This monograph was originally published by the Army War College under the title Lying To Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here. It deserves to be noted that the described themes and dynamics are not solely limited to the specific military service being examined.

Read Part One, Part Two.

By Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen J. Gerras

Lying to Ourselves

It may be that this monograph has merely identified a phenomenon that has existed quietly in the Army (and in most large bureaucracies) since time immemorial. It may be that lying to the “little old lady in tennis shoes” in order to clear post, fudging a trusted NCO’s weight on an NCOER, or writing off a CONEX of surplus Oakleys is emblematic of actions that the Army will seldom discuss, but will always tolerate. Perhaps the stereotypical supply sergeant’s response of “You don’t want to know” will always be the proper response to the question of “Where did this stuff come from?” It could be that as long as dishonesty and deceit are restricted to the trivial and bothersome aspects of the Army, the status quo represents the best way to deal with an out of control, overbearing Army bureaucracy. After all, dishonesty in the Army is not new. For example, in the summer of 1970, researchers at the U.S. Army War College published the Study on Military Professionalism which found that, “Inaccurate reporting—rampant throughout the Army and perceived by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7—is significant.”¹⁸ The report quoted a captain who, at the height of the Vietnam War, stated that, “It’s necessary today, to lie, cheat, and steal to meet the impossible demands of higher officers or continue to meet the statistical requirements.”¹⁹

Acquiescence to the status quo because the Army has been dogged by the same problems in the past, however, ignores several potentially destructive implications of the current culture. First, while discussions revealed that nearly all officers were confident in their ability to correctly determine which requirements were trivial or nonsensical, those judgments can vary widely across individuals and groups. For example, some officers offered that not reporting a negligent discharge (ND) was a common example of acceptable lying, especially when it was a simple mistake and easily remedied without getting higher headquarters involved. Other officers, particularly those in the combat arms, insisted that an ND was a serious breach of discipline and leaders were duty bound to send a report upward. Similarly, some officers were aghast that anyone would submit inaccurate or incomplete storyboards, while others were much more accepting of less-than-precise submissions. Confusion and inconsistency across the force result from allowing individual interpretations to determine where to delineate the bounds of acceptable dishonesty. As one captain astutely noted:

“I think a real danger—since it’s unsaid and it’s not out there— is [that] we’re requiring every single person at every single level to make their own determination on what they want to lie about. Because we’re all setting a different standard and because we can’t talk about it, we’re obviously going to have the potential for the guys who take it too far.”

Tolerating a level of dishonesty in areas deemed trivial or unimportant also results in the degradation of the trust that is vital to the military profession. Once the bar of ethical standards is lowered, the malleability of those standards becomes a rationale for other unethical decisions. For example, one officer explained why CERP money was easily misused:

“I think the reason why we have an easier time accepting that CERP money might be used by people falsely is because you look at the institutional Army and see all the fraud, waste, and abuse that happens at every level.”

The slippery slope of ethical compromise is a real and legitimate danger to the assumption of truth in the profession. Noted ethicist Sissella Bok explains this threat in more detail:

“Of course, we know that many lies are trivial. But since we, when lied to, have no way to judge which lies are the trivial ones, and since we have no confidence that liars will restrict themselves to just such trivial lies, the perspective of the deceived leads us to be wary of all deception.”²⁰

Just as it is imprudent to expect absolute impeccability from the officer corps, it is also foolhardy to condone a casual view of deceit and duplicity in the ranks. Disregarding the pervasive dishonesty throughout the Army leads to the eventual conclusion that nothing and no one can be trusted. As Saint Augustine wisely noted, “When regard for truth has been broken down or even slightly weakened, all things remain doubtful.”²¹

Making excuses for an acceptable level of dishonesty also provides cover for deception that is less nobly motivated. While difficult to admit, many officers acutely feel the pressure of peer competition influencing their ethical decisions. As one officer pointed out:

“You’re a bad leader and you failed if you didn’t get everyone through the hour-long human trafficking thing. All the other company commanders in the United States Army somehow managed to do it and you’re gonna be the only guy that didn’t do it because you [truthfully] reported 85%.”

Careerism is a potent force that serves as a catalyst for dishonesty. The current downsizing intensifies the competition in the ranks with very few officers desiring to be “alone on the island.” In the words of one candid officer:

“We’re all kind of vultures. The one guy [who told the truth] – get him. He exposed himself. And no one wants to stand out. We all see reductions are being made. If you’re looking to do this [stay in the Army] for a long period of time, your intent is to appease the person above you. Just like the person you’re appeasing made that decision a long time ago.”

Convincing ourselves that deceitfulness in the Army is mostly well-intentioned altruism serves to mask the caustic effects of lying, cheating, or stealing for self-advancement. As a very perceptive captain observed:

“In our own eyes and our perspective, we do things for the right reasons. When you really come down to it [though], the big question is that while you may be saying you did it for the good of your men, or you did it for the right reasons, how is that different at the end of the day from someone who didn’t?”

The gravest peril of the tacit acceptance of dishonesty, however, is the facilitation of hypocrisy in Army leaders. The Army as a profession speaks of values, integrity, and honor. The Army as an organization practices zero defects, pencil-whipping, and checking the box. Army leaders are situated between the two identities—parroting the talking points of the latest Army Profession Campaign while placating the Army bureaucracy or civilian overseers by telling them what they want to hear. As a result, Army leaders learn to talk of one world while living in another. A major described the current trend:

“It’s getting to the point where you’re almost rewarded for being somebody you’re not. That’s a dangerous situation especially now as we downsize. We’re creating an environment where everything is too rosy because everyone is afraid to paint the true picture. You just wonder where it will break, when it will fall apart.”

At the strategic level, it is this hypocrisy that allows senior Army leaders to unconcernedly shift a billion dollars to overseas contingency operations funding to minimize the base budget or to brief as fact the number of sexual assault response coordinators when the data are obviously suspect. At the operational level, it is this self-deception that makes it easy for leaders to dismiss equivocation and false reports to “bad” units and attribute pencil-whipping and fudging to “weak” leaders. At the tactical level, it is this duplicity that allows leaders to “feed the beast” bogus information while maintaining a self-identity of someone who does not lie, cheat, or steal.

