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Neither Fish nor Fowl: China’s Development of a Nuclear Battery AIP Submarine

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By Dr. Sarah Kirchberger and CAPT Christopher P. Carlson, USN (Ret)

On September 27, 2024, news broke that a previously unreported new type of Chinese nuclear-powered submarine, dubbed the “Type 041,” had suffered a major mishap at its fitting out pier at the Wuchang shipyard in Wuhan, according to unnamed Pentagon sources. Submarine expert Thomas Shugart had previously spotted an unknown submarine with a distinct x-shaped stern at Wuchang Shipyard from satellite imagery taken on 26 April 2024, and days later reported unusual crane activity at the same pier location from June 2024 imagery, speculating that the new boat suffered a serious incident.

Even more intriguing and consequential than the question of whether a submarine incident of some sort actually did occur at Wuchang or not, is however another issue: What type of “nuclear-powered submarine” could this new design possibly be?

China watchers were quick to point out that the Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan had not hitherto built any nuclear submarines, although the shipyard’s facilities were completely rebuilt at a new location (from 2012-2020) and massively enlarged. All Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) have so far been constructed exclusively at the Bohai Shipyard at Huludao. The imagery of the new submarine makes it clear it is too small for a SSN, and is similar in size to China’s Type 039A/B/C Yuan series of conventionally powered submarines. Another interesting indicator was the reported type number – “041” – which is a continuation of the traditional numbering scheme carried by China’s diesel-electric submarines. By contrast, China’s nuclear-powered subs, whether SSNs or SSBNs, all have official type numbers starting with “09.” The next-generation Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN are possibly already under construction at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, and there is no plausible suggestion that the smaller, unknown boat observed in Wuhan could represent either of those two platforms, given the larger estimated displacement of the Type 095 and Type 096 compared with the previous generation of Chinese SSNs and SSBNs.

A new type of nuclear battery AIP propulsion?

It would have been easy to dismiss the news of a supposedly nuclear-powered Type 041 submarine built in Wuhan as misinformation, were it not for the fact that several years earlier Chinese sources had hinted at a project for developing small, low power auxiliary nuclear reactors for conventional submarines, replacing the Stirling engine air-independent power system (AIP) that China developed based on a technology transfer from Sweden during the 1980s. A 2017 report by Richard D. Fisher described some details of such a plan based on slides from an academic lecture given by retired Rear Admiral Zhao Dengping.

Despite successfully developing a Stirling engine-based AIP system, China is known to have struggled with developing a more advanced, fuel cell-based AIP system as is currently in use with the German, South Korean and Singaporean navies, among others. Neither has China deployed lithium-ion batteries aboard its submarines, as pioneered by Japan. Here, Chinese analyses have stressed unresolved issues regarding the danger of thermal runaway, which poses heightened risks of a severe fire aboard a submerged submarine.

In light of such technical challenges, China may have decided to forgo developing high power density fuel cells or even more powerful Stirling engines for submarine applications, even though lithium-ion batteries are probably still on the table, opting for a different solution altogether by developing a nuclear battery.

Interestingly, as reported by R.D. Fisher, Rear Admiral Zhao Dengping’s lecture slides described just such a nuclear battery project. Of the presentation slides posted online, three dealt specifically with a small-scale nuclear reactor for conventional submarine platforms. One slide showed a basic schematic diagram that depicted a possible layout of the nuclear-powered electric propulsion plant. The reactor itself is described as a low pressure, low temperature design that employs natural circulation in the primary loop. Steam is generated, however, through an intermediate loop that appears to be in a separate compartment, which is then sent to a secondary loop with a conventional steam driven turbine generator in yet another compartment. While this design suggests an emphasis on safety, it does so at the expense of internal volume requirements and thermodynamic efficiency.

It is reasonable to ask if these slides accurately reflect Chinese intentions. With the benefit of hindsight, the response would be a confident “yes” because every slide posted from RADM Zhao’s lecture showed a platform or system that was then in service, undergoing testing, or was in the advanced research and development stage. For example, Zhao presented a slide that discussed a large deck amphibious assault ship – larger than the Type 075. The computer-generated graphic on the slide is very similar to the Type 076 currently under construction at the new Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard on Changxing Island. Another slide depicted an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) engagement launched from a surface ship. This too has come to fruition when a video of a Type 055 launching an ASBM was posted in April 2022. These two examples of a platform or system that hadn’t been known to exist in 2017, but became evident years later, demand that the small reactor concept be taken seriously.

