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Call for Articles

Call for Articles: NATO Naval Power and Maritime Security

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Articles Due: March 31, 2025
Series Dates: April 21-25, 2025
Article Length: 1,500-3,000 words
Send To: [email protected].

By Dmitry Filipoff

The NATO alliance is facing an inflection point as the U.S. reconsiders its commitments. NATO navies must envision alternative futures where they may have to take on a much greater share of their collective defense. As the U.S. seeks a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine, NATO navies may have to brace for Russian threats on different terms.

How may NATO navies evolve in this changing context? How may threats from Russia in the maritime domain shift and present newfound challenges to NATO naval power? How can NATO navies strategize their roles in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East amidst tensions with China and active combat operations in the Red Sea? Authors are invited to consider these questions and more as we consider the future of NATO’s naval power and maritime security.

Send all submissions to [email protected].

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 ships and submarines sail in formation in the Ionian Sea off the coast of Sicily on February 21, 2022 during Exercise Dynamic Manta. (NATO photo) 

Notes to the New Administration

Notes to the New Administration Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past week, CIMSEC featured a series of submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles for short notes on what the new U.S. administration can consider to strengthen American naval power, reinforce alliances, and compete effectively against great powers. Authors examined a multitude of issues and offered recommendations for reform. From shipbuilding shortfalls to competing with China, to reinforcing alliances and strengthening logistics, the new administration faces many challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain. 

Below are the authors that featured during this series. We thank them for their contributions.

“Prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for Protracted War against China,” by Walker Mills

“There is no reason the U.S. military should expect a conflict with the PRC to be short, or to be won quickly. Rather, history tells us the opposite. Why would we expect the world’s most populous country and the second-largest economy to back down after only the opening salvo of a war it started, even if the opening round went poorly?”

“Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” by Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (ret.)

“The Naval War College was the critical engine that drove the warfighting education of the officer corps that designed, perfected, and fought the fleet that produced victory at sea in World War II. But today, the college has become moribund in terms of its relevance to the emerging warfare environment.”

“U.S. Ground Forces Can Check Chinese Naval Advantage Now,” by Brian Kerg

“While it may take the U.S. years to build a single ship, it can raise, man, and equip ground forces optimized for operations on key maritime terrain at the speed of relevance, raising minimally required forces in under a year. Such forces, once raised, can achieve asymmetric and decisive strategic deterrent effects through permanent deployment to decisive points within the territory of U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and partners such as Taiwan.”

“The Best of Both Worlds: Educating Future Navy Officers,” by Claude Berube

“The Navy should have one commissioning source – the U.S. Naval Academy. But it should be adapted to benefit from other educational programs and experiences domestically.”

“Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea,” by William Martin

“In recent years, China has increased its aggressive activity in this vital maritime lane, to the detriment of U.S. interests, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies must increase force presence along this key maritime terrain to disrupt PLA confidence in freely maneuvering through these waters as they conduct operations counter to U.S. interests.”

“Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall,” by Benjamin Van Horrick

“Linguists will serve as an invaluable link in the killchain during wartime. All available assets from across the coalition must be brought to bear to make sense of the environment, prosecute targets, and support maneuver in all forms. Linguists will minimize friction and the fog of war as coalition members shorten the time between sensing and striking a target – no matter what country the capabilities originate from.”

“ESBs for Intermediate Naval Lift in Support of Expeditionary Operations,” by Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC

“To increase the capability of the naval expeditionary force to meet the demands across the global maritime commons and in non-permissive maritime environments, the Navy should acquire at least 30 Lewis B Puller (ESB-3)-class Expeditionary Mobile Base ships.”

“A High-Low Naval Portfolio: Maximize Strategic Returns with Balanced Force Design,” by Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine

“To remain both cost-effective and globally engaged, the U.S. Navy needs a balanced mix of high-end capital ships and smaller, more economical vessels, even if the latter are inherently less armed and defended. This tradeoff is not only acceptable but strategically beneficial, given the Navy’s role in day-to-day operations.”

“An Investment in the U.S. Navy is an Investment in Prosperity,” by Sam J. Tandgredi

“The U.S. Navy has a purpose that goes beyond warfighting. It is a critical geo-economic instrument that through global naval dominance helps sustain the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency. An investment in naval dominance is an investment in continued prosperity. Without it our future will be poorer.”