Confronting the Truth

While the preceding pages paint a somewhat dire picture, there is still much to be celebrated in the military profession. The military remains a noble profession filled with competent and committed servants of the nation. And yet the profession’s foundation of trust is slowly being eroded by the corrupting influence of duplicity and deceit. Ignoring dishonesty as a minor shortcoming or writing it off as an inevitable aspect of bureaucracy accomplishes nothing. Instead, the Army must take some rather drastic measures in order to correct the current deleterious culture. Three broad recommendations are offered here. Each will be difficult to implement because of the entrenched culture, but each is critical to restoring trust in the Army profession.

Acknowledge the Problem.

Dishonesty is a topic that many in the Army are extremely uncomfortable discussing openly. While junior officers tend to freely describe their struggles in maintaining their integrity in a culture that breeds dishonesty, senior officers are often reluctant to admit their personal failings in front of subordinates (or in the case of very senior officers, their peers). The need to preserve a “professional” appearance is just too strong for many senior officers to personalize their dealings with the Army culture. They can easily lecture about the ideals of integrity and honor, but many find it extremely difficult to admit that they too have encountered (and currently live with) a culture that condones dishonesty. The result is that dishonesty in the Army can be a topic for DFAC lunch table gripe sessions, but seldom for LPDs or addresses by senior leaders. In the meantime, the requirements passed down from higher become more numerous and the slow slide down the ethical slope continues. Until a candid exchange concerning dishonesty begins, the current culture will not improve.

Openly dealing with deception in the Army formation also serves to prevent a subtle hazard of the current situation—hubris. In the past two decades, the Army has dramatically revitalized its status as a profession. There has been a resurgence in analyzing the Army as a profession and examining all the attendant implications. Additionally, polls show that public confidence in the military remains the highest of all American institutions, and it is still common for those in uniform to hear, “Thank you for your service” from complete strangers. Indeed, the professional all-volunteer force has served the nation well in a difficult time of war and conflict.

The effusive public adulation and constant professional self-talk, however, can also lead to excessive pride and self-exaltation. Overconfidence can leave officers—especially those at the senior level—vulnerable to the belief that they are unimperiled by the temptations and snares found at the common level of life. The ease of fudging on a TDY voucher, the enticement of improper gifts, and the allure of an illicit relationship are minimized and discounted as concerns faced by lesser mortals.

Tradition has it that in ancient Rome, a triumphant general would ride in a celebratory procession through the city after a key battlefield victory. Always standing in the chariot behind the general, however, was a slave who whispered into the ear of the general, “Respice post te! Hominem te memento!” meaning “Look behind you! Remember that you are but a man!”²² Acknowledging organizational and individual fallibilities is the first step toward changing the culture of dishonesty plaguing the Army.

Exercise Restraint.

It is no secret that units and individuals are overwhelmed by the amount of requirements and directives placed upon them. Therefore, restraint must be established in the amount of mandatory training passed down to the force. Instead of making lower level leaders decide which mandatory training or directive they will ignore (but still report 100 percent compliance), leaders at the strategic level must shoulder the burden of prioritizing which directives are truly required. Abdicating that responsibility at the senior level understandably avoids the unpleasant task of informing a proponent, stakeholder, or constituent that his or her particular concern is not a top priority in the Army. Additionally, it gives the Army plausible deniability if something does go wrong. But it also leaves leaders at the lowest levels with no choice but to sacrifice their integrity in order to prop up the façade that all is well.

Of course, exercising restraint is difficult in an organization as large as the Army. Each staff, each level of headquarters, and each senior leader that adds a requirement earnestly believes in the importance and necessity of that requirement. Therefore restraint cannot be achieved merely by announcing it and expecting everyone to curb their propensity for new ideas. Instead, restraint will be exercised when a central authority, armed with a clear understanding of the time and resource constrained environment of the Army, examines and vets the entirety of requirements. While AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, is the obvious candidate for this added scrutiny, ALARACTS, policies from major commands, and directives from all headquarters should also be analyzed in regard to their impact on the cumulative load.

Restraint also needs to be introduced into the rampant use of an officer’s integrity for frivolous purposes. Too often, the Army turns to an officer’s integrity to verify compliance of minor concerns instead of other means such as sampling or auditing. For example, requiring all officers to attest on their OERs that they have initiated a multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) in the last 3 years probably has the well-intended purpose of socializing the force to 360° feedback. But the unanticipated outcome has been the diminution of the gravitas of an officer’s signature as rated officers, raters, and senior raters dismiss the requirement as an administrative nuisance rather than an ethical choice. (That the MSAF requirement could be easily verified through automation compounds the problem). The Army must restore the dignity and seriousness of an officer’s word by requiring it for consequential issues rather than incidental administrative requirements.

Lead Truthfully. 

As the institution acknowledges the current situation and begins exercising restraint, leaders at all levels must focus on leading truthfully. Leading truthfully dismantles the façade of mutually agreed deception by putting considerations of the integrity of the profession back into the decision-making process. Thus, at the senior level, leading truthfully may include informing a political appointee that while bath salts are a scourge to American teens, the problem may not merit Army-wide mandatory training until some other topic is removed. Leading truthfully may also include tolerating risk by striving for 100 percent compliance in all areas, but being satisfied when only 85 percent is reported in some. Leading truthfully may also involve brutally honest reporting from subordinates who risk being labeled malcontents or slackers because of their candor.

A focused emphasis on leading truthfully goes beyond inserting an online block of instruction on ethics, scheduling an ethics stand down, or creating an ethics center of excellence. Instead, leading truthfully attempts to preempt ethical fading by examining the moral implications of a leader’s decision first instead of rationalizing them away after the fact. Finally, leading truthfully changes the culture gradually and will only be effective if embraced by all leaders, not just a token few.

