Notes to the New Administration Week

By Sam J. Tangredi

All other criteria aside, key figures in the new administration have a knowledge of how to make money. They now need to recognize that the U.S. Navy has a purpose that goes beyond warfighting. It is a critical geo-economic instrument that through global naval dominance helps sustain the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency. An investment in naval dominance is an investment in continued prosperity. Without it our future will be poorer.

Holding the world reserve currency—the primary currency with which global trade is conducted—provides great economic benefit to national prosperity. As one financial analyst notes, “Typically, the world’s reserve currency—the U.S. dollar—has given the U.S. a special privilege of not being held to the same standard as others. We can get away with issuing more dollars.” This generally allows the U.S. government to borrow money at lower interest rates than others to fuel its spending and keep taxes lower, presumably encouraging an innovative, expanding economy.

Historically, the world reserve currency has followed the course of the globally dominant sea power. Economists have identified the historical shift of world reserve currency status from Venice to Spain to the Dutch Republic (Netherlands) to Great Britain to the U.S. All had vibrant economies (relative to their era), all benefited from global trade, all had large merchant fleets. But other nations also possessed these attributes. Each however was also the dominant naval power at the time their currencies were accepted as the common global trading medium. This does not necessarily mean that global naval dominance is the direct cause of holding the world reserve currency, but it is a correlated sustaining factor.

What is it about naval dominance? The global financial markets crave security and stability. Naval dominance ensures the perception of security and stability to financial markets by providing a major competitive commercial advantage. Not only can naval dominance ensure that a nation’s trade cannot be cut off by another nation, but that it can cut off the trade of other nations, if it so chooses. This is not the classical interpretation of free trade, but it is the reality. If financial markets seek the greatest stability, it is logical that they would consider the potential of this advantage.

Today’s Department of Defense has become a Department of War that is managing far flung conflicts in the name of counterterrorism and stability, generally in the form of special operations forces (SOF). Even with the focus on the People’s Republic of China (which wants to dethrone the U.S. dollar), DoD has largely forgotten about the U.S. Navy’s unique role as a result of its current joint ideology. But the DoD is responsible for the defense of Americans, both in terms of their national security and their prosperity. It cannot fund naval forces equivalently if it does not want the PRC renminbi to become the next world reserve currency, driven in part by the ever-expanding PLA Navy. A shrinking Navy that loses global naval dominance will eventually lead to a shrinking dollar, with grave consequences for American prosperity.

Dr. Sam J. Tangredi serves as the Leidos Chair of Future Warfare Studies and is professor of national, naval and maritime strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He has published seven books, over 200 journal articles and book chapters, and numerous reports for government and academic institutions on a broad range of defense issues. His latest work is Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars (Naval Institute Press, 2024), co-authored with George Galdorisi. Dr. Tangredi is a retired Navy captain and surface warfare officer and specialist in naval strategy. He held command at sea, was head of the OPNAV Strategy and Concepts Branch, and directed other strategic planning organizations.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer Lassen escorts the merchant vessel Tomahawk through the Strait of Hormuz. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael H. Lehman/Navy)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine

Dear Secretary-Designate Phelan,

Much like constructing an investment portfolio, developing a balanced naval force involves spreading risk and resources across complementary assets. While large, heavily armed, and exquisitely equipped warships deliver formidable returns in terms of deterrence and combat power, they are also expensive to build, crew, and maintain. They are also difficult to integrate with smaller, less capable partner navies. To remain both cost-effective and globally engaged, the U.S. Navy needs a balanced mix of high-end capital ships and smaller, more economical vessels, even if the latter are inherently less armed and defended. This tradeoff is not only acceptable but strategically beneficial, given the Navy’s role in day-to-day operations.

In naval terms, the “high-end” segment of the fleet—supercarriers, large amphibious assault ships, submarines, and destroyers—constitutes our “blue-chip” investments, yielding substantial deterrent and warfighting value when employed in crises or conflict. However, operating them continuously for routine missions equates to wearing down premium assets on relatively low-threat tasks, akin to using golden sledgehammers to drive nails.

