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History

In Grateful Memory: Andrew Marshall and His Quest for Questions

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By Mie Augier and Wayne Hughes

Introduction

In the outpouring of appreciation following the passing of Andrew W. Marshall, many people paid tribute to different parts of his work, to include understanding the weaknesses of the Soviet economy, net assessment as a way of thinking, and the emerging power of China. His many friends and admirers wanted to give credit where credit is due.

This brief note complements the many tributes. We aim to capture elements of how he was thinking more than what he was thinking. We emphasize a few key characteristics: How he viewed the world, the nature of his interdisciplinary mind that focused on the importance of questions, and reflections on what future generations of scholars and practitioners can learn from and be inspired by.

Already in his youth, Marshall had an extraordinarily open mind, a lasting appreciation for history, and a Midwestern humbleness and modesty that stayed with him.1 As a child, he read widely at the public library, and bought books when he got a little money. Always respectful of people, he treated everyone alike; ideas and thinking had no rank or titles. Living through the depression and interwar years, he was aware of the broad societal and geopolitical underpinnings and implications of war and peace, and the centrality of human nature. He came close to becoming an academic after studying at the University of Chicago with scholars such as Milton Friedman, Frank Knight, and Rudolf Carnap (and meeting other emerging social scientists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow).

But his interests were always broader than what one or two disciplines could encompass. At RAND, he found an institution that could accommodate his broad range of interests and his passion for helping the country think better about matters related to national security, and where he could begin developing an intellectual framework for that. There he found individuals with similar and complementary interests such as Herman Kahn, Herbert Goldhamer, Nathan Leites, and James Schlesinger. He also came to see the importance of organizations both as a lens for understanding the behavior of nations and national security players, and also as facilitators (or sometimes, inhibitors) of better strategic thinking. 

A Quest for Questions

Andy Marshall’s work at RAND provided important insights into key strategic issues – a focus that he would continue and develop later at the Pentagon. For example, he developed the early elements of the long term competition framework, and worked with Graham Allison, James March, and others to develop different lenses (rational, organizational, and bureaucratic) for understanding governmental decision making. He was involved in the early developments of scenario planning and wargaming exercises at RAND that emerged in large part in reaction to other major developments at RAND: systems analysis and game theory. 

What is important is not just what he did and the studies he worked on or who he mentored, but also how his character and style helped him think the way he did. Underlying Marshall’s perspective was an emphasis on questions. Focusing on questions helps one get the right diagnosis of a situation because one is less inclined to reinforce what one already believes, and researching the empirical issues one is naturally led to also cross disciplinary boundaries. As he began to look into academic underpinnings for long term strategy and strategic thinking, he began to challenge existing ways of thinking about strategy and behavior to develop a broader view.

Essential in Marshall’s mind was the centrality of human nature and insights from organizational behavior. Very early on, Marshall and his close friend Herman Kahn would go on long walks on the weekend in the Brentwood area, talking about the importance of human nature to understand conflicts. Many colleagues at RAND didn’t share their enthusiasm for trying to generate empirical insights, preferring instead to apply existing theory – especially systems analysis. Over time, Marshall found research from bio-social anthropology, zoology, psychology, organizational behavior, business strategy, and cultural studies to be useful in developing insights about how culture influences individuals, organizations, and the behavior of groups, which was often quite different from theories of opponents’ strategic cultures. He engaged the work of Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox on understanding ‘men in groups.’

In the 1960s, Marshall began a decades-long friendship with James Schlesinger, who started as Marshall’s research assistant at RAND, fresh out of the economics program at Harvard. The two of them embarked on a mission to develop broader strategic thinking at RAND and insights into how the Soviet Union really worked, as opposed to how it behaved according to game theory and systems analysis. They used elements of different conceptual frameworks including the studies of Herbert Simon, Richard Cyert, James March, and the psycho-cultural works of Nathan Leites. They suggested setting up a program or even a department of organizational behavior at RAND. They were convinced that a broader understanding of the Soviet Union would lead to understanding how poorly our intelligence estimates of the Soviet economy really were. They studied organizations both as a lens to understand our opponents and as something that would help develop better strategic thinkers.

As anyone who has tried to integrate work from different disciplines knows, mixing different perspectives while keeping the diagnostic focus is very difficult. Centripetal forces of academic disciplines meant working within single disciplines would produce failing prescriptions. Thus for Marshall, it could have been easier to ‘give in,’ but he always cared more about getting useful insights, not academic or political approval of his own career or bureaucratic survival. “We are here to inform, not to please,” he’d say.

He did not waver in challenging us, and himself, to think about national security in the broadest sense. No single theory or perspective has it right. Marshall believed if one looks for only one dominant perspective, one runs the risk of producing a trained incapacity for strategy and strategic thinking. He and Schlesinger thought about this in the context of RAND, for instance in advising the then-incoming president, Harry Rowen, how to restructure and better organize RAND. Rowen wrote to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara about his organization’s strengths and weaknesses, and Marshall and Schlesinger wrote several memos on how to get better strategic thinking at RAND along with some of the organizational trends to be aware of.2

Their emphasis on the importance of long term, interdisciplinary thinking is just as important for think tanks and educational institutions today. These issues of how Marshall thought about things are central to his later development of net assessment as an interdisciplinary approach.

Legacies and Lessons  

Pursuing better empirical insights into strategic issues was for Marshall a lifelong calling, in addition to his distinguished career of public service and time at RAND. While we can never replicate his thinking, his legacy gives us many things to consider and build on for the future, whether in the education of future strategists, in our own thinking and doing strategy, and in our service as U.S. citizens. Marshal’s work includes many profound lessons.

Understanding the world as it is, not as how we might wish it to be. Marshall found it important that we approach strategic issues from a variety of perspectives, including national and organizational culture and demography, as important drivers of the future strategic environment.3

Finding value in outlier ideas – and in others’ ideas in general. This may sound straightforward, but it is not easy, because it implies always questioning one’s own beliefs. Seeing beyond one’s own favorite perspectives, ideas, and biases implies always questioning one’s own thinking. Questioning oneself is not most people’s favorite activity. But it is important both as a way to achieve better insights and to foster innovative thinking in others. He thought organizations often tend to edge out people with different ideas. John Boyd is an example of an innovative thinker and outlier who Marshall thought highly of.

Appreciation for understanding and gaming unthinkable futures. Marshall knew from his days at RAND that we need not just understand the likely futures, but also, and perhaps especially, the less likely, less likable, and more unthinkable ones (a theme that Herman Kahn also elaborated; Kahn’s essay, “In Defense of Thinking,” speaks to that).4 Marshall exploited wargames and case studies as ways to explore alternatives and what they might mean. From the early gaming exercises, his focus was on being as realistic as possible by including people with a variety of backgrounds and expertise; and by focusing on processes, not goals. Games facilitate cross-disciplinary discussions and collaborations to help players with diverse backgrounds understand contingencies they would not otherwise have thought of. Games were ways to instill better, broader strategic thinking by forcing participants to think through and formulate strategies.

Marshall believed the discomfort that comes with uncertainty goes hand-in-hand with exploring the boundaries of what one knows. Gaming was one way he taught decision-makers to be more comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. He believed in case studies and wargaming as participatory forms of learning and manifestations of an interdisciplinary approach. He knew that case learning can include counterfactuals, or ‘what ifs,’ and a way to learn from failures and avoid blind alleys.5   

Marshall appreciated the roles organizations play in national security, and also for fostering or hindering sound thinking about national security questions. Much insight could be gained from a better understanding of how peer competitors’ organizations work, how their routines and operational codes evolve, and how their organizational structures, cultures, and practices are interrelated. What strengths and weaknesses influence their strategic decision-making? A better appreciation for the importance of how we organize to nurture strategic thinking in military educational institutions is important today, especially in the light of the recent Education for Seapower report’s emphasis on developing better strategic and critical thinkers. Marshall was the exemplar of a great strategic thinker who thought critically, long term, and organizationally.