The Army profession rests upon a bedrock of trust. That trust continues to be treasured and guarded, but an alternative ethical reality has emerged where junior officers are socialized into believing that pencil-whipping the stats and feeding the beast are not only routine, but expected. This alternative reality is a place where senior officers romanticize the past and convince themselves that they somehow managed to achieve their station in life without tarnishing their own integrity.

Unfortunately, the boundaries of this parallel ethical universe are slowly expanding into more and more of the profession. Ethical fading and rampant rationalizations have allowed leaders to espouse lofty professional values while slogging through the mire of dishonesty and deceit. The end result is a corrosive ethical culture that few acknowledge and even fewer discuss or work to correct. The Army urgently needs to address the corrupting influence of dishonesty in the Army profession. This monograph is but one small step toward initiating that conversation and perhaps stimulating a modicum of action.

Leonard Wong is a research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. He focuses on the human and organizational dimensions of the military. He is a retired Army officer whose career includes teaching leadership at West Point and serving as an analyst for the Chief of Staff of the Army. His research has led him to locations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Vietnam. He has testified before Congress. Dr. Wong’s work has been highlighted in news media such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, New Yorker, CNN, NPR, PBS, and 60 Minutes. Dr. Wong is a professional engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.

Stephen J. Gerras is a Professor of Behavioral Sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. He served in the Army for over 25 years, including commanding a light infantry company and a transportation battalion, teaching leadership at West Point, and serving as the Chief of Operations and Agreements for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey. Colonel (Ret.) Gerras holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. in industrial and organizational psychology from Penn State University.

Endnotes

18. Study on Military Professionalism, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1970, p. 20.

19. Ibid., p. B-1-28.

20. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, New York: Random House, 1999, 21, (emphasis in the original).

21. Saint Augustine, “On Lying,” Philip Schaff, ed., A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1887, available from libertyfund.org/titles/2273.

22. Tertullian, Apologeticus, Chapter 33, available from tertullian.org/articles/mayor_apologeticum/mayor_apolog eticum_07translation.htm.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 16, 2020) A sailor stands watch as a phone talker on the bridge of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

This monograph was originally published by the Army War College under the title Lying To Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here. It deserves to be noted that the described themes and dynamics are not solely limited to the specific military service being examined.

Read Part One here.

By Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen J. Gerras

Downrange

One might expect that ethical boundaries are more plainly delineated in a combat environment—the stakes are higher, and the mission is more clearly focused. Discussions with officers, however, revealed that many of the same issues in the garrison environment also emerge in combat. For example, a senior officer described how the combat mission can lead to putting the right “spin” on reports: “We got so focused on getting bodies to combat that we overlooked a lot of issues like weight control, alcohol, or PT.” Not surprisingly, directed training is also often sidestepped in theater. One captain spoke of trying to complete mandatory Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SHARP) training:

“We needed to get SHARP training done and reported to higher headquarters, so we called the platoons and told them to gather the boys around the radio and we said, ‘Don’t touch girls.’ That was our quarterly SHARP training.”

But stretching the truth downrange often extends beyond compliance with mandatory training. A major described how Green 2 sensitive item reports were submitted early every morning. Despite the usual 100 percent accountability, however, it was obvious that it could not have been conducted to standard since nobody ever knocked on their doors to check weapon serial numbers. Another officer related how supply accountability in a combat zone could be manipulated by misrepresenting the truth:

“We found ways to beat the system. You show up in country and you get a layout and immediately what do you do? You do a shortage annex for everything. So that way the Army—with an infinite budget in country—would replenish your product [even though] the unit never really lost the equipment in the beginning.”

Discussions with senior officers revealed other examples of bending the truth. One colonel stated that, “The cost of investigating a lost widget isn’t worth the cost of the item; they write it off and later say it was lost to the Pakistanis.” Another colonel stated:

“We were required to inspect 150 polling sites in Iraq (which nobody could possibly ever do) and fill out an elaborate spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was to get validation for higher that you did what they told you to. We gave them what they wanted.”

One frequently provided example of deception at the senior level concerned readiness assessments of partner forces. It was not uncommon for readiness ratings to vary in conjunction with deployment cycles. In other words, the commander’s assessments were not based so much on the counterpart unit capabilities as they were on the American unit stage of deployment. As one colonel explained:

“I show up and [the readiness assessments] go yellow or green to red. I’m ready to leave – they go from yellow to green. We went through the reports with the CG every ninety days. Everyone wanted to believe what they wanted to believe.”

One widespread recurring requirement for junior leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq was the storyboard—a PowerPoint narrative describing unit events and occurrences. One senior officer pointed out, however, that:

“Every contact with the enemy required a storyboard. People did not report enemy contact because they knew the storyboard was useless and they didn’t want to go through the hassle.”

A captain gave his perspective and his eventual approach to providing incomplete and inaccurate storyboards to higher headquarters:

“I understand there is a higher reporting requirement of which I reported verbally, and I did a proper debrief—I wrote it down and then I sent it to them. [But now] I have to combine a bunch of pictures onto a PowerPoint slide. Now I’m doing this storyboard because there’s an IED, because a donkey fell off the mountain, because some dude’s dog came in and I had to shoot it on the COP and now this dude is mad. It became an absolute burden. So what ended up happening was [that] after about the first couple of months, you’re saving your storyboards, and as soon as you had an incident that [was] somewhat similar to what you already had, it became a cut and paste gig. And the quality of the information that you are giving them wasn’t painting the picture for higher as to what was going on. And you can say, “Yes, Lieutenant, you should have done better.” You’re absolutely right. But when I only had 4 hours between this mission and the next, what’s better – spending 15 minutes to make this beautiful storyboard or planning my next operation?”

The attitude of “I don’t need to tell anyone what happened” was also found in other areas where it was perceived that the reporting requirements were too onerous. For example, one officer discussed his unit’s failure to ask permission to respond to indirect fire (IDF):

“Counterfire became a big issue in terms of [the] ability to counterfire when you were receiving IDF. Some companies in our battalion were returning fire without an accurate grid. They got shot at so they shot back. Of course, they were out in the middle of nowhere with a low chance of collateral damage. [But] people in our battalion knew, and just didn’t say anything. I’m not sure how high up people knew, but it was accepted. That was the norm. We’ll just not say anything about it.”

