Notes to the New Administration Week

By Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (ret.)

The Navy is busy incorporating new technology into its fleet design, but is not paying commensurate attention to developing the officers who will fight that new fleet.

The Naval War College was the critical engine that drove the warfighting education of the officer corps that designed, perfected, and fought the fleet that produced victory at sea in World War II. But today, the college has become moribund in terms of its relevance to the emerging warfare environment. The current curriculum structure was adopted in 1972 when geopolitical and operational conditions were far different than today. In 1972, Rear Admiral Stansfield Turner imposed a new curriculum on both the senior and junior courses, one that emphasized academic rigor and focused on national strategy and policy. This curriculum remains in place, now heavily augmented by joint education requirements.

After World War II, the combination of American naval supremacy, the advent of nuclear weapons, and the maritime strategy of sustained forward deployments around the periphery of Eurasia served to sideline the Naval War College. In that environment the Bureau of Naval Personnel ceased assigning officers with the highest potential as students, making the college an unattractive career move for aspiring officers. Internally, research and teaching became largely separated, a situation that still exists to this day.

Wargaming, the core of the college’s teaching prior to WWII, is no longer heavily featured in the curriculum. Instead, the college now mostly focuses on providing joint education requirements and master’s degrees. Support to the fleet is provided by multiple branches, but the college still fails to be an engine of innovation and officer development as it once was. The modern college has drifted far from what it was in the decades before World War II.

The tool for revitalizing the Naval War College into a major engine of officer warfighting education exists in the form of the Halsey Groups, small advanced research programs based on rigorous classified wargaming that have been in operation since the early 2000s. But these classes are currently far too small to produce enough graduates that create a critical mass of officers with intensive wargaming experience. These classes and their procedures should be scaled up and used as the basis for a new junior course at the college that is strongly incentivized by the personnel system. Such a course could produce a hundred or more graduates per year that investigate warfighting concepts, campaign plans, and fleet designs through iterative wargaming, much like their interwar-period ancestors who would go on to win World War II.

The most recent high-profile Navy professional military education study, the Education for Seapower (E4S) study, focused on high-level strategic thinking and failed to recognize the importance of warfare education or the attendant research needed. Warfighting education is a prerequisite for developing higher-level strategic thinking later in an officer’s career. Moreover, while only a few officers have the opportunity to engage in high-level strategy, most officers occupy warfighting positions at some point in their careers.

Small groups such as the Strategic Studies Group, Deep Blue, and others have largely failed to achieve influence over Navy warfighting development regardless of the merit of their ideas. What is needed is a critical mass of officers with rigorous wargaming and research experience populating fleet units and staffs, like what occurred in the years from the Naval War College’s founding up to World War II. However, the college in recent times has demonstrated little interest in updating its core courses or expanding its wargaming programs to replicate its interwar-period success. Therefore, clear direction from OPNAV and SECNAV is required.

Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and professor emeritus of the Naval War College. He served on active duty in the Navy as a light attack/strike fighter aviator. At the Naval War College he served in various positions, including planning and decision-making instructor, joint education adviser, chairman of the Wargaming Department, and dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. On occasion he served as a special adviser to the 31st Chief of Naval Operations. He has published over thirty journal articles and several book chapters.

Featured Image: SOUTH CHINA SEA (Jan. 12, 2025) Lt. Clint Vance, of Montana, signals an F/A-18F Super Hornet, assigned to the “Bounty Hunters” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 2, to launch from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nate Jordan)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Walker Mills

The last two presidential administrations have presided over a shift to an increasingly confrontational relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the new administration appears ready to continue that trend, if not accelerate it. Senior military leaders especially have been alarmingly clear about likelihood of a potential conflict with the PRC over Taiwan. From “the Davidson Window” to even more specific warnings about a war in 2025, the Pentagon has been sounding the alarm.

But unfortunately, there has been an outsized focus on a “short sharp war” rather than a protracted conflict, or even a narrower focus on the first “72 hours” of a conflict.  Winning a war between great powers in only hours or days is an attractive goal, but it is also ahistorical.

There is no reason the U.S. military should expect a conflict with the PRC to be short, or to be won quickly. Rather, history tells us the opposite. Why would we expect the world’s most populous country and the second-largest economy to back down after only the opening salvo of a war it started, even if the opening round went poorly?