“Refocus on Warfighting To Boost Recruiting and Retention,” by Karl Flynn

“Make America’s youth want to serve by clearly stating our national security imperatives, minimize distractions from core warfighting functions, and eliminate all lowered standards.”

“Reconsider Red Sea Risk: Revealing U.S. Navy Air and Missile Defense Capability to China,” by Clay Robinson

“China’s relatively unfettered access to significant quantities of data on U.S. combat engagements, and their ability to glean the capabilities and limitations of critical U.S. Navy air and missile defense capabilities, may represent a far greater boon for them in the long run.”

“Work with Allies to Strengthen Deterrence against China,” by Michael Tkacik

“It is increasingly clear that China has the advantage in a long war, making the current state of deterrence untenable. Therefore, the U.S. must seek partners to increase the costs of Chinese revisionism and augment U.S. capabilities.”

“Build Containerized Missile Ships for Rapid and Affordable Fleet Growth,” by Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)

“There is a solution that is faster and more affordable – purchase used merchant container ships and outfit them with containerized missiles, drones, and other modular capabilities.”

“Balance AUKUS and Amphibious Fleet Readiness,” by Chris Huff

“While a strategic success with long-term benefits, AUKUS has introduced challenges due to increased costs, resource competition, and extended production timelines for Virginia– and Columbia-class submarines. These issues have adversely affected the Navy’s amphibious fleet, undermining the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain readiness and execute its vital global responsibilities.”

“It is Time for a New Maritime Strategy,” by Peter Dombrowski

“An ambitious new maritime strategy will help the Navy raise more resources, generate positive attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and win appropriate congressional guidance to set the Navy on the right course for the coming decade. If the Navy is to meet the pacing threat posed by the PLA Navy, it must rally public support, galvanize Congress, and convince the world that the United States fully remains the world’s premier naval power.”

“Invest in Sustainment Capabilities to Increase Combat Credibility,” by Joseph Mroszczyk

“The new administration must urgently focus its efforts on strengthening the U.S. military’s combat credibility in the Western Pacific through investments in capabilities that enable at-sea and distributed logistics. To deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from aggression against Taiwan, the U.S. military must demonstrate it can effectively sustain combat at great distances and across a distributed force.”

“Rebuild Commercial Maritime Might to Restore U.S. Sea Power,” by Commander Ander S. Heiles, USN

“The administration faces an urgent choice – continue America’s narrow focus on naval power or comprehensively rebuild the commercial capability Mahan identified as essential to national power. By restoring the balance between combat and commercial maritime capabilities, the U.S. can secure its position in the era of great power competition.”

“It is Time for a Real Maritime Strategy: Focus on Shipbuilding, Seafaring, and Sway,” by Christopher Costello

“The United States needs a true, comprehensive maritime strategy. It takes the form of an interconnected effort that recognizes that seapower does not flow from naval power alone and the conditions under which the U.S. developed into a great maritime power have shifted. Readjustment is necessary.”

“It is Time to Build Small Warships,” by Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

“Scholars and engineers at the Naval Postgraduate School have developed a bi-modal fleet concept featuring a mix of small sea denial and large sea control vessels to correct this weakness. The key to implementing this strategy is the LMACC, or Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability.”

“The Specter of Tariffs and the Revival of the U.S. Merchant Marine,” by Ben Massengale

“Imposition of those tariffs could provide a window of opportunity to revive the U.S. Merchant Marine by making foreign vessels less competitive in conducting trade in the U.S. This could be done by granting cargo imported by U.S.-flagged vessels a reduced tariff to not only compensate for the additional cost it takes to operate an American ship, but also making its operations significantly more profitable than its foreign competitors.”

“Develop Strategies to Counter China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” by Roshan Kulatunga

“China’s approach involves a systematic infiltration of various sectors, including technology, academia, media, and even political domains, to gather intelligence and insights into the strategies of possible adversaries. This multifaceted approach allows China to build a nuanced understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions while subtly undermining them.”

“Strengthen America’s Maritime Borders,” by David Ware

“What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.”

“Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture,” by Francis Crozier

“The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment.”

“Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power,” by Jason Lancaster

“A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image:  Ships and submarines participating in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise sail in formation in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands July 27, 2012. (U.S. Navy Photo)

Notes to the New Administration

Notes to the New Administration Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC received a tremendous response to our Call for Articles for short notes on what the new U.S. administration can consider to strengthen American naval power, reinforce alliances, and compete effectively against great powers. Authors addressed a wide range of issues and offered recommendations for reform. Below are the articles that will feature as the week unfolds.

“Prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for Protracted War against China,” by Walker Mills
“Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” by Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (ret.)
“U.S. Ground Forces Can Check Chinese Naval Advantage Now,” by Brian Kerg
“The Best of Both Worlds: Educating Future Navy Officers,” by Claude Berube
“Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea,” by William Martin
“Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall,” by Benjamin Van Horrick
“ESBs for Intermediate Naval Lift in Support of Expeditionary Operations,” by Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC
“A High-Low Naval Portfolio: Maximize Strategic Returns with Balanced Force Design,” by Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine
“An Investment in the U.S. Navy is an Investment in Prosperity,” by Sam J. Tandgredi
“Refocus on Warfighting To Boost Recruiting and Retention,” by Karl Flynn
“Reconsider Red Sea Risk: Revealing U.S. Navy Air and Missile Defense Capability to China,” by Clay Robinson
“Work with Allies to Strengthen Deterrence against China,” by Michael Tkacik
“Build Containerized Missile Ships for Rapid and Affordable Fleet Growth,” by Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)
“Balance AUKUS and Amphibious Fleet Readiness,” by Chris Huff
“It is Time for a New Maritime Strategy,” by Peter Dombrowski
“Invest in Sustainment Capabilities to Increase Combat Credibility,” by Joseph Mroszczyk
“Rebuild Commercial Maritime Might to Restore U.S. Sea Power,” by Commander Ander S. Heiles, USN
“It is Time for a Real Maritime Strategy: Focus on Shipbuilding, Seafaring, and Sway,” by Christopher Costello
“It is Time to Build Small Warships,” by Ben DiDonato and Shelley Gallup
“The Specter of Tariffs and the Revival of the U.S. Merchant Marine,” by Ben Massengale
“Develop Strategies to Counter China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” by Roshan Kulatunga
“Strengthen America’s Maritime Borders,” by David Ware
“Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture,” by Francis Crozier
“Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power,” by Jason Lancaster

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: Multinational ships sail in formation off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)

Interviews

SMWDC, Growing the Tactical Skill of the Surface Force

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By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC recently engaged with the commander of the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), RDML Wilson Marks, to discuss the latest developments and priorities of the command. RDML Marks discusses multiple topics in this interview, including how SMWDC is learning from Red Sea combat, the wartime role of the command, and how far SMWDC has come ten years after its establishment.

SMWDC has been deeply involved in processing combat lessons from the Red Sea and applying them to sharpen the skill of warfighters at the point of contact. What does this learning process look like for SMWDC and can you provide a sense of what kinds of lessons are being learned?

SMWDC’s approach to learning and adapting from combat lessons in the Red Sea is a dynamic, collaborative, and mission-focused process. By leveraging its close relationships with key partners like the Naval Surface Warfare Centers, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems, SMWDC facilitates rapid analysis of how Sailors, combat systems, sensors, and weapons are performing in real-world scenarios. This teamwork ensures feedback from the frontlines is quickly turned into actionable improvements for our warfighters.

The process begins with thorough analysis of combat data collected from operations. SMWDC uses this information to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), providing tailored tactical recommendations to ships. Beyond immediate operational support, these lessons are also fed back to Surface Warfare Technical Division and our Fleet Training Divisions to enhance combat system capabilities, ensuring our warships are equipped to meet evolving threat environments and trained on how to respond.

Training is a critical element of this learning cycle. In collaboration with Surface Combat Systems Training Command, SMWDC incorporates these combat lessons into realistic training scenarios. These scenarios are then integrated into Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) exercises, which are designed to prepare warships for the challenges they will face during deployment and in combat operations. By doing so, SMWDC ensures the operator is not only equipped with the latest knowledge, but also receives repetitive training rehearsals or “reps and sets” of applying updated tactics that mirror combat conditions.