While high-end platforms remain critical, the Navy’s attempts to field smaller, lower-end ships have encountered pitfalls, as illustrated by the Littoral Combat Ships and the Constellation-class frigate (FFG-62) program. Originally envisioned as a cost-effective adaptation of the European multi-purpose frigate (Fregata Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM)), it was supposed to benefit from an existing hull design and propulsion system. Instead, design changes aimed at countering peer adversaries’ capabilities have ballooned the ship’s complexity, resulting in only about fifteen percent commonality with its FREMM predecessor and significant cost, schedule, and performance risks.

Yet these frigates should not need the same level of capability as a destroyer. Their true value lies in handling missions along the low-intensity end of the competition continuum, where their inherent affordability, simplicity, and smaller crew requirements deliver operational efficiency. By assigning them to daily presence tasks and maritime security operations, the Navy can conserve its more capable vessels for high-risk scenarios, preserving their readiness and deterring potential adversaries without incurring excessive operating costs.

Moreover, the Constellation-class frigate, like the Littoral Combat Ship, operates well within the environments where global partnership-building occurs, particularly alongside allied navies that field similarly-sized and equipped ships. These lower-end combatants facilitate trust-building exercises and joint patrols, strengthening alliances in ways that large, capital-intensive platforms sometimes cannot. And if conflict were ever to break out, they could reposition to conduct maritime interdiction, protect sea lines of communication, or support operations in secondary theaters, freeing the Navy’s high-end assets to focus on major combat.

As Secretary of the Navy, you have the unique opportunity to apply an investor’s mindset to our naval force design: prioritizing strategic returns, hedging against risk, and maximizing the value of every platform. By recalibrating the fleet to feature both capital-intensive “blue-chip” combatants and smaller, relatively lower-cost “growth” vessels, you can ensure the Navy remains agile across the full competition continuum. This portfolio-style approach not only delivers sustainable presence and alliance-building on a global scale, but also preserves high-end readiness for critical moments when exquisite capability proves indispensable. In doing so, you will champion a modernized sea power strategy that delivers robust dividends to the nation while smartly managing limited resources.

Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is an FA-18 weapons systems officer currently assigned to Strike Fighter Wing Pacific. He previously served as a fellow with the Halsey Alfa Advanced Research Group at the U.S. Naval War College.

Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is a naval aviator currently assigned to U.S. 7th Fleet. He is a CIMSEC Senior Editor.

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: SOUTH CHINA SEA (Sept. 7, 2021) An F-35C Lightning II, assigned to the “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147, launches from the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) while the carrier transits the South China Sea with Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Tulsa (LCS 16).

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC

The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy find themselves having to reevaluate and evolve their relationship to execute the concepts of Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). While not exactly new concepts, LOCE and EABO have not been put into practice by the Marine Corps and Navy in major operations since the Pacific campaign of World War II. There has been a major focus on amphibious lift inside the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) of the adversary, but this leaves a gap in the intermediate zone in which Marines and equipment must be transported from larger hubs in the United States or allied countries to points in which they transition into the WEZ. To increase the capability of the naval expeditionary force to meet the demands across the global maritime commons and in non-permissive maritime environments, the Navy should acquire at least 30 Lewis B Puller (ESB-3)-class Expeditionary Mobile Base ships.

The mission sets of LOCE/EABO require distributed forces over long distances and the need to minimize the effects of ship losses. The Navy needs to acquire at least 30 ESB ships in order to accomplish this. The ESB class can provide lift capacity for 250 Marines and four CH-53/MV-22 aircraft at a cost of $135 million per ship. For the $2 billion cost of a San Antonio (LPD-17) class ship that can lift 699 Marines, two CH-53/MV-22 aircraft, and provides a surface connector capability the Navy could field approximately 15 ESB-class ships, offering a lift capacity of 3,750 Marines and 60 MV-22/CH-53 aircraft. Having a plethora of ESB ships allows the Navy to minimize the degradation of lift capacity due to maintenance or combat loss. It also gives the MEU/ARG command team added flexibility in their force composition and their ability to distribute forces across the area of operations necessary to execute LOCE and EABOs.