The most important lesson from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is not about drones or the continued viability of armored maneuver. It is the reminder that wars will almost inevitably continue long after the combatants expected them to end – creating acute shortages of troops and materiel that threaten strategic collapse.

Both Russia and Ukraine initially slow-rolled conscription efforts for political reasons, and those decisions had significant negative effects on the battlefield. In the material realm, neither country is able to keep up with the battlefield usage of shells, tanks, drones and other equipment. In Russia’s case, it has been forced to draw from decades-old stocks of armored vehicles and has been forced to turn to Iran and North Korea for weapons, while also luring recruits from faraway countries like Yemen and Nepal to fill out its depleted ranks. Ukraine for its part is still overcoming a critical period of “shell hunger” and is heavily reliant on Western support for weaponry ranging from tanks to cruise missiles.

If there is a silver lining, it is that discussions about protraction are becoming increasingly common inside and outside the military. In the words of one Navy officer, focusing on a short sharp war is a “loser’s gambit,” and from a Marine, it is “short-sighted.” But a recognition of the reality we face is only the beginning.

The incoming administration needs to take concrete steps to prepare the sea services for a multi-year conflict by ensuring they have the right mix of capabilities for a long war, can rapidly generate new combat forces, and can keep existing forces well-equipped to keep up the fight. The services need to ensure they can draw from well-organized and resourced reserve components that are fit for the purpose of supporting the active-duty component in a major conflict. And, just as importantly, the services need to ensure they can rapidly generate combat power from new recruits, or potentially even draftees. This will ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps are ready not just to “fight tonight,” but to fight tomorrow, and the next year too.

Walker D. Mills is a Marine infantry officer and MQ-9A “Reaper” pilot. He is a co-host of the Sea Control podcast and a Senior Editor at CIMSEC. He is also a Co-Director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Project Maritime.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: U.S. Marines with Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, observe their surroundings during a small boat raid at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, Sept. 10, 2019. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Brendan Mullin)

By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC received a tremendous response to our Call for Articles for short notes on what the new U.S. administration can consider to strengthen American naval power, reinforce alliances, and compete effectively against great powers. Authors addressed a wide range of issues and offered recommendations for reform. Below are the articles that will feature as the week unfolds.

“Prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for Protracted War against China,” by Walker Mills
“Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” by Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (ret.)
“U.S. Ground Forces Can Check Chinese Naval Advantage Now,” by Brian Kerg
“The Best of Both Worlds: Educating Future Navy Officers,” by Claude Berube
“Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea,” by William Martin
“Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall,” by Benjamin Van Horrick
“ESBs for Intermediate Naval Lift in Support of Expeditionary Operations,” by Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC
“A High-Low Naval Portfolio: Maximize Strategic Returns with Balanced Force Design,” by Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine
“An Investment in the U.S. Navy is an Investment in Prosperity,” by Sam J. Tandgredi
“Refocus on Warfighting To Boost Recruiting and Retention,” by Karl Flynn
“Reconsider Red Sea Risk: Revealing U.S. Navy Air and Missile Defense Capability to China,” by Clay Robinson
“Work with Allies to Strengthen Deterrence against China,” by Michael Tkacik
“Build Containerized Missile Ships for Rapid and Affordable Fleet Growth,” by Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)
“Balance AUKUS and Amphibious Fleet Readiness,” by Chris Huff
“It is Time for a New Maritime Strategy,” by Peter Dombrowski
“Invest in Sustainment Capabilities to Increase Combat Credibility,” by Joseph Mroszczyk
“Rebuild Commercial Maritime Might to Restore U.S. Sea Power,” by Commander Ander S. Heiles, USN
“It is Time for a Real Maritime Strategy: Focus on Shipbuilding, Seafaring, and Sway,” by Christopher Costello
“The Specter of Tariffs and the Revival of the U.S. Merchant Marine,” by Ben Massengale
“Develop Strategies to Counter China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” by Roshan Kulatunga
“Strengthen America’s Maritime Borders,” by David Ware
“Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture,” by Francis Crozier
“Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power,” by Jason Lancaster

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: Multinational ships sail in formation off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)