Conclusion

The passing of Andrew Marshall may mark the end of an era in the history of Cold War strategists because his role in shaping U.S. strategy lasted many decades and was unparalleled. So, too, was his modesty, his humbleness, his caring about others, and his always questioning mind. He combined devotion to thinking and to the country and the need to understand with a gentle and patient spirit. He exemplified the best that any era can hope to achieve when it comes to the difficult but vital vision of how to think more strategically to help his country.

Perhaps the most important lesson is how Marshall sought value from areas outside his own domain and expertise. Rooted in his genuine humbleness and curiosity, he did not follow the natural human instinct to ‘do what we know how to do best,’ and instead chose to pursue knowledge in areas he didn’t know well, and keep pursuing questions. When Marshall died, the country lost his strategic, human, intellectual, and moral compass. His quest for questions now rests upon us.

Dr. Mie Augier is a professor at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. She is interested in strategy, organizations, innovation, leadership, and how to educate strategic and innovative thinkers.

Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.) served thirty years on active duty, commanding a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a large training command. In retirement has taught, done research, and served as a Dean at the Naval Postgraduate School for over thirty years. He is a distinguished author of the U.S. Naval Institute.

Endnotes

1. He almost never talked about his own work or approaches. His modesty was even embedded in his language (most of the time he said “we” or “one”, not me or I …). Not imposing his own views or perspectives or theories is a significant part of his approach to strategy and emphasis on diagnosis, rather than prescription, as it helps get a better understanding of the situation and what forces might shape the future. The combination of his humbleness, interest in diagnosis and a broad and questioning mind set him apart from almost everyone else, especially in academia.

2. They also suggested, in collaboration with Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, that the aforementioned organizational behavior department be instituted. While this and most of their suggestions didn’t materialize, they became grounds for Marshall and Schlesinger’s work on net assessment over the next decades.

3. Nathan Leites’ work on the operational code of the Soviet Union is a very relevant way of appreciating others; something that one could fruitfully develop with regards to China, too, especially in light of the national security strategy emphasis on peer competitors. How they organize; how they perceive; how they think, is all very central to our competitive advantage and how we might fare in war.

4. See for instance his piece “In Defense of Thinking” https://www.hudson.org/research/2211-in-defense-of-thinking

5. Teaching cases of historical failures also can help us be more comfortable by talking and learning from them.

Featured Image: Andy Marshall attends his retirement farewell ceremony at the Pentagon on Jan. 5, 2015. (Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz/U.S. Air Force)

History

Blockade: An Imperfect Strategy

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By LT Jason Lancaster, USN

Introduction

Throughout history, maritime nations have used naval blockades to wreck the economies of their adversaries and bend them to their will. However, the impact of blockade in history has been overstated. Throughout history, blockade has been a part of military success, but it has never been the primary key to victory. Most successful blockades enabled land campaigns to succeed but would not have won wars on their own. Blockades are a politico-economic form of warfare that can quite often have unexpected political results. Modern calls to defeat China solely through an “easy and bloodless” naval blockade understate the physical difficulties and political challenges of a successful blockade, ignore that successful blockades support events ashore, and that blockades have not been successful as standalone campaigns.

Legal Definitions of Blockade

The San Remo Manual on International Law applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea includes the requirements for a blockade. It must be announced, and all neutral and belligerent states should be notified of the blockade. It must be effectively maintained by a force as close as is required to be effective. It must not bar access to the ports and coast of a neutral state. It must be applied impartially to vessels of all states.

A blockade is not lawful if it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it objects essential for survival, or the damage to the civilian population outweighs the military advantage of the blockade. The blockading belligerent shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian population or for sick and wounded members of the armed forces.1 These requirements are designed to allow maritime states to conduct operations while minimizing the suffering of the civilian population of belligerents.

Quarantine is not a blockade. According to the Navy Commander’s Handbook on Operational Law, “the goal of quarantine is de-escalation and a return to the status quo ante.” The goal of a blockade is “denial and degradation of an enemy’s capability.”2

The British Blockade of Napoleonic and Revolutionary France

While some have argued that British blockades were the reason for victory over Napoleon, the blockades were not the root of victory. Even though they caused economic hardship it was not severe enough to force France to make a lasting peace. 20 years of blockade took its toll on cities like Bordeaux that relied on foreign trade and industries set up around imports like refining sugar, but the loss of such trade did not cause France to surrender. 20 years of bloody war from the Russian Steppes to the coast of Portugal caused the French empire to collapse after repeated military defeats ashore.  

From 1793 until 1802 and between 1804 and 1814, Great Britain conducted a close naval blockade of France and her allies. Throughout the wars of the 18th century Britain had refined the techniques and logistics of supporting a fleet on a hostile shore for sustained periods of time. Despite the idea that the primary purpose of the blockade was to strangle French commerce, the real purpose of the blockade was to prevent the French from invading Britain or Ireland. Despite the arduous blockade, the French twice managed to land forces in Britain and Ireland during the war. The blockade did limit the size and effectiveness of the landings. Humorously, the French invaders that landed at Fishguard, Wales surrendered to the local women who had come to look at the strange invaders.

Throughout the war, the close blockade of Brest was hotly debated. Was it better for ships to be beaten and battered off the stormy Biscay coast, or to maintain the fleet in port in expectation for the French to come out? Ships were lost in wrecks or damaged sufficiently to be sent back to British dockyards for repairs. These losses impacted the overall strength of the blockading force if the French did come out.3 Parallels can be drawn between the surface fleet today and the Royal Navy of 1805. The dockyards were full of ships desperately needing refit after years at sea, but the number of qualified dockyard workers had dwindled in both private and public dockyards. Shortages of skilled dockyard workers meant that new construction took longer than expected. HMS Royal Sovereign, Admiral Collingwood’s flagship at Trafalgar, was still in construction after 12 years, almost 3 years longer than normal for a first rate ship of the line.4    

The British blockade had an economic impact on Europe, but in some industries the impact was to preserve the traditional production method and delay the introduction of the new mechanized production methods used in Great Britain. The British blockade and the French Berlin Decrees banning trade between the continent and Great Britain certainly affected trade, but only seldom did it cause production to cease entirely. There were shortages of raw materials like cotton, but the cotton mills only went idle for a few months in 1808. The price was sometimes 2-4 times as high as that paid in Britain. From 1790 until 1810, French cotton consumption increased threefold while in Britain consumption increased fourfold.5

The blockade had unexpected political repercussions for Great Britain. The British blockade of France and her allies helped cause a war with Denmark in 1801 and the United States in 1812. Many ships from occupied places like the Netherlands ended up registering their vessels in neutral nations like Denmark and Sweden to continue trading. According to international law goods that were not contraband in neutral vessels could not be impeded. However, neutral goods such as hemp, pitch, tar, and pine logs were used to build and support naval vessels. Wheat was a neutral good but its dual use could make bread for the average French citizen or the citizen soldier. Britain argued that when the entire nation was in arms, was there a difference? Annoyed at British interference in their trade, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia re-created the League of Armed Neutrality. Britain sent a fleet to Copenhagen, where Admiral Nelson fought a bloody battle with the Danes and persuaded them to surrender the remainder of the fleet. This combined with the death of Tsar Paul ended the League and its threat to the blockade.

In 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain over the issues of free trade and Sailors’ rights. Many American citizens had either moved from Great Britain or could have been considered British subjects because of when they were born in America. The Royal Navy, perennially short of Sailors, impressed them from merchant ships. To a nation fighting for its life, often times alone, the nationality of a Sailor might matter little, especially since the British government believed that subjects could not change their nationality and had “an inalienable right to their service.”6 In 1807, the HMS Leopard stopped and searched the warship USS Chesapeake, a U.S. naval vessel for deserters, took four and hung one of them. It was a step too far. President Thomas Jefferson stated of the affair, “Never since the Battle of Lexington have I seen this country in such a state of exasperation as at present, and even that did not produce such unanimity.” While this incident did not cause the United States to go to war, it played a role following continued British harassment of American merchant ships.