Another area that reflected the malleability of ethical standards was the distribution of cash through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). As one senior officer noted, “CERP is not tracked in detail and everyone knows it.” Another colonel observed:

“CERP money is an area where we probably fudge. We gave company commanders a lot of money that we powered down to people who weren’t trained. We probably submitted reports that weren’t accurate.” 

Ethical Fading

At the outset of this monograph, it was brashly declared that most U.S. Army officers routinely lie. It would not be surprising if many uniformed readers raised a skeptical eyebrow at that claim. Indeed, it would not be unusual for nearly all military readers to maintain a self-identity that takes offense with notions of dishonesty or deception. Ironically, though, many of the same people who flinched at that initial accusation of deceit probably yawned with each new example of untruthfulness offered in the preceding pages. “White” lies and “innocent” mistruths have become so commonplace in the U.S. Army that there is often no ethical angst, no deep soul-searching, and no righteous outrage when examples of routine dishonesty are encountered. Mutually agreed deception exists in the Army because many decisions to lie, cheat, or steal are simply no longer viewed as ethical choices.

Behavioral ethics experts point out that people often fail to recognize the moral components of an ethical decision because of ethical fading. Ethical fading occurs when the “moral colors of an ethical decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications.”¹³ Ethical fading allows us to convince ourselves that considerations of right or wrong are not applicable to decisions that in any other circumstances would be ethical dilemmas. This is not so much because we lack a moral foundation or adequate ethics training, but because psychological processes and influencing factors subtly neutralize the “ethics” from an ethical dilemma. Ethical fading allows Army officers to transform morally wrong behavior into socially acceptable conduct by dimming the glare and guilt of the ethical spotlight.

One factor that encourages ethical fading in the Army is the use of euphemisms and obscure phrases to disguise the ethical principles involved in decisions.¹⁴ Phrases such as checking the box and giving them what they want abound and focus attention on the Army’s annoying administrative demands rather than dwelling on the implications of dishonesty in official reports. Indeed, many officers even go as far as to insist that lying to the system can better be described as prioritizing, accepting prudent risk, or simply good leadership.

A more recent and significant development concerning ethical fading is the exponential growth in the number of occasions that an officer is obliged to confirm or verify compliance with requirements. When it comes to requirements for units and individuals, the Army resembles a compulsive hoarder. It is excessively permissive in allowing the creation of new requirements, but it is also amazingly reluctant to discard old demands. The result is a rapid accumulation of directives passed down, data calls sent out, and new requirements generated by the Army. Importantly, the Army relies on leaders to enforce compliance of the increasing amount of requirements and to certify the accuracy of the expanding number of reports sent upward.

The first time that officers sign an OER support form authenticating a counseling session that never happened or check a box saying, “I have read the above requirements” when they really only glanced at the 1,800-word IA acceptable use policy, they might feel a tinge of ethical concern. After repeated exposure to the burgeoning demands and the associated need to put their honor on the line, however, officers become ethically numb. Eventually, their signature and word become tools to maneuver through the Army bureaucracy rather than symbols of integrity and honesty.¹⁵ This desensitization dilutes the seriousness of an officer’s word and allows what should be an ethical decision to fade into just another way the Army does business. To make matters worse, technological advances and the cumulative effects of time have led to today’s officers facing a much larger amount of information to corroborate than their predecessors.

Ethical fading is also influenced by the psychological distance from an individual to the actual point of dishonesty or deception. Lying, cheating, and stealing become easier to choose when there are more steps between an officer and the dishonest act—the greater the distance, the greater the chance for ethical fading.¹⁶ Thus, most officers would be extremely uncomfortable telling their rater face-to-face that their unit completed ARFORGEN pre-deployment NBC training when they, in fact, did not. Those same officers, however, would probably be more comfortable conveying the same mistruth via a block checked on the ARFORGEN checklist. Likewise, a digital, instead of handwritten, signature on a sponsorship form attesting that an officer was briefed on the sponsorship program prior to PCSing—when they were not—broadens the separation between the officer and the dishonest act. Even the Army’s ubiquitous PowerPoint charts provide briefers the ability to focus on intricate color-coded metrics and thus distance themselves from the inaccurate or ambiguous information the metrics may be conveying.

The psychological distance between a person and the consequences of a dishonest act can also influence ethical fading. A moral decision can lose its ethical overtones if the eventual repercussions of such a choice are either unknown or minimized. For example, the explanation of an officer concerning inaccurate storyboards is illustrative of the common perception that much of the information submitted upward disappears into the ether of the Army bureaucracy:

“Where do the story boards go? They’re going to [a] magic storyboard heaven somewhere where there are billions of storyboards that are collected or logged somehow? After doing hundreds of storyboards, I honestly can’t tell you where any of them go. I send them to my battalion level element who does something with them who then sends them to some other element who eventually puts them on a screen in front of somebody who then prints them out and shreds them? I don’t know.”

Dismissing any potential damage that may result from a misleading or incomplete storyboard allows leaders to view the requirement as yet another petty bureaucratic obligation void of any ethical considerations.

Making Excuses

With ethical fading serving to bolster the self-deception that problematic moral decisions are ethics-neutral, any remaining ethical doubts can be overcome by justifications and rationalizations. While discussions with officers revealed a wide assortment of justifications for unethical behavior, one rationalization appears to underlie all other rationalizations— that dishonesty is often necessary because the directed task, the data requested, or the reporting requirement is unreasonable or “dumb.” When a demand is perceived as an irritation or annoyance, a person’s less than honest response almost becomes a compensatory act against the injustice.¹⁷ Officers convince themselves that instead of being unethical, they are really restoring a sense of balance and sanity to the Army. For example, one officer spoke of the distinction he made between useful and useless required reports:

“You can [ask] anybody in this room—the purpose of sending a SALTA or declaring a TIC, CASEVAC—not a MEDEVAC nine lines—we definitely know why we do that stuff and why we’re reporting. And people jump. They’re timely. They’re accurate. . .But some of this stuff is: You need this for why? Show me in the reports guide that we use or wherever [that] this is actually a required report. Because right now it seems like you’re just wasting a unit leader’s time.”