While not as stealthy or as small as the developing McClung (LSM-1) class, a deep bench of ESB ships would enable the amphibious lift of Marines and equipment to the WEZ and intermediate transition points, or close enough to the WEZ to utilize the MV-22 or CH-53K to complete the journey while minimizing risk to the ESB. Having a deeper inventory of affordable transport ships will be fundamental toward enabling Navy and Marine warfighting concepts inside the WEZ of a rival great power.

Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe is a Maritime Space Officer (1706) serving as the Information Warfare Operations Officer at the I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group Information Coordination Center, Camp Pendleton, CA. He has served as a Low Altitude Air Defense Officer (7204) with the Tactical Air Commander Center 38, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, and deployed on the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. He also previously served in the Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer on USS Cowpens (CG-63) and USS Antietam (CG-54).

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: SAN DIEGO (Feb. 9, 2024) The expeditionary sea base Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) John L. Canley (ESB 6) enters San Diego Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark D. Faram)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Benjamin Van Horrick

A dire shortage of Asian operation linguists in the First Island Chain hinders the United States’ capability to deter Chinese aggression. The joint force’s campaigns depend on strengthening regional partners and fighting as coalitions. Operational linguists act as interpreters and translators, forge trust, assist with planning, and enable the execution of coalition operations. Since language is culture, linguists also inform and educate the commands about the host nation’s cultural and social nuances, such as those that can affect operational integration. However, the present number of operational linguists in the Pacific is already insufficient for regular peacetime campaigning, let alone for crisis or war. The new administration can fix the problem and add more operational linguists in the Pacific before the operational need becomes a damaging shortfall.

The difficulty of Northeast Asian languages, coupled with the steep learning curve associated with translating for and working with military units, makes recruiting cleared, contracted linguists an urgent operational requirement. As America expanded operations in southern Afghanistan, the shortage of Dari and Pashtun linguists hindered operations. Coupled with the rapid advancement of PRC capabilities and the joint force’s increasing operational tempo in the Pacific, now is ideal for building a deep bench of Asian language linguists. The exercises in Korea, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines are growing more complex and ambitious. These operations increasingly depend on accurate translations to meet exercise objectives, mitigate risk, and strengthen alliances.

Servicemembers with language skills often do not serve as operational linguists. Most uniformed linguists are crypto-linguists, specialized in listening to conversations and pulling relevant information. Uniformed Regional Area Officers (RAO) and Foreign Area Officers (FAO) possess language skills, but focus on planning with partners. These talented officers and SNCOs can and will support transition and transcription, but the investment the services make in RAOs and FAOs goes far beyond their linguist acumen. Many operational linguists, ones who interpret conversations and translate documents and correspondence between US forces and their partners, are contracted support.

Linguists will serve as an invaluable link in the killchain during wartime. All available assets from across the coalition must be brought to bear to make sense of the environment, prosecute targets, and support maneuver in all forms. Linguists will minimize friction and the fog of war as coalition members shorten the time between sensing and striking a target – no matter what country the capabilities originate from.

During conflict, command centers and coordination cells will link partners in the Pacific as they respond and counter PRC aggression. Unlike the Global War on Terror, the joint force will integrate and accentuate partner capabilities rather than advise and assist. These centers and cells’ detailed coordination and synchronization will rely on linguists to build and maintain shared awareness of the operational environment. Information sharing will allow coalition forces to generate tempo and exploit fleeting opportunities in the battlespace. Commanding and coordinating the fight in the Pacific will require proficiency in multiple difficult languages such as Japanese, Korean, Thai, Tagalog, and Mandarin.

Coalition warfighting is central to the modern U.S. way of war, placing a premium on linguists. During a crisis or war the demand for these critical personnel will only increase. If the joint force leaves the operational need unaddressed, it risks losing mission success in translation.

Major Benjamin Van Horrick is the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade current logistics operations officer. 

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or positions of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Col. Robert Brodie, commanding officer of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Col. Kouki Watanabe, commanding officer of the JGSDF 12th Infantry Regiment, salute the formations of U.S. Marines with Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 31st MEU, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Service Members with the 12th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division, Western Army, during the opening ceremony for Exercise Forest Light Western Army at Camp Oyanohara, Kyushu, Japan, Jan. 18, 2020. (Official Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ethan M. LeBlanc)