From 1805-1813 the U.S. and Britain negotiated over the meaning of neutral shipping. Despite these negotiations, by 1806 120 U.S.-flagged vessels had been seized by the Royal Navy. The British position insisted that American vessels must carry non-American goods to an American port, unload them, pay duties, reload them, and then they were free to transship them to any country. The U.S. position was that as a neutral nation they had the right to ship any goods anywhere.7

In 1806, the U.S. also challenged British ideas of what constituted a blockaded port. American diplomats challenged the idea that the entire coastline could be blockaded by proclamation, but rather that warships had to create, “an evident danger in entering.”8 The U.S. Congress responded to British and French declarations of blockade against each other with an embargo on some British manufactured goods in the expectation that economic policy might force the British to accede to American demands.9 The twin wounds to trade and national honor through impressment eventually meant that the U.S. preferred to fight than continue to submit to such injustices.       

The British blockade hampered but never destroyed French trade. It made enemies of neutral nations, and did not expedite victory. Despite continued victory at sea, the Napoleonic Wars demonstrated that while a maritime power may contain a continental power, in total war a continental power must be defeated ashore.

Union Blockade of the Confederate States

Interestingly, if Britain would have acquiesced to American policy on blockade, then the Union blockade of the Confederacy may never have been legal. Despite the Union blockading the ports of the South, the Confederacy maintained open ports through almost the entire war. While the South suffered ever increasing shortages, blockade runners continued to supply the Confederate States and only the dominance of the northern armies compelled the South to capitulate.

The Union Navy began the war with 90 ships, including 40 steam vessels and 50 sailing ships. Not all of those ships were ready for war. Some were in the naval dockyards, some were stationed across the globe in California, the Mediterranean, Asia, and Brazil to protect tradeVessels stationed overseas would take up to six months to return to the U.S.10 At the outbreak of war, there were only three vessels ready for war on the Atlantic coast. It would take time for the Union Navy to marshal the forces required to conduct an effective blockade of a 3,500 mile coastline.

The Confederate and British governments did not believe that the Union Navy could successfully blockade the entire Confederate coast. However, the Union Blockade Strategy Board looked at the problem differently. Instead of worrying about the entire coastline, the Strategy Board broke the required blockade down to major ports with transport connections to the rest of the country. This drastically reduced the amount of coastline that required blockading. The Strategy Board utilized the United States Coast Survey’s records to examine the inlets, waterways, and ports of the South and decided that the primary ports of entry to blockade were Richmond, Norfolk, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans, and Galveston. The James and Elizabeth River channels leading to Richmond and Norfolk were blocked by Fortress Monroe and began the war well-blockaded. The remainder of the ports required blockading squadrons.

The initial organization of the Union blockading squadron consisted of one squadron blockading the Confederate coast from the Virginia Capes to Key West. This was later divided into North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was responsible for the blockade between the Virginia Capes and the border between North and South Carolina. The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was responsible for the blockade from the North and South Carolina border to Key West. In the Gulf of Mexico there was the Gulf Blockading Squadron which was also subdivided between east and west; the Eastern Blockading squadron watching the port of Mobile and the Western blockading squadron watching the port of Galveston and the Texas coast.

The Union blockade of Confederate states. (Mark A. Moore)

Ironically, the rights that the U.S. had gone to war with Great Britain over during the Napoleonic Wars were abandoned when the northern states declared their blockade of Confederate ports. The Trent affair almost brought Great Britain into the war against the north. In November 1861, two Confederate diplomats were traveling to London aboard a British flagged mail packet, the Trent. The ship was then forcibly stopped and searched by a Union frigate. Despite the protestations of the Trent’s captain, the two Confederate diplomats were taken into custody by the North and detained at Fort Warren, Massachusetts. The British government and press were outraged by the insult to their flag and international law. The two officials were released because the British government demanded their return and began some military preparations.11 

While the blockade grew ever more effective, it was never entirely effective. Throughout the second half of 1864 the port of Wilmington received 3.5 million pounds of meat, 1.5 million pounds of lead, 2 million pounds of saltpeter, 500,000 pairs of shoes, 300,000 blankets, 50,000 rifles, and 43 cannon. The Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee received new uniforms and equipment.12 This does not mean that the blockade did not cause shortages amongst the population or the army, but that as an offensive strategy blockade alone would never defeat the South.

The only effective way the North closed Confederate ports was by physically capturing the port or destroying the fortifications and ships defending the port and occupying inland waters. Savannah was not captured until December 1864 when General Sherman took the city from the landward side. The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron had supported the northern army as it bombarded Fort Pulaski into submission. With the mouth of the Savannah River closed, Savannah lost its appeal as a blockade running destination. Likewise, the port of Mobile was not captured by Admiral Farragut; however his capture of Fort Morgan and the CSS Tennessee meant that blockade runners could not reach Mobile. Oftentimes, northern efforts to close a port simply shifted blockade running to another port. The Union offensive against Charleston in 1863 shifted blockade running to the port of Wilmington which because of the geography was even more difficult for the northern fleet to blockade than Charleston.

Blockading China

A blockade of China would be an immense undertaking. Chokepoints like the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits would all have to be guarded. However, the Law of the Sea recognizes a 200 NM Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). Neutral nations’ EEZ must be respected by combatant nations. To effectively police the chokepoints of maritime Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia would have to support the U.S. position. But neither of them are U.S. treaty allies and it is a major planning assumption that they would automatically support the U.S. side in a conflict. China would certainly exert great amounts of pressure on those states to remain neutral.

An average of 52 oil tankers transit the Malacca Strait a day, and the sheer number of possible boardings and prize crews could rapidly overwhelm the combat forces enforcing the blockade.13 A more effective means of blockading China would be a massive mining campaign. During World War II the British flew 20,000 minelaying sorties in the Atlantic Theater. These sorties sank 683 Axis ships while losing 450 aircraft. Only 150 Axis ships were sank by British surface and subsurface vessels. In 1945, the U.S. Army Air Corps helped isolate Japan from the rest of the world, starving Japan of resources.14 Despite the historical successes, the U.S. has not kept pace with the rapid technological changes in mine technology. Today, the bulk of U.S. mines are air-dropped, but the U.S. would have difficulty sewing air-dropped minefields in the face of the PLAAF and Chinese air defenses.

Conclusion

Throughout history blockade has been used as a strategy to deny adversaries foreign trade and prevent enemy warships from going to sea. However, neither blockade mentioned solely won the war. Troops ashore decisively defeated enemy armies and seized territory to win those wars. A “bloodless distant blockade” is not a magical panacea to bend China to U.S. will. A blockade of either country will stress U.S. resources to the limit and carries unknown diplomatic risks. It has not worked in the past, and will continue to fail as a standalone strategy in the future. It is an effective aid to victory, but no secret weapon.

LT Jason Lancaster is an alumnus of Mary Washington College and has an M.A. from the University of Tulsa. He is currently serving as the N8 Tactical Development Officer at Commander, Destroyer Squadron 26. The above views are his own and do not reflect the position of the Navy or Department of Defense.