Some seven years after RADM Zhao’s slides became public, on 24 April 2024, a Chinese news article claimed that, in honor of the 75th birthday of the PLA Navy, a “new nuclear-powered submarine installed with a domestically produced small nuclear reactor” and based on the hull design of the conventionally powered “Type 039C” AIP sub was in development at the Wuchang shipyard in Wuhan. Note, this article came out a mere two days before the satellite images of the shipyard were taken and subsequently analyzed by Tom Shugart. The article compares the new Type 041 submarine design to an enlarged French Rubis class and states that its submerged displacement would be around 4,000 tons and thus larger than the Rubis, allowing it to integrate more capable sensor and weapon systems. The article describes the small auxiliary reactor as a “low-temperature, low-pressure, subcritical nuclear reactor” to “directly charge” the boat’s battery rather than drive the propeller. This describes a nuclear battery AIP system that allows the battery to be charged continuously while the boat is submerged and would eliminate the need to surface every 20 days as in the case of China’s Stirling AIP submarines.

The article goes on to say the first one or two units of the Type 041 would likely be used as prototypes for weeding out technical issues before any further units would be produced. It speculates that if the development is successful, even older conventional submarines could be gradually retrofitted with a nuclear battery AIP system. The article states that this could potentially transform China’s conventional submarine fleet into a fully nuclear-powered fleet. Despite some questionable technical conclusions by the author, the article is consistent with Zhao’s lecture material.

What is a nuclear battery?

The reference to a “small” reactor on the Type 041 should be understood in the context of existing submarine reactors, which produce between 70 – 190 megawatts of thermal power (MWt) depending on the design and all belong to the category of microreactors. These reactors are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency as having a power generation capability of less than 50 megawatts of electrical power (MWe), or approximately 220 MWt. Most microreactors are in the 1 – 20 MWe (≈6 – 125 MWt) range; the nuclear battery resides at the bottom end of this category. Nuclear batteries are loosely defined as nuclear reactors that produce up to 20 MWt or approximately 3 MWe. These reactors are indeed “small” in comparison to those on larger SSNs and SSBNs and can fit into a Type 039A/B/C submarine pressure hull that is about 7.1 meters in diameter.

While rather scarce, nuclear batteries have been used in submarine and submersible designs before: the American NR-1 (≈1 MWt), the Soviet Project 651E Juliett with the VAU-6 (4.9 MWt) boiling water reactor, the Project 20120 Sarov, and the collection of deep-diving submersibles of the Soviet/Russian Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research or GUGI, including Project 1851 X-Ray, Project 1851.1 Paltus, Project 1910 Uniform, and Project 1083.1 Losharik, reported to have a pressurized water reactor in the 10 – 15 MWt range. Lastly, Canada conducted considerable research in the late 1980s to develop a “baby nuke” submarine using an Autonomous Marine Power Source or AMPS-1000 powerplant with a maximum design power of 10.8 MWt.

Based on RADM Zhao’s description that the small reactor being considered operates at low pressure and low temperature, it is reasonable to assume a maximum thermal power rating of 10 – 11 MW – consistent with Soviet and Canadian experience. The thermodynamic efficiency would be on the low side for historical nuclear batteries, around 12% – 13%, due to the losses involved with the additional intermediate steam generation loop as shown in the system diagram slide. Despite the low efficiency, such a nuclear power plant could generate about 1.3 MWe, four to five times that of any conventional AIP system. The hull size of the Type 041 revealed in satellite imagery is sufficiently large to accommodate the design as shown, but even with the additional 7 meters in length, the Stirling engines and cryogenic oxygen storage would have to be removed to free up additional volume.

Operational advantages of a nuclear battery

All types of advanced conventional AIP propulsion systems, whether fuel cell, Stirling engine, or steam turbine based, offer extended submerged endurance to small and medium size submarines when compared with traditional diesel-electric propulsion systems, such as that fitted to the Project 636M Kilo-class China imported from Russia. The latter typically needs to come up to snorkeling depth every day for two to three hours to recharge its batteries, assuming a 10% – 12% indiscretion rate, thus greatly increasing the risk of detection. At best, a Kilo-class submarine can stay submerged at slow speed for about three days before needing to snorkel. Chinese analysts have in the past lamented the fact that this limitation exposes Chinese submarines to adversary anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces just when they are about to reach deeper diving depths in the Okinawa Trough after leaving port in East China. Any AIP system would help to alleviate this predicament, but the maximum submerged transit speed of a submarine utilizing a conventional AIP system is still only 4 – 6 knots. A nuclear battery AIP system as described above could support submerged transit speeds of up to 9 – 10 knots while meeting all hotel loads and the electrical power requirements of the nuclear plant auxiliaries.

