of the NDS. This comes in the form of Joint Force Operating Scenarios (JFOS). The JFOS mimics a Level 3 Operation Plan (OPLAN) set in a future operating environment. The Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD(CAPE)) and Service’s programming and budget evaluation offices examine the potential solutions necessary to achieve the ways and provide comparative assessment of the “means” presented by the Services to recommend the best composition for the force. The work of CAPE and other service analytic organizations is generally performed through quantitative modeling and simulation derived from the conditions applied to scenarios and war games. Only one product, the Joint Operating Environment (JOE), produced by the Joint Staff J7 routinely attempts to articulate a plausible future out to twenty years. The JOE is not comprised of any specific scenario but more a well-considered primer of issues influencing future security considerations.

The case for modernization is derived from the results of wargames and analyses from the scenarios and impacts the ability of the Service chiefs to design and fund the needs for the next evolution in the character of conflict. The case for maintaining the current force is based on current threats and emergent conditions which impact the ability of Combatant Commanders to fulfill their approved plans and missions. Suffice to say, there is no substitute for thinking hard about a problem which often corresponds to buying institutional time to think long as well. Planning earlier and including the potential growth in adversary capacity facilitates delivery of capabilities at the time they are needed, not after. Further, it can prevent retaining something long after it is useful, which causes current gaps to become more urgent and draws institutional focus to the present at the expense of the future. There is also a tendency at times to consider readiness by covering as many options through sub-specialization and regionalization in force development. That can provide useful insights, but in general those should be unique exceptions needed for a particular challenge balanced by the general demands of the force with tools that are applicable and adaptable to nearly any circumstance.

Assessing Risk between current and future

Understanding how institutional readiness is derived must be synchronized with a method for weighing risk against current and future threats. Much ink and rhetoric has been expended to complain over who has the best view and need to lead the efforts of force design in DoD. Secretary of Defense staff? Joint Staff? Combatant Commanders? Service Chiefs? A simple answer is “yes”, and it depends on what is being measured. Quite clearly Combatant Commanders come with a regional and threat-specific focus gauged on the near-term. That would make it inappropriate for them to manage efforts and Service-level resources to design a force that requires 10 years on average just to identify and develop. Further, Combatant Commanders compete against each other for resources and do not have a unitary appreciation of the threats. Yet they are totally within their purview to request forces with capabilities that make it possible to achieve assigned missions, and modify those forces as needed to suit the task. Conversely, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs must adjudicate that world-wide view and create forces capable of operating in any climb and place. They must deliver capabilities that require alignment of entire enterprises in complex discovery regardless of how often priorities shift or misguided defense acquisition efforts can be. This can be a complex process which requires OSD, with the aid of the Joint Staff, to provide an objective assessment of the proposed solutions to current and future readiness by the Combatant Commanders and the Services.

Richard Betts’ 1995 book Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, articulated a framework for thinking about readiness where he argued that decision-makers need to ask three key questions about readiness: Ready for what? Ready for when? And Ready with what? How can Betts’ framework be converted into a common model of comparison between current and future to co-equally weigh the sustainment of the current force against the imperative to modernize? An example is below:

Decision-makers need to ask three key questions about readiness: Ready for what? Ready for when? And Ready with what?

Risk Framework for Capability and Capacity

This model takes the three questions posed by Betts and frames them in three different graphs to help visualize risk and assess value based on the interactive variables of mission relevance, readiness to conduct a mission, and the capability of various force options. The graph under “Ready for What?” shows risk in terms of a military problem based on the likely frequency of occurrence. For example, nuclear forces may rest on the highest risk challenge with the lowest likelihood of occurrence. They are relevant to strategic deterrence but may have limited value in terms of day-to-day competitive activities. This graph also shows that generally lower risk activities (that can be cumulatively consequential to national security) have a higher probability of occurrence opposed to existential concerns. This gives a scale of an investment’s value based on its use case and the risk of not having it poses to our nation and our interests. The graph in Ready for when? shows how the duration of an expected challenge and how quickly it must be responded to factors into the cost of sustained preparedness. An immediate response requirement (ex. hostage rescue) requires a persistent ready posture. This may be opposed to larger scale contingencies that historically have longer periods of indication and warning with corresponding windows in time to prepare. The graph shows how overall daily readiness and training requirements factor into cost and sustainment of unique capabilities. Lastly, under “Ready with what?,” risk can be evaluated in terms what type of force is required for a challenge (large or small) and how long that force will be used. Generally, a short duration mission requires a discrete force of specialized capability, and a longer mission requires a larger force but that will take longer to prepare and enable. That will reflect on the capability of a force to operate effectively and how much investment is required to reach the standard necessary for a planned contingency.

The effectiveness of this model is a function on two factors. First, it converts Betts’ framework into a formula that can be applied to readiness for both current and future challenges to provide co-equal metrics of comparison. Second, it provides a clear criteria and visualization for the significance of those criteria by assessing the risk of maintaining a current capability or necessity of transitioning to a future one. Regardless of the choice, Betts’ framework can help move the Department forward when it comes to weighing risk with more empirical values that balance subjective and objective concerns in current force employment and future force design. 

Conclusion

The DoD has struggled to define institutional readiness and find a risk framework that can be equally applied to future and current concerns. Bett’s framework and other models in this discussion are templates for conducting comparative analysis of current and future risk to identify which focus areas are of primary concern. The framework used for distillation of those focus areas will inform the investment balance and mitigate tension between current urgent and future important concerns. This competition is framed by an acceptable risk level tolerance competition, pitting current and future challenges against each other. If a current challenge is unmitigated and high risk, it may require DoD to de-emphasize evaluation of future objectives. If the future appears to be riskier and the current challenges are as “in hand” as they will ever be, then an emphasis on addressing future concerns would be required. Currently, the DoD does not compare current and future threats to a common framework. The lack of framework creates an inability to weigh efforts and resources for either near term security or long-term effect or to even make an assessment. Instead, they are lumped into a pot of “threats” and sorted out by the whomever is the most successful advocate posturing around a vague definition of the need to be “ready” with very few metrics of prioritization or categorization. The goal of readiness is to avoid “present shock” – a condition in which “we live in a continuous, always-on ‘now’” and lose the sense of long-term direction. This can only be achieved when readiness is clearly defined with common criteria for evaluating the risks of sustainment and modernization of capabilities as they apply to current problems or future dilemmas.

Travis Reese retired from the Marine Corps as Lieutenant Colonel after nearly 21 years of service. While on active duty he served in a variety of billets including tours in capabilities development, future scenario design, and institutional strategy. Mr. Reese is now the Director of Wargaming and Net Assessment for Troika Solutions in Reston, VA.

Featured Image: EIELSON AIR FORCE BASE, Alaska (March 25, 2022) – A formation of 42 F-35A Lightning IIs during a routine readiness exercise at Eielson Air Force Base (EAFB), Alaska, March 25, 2022. The formation demonstrated the 354th Fighter Wing’s (FW) ability to rapidly mobilize fifth-generation aircraft in arctic conditions. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Jose Miguel T. Tamondong)