As the ancient philosopher Archilochus wisely observed, “We do not rise to the level of our expectations, we fall to the level of our training.” SMWDC embraces this principle by streamlining learning processes and strengthening collaboration across the surface warfare enterprise to keep pace with the ever-changing nature of warfare at sea. This commitment to learning, adapting, and training ensures our warfighters remain ready to fight and win across all domains.

SMWDC recently completed the consolidation of its specialty schools into a central institution – the Surface Advanced Warfighting School (SAWS). What is the significance of this new organization and how will it enhance the quality of warfare tactics instructor (WTI) education?

The creation of the new SAWS center marks a significant milestone for the surface warfare community, enhancing the quality and impact of Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) education. Prior to this consolidation, WTI courses were taught at separate locations and managed by different organizations. This led to some inconsistencies in learning objectives, graduation requirements, and the delivery of academic material.

By uniting all WTI courses under one command, the new SAWS facility ensures a standardized curriculum and a shared foundation for all WTIs. This alignment strengthens their understanding of their critical role in sharpening the tactical edge of the surface force. However, the true value of SAWS goes beyond curriculum consistency—it lies in the collaboration and innovation fostered within its walls.

SAWS teaches WTIs from the four warfare specialties, creating a dynamic environment where our nation’s elite surface warfighters confront today’s complex tactical challenges and anticipate those of the future. Modern warfare rarely fits neatly into a single domain, and the ability to think and fight across warfare areas is essential. By housing this diverse expertise under one roof, SAWS enables a synergy that drives creative solutions, sharper tactics, and a cohesive approach to multi-domain operations.

In short, SAWS is not just about improving education—it is about creating a collaborative center that equips WTIs to drive the tactical excellence the surface navy needs to win in today’s increasingly complex maritime battlespace.

The surface fleet is currently experiencing a historic transformation in anti-ship firepower. The introduction of SM-6 and Maritime Strike Tomahawk will give the surface fleet the capability to launch long-range, high-volume salvo attacks against warships, unlike the Harpoon capability of past generations. What is SMWDC’s role in realizing the potential of these new weapons and evolving the maritime fires doctrine of the surface fleet?

SMWDC is participating in the development of concept of operations for new weapons being delivered to the fleet and is responsible for drafting and evolving the tactics, techniques, and procedures for effectively employing them in combat. SMWDC is working with the acquisition team and the rest of the surface warfare enterprise to ensure doctrine and training are phased with delivery of capabilities to ensure Sailors can employ them effectively when armed with these new capabilities.

SMWDC is also responsible for drafting and refining the TTPs that elite surface warfighters use to effectively employ surface capabilities. This involves close collaboration with the broader surface warfare enterprise and acquisition team to ensure operational doctrine and training are synchronized with the delivery of these cutting-edge systems.

SMWDC is instrumental in unlocking the full potential of advanced weapons. By aligning doctrine, training, and capability delivery, SMWDC ensures the Navy’s elite surface warfighters are trained to employ weapons to their maximum effect – enhancing the surface force’s ability to dominate in high-end conflict. As the fleet integrates cutting-edge capabilities, WTIs lead the charge in shaping the concept of operations that will dictate their effective use in combat.

CNO’s Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN) prioritizes readiness for a great power war with China in the 2027 timeframe. How may SMWDC’s operations and roles change in wartime, especially if the surface fleet has to reduce the manning of its shore establishment to surge afloat forces?

In wartime, SMWDC’s operations and roles would shift from a focus on training and doctrine development to direct operational support. We would still produce new WTIs and conduct advanced-level training for the fleet, but our team would also provide real-time tactical expertise to deployed ships, strike groups, and Maritime Operations Centers. SMWDC would prioritize rapid updates to tactics and doctrine based on evolving combat lessons and ensure interoperability within the joint and allied warfighting ecosystem. Ultimately, SMWDC would ensure the operational readiness of surface forces by continuing to refine and deliver effective TTPs while supporting units with tailored training and assessments. This would ensure the surface fleet remains lethal and adaptable in a great power conflict. 

SMWDC launched the inaugural cycle of the Surface Requirements Group (SURFRG) in 2023 and recently completed the second cycle. What are the lessons from these initial cycles and how is the SURFRG deepening the involvement of WTIs in the requirements and systems development process?