Another advantage that is often not discussed is that there is ample electrical power available to outfit a Type 041 with a full spectrum of atmospheric control equipment. Conventional AIP boats still need to ventilate daily to renew the atmosphere with fresh air, unless the crew relies on a limited supply of consumable chemical systems to purge carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide from the atmosphere. Oxygen isn’t a problem as the crew can vent off a little from the AIP cryogenic oxygen tank to support their needs. A Type 041 can feasibly be fitted with compact oxygen generators, carbon dioxide scrubbers, and carbon monoxide-hydrogen burners, thereby giving the submarine complete independence from outside air.

Lastly, despite what the advertising brochures say, conventional AIP systems do not charge submarine storage batteries well. They can keep a fully charged battery topped off, but recharging a battery that has been significantly discharged is really not a viable option. Russian brochure data on the Project 636 Kilo states that it would take about 12 hours to recharge a completely discharged battery; this is with most of the output of two 1.5 MW DC generators run by the diesel engines. A conventional AIP system would be hard pressed to produce even a tenth of the power that diesel-driven DC generators can provide – this means multiple days to fully recharge a very low battery. A nuclear battery AIP system would be more capable of recharging a battery, but it will still take longer than using the diesel-driven DC generators. The main advantage in this case is the nuclear AIP system could support sufficient speeds to move the submarine clear of a possible ASW threat so that the diesel generators could be used to recharge the battery.

This severe limitation is why most AIP submarine crews tend to operate their boat like a traditional diesel-electric submarine for as long as they can, holding the AIP system in reserve for those tactical situations that demand greater stealth. By contrast, a nuclear battery AIP system turns this operating concept on its head. The crew can rely on the reactor to meet all their operating needs, allowing them to hold the battery in reserve to deal with those rare occasions where higher speed sprints are required to approach a target. In other words, a “SSn,” if you will, can patrol like a larger nuclear attack submarine, but because it lacks high-speed endurance would have to resort to conventional submarine approach tactics as the situation demands.

Due to their smaller size and comparative quietness, a SSn is better suited than larger SSNs to area-denial missions in shallow, coastal waters where the environment would make it difficult to detect a nuclear battery AIP platform; this makes them likewise useful for intelligence and mining missions. Whenever greater speed and longer steaming distances are required, however – for instance when hunting an adversary carrier strike group or tracking and trailing SSBNs on the high seas – their limitations render the SSn unsuitable. China, in light of its complex maritime geography of shallow littorals, does have an enduring requirement to operate both smaller coastal submarines for area denial missions in the Near Seas, as well as larger SSNs and SSBNs for its nuclear deterrence and missions in the Far Seas.

Could China have developed a nuclear battery AIP alone?

China has had difficulties in designing modern, reliable, and safe nuclear reactors for its next generation SSNs and SSBNs and reportedly has turned to Russian assistance in the recent past. This raises the question whether Russian help was also involved in developing China’s nuclear battery AIP submarine propulsion. Although open-source information falls short of a definitive answer, some indications hint at Russian assistance.

Firstly, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, have the most operational experience with this type of propulsion plant. The Soviet and Russian navies have operated nine relevant submarines, including the Project 651E Juliett and the Project 20120 Sarov, with the majority assigned to GUGI. Given that most of these nuclear battery plants were designed and built in the 1980s, Russia’s defense establishment would likely feel comfortable in sharing detailed design information on the older systems as well as providing technical support to China’s endeavors.

Secondly, Russia has previously transferred other types of nuclear propulsion technology to China. CMSI reported in 2023 that an agreement concluded in 2010 between Rosatom and the China Atomic Energy Agency for the expansion of Russian-Chinese joint nuclear power programs – including floating nuclear power plants – gave China “access to detailed technical information on the nuclear reactors Russia was installing on their nuclear power barges and new icebreakers.” These reactors either didn’t fully address China’s military needs or were too large for installation aboard a submarine, but nonetheless this transfer indicates a general willingness of Russia to provide China sensitive nuclear reactor technology.

Thirdly, there have been announcements that China and Russia are collaborating on a novel type of small submarine design. Already in 2015, reports indicated a Chinese interest in procuring four Lada-class submarines from Russia – a purchase that was never followed through in light of the Lada-class’s vexing technical issues. However, on August 25, 2020, quoting an official representative of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), Russian state media announced that Russia and China were “jointly designing a new generation non-nuclear submarine.”

Although no further public information about this new type of jointly developed conventional submarine has since been disclosed, in October 2020, Vladimir Putin gave an intriguing answer to a question on Russian-Chinese relations at the 17th Valdai Annual Meeting:

“We have achieved a high level of cooperation in the defence industry—I am not only talking about the exchange or the purchase and sale of military products, but the sharing of technologies, which is perhaps most important. There are also very sensitive issues here. I will not speak publicly about them now, but our Chinese friends are aware of them. Undoubtedly, cooperation between Russia and China is boosting the defence potential of the Chinese People’s Army, which is in the interests of Russia as well as China.”

