Notes to the New Administration Week

By Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)

There has long been public angst in DC about the number of ships in the U. S. Navy, which is projected to decline to 283 in 2027. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the number of ships will slowly begin to increase in 2028 and reach 381 manned ships and 134 unmanned ships by 2045. Today, the PLA Navy has 370 ships and is building at a higher rate than the United States.

The new administration should understand that the number of ships is the wrong metric. The metric to instead focus on is the number of missiles the Navy possesses and how they are deployed across the fleet via platforms. In a high-end war at sea, offensive firepower would be mostly delivered by missiles, and most of those missiles are likely to be launched by surface ships. Yes, the Navy’s aircraft carriers and their embarked aircraft can carry missiles as well, but the number of missiles per aircraft is small and aircraft range is limited, potentially putting them beyond striking distance of important PRC targets. The surface fleet features thousands of vertical launch cells that can generate missile salvos much faster than the sortie generation rates of aircraft carriers and airfields.

This means the U. S. Navy needs more missiles and they should be deployed in a larger number of widely distributed ships to complicate the PRC’s targeting. But today it takes approximately nine years to build a flight III guided missile destroyer at a cost of about $2.5B.¹ Comparable figures for a Constellation-class guided missile frigate are seven years and about $1.4B.² Staying the course on current surface warship acquisition will not grow the missile capacity of the fleet at a speed and scale that makes a major difference by the end of this decade.

There is a solution that is faster and more affordable – purchase used merchant container ships and outfit them with containerized missiles, drones, and other modular capabilities. They could be deployed in less than two years and the net acquisition cost could be $130 to $140 million dollars each. This can amount to ten missile merchants with 400 missiles for the price of one frigate. These ships can affordably increase the number of missiles at sea at a much more affordable rate compared to conventional warships, while spreading this firepower across a greater number of less exquisite platforms to complicate PRC targeting. Armed merchant ships deserve close consideration by the new administration for their many untapped advantages.

Captain R. Robinson “Robby” Harris commanded USS Conolly (DD-979) and Destroyer Squadron 32. Ashore he served as Executive Director of the CNO Executive Panel. He was a CNO Fellow in CNO Strategic Studies Group XII.

Dr. T. X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University. He served 30 years in the Marine Corps.

References

1. Email from Congressional Budget Office senior analyst Dr. Eric Labs, January 14, 2025.

2. Ibid.

Featured Image: Container feeder Charo B sailing from Cádiz, November 2021. (Photo via Wikimedia commons)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Michael Tkacik

War between the United States and China would be devastating for both states and the world. Such a conflict could include a nuclear exchange and the likelihood of that exchange spiraling out of control is high. Avoiding war between the U.S. and China must be the highest priority of the incoming administration.

China is a rising, revisionist great power, while the U.S. is a declining, status quo great power. In such a situation, variables lean toward war. To avoid war, the costs must clearly outweigh the benefits for the revisionist state – China – and foster deterrence.

Unfortunately, because the U.S. has denuded itself of manufacturing, internal balancing has reduced impact on China. But external balancing – cooperating or allying with like-minded states – may impact China’s cost-benefit calculation. In the Indo-Pacific, this means cooperating with states that have deterrent-inducing characteristics. These characteristics include industrial capacity, operational benefits, strategic depth, and countervailing strengths.

Because China has such a massive manufacturing advantage, it would probably win a long conventional war with the United States. As the U.S. out-manufactured past opponents in the 20^th century, so too China could replace lost military capacity more quickly and in far greater amounts than the U.S. could. It has been widely noted that the Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China’s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times greater than America’s. China’s overall manufacturing capacity is 31 percent of global output while the U.S. accounts for only 16 percent.

The U.S. must bolster manufacturing capacity by cooperating with like-minded states. Regional allies Japan and South Korea both have significant manufacturing capacity and some of it in key areas such as shipbuilding. The U.S. should begin using that capacity for maintenance work and eventually for production of certain U.S. assets. Formal agreements on cooperative manufacturing should be reached with both countries.