The inaugural cycle of SURFRG in FY 2023 was a significant step forward in aligning the Surface Force’s tactical needs with systems development and acquisition priorities. Now, with two cycles complete, the process has matured, providing valuable lessons and deeper integration of WTIs into the requirements process.

Key Lessons from the First Two Cycles

One of the primary lessons learned is the critical importance of amplifying the voice of the fleet. WTIs, operational surface forces, numbered fleet commanders, Warfighting Development Centers, and fleet commander staffs all provide unique perspectives that ensure SURFRG is addressing the real-world tactical challenges facing the surface force. During the second cycle, the SURFRG team visited 5th, 6th, and 7th fleets to gather direct feedback from warfighters on the frontlines. Additionally, engaging senior fleet leadership in working groups was instrumental in refining priorities and identifying actionable gaps.

Another significant insight is the need for comprehensive awareness of potential solutions to identified gaps. Collaboration with Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems and Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence program offices is vital, and SURFRG expanded its reach to include the Office of Naval Research and private industry. Industry engagement is especially valuable, as companies present innovative initiatives directly aligned with the surface force’s highest-priority gaps. For example, during the most recent SURFRG industry panel, eight companies briefed 14 initiatives, offering cutting-edge solutions to resource sponsors, the acquisition community, type commanders, and WTIs.

Additionally, information warfare is a key enabler of the surface navy’s tactical success. Moving forward, SURFRG plans to integrate the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Information Warfare Directorate and Naval Information Warfare Systems Command more deeply into the process, reflecting the evolving complexity of the maritime battlespace.

Expanding WTI Involvement

WTIs now play a central role in every stage of the SURFRG process, bringing the perspective of experienced warfighters to requirements and system development:

  • In the Tactical Gap Working Group, WTIs analyze deployment briefs, operational plans, exercises, and real-world performance, such as lessons learned from the Red Sea, to identify and prioritize warfighting gaps.
  • In the Tactical Solutions Working Group, WTIs evaluate the tactical relevance of proposed solutions, ensuring recommendations are grounded in operational reality and aligned with fleet needs.

By embedding WTIs into these working groups, SURFRG ensures solutions are not just technically feasible, but also operationally impactful. This approach certifies that tactical capability development remains directly tied to the needs of Sailors and warfighters in theater.

Building Momentum

The SURFRG delivers capabilities that address the most pressing tactical gaps. With its process refined and lessons from the first two cycles incorporated, SURFRG is well-positioned to continue driving advancements in surface warfighting capabilities. SURFRG remains a critical vehicle for aligning fleet feedback, technical innovation, and acquisition efforts to ensure the surface force is ready to dominate in any operational environment.

For Sailors who have not gone through the WTI track, but are seeking to improve their tactical warfighting skill, what resources can they leverage, or daily practices and routines can they integrate into their schedules?

Ultimately, improving tactical warfighting skill is a journey of continuous learning. Leveraging the tools and resources available, along with a disciplined approach to training, will prepare Sailors to excel in their roles.

For Sailors seeking to enhance their tactical warfighting skills without going through the WTI track, the most impactful practice is to read and specifically familiarize themselves with doctrine and TTPs. Understanding these fundamentals is critical to effectively employing weapon systems. While the demands of shipboard life can make finding time to read TTPs challenging, it is essential to approach it efficiently and engage with the material.

SMDWC manages a variety of resources available to Sailors on the SMWDC online collaboration portal, including training lectures, links to specific warfare area TTPs, and the “Ask a WTI” portal, where Sailors can seek guidance from experienced tacticians. Additionally, the Naval Warfare Development Center provides access to all tactical publications through the Naval Warfare Library, making these resources readily available for personal study.

Building tactical proficiency also requires consistent practice and repetition. Sailors should prioritize regular training and seek opportunities to refine their skills, whether through drills, simulations, or studying after-action reports. This commitment to ongoing learning is critical for developing a battle-ready mindset and ensures the ability to perform effectively in any operational situation.

The WTI community publicly aspires to be “Humble, Credible, and Approachable” – character traits that can be difficult to teach in a classroom. How does SMWDC instill these traits in WTI candidates and why are these traits important for cultivating tactical skill?