References

  1. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 1994.
  2. S. Navy Commander’s Operational Law Handbook NWP 1-14M, 2007.
  3. National Research Council. 2001. Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10176
  4. Francois Crouzet, “Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 24 (1964).
  5. Nicholas Tracy, The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, Volume III 1804-1806, (London, Stackpole Books, 1999), pp 12-13.
  6. Brian Lavery, “Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1793-1815” (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2000).
  7. Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relation with the War of 1812 (London, Sampson, Low, Marston & Company, 1905), pp 2-4.
  8. Robert M. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1993).
  9. Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government Vol. I, (Richmond, De Capo, 1990).
  10. Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1988).
  11. Jason Glab, “Blockading China: A Guide”, https://warontherocks.com/2013/10/blockading-china-a-guide/commentary, October 1, 2013.
  12. Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct, and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/12/stranglehold-context-conduct-and-consequences-of-american-naval-blockade-of-china-pub-51135, February 12, 2013.
  13. Edward Ingram, In Defense of British India, (London, A. Wheaton & Co., 1984).
  14. Noel Mostert, The Line Upon A Wind, (New York, Norton, 2008).

Bibliography

[1] San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 1994, Section II Art. 93-104

[2] U.S. Navy Commander’s Operational Law Handbook NWP 1-14M, 2007Pg 4-10.

[3] Tracy, Nicholas, “The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, Volume III 1804-1806,” (London, Stackpole Books, 1999), pp 12-13.

[4] Brian Lavery, “Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1793-1815” (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2000), pg 66.

[5] Francois Crouzet, “Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 24 (1964): pg 578.

[6] Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relation with the War of 1812 (London, Sampson, Low, Marston & Company, 1905), pp 2-4.

[7]Ibid, pp 104-108.

[8] Ibid, pg 110.

[9] Ibid, pp 114-115.

[10] Robert M. Browning, From Cape Charles to Cape Fear (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1993), pp 2-3.

[11] Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government Vol. I, (Richmond, De Capo, 1990), pp 402-403.

[12] Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1988), pg 1.

[13] Jason Glab, “Blockading China: A Guide”, https://warontherocks.com/2013/10/blockading-china-a-guide/commentary, October 1, 2013

[14] National Research Council. 2001. Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10176 Pg 18.

Featured Image: Battle of Mobile Bay (Louis Prang/Wikimedia Commons)

Europe, History

The Spanish Civil War at Sea: Limits to Sea Power’s Influence on History?

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By Mark Munson

Sea power advocates traditionally justify the role of navies as a national security tool by their function in winning and deterring wars. The U.S. Navy’s current maritime strategy articulates this idea by stating that sea power is “the critical foundation of national power and prosperity and international prestige.”1 However, past wars at sea have been won by states or combatants in spite of significant naval disadvantages. The Spanish Civil War provides one such example of a less capable power defeating an enemy with a bigger navy. A successfully executed strategy can overcome a larger fleet, where victories by smaller navies can be enabled by factors like air power and the active support of willing allies, allowing them to successfully apply sea power in support of national objectives.

Pre-Uprising

In 1936, right-wing Spanish military officers (later referred to as “Nationalists,” an example of successful historical branding as they were actually the rebels in this case) mutinied against the republican government that had ruled Spain since the end of the monarchy in 1931. While the Spanish Civil War is not typically considered one of the major naval conflicts of the twentieth century, control of the seas around Spain, particularly the Strait of Gibraltar, was vitally important at the start of the conflict since most of the rebel troops were based across the strait in Spanish Morocco, where the Spanish Army had been conducting a brutal pacification campaign for decades.

The Spanish Legion (El Tercio, Spain’s attempt at replicating the French Foreign Legion) and Spanish Army units referred to as Regulares (composed of Moroccan natives) were at the core of the Army of Africa that the right-wing Nationalists would rely on in their revolt against the Republic’s Popular Front government. Moving those troops across the strait would require support from the Spanish Navy.

While some historians claim that senior naval officers coordinated with the eventual Spanish dictator Francisco Franco before the mutiny,2 others argue that General Emiliano Mola, the main organizer of the rising, had “made no serious provision for naval commitment to the plot,”3 assuming that “the Spanish Navy would remain impotent and neutral” after Spanish Army officers had rebelled.4 The aristocratic and “strongly monarchist” Navy officer corps was more socially homogenous than its Army counterpart, which had some “liberal pockets.” The mutineers gambled that most Spanish Navy officers would side with them, a move that would be borne out.

Immediately before the rising, however, the Republican government, suspecting a possible coup, had already deployed warships to the strait to deter a potential crossing from Africa.5 The Navy Minister, Jose Giral, had kept ships deployed away from potential strongholds of the mutineers, and more importantly, tasked “loyal telegraph operators” to monitor communications both ashore and afloat.6 Enlisted sailors, meanwhile, had also intuited the rising, holding a secret meeting in Ferrol on 13 July to prepare for a rebellion by their officers.7

That planning was timely. On 18 July, a civilian radio operator working at Navy headquarters in Madrid intercepted a message from Franco transmitted to senior officers encouraging them to rise up in support of the mutiny initiated the previous day by Army units in Morocco. Giral responded to the news by instructing all fleet radio operators to “to watch their officers, a gang of fascists,” and issuing a follow-up command “dismissing all officers who refused government orders.”8

Sorting Sides

Many Navy personnel first learned of the rising that day when they received Giral’s orders to attack rebel Army units.9 Disregarding the pleas of their officers to support the rebellion, crews of many Spanish Navy ships spread word of the rising, deposed their officers, and formed committees to run the ships.10 Onboard the battleship Jaime I, the crew “overwhelmed, imprisoned, and in many cases, shot those officers who seemed disloyal.”11 After the skirmish between officers and their men, the crew had a famous exchange with Madrid:

“Crew of Jaime I to ministry of marine. We have had serious resistance from the commanders and officers onboard and have subdued them by force…Urgently request instructions as to bodies.”

“Ministry of marine to crew Jaime I. Lower bodies overboard with respectful solemnity. What is your present position?”12

A similar series of events reportedly took place onboard the cruiser Miguel de Cervantes, whose officers reportedly “resisted the ship’s company to the last man.”13

Line drawing of the Spanish Republican battleship JAIME I. (Wikimedia Commons)

The captain of the destroyer Sánchez Barcaiztegui, off the shore of North Africa near Melilla, attempted to sway the men to the cause of the mutineers, but after pleading his case he “was greeted by profound silence, which was interrupted by a single cry “To Cartagena!” This cry was taken up by the whole ship’s company.” After ousting their officers and bombarding Nationalist positions in Melilla and Ceuta, the crew returned in command of the ship to port in Cartagena, where the Navy base had remained loyal to the Republic.14 On station near Melilla, the officers of the destroyer Churruca remained in control because of a malfunctioning radio that had left all aboard oblivious to events.15 Once communications were restored, however, the crew seized control of the ship after it had delivered troops to Cadiz.16

Officers not killed during the rising were imprisoned ashore, where many were later executed.17 According to one account, “230 out of 675 naval officers on active service” were killed during the first months of the war.18 After rejecting the Ministry’s command to attack the rebels on 18 July, most naval officers were deposed by the crews per Giral’s orders, with chief engineers assuming duty as new commanding officers.19 By the time the Spanish Navy had sorted itself into two warring factions, the Republic was left with a tiny fraction of the former Spanish Navy’s senior uniformed leadership: only two of the 19 admirals, and two of the 31 commanding officers of large combatants sided with the Republic. According to one estimate, “only 10 percent of the Cuerpo General,” the Navy’s sea-going line officers, stayed loyal to the Republic.20 Those who stayed loyal were often “demoralized by the murder of their comrades and the insecurity of their own position.”21

It is unclear whether their exodus left the Republican fleet a leaderless and undisciplined rabble, or the officer corps’ preference for service with the Nationalists gave it an intangible, war-winning, leadership advantage. Regardless, the workers committees formed by the Republican sailors to replace the officers afloat failed to translate revolutionary zeal into victory at sea. Nikolai Kuznetsov, then a captain serving as the Soviet naval attaché in Madrid, recalled that the shipboard committees resulted in much talk but little action, citing a visit to the battleship Jaime I in which “the phrase ‘conquer or die’ was heard everywhere, but the anarchists neither conquered nor died.”22