Another officer rationalized how ethical standards should be loosened for requirements perceived as unimportant:

“If it’s a green tab leader that’s asking me for information—the battalion commander, brigade commander, or something the division commander is going to see—then I would sit down and do it. That would be accurate reporting. If it was something that was going into a staff and wasn’t going to drive a critical decision the battalion made in terms of training or something I need to accomplish for a METL task . . . what goes up, goes up. Is it probably a little off? Yeah, there’s a margin of error.”

Finally, one officer, in euphemistic terms, summarized the Army’s tolerance for deception on seemingly meaningless requirements:

“I don’t think it’s that anyone expects you to lie. But I think there is an expectation of—I think the word is—equivocation…I don’t want to say it’s accepted, because that doesn’t sound good or it doesn’t sound right. But I think some expectation of equivocation is accepted on dumb things.”

Two other rationalizations are often used as justifications for dishonesty—mission accomplishment and supporting the troops. With these rationalizations, the use of deceit or submitting inaccurate information is viewed as an altruistic gesture carried out to benefit a unit or its soldiers. Officers reported that they sometimes needed to act as Robin Hood—going outside the ethical boundaries to assist others. As one officer nobly put it:

“I’m just going to “check this box” . . . and if I’m 70% accurate—that’s good enough to 1) keep my guys out of trouble and 2) keep my boss out of trouble so we can keep doing good things for the country.”

One captain recalled an instance where an IED injured a platoon leader and his replacement during a relief in place. The incident required an assessment of possible traumatic brain injury for both lieutenants. The captain explained:

“I falsified the [traumatic brain injury] report that changed a distance from the IED strike [to where] one person was standing. So that way someone didn’t come back down and stick a finger in my CO’s chest and say, “You need to evac that lieutenant right now!” Because in the middle of [a] RIP, that’s not going to happen. If I do that, I’m going to put my boys in bags because they don’t have any leadership. That ain’t happening. I owe the parents of this country more than that.”

Another officer rationalized how funds were deceptively obtained in theater on behalf of the troops:

“It’s odd that in situations that I’ve been in, it’s never been blatant self-interest. It’s never been, “I’m going to get this money so I can buy myself two couches for my office while I’m in Afghanistan.” [Instead], it’s always like—for us, it was hard as hell to get water heaters. For some reason we could not get hot showers for our soldiers. It wasn’t CERP money, but we had to finagle God-knows-how-many organizations to finally get these things and we had to say we’re using this for this, when in fact it was so our guys could have hot showers when they get back off patrol. The truth of the matter is that, at the level that we’re at, a lot of times we gotta get it done and we’re going to find a way to do it.”

Another officer accurately described how the rationalization process softens the sting of dishonesty:

“You feel more comfortable if it’s not for us—if it’s for what we think is the greater good. Like [lying about] all the 350-1 requirements prior to going on block leave. I want my soldiers to go on leave . . . It’s not for me. It’s for the greater good. [But] that doesn’t mean it’s right.”

Rationalizing allows officers to maintain their self-image as a person of integrity despite acts of dishonesty.

Read Part Three.

Leonard Wong is a research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. He focuses on the human and organizational dimensions of the military. He is a retired Army officer whose career includes teaching leadership at West Point and serving as an analyst for the Chief of Staff of the Army. His research has led him to locations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Vietnam. He has testified before Congress. Dr. Wong’s work has been highlighted in news media such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, New Yorker, CNN, NPR, PBS, and 60 Minutes. Dr. Wong is a professional engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.

Stephen J. Gerras is a Professor of Behavioral Sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. He served in the Army for over 25 years, including commanding a light infantry company and a transportation battalion, teaching leadership at West Point, and serving as the Chief of Operations and Agreements for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey. Colonel (Ret.) Gerras holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. in industrial and organizational psychology from Penn State University.

Endnotes

13, Ann Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick, “Ethical fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior,” Social Justice Research, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 2004, p. 224. Also see Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 30-31.

14. Tenbrunsel and Messick refer to such phrases as language euphemisms, 226.

15. See Albert Bandura, “Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,” Journal of Moral Education, 31, No. 2, 2002, pp. 101-119, for how repeated exposure leads to moral disengagement.

16. Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty, New York: HarperCollins, 2012, p. 59.

17. Ariely, pp. 177-178.

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 24, 2020) Sailors from Naval Beach Unit 7 man a line alongside Sailors from the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18) during an underway replenishment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelby Sanders)

By Scott Humr

Eroding U.S. military advantage coupled with a deluge of advanced technologies flooding the strategic landscape have forced Sea Service leaders to seek the ever diminishing high ground of technological overmatch. Yet, the pursuit of bleeding-edge technologies only provides a fleeting reprieve from having to ascend the next high-tech promontory. While pursuing the latest technologies is necessary, it is not sufficient to keep American military heads above water for very long. 

The U.S. military’s technological advantage has eroded rapidly.¹ While technology is always changing, it is changing at an accelerating pace.² A fourth and fifth offset will likely follow DoD’s third offset strategy in the not-too-distant future.³ These offsets, like those of the past, will increase the range and deadliness of American technologies. Yet, increasingly remote warfare will require equally important changes within Sea Service culture. Naval concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE), and “inside force” will require a naval culture characterized by highly innovative and resilient personnel.⁴ To chart this future, the Sea Services must disregard conventional habits, determine clear metrics for change, deepen educational opportunities, and develop a collective consciousness which unites disparate warfare areas.

Practices to Jettison

Practices accumulated over the past 25 years within the Sea Services will weigh down proposed warfighting concepts and threaten to capsize efforts for change. From organizational technology to processes, these artifacts can lend clues towards understanding the current culture’s values.⁵ Conversely, practices and equipment influence the conduct of warfare, which also shape culture.⁶ Understanding this reinforcing construct provides better insight into correctly diagnosing cultural values. Just as ancient mariners would jettison cargo to stabilize their ship caught in rough seas, the Sea Services must discard practices and behaviors that burden efforts to operate effectively in the future.