The traits of being humble, credible, and approachable are foundational to the WTI community and SMWDC emphasizes their importance from the very beginning of WTI training. These qualities are not only taught but are assessed—both formally and informally—throughout the program to ensure WTI candidates embody them in every interaction. From day one, WTI candidates are put through a rigorous process that includes delivering briefings, lectures, oral boards, and peer feedback. These evolutions, combined with daily interactions with the SAWS staff, provide continual opportunities to evaluate and develop these traits.

  • Humble: WTIs understand their mission is to strive for tactical excellence while maintaining a focus on serving the fleet. They approach every interaction with the mindset of improving warfighting teams and building on their collective tactical knowledge. This humility ensures WTIs remain team-oriented and focused on enabling success across the surface force.
  • Credible: Credibility stems from a deep understanding of tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine that are directly relevant to the warfighter. WTIs are trained to speak with authority while staying within their areas of expertise. This disciplined approach ensures their input remains valuable and trusted, strengthening their role as tactical leaders.
  • Approachable: Approachability is critical to fostering an environment where Sailors feel comfortable asking questions, discussing tactics, and acknowledging challenges. WTIs prioritize creating a space where warfighters can address tactical gaps or uncertainties without hesitation. This open dialogue is key to continuous improvement and mission success.

These traits are vital for cultivating tactical skill because they create a culture of trust, learning, and collaboration. WTIs must be approachable enough for Sailors to engage with them, credible enough to deliver meaningful guidance, and humble enough to remain focused on the fleet’s success over their own. By instilling and reinforcing these characteristics, SMWDC ensures WTIs are prepared to elevate the warfighting capability of the Surface Navy, one team at a time.

The year 2025 will mark the 10-year anniversary of SMWDC. How far has SMWDC come in those years, and how may the institution evolve through the next decade?

2025 marks a decade of progress and transformation for SMWDC. From its humble beginnings in 2015, SMWDC has grown into a cornerstone of the Surface Navy’s tactical excellence, delivering on its promise to increase warfighting readiness across all mission areas. At its inception, SMWDC was tasked with standardizing training in Amphibious Warfare, Air Warfare, Ballistic Missile Defense, Mine Warfare, Maritime Operations, single-ship Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Anti-Surface Warfare.

The central focus has always been clear – investing in people – the greatest asset in our force. SMWDC’s WTIs have been instrumental in bridging the readiness gap, acting as force multipliers and driving a cultural shift toward a “Warfighting First” mindset. SWATT, multi-ship and unit-level training, ensures ships and Sailors are deployment-ready, capable of integrating seamlessly into operations and meeting evolving threats head-on.

SMWDC has also been central to the development and refinement of warfighting doctrine. Through the writing, validation, and alignment of TTPs, SMWDC enabled standardized, high-level tactical training and enhanced fleet proficiency across individual, unit, and integrated levels of combat.

Looking ahead, the vision for SMWDC remains innovative and forward-focused. Over the next decade, SMWDC will continue to build lethality through the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum, ensuring warfighters achieve higher levels of individual tactical competency to meet the challenges posed by peer adversaries. Unit-level training will drive combat readiness, while SMWDC’s reachback and flyaway support will provide critical expertise to operational commanders in real time.

SMWDC will continue to lead the way in fostering tactical innovation. By developing new TTPs, promoting creative and critical thinking, and leveraging initiatives like the SURFRG, SMWDC will work to identify and recommend material solutions to address the Surface Force’s toughest challenges.

In its first decade, SMWDC transformed surface warfighting proficiency. The next decade will see it build on that foundation, ensuring the Surface Force remains ready, lethal, and adaptable—prepared to prevail in high-end combat operations at sea against any adversary.

Rear Admiral Wilson Marks graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994 with a Bachelor of Science in History. He has also earned a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs in Strategic Studies from the Naval War College and a Master of Science in National Strategic Studies from the National War College. Marks commanded USS Mason (DDG 87), USS Robert Smalls (CG 62) formerly named USS Chancellorsville, Provincial Reconstruction Team Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, and Naval Surface Group Western Pacific. Ashore, he served as a Placement Officer and Assistant Captain Detailer at Naval Personnel Command, Executive Assistant to the commander of Naval Surface Force Atlantic, the Deputy for Combat System and Warfighting Integration at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and as the Executive Assistant to the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet. Marks assumed the role of Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in May 2023.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: Arabian Gulf (Nov. 28, 2017) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70) steams in formation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Daniel Pastor/Released)