The enlisted crews did secure more of the fleet than their officers, particularly most of the newest combatants, including Jaime I, three cruisers, twenty destroyers, and twelve submarines. The Nationalists seized the battleship España from drydock, two cruisers, a destroyer, some gunboats, two submarines, and five Coast Guard vessels. Crucially, they also captured Canarias and Balaeres, two new cruisers under construction in Ferrol at the time of the rising.23

Somewhat mitigating their deficiency in numbers of ships, the Nationalists seized major naval bases on the Spanish mainland in Ferrol, Cadiz, and Algeciras, while the Republic was left with Cartagena and Mahon on the island of Minorca, both of which both had comparatively limited maintenance facilities. Republican control of major civilian ports and shipyards in Barcelona and Bilbao, along with two-thirds of Spain’s merchant fleet, ultimately failed to influence the course of the naval war.24

Nationalist Operations (The Rebels)

By late July 1936, the two Spanish navies had begun to contest the strait, since control of that chokepoint would prevent any Nationalist attempt to move their troops from Morocco. By early August the bulk of the Republican Navy was operating there, trying to bottle up the enemy Army of Africa25 as Italy began to deploy Savoia Marchetti 81 bombers (SM.81) to Nationalist bases in Morocco.26

An Italian SM.81 like those used to magnify and enable the limited sea power of the Spanish Nationalists. (Wikimedia Commons)

When most of the Republican ships left the strait to replenish supplies in Cartagena on 5 August, the Nationalists immediately seized the initiative. The Italian bombers pounced on the few destroyers left behind, damaging Almirante Valdes and Lepanto, and clearing the way for the sealift of Nationalist troops to Spain.27 The German battleships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer, also operating near the strait at that time, likely deterred the Republican ships from interdicting the convoy of Franco’s troops.28

The Italians scattered the Republican fleet, allowing 3,000 men from the Army of Africa to cross by sea.29 The so-called “victory convoy”30 that sailed on “the day of the Virgin of Africa” was critical at that stage of the war. Those troops would form the bulk of the force that “cut off the Portuguese frontier from the republicans” and joined “forces with the Army of the North,” establishing the Nationalists firmly on the ground for the rest of the war.31

The German Luftwaffe also contributed to saving the Nationalist cause, with German air power playing a vital role in the airlift of troops essential to Nationalist logistics. Hitler reportedly said that “Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju 52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory.”32 “The first major airlift of troops in history” transported 1,500 troops in its first week. Eventually the German and Italian air forces transported up to 12,000 soldiers to Spain in the opening months of the war.33 The real impact of the airlift may have been qualitative rather than quantitative, however, with German aviation demonstrating Nazi commitment and thereby stiffening rebel resolve. While the number of men flown by the Nazis was significantly less than the number of troops ferried cross the strait by sea, it “had an enormous influence both on the nationalists’ morale and on the international assessment of their chances of victory.”34 While the airlift may not have been the decisive moment in the war, as “the Army of Africa would have got across eventually,”35 Hitler’s intervention is what turned “a coup d’etat going wrong into a bloody and prolonged civil war.”36

The war at sea was also one of allies, with the Nationalists benefiting from more active support from their German and Italian allies at sea than any aid the Republic received. Germany evaded the Republic’s blockade of their commercial shipping by using vessels registered in Panama, and the Nationalist Navy convoyed in Italian ships.37 The German and Italian navies steadily increased their support to the Nationalists throughout the early months of the war, organizing arms shipments and convoying them through the Republic’s “flimsy blockade,” monitoring the Republican fleet at sea, “openly transmitting periodic position reports,” and establishing formal liaison relationships with the Nationalist Navy.38 The Italian Navy also trained and equipped the Nationalist Navy with submarines and torpedo boats.39

The Italian Navy flagrantly abused the concept of neutrality to justify anchoring warships and landing marines in the nominally-neutral port of Tangier, claiming that they needed to evacuate endangered Italian citizens. By the time thousands of Italians and other third-country nationals had left the city, Italian forces had managed to deter the Republican Navy from entering the port and discouraged Republican loyalists from taking control of that vital haven on the southern side of the strait.40

Map of the Strait of Gibraltar (BBC)

Republican Operations (The State)

In contrast to the straightforward German and Italian support to the Nationalists, the Republic’s reliance on the Soviet Union subjected it to constraints and conflicting objectives. The German and Italian navies prevented the deployment of Soviet warships in the Spanish theater, and Nationalist forces could interdict Soviet-flagged merchant shipping that attempted to transit the Mediterranean.41 Soviet arms shipments to the Republic had to be carried by Spanish shipping, with British-flagged shipping carrying the bulk of “legitimate trade” like “oil, coal, food and other supplies.”42 But despite difficulties, including the lack of sympathy by most of the remaining senior Republican Navy officers for Soviet or Spanish communists, the Republican Navy was able to maintain maritime lines-of-communication with the Soviet Union- “between October 1936 and September 1937, over twenty large, mostly Spanish, transport ships made journeys from the Black Sea to Spain without difficulty.”43

Despite the success of those convoys, critics of the Soviet naval strategy correctly point out that it “was narrowly defensive and was essentially derived from the assumptions of inevitable material inferiority to imperialist navies which could only be defeated by a kind of proletarian guerilla warfare at sea.” This strategy made little sense for a Republican Navy that started the war with every “material and geographical capability to carry the war to the enemy.” Rather than taking the initiative, the Republic ceded use of the sea by limiting their scope of naval operations mainly to escorting Soviet shipping.44

Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, the Soviet adviser to the Spanish Republic and future Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union. (Wikimedia Commons)

Soviet influence had an operational impact later in 1936 as well. On 29 September, the Nationalist cruisers Almirante Cervera and Canarias sunk Almirante Ferrándiz and damaged Gravina at the battle of Cape Spartel,45 in what has been called the “turning point of the naval war.” Afterward “the Republican Navy would never regain the initiative or its confidence, while the Nationalist Navy would never lose them.” Kuznetsov had approved the diversion of Republican ships from the strait, but eventually acknowledged “it was a terrible blunder.”46

It should be noted, however, that the Soviets controlled the Republican Navy in virtually the same manner as they influenced Republican Army operations ashore during the first two years of the war.47 Ironically, the Spanish Communist Party vigorously criticized “the passivity of the Republican fleet,” not realizing that its caution at sea was dictated by a naval strategy crafted by Soviet officers to meet Soviet objectives.48 One assessment of Soviet assistance argues that “Stalin’s material aid kept the Republic temporarily alive, but his military advisers helped dig its grave.”49

Neutral or Complicit Onlookers?

While France and Great Britain tried to maintain neutrality in their relations with the two sides, the international regime they attempted to implement and enforce at sea actively harmed the Republican cause. The Non-Intervention Agreement of September 1936 not only failed to stop the flow of fighters and materiel to both sides, but one-sided adherence to the agreement by the “genuinely” neutral UK and the “formally” neutral France did little to diminish the flow of German, Italian, or Soviet aid into Spain.50 Franco-British neutrality did not extend to actually ensuring that other European powers behaved as neutrals, as they chose to overlook direct Italian and German naval participation in the hostilities.51

The French left-wing Popular Front government did make some moves to help the Republican government with which it had much ideological sympathy, but on a smaller scale than Italy or Germany aided the Nationalists. On the maritime front, however, even a minimal French commitment in support of the Republic was undercut by a British refusal to cooperate. Overtures by the French Navy’s Admiral Francois Darlan to the British to counter Italian and German naval support to the Nationalists were rebuffed in 1936.52 Lord Chatfield, the Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord, told Darlan that Franco was a “good Spanish patriot” and that the Royal Navy was “unfavourably impressed” by “the murder of the Spanish naval officers.”53

The British reluctance to support the Republic with Royal Navy operations afloat was not just officer-class solidarity with the Nationalist sympathies of their Spanish Navy peers, however. It also reflected larger geopolitical concerns and diverging imperial interests not aligned with the Anglo-French naval alliance. While fears of “combined Italian-German-Spanish naval operations” in the Mediterranean drove French planning, British desire for a rapprochement with Italy after disputes over the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 led to a less aggressive British policy.54

Conclusion

Despite its initial significant naval advantage, the Spanish Republic was ultimately defeated by the Nationalists in 1939. While both sides operated at sea throughout the conflict, the Republic had lost the naval war within the first few months. Historians have justifiably blamed the Republican Navy for its failure to keep the Army of Africa bottled up in Morocco, but it is unfair to attribute this failure to anarchist shipboard committees and the few officers that remained loyal to the government in Madrid. The smaller Nationalist fleet exploited air power and vigorous allied support to more effectively apply sea power in order to win the war. Sea power proved decisive in the Spanish Civil War, just not in the narrow understanding of naval strength typified by measuring numbers of vessels. Ships and other materiel of war are tools, and the Nationalists proved better at using theirs at sea between 1936 and 1939.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a naval officer assigned to Coastal Riverine Group TWO. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

References

[1] A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015.