Navy and Marine Corps Force Design concepts require embracing warfighting practices that place personnel in spartan locations with minimal contact for extended periods of time.⁷ Therefore, servicemembers cannot expect the same creature comforts afforded over the last 20 years of operations in Southwest Asia. Frequent connectivity to family or streaming content over camp-wide Wi-Fi would offer opportunities for a technologically advanced adversary to sense and target such locations.⁸ Standard operating procedures that require regular reporting or unremitting requests for information exchange will require adaptation or elimination to limit exposure. 

American habits for employing increasing amounts of technology over the last quarter century have also created a complexity burden that is difficult to sustain. For this reason, it has become quite normal to expect a bevy of contractors to buttress communication networks and software to support logistics and security.⁹ However, naval leadership should not count on this type of help in the future. Standard support personnel will have to become multiskilled to keep manpower requirements below an acceptable threshold.¹⁰ Parallel to how the Marine Corps is evaluating the consolidation of several infantry MOSs into a single “commando MOS,”¹¹ the Sea Services must look to do the same across support functions to achieve the efficiencies the Naval Services demand. 

Operating in a distributed maritime environment requires a reinvigoration of the ability to thrive in austerity. The previous experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have bred mindsets habituated to expect uninterrupted and timely logistics support. Future logistics operations will, however, need to be reconceived when support is contested in remote locations.¹² Where feasible, EABOs will need to become networks of lateral support to each other for greater responsiveness. Only by fostering a culture of radical self-sufficiency and diversifying logistics sustainment can the Sea Services realistically maintain distributed operations. Still, habits that continue to emphasize strict hierarchies of command and control with extensive approval chains will also need to evolve to support an agile network of EABOs.

In his book, Command: The Twenty-First-Century General, Anthony King aptly stated, “Existing command models, derived from the twentieth century, have become increasingly obsolete in the face of new global problems.”¹³ Indeed, command models that prevent maneuver warfare from the sea must be transformed. Operations that once allowed for clear separation of duties between a Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) will not likely apply well in a future characterized by multi-domain operations (MDO).¹⁴ For example, the concept of “green in support of blue” in defense of the amphibious task force and “blue in support of green” once a preponderance of forces are ashore will become amorphous under EABO. Supporting and supported roles will become fluid and complex requiring quick decision making and authorities better suited for a single commander. To guide this change, the Sea Services should experiment with combining both CATF and CLF roles under Composite Warfare Commanders (CWC). 

The CWC under the single battle concept would allow for seamless decision making and deconfliction within a battle space. Analogous to how Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operated under the leadership of General Stanly McCrystal in Iraq, the Sea Services must push authority to CWCs to operate faster than the adversary.¹⁵ Multiple CWCs could operate under a single, but agile Commander Amphibious Force (CAF). The CAF would function as the officer in tactical command who organizes CWCs and subordinate warfare commanders.¹⁶ The CAF could also deconflict requirements for strategic and low-density assets within the area of operations. 

In short, the Sea Services must forgo the previous separation between the CATF and CLF while adopting a more comprehensive and agile view of CWCs to support EABO, LOCE, and other MDO at sea. Such fundamental changes will require even greater naval integration than previously sought. However, greater integration must go beyond exchanging a few liaison officers and calling it a win. Rather, Sea Service leadership must develop meaningful measurements of naval integration which can radically strengthen our common culture.

Measuring Change: Integration by Subtraction

War is a human phenomenon and how a force fights can be viewed as an extension of its culture.¹⁷ Developing closer bonds amongst the Sea Services in the future will become significant towards developing this culture. The Sea Services must therefore cast off from the shores of Service parochialism to embrace even greater integration. To be sure, developing clear metrics for measuring unit integration and capturing feedback from personnel will help shape the naval culture to compete effectively. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy and derivative Sea Service guidance, such as the Tri-Service strategy, Advantage at Sea, are orienting efforts towards a future that necessitates greater Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard integration. A novel measurement for greater Navy and Marine Corps integration is the total number of commands eliminated—or addition by subtraction.¹⁸ For instance, Commander, Marine Forces Pacific could become the Deputy Commander of U.S. 7th Fleet. 7th Fleet could also create a standing Combined Task Force (CTF) composed of Navy and Marine personnel similar to 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to oversee multiple Marine Littoral Regiments.¹⁹ Correspondingly, Commander, Marine Forces CENTCOM (MARCENT) could become the deputy Commander, U.S. 5th Fleet with headquarters in Tampa, FL. While this could reduce several Marine Commands to a two-star level it has the greater benefit of increasing naval integration and reducing staff manpower levels for both services. 

Important feedback for measuring cultural change within the Sea Services will also come from deck-plate leadership. The Services need to implement 360-degree feedback for all leaders. Such multi-source feedback can provide the valuable information needed to improve naval leadership, and by extension—culture. 360-degree assessments accomplish this by helping to identify leadership blind spots and allow meaningful corrections to be made quickly. Waiting for the results of episodic command climate surveys are no longer sufficient. This comprehensive feedback process could help empower junior leaders with the necessary candor to improve command climate almost immediately. More importantly, it will foster greater lateral cooperation amongst peers over current models that incentivize peer competition.²⁰ 360-degree feedback will allow the Sea Services to continually take the proper depth soundings of their cultures by identifying the best leaders and to avoid running the Sea Service ship aground on the hidden reefs of toxic leadership. 