Not all states have the advanced manufacturing capacity necessary for a long war, but some states bring operational advantage. The Philippines spreads across the first island chain and provides ample room for dispersing forces, especially land-based missiles that can help to deter Chinese aggression. Pacific Island nations such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia provide depth for dispersion and logistical support. The U.S. should work to improve ties across the first and second island chains and improve capacity to support military operations.

Australia and New Zealand provide geostrategic depth as well as shared political ideals. Here, cooperation takes the form of AUKUS and the Quad, though neither organization includes New Zealand. The Five Eyes is a beginning, but New Zealand should be more deeply integrated into the U.S. deterrent strategy, perhaps by offering a role in AUKUS, the Quad, or a third organization similar to ANZUS.

Another way to deter China is to raise the possibility of war on multiple fronts with multiple states. In this regard, both India and Vietnam have long-standing differences with China that have led to war in the past. Cooperation must be heightened with these states. Formal statements supporting the status quo would be a start. Increased military aid to each state makes them more able to resist Chinese aggression. Though it is not currently foreseeable that either India or Vietnam would directly assist the U.S. in a war with China, the process of creating incentives for greater cooperation now could one day lead to a reasonable expectation of assistance during war. This, in turn, would help deter Chinese revisionism.

It is increasingly clear that China has the advantage in a long war, making the current state of deterrence untenable. Therefore, the U.S. must seek partners to increase the costs of Chinese revisionism and augment U.S. capabilities.

Michael Tkacik ([email protected]) holds a PhD from the University of Maryland and a JD from Duke University. He has published articles in a variety of journals. Tkacik’s current research interests include the implications of China’s rise, China’s behavior in the South China Sea, and nuclear weapons policy across Asia. He is a professor of government and director of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Matt Shibata teaches a Philippine Marine proper weapon handling techniques during Air Assault Support Exercise 2015-2 at Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Philippines, July 15, 2015. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tyler S. Giguere/Released)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Clay Robinson

In the tally of winners and losers in the Houthi’s Red Sea attacks, China continues to benefit from others’ economic losses. Several critics have pointed to evidence of Chinese opportunism in the Red Sea in the form of negotiated safe passage for Chinese shipping from Houthi attacks. Meanwhile, others have highlighted the inconvenient truth that as of January 2025, the U.S. Navy has spent billions to counter relatively inexpensive Houthi missiles and drones. Yet China’s most significant victory may yet to be realized. China’s relatively unfettered access to significant quantities of data on U.S. combat engagements, and their ability to glean the capabilities and limitations of critical U.S. Navy air and missile defense capabilities, may represent a far greater boon for them in the long run.

Evidence of Chinese efforts to access, exfiltrate, and reverse engineer U.S. military technologies is plentiful. China may be learning even more from watching and collecting on U.S. Navy engagements against hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones launched by the Houthis. From the relative safety of the nearby Chinese base in Djibouti and the warships of the People Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) Naval Escort Task Force (NETF) in the nearby Gulf of Aden, China is positioned to witness and collect on some of the U.S. Navy’s most advanced air and missile defense capabilities during real-world combat operations. It is also likely that China is targeting the data-driven lessons learned process that is regularly pushing capability updates out to warships in the Red Sea. It is possible that this collection is providing China with invaluable lessons on how to counter U.S. Navy capabilities should there ever be a direct confrontation between the two global superpowers.

The purported benefits of these Red Sea operations to the U.S. have come under significant scrutiny, but this additional factor could make the future cost-benefit analysis even more difficult to support. Decisions about when and how to reveal or conceal military capabilities require careful consideration of the effort an adversary would have to expend to counter the capability. Therefore, the capabilities that are relatively easy and inexpensive to counter should be protected rather than revealed in a fashion that allows adversaries to learn about them. The U.S. could even consider its own collection operation to better understand how China is making use of Red Sea combat data to sharpen its forces.