[2] Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain (New York: Penguin, 2006), 71.

[3] Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 212.

[4] Willard C. Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” Naval War College Review 38, no. 1, (January/February 1984): 24.

[5] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 24.

[6] Thomas, 204.

[7] Beevor, 71-72.

[8] Beevor., 57, 72.

[9] Ibid., 71.

[10] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 25.

[11] Thomas, 243.

[12] Beevor, 72.

[13] Thomas, 243.

[14] Ibid., 72.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Beevor, 72.

[17] Thomas, 243.

[18] Ibid., 243 (footnote).

[19] Ibid., 227.

[20] Michael Alpert, “The Clash of Spanish Armies: Contrasting Ways of War in Spain, 1936-1939,” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 345.

[21] Thomas., 331-332.

[22] Ibid, 549.

[23] Ibid., 331-332.

[24] Ibid., 331-332.

[25] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 25.

[26] Ibid., 28.

[27] Ibid., 28; Michael Alpert, La Guerra Civil Española en el Mar (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1987), 92.

[28] Thomas, 370-371; Michael Alpert, “The Clash of Spanish Armies: Contrasting Ways of War in Spain, 1936-1939,” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 334.

[29] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 29; Thomas, 370-371; Beevor, 117-118.

[30] Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (New York: Basic Books, 1994) 161-162.

[31] Thomas, 370-371.

[32] Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941-1944, trans. Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens (New York: Enigma Books, 2000), 687.

[33] Beevor, 117-118.

[34] Ibid., 117-118.

[35] Ibid., 427.

[36] Preston, 160.

[37] Peter Gretton, “The Nyon Conference – The Naval Aspect,” The English Historical Review 90, no. 354 (January 1975): 103.

[38] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 30.

[39] Sullivan, 10.

[40] Ibid., 9.

[41] Alpert, “The Clash of Spanish Armies: Contrasting Ways of War in Spain, 1936-1939,” 348.

[42] Gretton, 103.

[43] Thomas, 549-550.

[44] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 32.

[45] Beevor, 144; Willard C. Frank, “Canarias, Adiós,” Warship International 2 (1979), accessed at http://www.kbismarck.org/canarias2.html.

[46] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 30-31.

[47] Ibid., 32.

[48] Ibid., 39.

[49] Ibid., 48.

[50] Gretton, 103.

[51] Michael Alpert, “The Clash of Spanish Armies: Contrasting Ways of War in Spain, 1936-1939,” 346.

[52] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 28.

[53] Thomas, 389.

[54] Frank, “Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War,” 30.

Featured Image: The Spanish cruiser Canarias (Colorized by Irootoko Jr.)

History

The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War

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By Christian H. Heller

Introduction

The 1973 Yom Kippur War shocked Israel and the world. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) complacency led to days of panic as Egyptian and Syrian forces threatened the very existence of Israel and triggered the potential “demise of the ‘third temple.'”1 Emergency American aid supported the Jewish defenders and averted a possible superpower confrontation reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Politically, the war reset a diplomatic stalemate between the Arabs and Israel and led to the negotiations at the Camp David summit. Militarily, the naval battles of the Yom Kippur War played almost no part in its outcome. They did, however, initiate a technological and tactical maritime revolution. The battles proved the effectiveness of missile and anti-missile systems to control the seas, and ushered in the missile age of naval warfare.

Breakout of War

The origins of the Yom Kippur War lie in the Arab humiliation during the previous war with Israel, nearly six years earlier. The overwhelming Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War created a political stalemate in which both sides were unwilling to negotiate from their resultant positions.2 Israel occupied the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Arabs knew their territory could not be recaptured via direct conflict.3 The new territory gave Israel the defensible borders and strategic depth it previously lacked and it refused to give them up.4 In Egypt, Anwar Sadat faced domestic unrest from a serious lack of state revenue due to the loss of the Suez Canal.5 The Egyptian population demanded “redemption” for their humiliation in the 1967 war.6

Egypt carefully planned for a limited war to achieve modest gains and reset the balance at the negotiating table. The main barrier to their plans was the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Most of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was destroyed on a single day in 1967 and Egypt’s air defenses were incapable of defending against the advanced Israeli planes.7 With the help of Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems like the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6, Egypt created a “layered anti-aircraft missile defense force” and increased its anti-aircraft (AA) missile force fourfold.8 The AA umbrella could both deter Israeli preemptive strikes and protect Egyptian forces while crossing the Suez Canal and invading the Sinai.9 Egypt also obtained new anti-tank weapons like Sagger missiles and armored vehicles to mitigate Israel’s superiority in armor assets and neutralize their counterattack capabilities in the Sinai.10 Together, with an impressive misinformation campaign, Soviet support for resupplies, and close coordination with Syria, the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a successful surprise invasion of Israel on the night of 6 October 1973.

Israel and its military were caught unprepared for the attack. Their leaders believed, “there was no chance for an Egyptian victory, thus no rational reason to resort to force.”11 Without a capable air force to negate the IAF’s advantage, leaders in Tel Aviv assumed they would be free from Egyptian military action until at least 1974.12 The night of 8 October, during which Egyptian anti-tank missiles destroyed an entire Israeli armor division in the Sinai, was one of the worst situations Israel has ever faced. Some records indicate that nuclear weapons were prepared, and on 9 October Prime Minister Golda Meir intended to fly to Washington, D.C. to personally request American help.13,14 American military aid flowed into Tel Aviv to avert an international crisis and potential nuclear war, and within a few days Israel again had the upper-hand in the conflict.15

Israeli Naval Preparations

The Israeli Navy was the only service prepared to fight and win the war from its initiation. While 1967 was an overwhelming victory for the army and air force, the navy found itself outgunned by Egypt’s Soviet-built missile boats. Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat with anti-ship missiles from its small, maneuverable, and heavily-armed missile boats. Israel’s navy traditionally had an inferior status domestically compared to the other military services and the deaths of 47 sailors on the Eilat reinforced that public opinion.16 The attack had a “traumatic effect” on the Israeli Navy whose leaders set about enacting immediate reforms.17

INS Eilat, Ex Royal Navy Z Class destroyer sold to Israel in 1955. (Wikimedia Commons)

Events on the other side of the Middle East reinforced Israel’s desire to improve its navy. Soviet missile boat technology demonstrated promise during the India-Pakistan War of 1971. The Indian Navy purchased Osa-class boats from the Soviet Union and trained with them at the port of Okha, near the Pakistani port of Karachi.18 The Soviet Navy led the world in littoral small craft development at the time. In 1975, the Soviet Navy had more “small combat craft” than the combined total throughout the rest of the world.19 The 130-ft Osa-class was the most well-known of the littoral ships. A standard vessel carried four Styx missile launchers and cruised at a top speed of 32 knots.20

The development of an anti-ship cruise missile became a Soviet goal after World War II. The U.S. Navy on the other hand, led by aviators with knowledge of bombing and torpedoes, believed their weapons to be the perfect anti-ship weapon. In contrast, the Soviet Navy developed multiple versions of cruise missiles to compensate for its lack of naval aviation.21

The missile boats’ speed, agility, and striking capability in the littoral waters along the two nations meant the squadron could reach Pakistani naval targets at Karachi immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. On 4 December, Indian missiles sank one Pakistani destroyer, one Pakistani minesweeper, one merchant ship, and damaged some oil storage facilities. Due to a possible aircraft counterattack, the Indian missile boats withdrew. While Indian naval leaders welcomed the victory, questions emerged about pressing the offensive and taking advantage of weak Pakistani defenses in the region.22 The Indian Navy launched a second strike four days later that destroyed another oil tanker and damaged two commercial tankers.23 The attacks demonstrated the possibilities of missile technology for offensive strikes and controlling an enemy’s naval capabilities as the Pakistani Navy restricted its movements outside of the Karachi harbor after the Indian victories. 