Educating for Cultural Change

Any successful cultural transformation requires changes to how forces are educated and trained. While Advantage at Sea properly advocates for “collaborat[ing] with allies and partners to increase exchange opportunities, including education, shore-based tours, and operational billets,” further inspection of how education is delivered is required to increase educational reach across naval institutions.²¹ The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that significant amounts of work and education can be accomplished remotely across time zones and mediums. For example, uprooting families for a six-to-ten-month long school only to move them again is not only wasteful but in many cases is completely unnecessary. Asynchronous educational opportunities are also an attractive option to provide education to more personnel who otherwise would never benefit from it. These delivery methods have the added benefit of affording military families, such as spouses who have professional careers, greater stability by allowing them to stay in a location longer.²²

Equally important, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps should jointly develop a comprehensive composite warfare commander’s course which officers from both services could attend. As mentioned above, EABO and LOCE will blur the lines between the CATF and CLF, necessitating the need to envision operations more holistically. CWCs will undoubtedly need a wide-ranging appreciation of both Marine and Navy capabilities as well as Joint Force assets. Just as all naval aviators wear a breast insignia designating their specialty, CWC school graduates, including Marines, could one day adopt a new warfare insignia designating them as CWCs. Yet, warfare cultures with unique distinctions and histories can create headwinds that buffet our progress towards change. It will therefore be important for all leaders within the Sea Services to provide the comprehensive vision for how each servicemember plays a part in delivering warfighting capabilities at sea. 

A Common Culture 

 Major organizational change can often run up against resistance.²³ Threats to relevancy in a future fight, budget cuts, or the evolution of roles can trigger a “survival instinct” where subcultures rally against or attempt to slow-roll changes.²⁴ Indeed, loss aversion bias and sunk costs are a well-documented phenomenon regularly used to maintain the status quo.²⁵ To avoid these pitfalls, it is important to fashion disparate warfare cultures into plank owners of a more integrated naval service culture. 

The Sea Services must develop a common culture characterized by a shared consciousness.²⁶ Drawing lessons from Team of Teams, future warfighting concepts must pair the best qualities of each warfare area to elicit the best outcomes.²⁷ For instance, General Stanley McCrystal was able to help create a cohesive environment for JSOC personnel, interagency organizations, military intelligence, and other disparate entities to collaborate effectively.²⁸ This allowed the various groups to not only adapt to changing intelligence faster, but also increased the operational tempo to out-cycle the enemy.²⁹ If the Sea Services are to achieve analogous efficiencies, they will require integrated training and formations that exist on a standing basis. For instance, it is rare for a typical Marine infantry unit to train with U.S. Navy sub-surface units. However, if Sea Service leadership expects units to cooperate on anti-submarine warfare (ASW), developing exercises and shared understanding for how such dissimilar units can create a symbiotic relationship is essential.³⁰ Except, such training comes at a cost. Sea Service leaders must also declare which training is no longer essential—something the services rarely do well. Warfare areas will adapt and work together when they are unfettered from non-essential training and given a credible vision for the future. It is therefore incumbent upon Sea Service leadership to clear paths for innovation at the lowest levels while also making it clear what requirements will be eliminated to create the time and space needed to meet these visions of operating together. 

Hold fast…

Calling for significant changes within a culture while implementing new practices is not without its difficulties. Many may affirm that the current culture is sufficient for this new era and change may be more detrimental to the institution overall.³¹ Radical change can in fact disturb the standard processes that many have become accustomed to as they provide predictability and stability. Balancing exploitation and exploration are often areas that can come into conflict with each other when resources and time are scarce. Refining and altering processes are often needed to remain competitive. Organizations, however, can often become disillusioned and jaded by change, especially if leadership is constantly chasing and trying to shoehorn the latest technology fad into current practices. Yet, stagnation and comfortability also breed complacency within an organization. Hence, the value of good leadership in determining the right path is crucial in getting the organization to row in the same direction.

The rise of an adversarial China and Russia who violate norms of the international system demand the Sea Services pursue significant change to stem the tide of belligerent activities. Such behaviors in the South China Sea (SCS) by China, for instance, threaten the economic resources of surrounding countries through overfishing and causing catastrophic ecological damage to reefs through their dredging operations.³² Chinese construction of military outposts in the SCS not only violates the sovereignty of other nations, but also threatens freedom of navigation of all nations.³³ Additionally, Chinese Maritime Militia, or “little blue men,”³⁴ could become the equivalent of the “little green men” who helped conduct a fait accompli in Russia’s annexation of Crimea.³⁵

Unprofessional behavior by the Russian Navy further exacerbates tensions and places American front line leaders in precarious situations that could escalate into an unnecessary conflict.³⁶ Operating below the threshold of war has become the norm and therefore requires new approaches for where and how forces are postured to create credible deterrence. The Sea Services must pursue significant changes to develop a more integrated culture that is able to create new cost impositions for adversarial nations.³⁷

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the services can respond and change quickly. Additionally, Sea Service leaders such as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger, have demonstrated the ability to rapidly shape the future force without direct permissions from Congress.³⁸Equal boldness is required to sunset bad habits and adopt better metrics to shape the culture of the naval force. Still, the Sea Services must conduct rigorous innovation and experimentation with new force design constructs and command relationships that will support efforts to outpace any enemy.³⁹ These achievements, however, will only be sustained by lashing the sails to the strong masts of the type of education that can meet the demands of a 21st century military. 

The tsunami of technologies submerging the battlefields of the 21st century is unrelenting. Military technological advantages will ebb and flow. Regardless of the technology, if the culture is not prepared to use it to its advantage, much will be for naught. A truly integrated naval culture will catalyze decision cycles to attain a network of kill chains.⁴⁰ Culture is at the helm of this ship and it’s the job of all Sea Service leaders to help steer it.

LtCol Scott Humr, USMC, is a student at the Naval Postgraduate School studying Information Sciences. He holds a Master’s in Military Studies from the Marine Corps University and a Master’s in Information Technology from the Naval Postgraduate School. His views are his own and do not necessarily represent the official views of the DoD or the government departments he is associated with.

Endnotes

[1] Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. “Finding Strength in Decline.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-12-10/finding-strength-decline. 

[2] Berman, Alison E. and Jason Dorrier. “Technology Feels Like It’s Accelerating — Because It Actually Is.” last modified March 22, 2016. https://singularityhub.com/2016/03/22/technology-feels-like-its-accelerating-because-it-actually-is/. 

[3] Kassinger, Theodore W. “Shaping the Fourth Offset.” last modified August 13, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/shaping-the-fourth-offset-the-emerging-role-of-export-controls-in-pursuit-of-national-economic-self-reliance. 