The questions for U.S. Navy decision-makers are threefold. First, are the air and missile defense capabilities of the Aegis Weapon System in danger of being countered by current or future Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, electronic warfare, or cyber capabilities? Second, does not just routine, but nearly persistent use of these critical capabilities for over a year to defend freedom of navigation in the Red Sea constitute a fully-informed decision that recognizes the potential consequences of third-party collection by China? Third, is access to collection on these operations unintentionally helping China improve their own missile capabilities?

The U.S. Navy should consider the unintended consequences of revealing sensitive air and missile defense capabilities to China through persistent display of these systems during Red Sea operations. The answers to these questions could lead to a reevaluation of U.S. strategy in the Red Sea.

Commander Clay Robinson is a retired U.S. Navy surface warfare officer with over 25 years of experience in naval operations and strategic planning. He is currently an adjunct instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College.

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the official views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components.

Featured Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Laboon (DDG 58) breaks away from formation, concluding a replenishment-at-sea July 3, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jacob Hilgendorf)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Karl Flynn

The most urgent problem facing the Department of the Navy is the critical shortfall in retention and recruitment. Ships, planes, and amphibious vehicles cannot function without Sailors and Marines to maintain and operate them. In order to mitigate this, make it clear to America’s youth why their service is needed, allow those in uniform to focus on their jobs, and reverse lowered standards.

Over the last several years, the military’s shortfall in personnel has constantly been in the headlines. The Navy had (and rescinded) six-day work weeks for recruiters, incurred 22,000 gaps in E-1 to E-4 at-sea billets, signed recruits who did not complete high school, lowered the minimum score for the AFQT, missed all recruiting goals in FY 23, and the Marine Corps was forced to drain the delayed entry program to 22 percent to meet recruiting goals. These examples clearly demonstrate the military’s personnel crisis.

There are several measures that could be taken to regain the strength of the all-volunteer force. First, make it clear to Americans why their country is worth dying for. Recruiters will often discuss GI bill benefits, healthcare, and other financial incentives for joining, but these incentives do not explain the fundamental purposes of the armed services. Rather, explain to Americans why our country and other democratic societies are worth defending. Furthermore, make the realpolitik situation clear to all Americans that if Taiwan is attacked and TSMC halts operations, the average American’s way of life and the security of the United States itself will be under threat.

The second measure is aimed at the operating forces – let Sailors and Marines do their jobs without distraction. Weighing them down with well-intended but cumbersome administrative requirements or time-consuming training that is irrelevant to their job is a constant point of contention. Sailors and Marines collectively spend millions of man-hours every year on mandatory training of dubious warfighting value. Cut these or distill them down to their bare essentials.

Additionally, fully man supporting establishments with civilian contractors and put an end to unit taxes. As an example, I was slated to lose an infantry unit leader Staff Sergeant to work at the base tax center. Had he gone, my company would have been short a platoon sergeant and he would have been doing a job with zero relevance to his specialty, thus losing proficiency as an infantryman.

Finally, reverse all lowered standards for entry into the military. If the military is expected to go to war, would prospective volunteers prefer to serve alongside other men and women who are held to higher or lower standards? While standards appear to be flexible tools to influence recruiting and retention, in reality they have significant implications for unit cohesion and the confidence of warfighters.

Not only would these measures support retention and recruitment in and of themselves, but implementing them would also make veterans more likely to encourage their friends or siblings to join. In short, make America’s youth want to serve by clearly stating our national security imperatives, minimize distractions from core warfighting functions, and eliminate all lowered standards.

Captain Karl Flynn, USMC, is a rifle company commander in 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: Marines with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, assigned to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) 19.2, take cover after throwing non-lethal grenades during a non-lethal weapons training exercise, Jan. 18, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Branden J. Bourque)