Soviet Osa I Class fast attack craft-missile underway. (Wikimedia Commons)

The Israeli Navy took notice of the India-Pakistan conflict and decided that small boats with advanced missiles had a greater advantage over large ships like destroyers and frigates in the littoral waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea.24 The increase in Israeli territory with the capture of the Sinai Peninsula in 1967 meant more coastline for the navy to protect, and a blue water navy composed of ocean going vessels was unnecessary when their main operating area was the littorals.25

Israeli missile boat procurement began in 1962 when Egypt and Syria obtained Soviet missile boats but accelerated drastically after 1967.26 By the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Navy consisted of fourteen Sa’ar-class missile boats.27 It was the first non-Soviet allied nation in the world to enter the anti-ship missile age.28 They faced significant numbers of enemy vessels. Egypt’s surface-craft consisted of twelve Osa-class missile boats, twenty-six torpedo boats, three destroyers, two frigates and various other vessels.29 Syria’s navy consisted of three Osa– and six older Komar-class missile boats, eleven torpedo boats, and two minesweepers.30

The small size of the missile boats was intended to minimize their target signature and add to the ships’ survivability, but raised questions about their potential firepower. The sinking of a fishing vessel by the Egyptians with a Soviet-built Styx missile in 1967 showcased both the ships’ capabilities and the threat to the Israeli Navy. The Styx missiles of Syria and Egypt also had a range of 25 nautical miles compared to the 12 nautical mile range of Israel’s Gabriel missiles.31 Despite Israel’s new ships, training, and preparations, its navy was still “out-ranged in missiles and outnumbered more than two to one” at the beginning of the conflict.32 In response, Israel accelerated its development of advanced electronic countermeasures to provide a greater defensive buffer for its new fleet.33 Israeli naval leaders also war gamed and experimented with new tactics to add additional defensive capabilities to their ships.34

Operationally, Israeli naval commanders learned from the lessons of the previous wars about limited flexibility and unclear tasking. They assigned three objectives to the navy in the Mediterranean: coastal defense, the elimination of the threat from Arab missile boats, and to support ground troops.35 The navy decided their offensive strategy would focus on the enemy missile boats.36 An active pursuit of the enemy’s naval assets would secondarily support the other two objectives.

The naval battles of the Yom Kippur War were remarkable for two historic developments. They were the first battles in history in which both combatants possessed ship-to-ship missiles, as well as the first time electronic countermeasures were used to defend against missile attacks.37 Two battles in particular highlight these historic changes in naval warfare: Latakia and Baltim.

The Battles

On the night of 6 October, 1973, at the outset of the war, a flotilla of five Israeli missile boats cruised off the coast of Syria attempting to draw the Syrian Navy into battle.38 They identified a Syrian torpedo boat, pursued it east towards shore, and sunk it. While sailing south along the coast opposite Latakia, a main Syrian harbor and naval base, the INS Reshef sank a Syrian minesweeper. The flotilla then identified three Syrian missile boats and deduced that the torpedo boat and minesweeper were naval decoys or observation posts.39 The Syrian ships launched eight Styx missiles at the Israeli squadron, but each was defeated with chaff launches which pulled the Styx targeting system away from the Israeli ships.40

The Israeli vessels advanced quickly and “sandwiched” the Syrian boats between them.41 In total, the Israeli flotilla launched 11 Gabriel missiles, six of which hit their targets.42 In only 25 minutes the navy sank three Syrian vessels. Israel resoundingly won the first naval missile battle in history with no casualties.43 Five Syrian ships were sunk and the Israeli Navy’s offensive and defensive developments tentatively proved themselves in battle.

Two days later on the night of 8 October, six Israeli vessels cruised towards Egypt in two columns after the devastating defeat of Israel’s tank-led counterattack in the Sinai.44 The squadron’s initial intent was to target military facilities just west of the Suez Canal.45 Four Egyptian boats attacked at midnight. The Egyptian Osa missile boats fired 16 missiles near their maximum range, then turned and ran. The Israeli ships shot twelve Gabriel missiles while pursuing. Six hit their targets and three Egyptian ships sank.46

The one-sided results from the battles frightened the Egyptian and Syrian leaders who restricted their navies to the waters nearest their harbors, just as Pakistan did two years earlier. The war involved subsequent smaller battles such as the Second Battle of Latakia. However, these battles involved Arab navies shooting their missiles from afar while relying on protection from merchant ships or coastal defenses.47 Fighting on land continued for almost three more weeks, but the war for the littorals was over.

Israeli Naval Raids, from Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, pg. 313

Tactical and Technical Developments

Israel developed tactics and technology specifically suited to its own needs. The small state knew who its enemy was and where its future conflicts would take place. The combination of domestically produced ships, new missiles, and original tactics was “one of the clearest cases of Israel’s tailoring its forces to those of the Arabs.”48 It developed ships and crews able to conduct advanced scouting activities, execute effective command and control, and employ overbearing firepower on its enemy. Each of these advancements helped the Israeli Navy overcome major deficits in numbers and range. The combination of surprise, initiative, and a boldness to use new capabilities became hallmarks of the Israeli littoral squadrons.49

The Sa’ar-class vessels combined the “maximum firepower possible” in a small, fast vessel perfectly suited for Eastern Mediterranean.50 Israel’s Gabriel missiles destroyed eight Arab ships, including six of their seven missile boats, despite their short range.51 The concentration of firepower onboard the Sa’ar was key to victory. During Latakia, the Israeli ships possessed 26 missiles each compared to Syria’s eight. In Baltim, the Israeli ships carried as many as 34 missiles compared to 16 on each Egyptian boat.52 Additionally, the Arabs made themselves easy to identify and target by keeping their radars turned on and talking frequently over open radio.53

Saar-class missile boat of the Israeli Navy (Wikimedia Commons)

Israel’s experimental tactics were simple. The Israeli boats turned toward the enemy to face them head on and charge at full speed to minimize their target profile and launched chaff decoys early to entice the enemy to launch their missiles at the furthest range. When the Arabs shot their missiles at the full 25 nautical miles, the Israelis were gifted with the maximum time possible to detect and avoid them while in flight.54 Then, using electronic countermeasures and more chaff, the Israeli boats could close with the enemy while evading the incoming missiles until within range of the Gabriels.55

Israeli defensive advancements achieved similar success. The Israeli Navy had no aircraft for reconnaissance and target identification but relied on electronic detection systems which could track the enemy’s radar without betraying their own position.56 The “multiple tricks” of long-range chaff, electronic jammers, high-speed maneuvers, radar-absorbing coating on the bows of the ships, and close-range chaff saved the Israeli fleet.57,58 The Egyptian and Syrian navies shot 52 missiles at the Israeli ships, and all of them missed.59

Israel also maximized its littoral geography and short lines of communications for speedy re-fueling and re-supply. The Israeli sustainment system was so efficient for the navy that it operationally turned a fleet of 14 ships into 24.60

Missile developments emerged on land during the war as well, adding to the impact which these new technologies could have on warfare. The success of “one of the densest missile walls in the world,” built by Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, demonstrated that control over the air could originate from below.61 Over 100 IAF aircraft were destroyed by Soviet-built SAM systems.62 The Egyptian army’s new anti-tank equipment paid off when the Israeli armored counterattack was “simply destroyed.”63 Within 24 hours of the invasion, the Israeli defenders in the Sinai lost over two-thirds of their 270 tanks to Egyptian anti-tank weapons.64 The world was paying attention, and these developments reshaped modern warfare.