[4] Greer, Tanner. “The Tip of the American Military Spear Is Being Blunted.” last modified July 6, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/06/us-marines-strategy-military-tip-spear-china-congress/. 

[5] Schein, Edgar H. Organizational culture and leadership. Vol. 2. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

[6] Mahnken, Thomas G. Technology and the American Way of War since 1945. Columbia University Press, 2010.

[7] Berger, Gen David H. “Commandant’s Planning Guidance.” (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2019). 

[8] Kerg, Maj Brian. “To Be Detected Is To Be Killed,” USNI Proceedings, Vol. 146/12/1,414, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/december/be-detected-be-killed. 

[9] Avant, Deborah D., and Renee De Nevers. “Military contractors & the American way of war.” Daedalus 140, no. 3 (2011): 88-99.

[10] Berger, David H. “A concept for stand-in forces.” USNI Proceedings, Vol 147/11/1,425, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/concept-stand-forces. 

[11] Harkins, Gina. “The Marine Corps Is Considering Merging All Infantry Jobs Into Just 1 MOS.” https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/12/03/marine-corps-considering-merging-all-infantry-jobs-just-1-mos.html. 

[12] Mills, Capt Walker D., and Erik Limpaecher. “Sustainment Will Be Contested.” USNI Proceedings, Vol. 146/11/1,413, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/sustainment-will-be-contested.

[13] King, Anthony. Command: The Twenty-First-Century General. Cambridge University Press, 2019, 9.

[14] Nostro, Mark. Command and Control in Littoral Operations. Naval War College Newport, RI, United States, 2016, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1021504.

[15] United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1-4 Competing. https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/Electronic-Library-Display/Article/2449338/mcdp-1-4/.

[16] Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-02 Amphibious Operations, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_02.pdf, xiv.

[17] Coker, Christopher. Waging war without warriors?: The changing culture of military conflict. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

[18] Janssen, Jeff. “7 Times When ‘Addition by Subtraction’ Might Add Up for Your Team.” https://www.championshipcoachesnetwork.com/public/399.cfm#:~:text=%22Addition%20by%20Subtraction%22%20is%20a,with%20or%20inhibiting%20your%20success. 

[19] Axe, David. “Meet Your New Island-Hopping, Missile-Slinging U.S. Marine Corps.” Forbes. Last modified May 14, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/05/14/meet-your-new-island-hopping-missile-slinging-us-marine-corps/?sh=62b672f08dae. 

[20] Jackson, Kimberly, Katherine L. Kidder, Sean Mann, William H. Waggy II, Natasha Lander, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4347.html, 104.

[21] Ryan, Mick. “The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition.” Joint Forces Quarterly, 96 1st Quarter 2020, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-96/JFQ-96_6-11_Ryan.pdf?ver=2020-02-07-150501-867. 

[22] Burke, Jeremy and Amalia Miller. “The Effects of Military Change-of-Station Moves on Spousal Earnings.” RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9920.html. 

[23] Kotter, John P., and Leonard A. Schlesinger. Choosing strategies for change. Harvard Business Review, 1979.

[24] Holmes, James, “The U.S. Marine Corps Wants A Generation Of Free Thinkers.” Last modified December 20 , 2020. https://www.19fortyfive.com/2020/12/the-u-s-marine-corps-wants-a-generation-of-free-thinkers/. 

[25] Levy, Jack S. “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict.” International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 17, no. 2 (1996): 179-95. Accessed December 28, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601302.

[26] McChrystal, Gen Stanley, Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell. Team of Teams: New rules of engagement for a complex world. Penguin, 2015.

[27] McChrystal, et. al,. Team of Teams.

[28] McChrystal, et. al,. Team of Teams, 162.

[29] McChrystal, et. al,. Team of Teams, 218.

[30] Eckstein, Megan. “CMC Berger Outlines How Marines Could Fight Submarines in the Future.” USNI News, September 8, 2020,  https://news.usni.org/2020/12/08/cmc-berger-outlines-how-marines-could-fight-submarines-in-the-future.  

[31] Athey, Philip. “Steely Eyed Killers No More: What Will the Corps’ Culture Look like under the New Force Design?.” Marine Corps Times, September 18, 2020, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/09/18/passive-defenders-orsteely-eyed-killers-what-will-the-corps-culture-look-like-under-new-force-design/. 

[32] Carroll, Clint. “Protecting the South China Sea.” Foreign Affairs.” Last modified June 9, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-06-09/protecting-south-china-sea. 

[33] Rapp-Hooper, Maria. “Confronting China in the South China Sea.” Foreign Affairs. Last modified February 8, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-08/confronting-china-south-china-sea. 

[34] Makocki, Michal, and Nicu Popescu. China and Russia: An Eastern Partnership in the Making? European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2016. 9-18. Accessed December 23, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06942.5. 

[35] “‘Little Green Men:’ a primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014.” The United States Army Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, North Carolina. https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf.

[36] Schemm, Paul and Paul Sonne. “Near-collision between U.S. and Russian warships in Pacific requires emergency maneuvers.” The Washington Post. Last modified June 7, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/near-collision-between-us-and-russian-warships-in-pacific-require-emergency-maneuvers/2019/06/07/fa4d036e-890e-11e9-a870-b9c411dc4312_story.html. 

[37] Mahnken, Thomas G. “Cost-Imposing Strategies: A Brief Primer.” Last modified November 18, 2014. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/cost-imposing-strategies-a-brief-primer. 

[38] Richmond, Gordon. “The Marines and America’s Special Operators: More Collaboration Required.” Last modified December 29, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/the-marines-and-americas-special-operators-more-collaboration-required/. 

[39] McGee, Captain Will. “Testing Force Design,” USNI Proceedings, Vol. 146/11/1,413, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/testing-force-design. 

[40] Brose, Christian. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the future of high-tech warfare, Hachette UK, 2020. 

Featured Image: An F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit takes off from the flight deck of amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) in support of Exercise Cobra Gold 2020. (U.S. Navy photo)