The Impact

Due to years of technical and tactical preparation combined with thousands of simulations and wargames, the Israeli Navy was the country’s only service ready to fight and win on October 6, 1973.65 Israeli naval leaders had instituted and carried-out a ten-year plan to directly tailor their naval capabilities to take advantage of the Egyptian and Syrian weaknesses.66 In the end the naval battles of the Yom Kippur War had no significance toward the outcome of the conflict, but its military impact was substantial and long-lasting.

Israeli successes in offensive and defensive missile technology marked the beginning of the missile age for naval warfare, especially for littoral combat power. The size of the ship and its guns mattered far less than its missiles and their accuracy. Defensive countermeasures like chaff, electronic jamming, and radar-absorbent paint became necessities as ships now acted under the premise of first-to-see, first-to-kill. Such offensive and defensive measures are mandatory in today’s naval operating spaces where anti-access/area-denial strategies and over-the-horizon systems are prolific, especially with regard to the littorals and close operating areas of the Pacific and Middle Eastern theaters.

Just as naval artillery transitioned from cannons to breech-loading artillery and fleet structure shifted from battleships to aircraft carriers, the Yom Kippur War ushered in the age of the missile, the missile boat, and modern littoral naval combat. Limited American experimentation with cruise missiles morphed into a complete fervor following the Yom Kippur War. The Harpoon missile research program, initiated in 1969, escalated with the U.S. Navy’s purchase of 150 missiles in 1974. The U.S. Navy formalized production in 1975. By 1979, 1,000 Harpoons had been delivered to the Navy with more in waiting.67

There is no modern definition for a missile boat, but most tend to be less than 1,000 tons (for reference, the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship weighs in at 3,500 tons), shorter than 90 meters, sails at a high speed, and carries an armament of cruise missiles and search radar to find targets.68 Their purpose is to be a cheap, mobile launching platform that achieves a high return-on-investment through the destruction of much larger, more expensive enemy ships. The capability—potential and realized—of a small fishing-boat sized warship to sink larger vessels like frigates, corvettes, tankers, or possibly aircraft carriers, has allowed smaller nations to field formidable naval threats in their home waters.

Most naval professionals are at least loosely familiar with the threat from Iranian fast attack craft in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. This technology, combined with geographic chokepoints, coastal geography, numerous staging areas, and defensive capabilities, permits Iran to pose a heavyweight threat with a lightweight force.69 Iran’s exploitation of its littoral advantages and unique offensive and defensive capabilities allows it to apply a doctrine of asymmetric naval warfare which could produce, “highly destabilizing and surprising results.”70 

Regardless of naming convention or location, fast, lightweight, heavily armed ships will remain an enticing option for navies around the world, especially those without the finances to deploy blue-water fleets or with naturally supportive geography. The Israeli Navy proved the efficacy of such a strategy in 1973 when a few insignificant naval battles changed naval warfare forever.

Christian Heller is an active duty intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps. He is an honors graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Oxford University, and was a Rhodes Scholar.

References

[1] Avner Cohen, “When Israel Stepped Back From the Brink”, The New York Times, 3 October 2013, Accessed online at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.html

[2] Tomis Kapitan, “Arab-Israeli Wars”, Encyclopedia of War and Ethics, edited by Donald A. Wells (Greenwood, 1996), 21

[3] David T. Buckwalter, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War”, Case Studies in Policy Making & Implementation from Naval War College, 119, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/

[4] Ibid., 120

[5] Ibid.

[6] Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 418

[7] Mohamed Kadry Said, “Layered Defense, Layered Attack: The Missile Race in the Middle East”, The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2002, 37

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 229

[11] Buckwalter, “The 1973,” 130

[12] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 227

[13] Elizabeth Stephens, “The Yom Kippur War”, History Today 58 is. 10 (October 2008): 5

[14] Buckwalter, “The 1973,” 130

[15] Stephens, “The Yom,” 5-8

[16] Adam B. Green, “The Israeli Navy’s Application of Operational Art in the Yom Kippur War: A Study in Operational Design”, Naval War College, 12 May, 2017, 1-4

[17] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Overview and Analysis of the Conflict”, September 1975, 113, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf

[18] Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph, Excerpt, 1 November 2017, Accessed at  http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/1971-war-the-first-missile-attack-on-karachi/

[19] “A Look at the Soviet Navy”, All Hands, September 1975, 11, Accessed online at http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/archpdf/ah197509.pdf

[20] Ibib.

[21] Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Alabama: Air University Press, 1985), 150

[22] Hiranandani

[23] “Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi”, Bharat Rakshak, 7 July 2004, Accessed at https://web.archive.org/web/20141119181622/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/44-Attacks-On-Karachi.html?start=1

[24] Ibid.

[25] Green, “The Israeli,” 3

[26] Ibid.

[27] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 311

[28] Green, “The Israeli,” 4

[29] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 311

[30] Ibid.

[31] John C. Schulte, “An Analysis of the historical effectiveness of anti-ship cruise missiles in littoral warfare”, Naval Post-Graduate School, September 1994, 5

[32] Green, “The Israeli,” 1

[33] Green, “The Israeli,” 4

[34] CIA, “The 1973,” 113-114

[35] Green, “The Israeli,” 8

[36] Ibid.

[37] Yao Ming Tiah, “An Analysis of small navy tactics using a modified Hughes’ Salvo Model”, Naval Post-Graduate School, March 2007, 52

[38]Tiah, “An Analysis,” 52

[39] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 311-312

[40] Schulte, “An Analysis,” 5

[41] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312

[42] Schulte, “An Analysis,” 5

[43] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312

[44] Tiah, “An Analysis,” 53

[45] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312

[46] Schulte, “An Analysis,” 6

[47] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312-313

[48] CIA, “The 1973,” 113

[49] Tiah, “An Analysis,” xxi

[50] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 314

[51] Tiah, “An Analysis,” 52

[52] Ibid., 54

[53] CIA, “The 1973,” 114

[54] Ibid.

[55] Jonathan F. Solomon, “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks”, Naval War College Review 66, no. 4, 2013, 13

[56] Tiah, “An Analysis,”, 54

[57] Solomon, “Maritime Deception,” 13 3

[58] CIA, “The 1973,” 113

[59] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 314

[60] Green, “The Israeli,” 11

[61] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli,, 227

[62] Robert S. Bolia, “Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study,” Parameters, Summer 2004, 53

[63] Charles F. Doroski, “The Fourth Arab-Israeli War: A Clausewitzian Victory for Egypt in Seventy-Three?” Naval War College, 16 May 1995, 10

[64] Buckwalter, “The 1973,” 126

[65] Green, “The Israeli,” 8

[66] CIA, “The 1973,” 114

[67] Werrell, The Evolution, 151

[68] “Analysis: Are Missile Boats Still Relevant in Modern Warfare”, Defencyclopedia, 17 November 2016, Accessed online at https://defencyclopedia.com/2016/11/17/analysis-are-missile-boats-still-relevant-in-modern-warfare/

[69] Fariborz Haghshenass, “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #87, September 2008, 7-11

[70] Haghsenass, 25

Featured Image: Saar3 missile boat. (Wikimedia Commons)