Though the nature of these “very sensitive” technologies remains unclear, submarine technology certainly fits the description, and in September 2024, news reports indeed indicated that Russia was supporting China with improving the nuclear propulsion plant of its next-generation Type 096 SSBN.

Fourth and lastly, Russia and China have for several years steadily enhanced their collaboration in sensitive anti-submarine warfare related technology areas – including fiber-optic hydrophones and underwater communication. This could be related to a general trend in their subsurface warfare cooperation.

Could the jointly developed Russian-Chinese “new generation non-nuclear submarine” be the Type 041? The apparent contradiction between the Russian statements and the arguments presented in this article could be accounted for if neither the Chinese nor the Russians consider this a traditional nuclear submarine, but a conventional submarine that uses a nuclear battery AIP system. Semantics? Perhaps, but this premise would also provide a rationale as to why the Type 041 was constructed at Wuchang instead of Huludao.

At this stage, it is not possible to determine whether the reported nuclear-powered Type 041 submarine spotted at Wuchang is related to the joint submarine collaboration that was announced in 2020. This new submarine could be solely a Chinese project, or a Chinese project that received some technical aid from Russia. None of these possibilities can be excluded.

The mutual benefits of collaboration on sensitive submarine technology

Russia, despite its superiority in the field of building nuclear submarines, has long struggled to develop AIP propulsion for its smaller conventional submarines. Russian industry representatives have envied China’s successful Stirling engine-based AIP system, going so far as to admit that the Rubin Design Bureau, when trying to develop fuel cell AIP and lithium-ion battery technology at the same time, was spreading itself too thinly and therefore did not succeed.

China, for its part, has lagged behind Russia in nuclear propulsion technology and has in the past received help from Russia in that area. The known transfers of Russian nuclear reactor technology might therefore just be the tip of the iceberg. There are thus clearly potential synergies that could be exploited. Joining forces to improve Chinese AIP with a small auxiliary nuclear reactor might be a project in which both sides could bring their respective strengths to the table while each profiting from a common submarine design. This hypothesis needs to be evaluated in the light of future information as it becomes available.

Since at least 2023, there has been speculation about the possibility that Russia might opt to rejuvenate its war-depleted fleet by ordering naval vessels from Chinese shipyards, which can offer competitive prices and superior production capacity, even for highly complex warships, when compared with cash-strapped Russian yards. On July 5, 2023, a Chinese news article reported a visit by Russia’s Navy Commander-in-Chief Yevmenov to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. The article frankly discussed the possibility that Russia might opt for Chinese shipyard orders to solve its production capacity problems – noting however that this would be possible only “if Russia can overcome its pride.” A joint submarine design could, however, be produced in parallel by Chinese and Russian shipyards.

Opting for an advanced, nuclear battery AIP design would also make operational sense for Russia, not least because the whole concept originated from the Soviet Union in the 1970s.

Russia is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis NATO submarines in the shallow and confined undersea domain of the Baltic Sea, where its traditional nuclear-powered submarines can’t operate as efficiently as in deeper water. For that theater alone, a more capable, smaller AIP submarine would be desirable – and likewise for the Black Sea, Barents Sea, and parts of the Arctic Ocean, where Russia also routinely encounters NATO navies. In particular the recent Norwegian-German Type 212CD class submarine cooperation would be a serious concern for Russia on its northern flank. The pressure of having to meet those challenges, against the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly lopsided dependency on Chinese political and economic support due its war against Ukraine and Russia’s reduced shipbuilding production capacity, may have induced Russia to agree to a joint development of nuclear battery AIP submarines.

Even without an official agreement, there is the possibility that Russia’s arms industries could be faced with a brain drain of Russian specialists towards China, as Russia’s economic crisis worsens. There could thus be informal, behind-the-scenes Russian involvement even in a “purely indigenous” Chinese submarine program.

Conclusion

So far, the limited information on a new Type 041 submarine spotted on satellite imagery at Wuchang Shipyard yields more questions than answers. The above musings should be treated as hypotheses, to be revised as new data emerges. However, given the rapid modernization of China’s military, and particularly its navy, it seems advisable to keep an eye on the likelihood that the Type 041 submarine could be sporting a novel, auxiliary nuclear powerplant in place of the Stirling engine previously employed in its AIP propulsion system. Furthermore, such an improvement may have been derived from Soviet (and now Russian) technology, which pioneered auxiliary nuclear batteries for submarines during the 1980s. And if that were the case, the Type 041 may be the outcome of a Russian-Chinese collaboration on a new type of conventional submarine as announced by Russian state media in 2020.

Lastly, even if the Type 041 is indeed a novel kind of nuclear-powered small submarine, the Chinese SSN and SSBN programs (Type 095 and 096) will almost certainly continue because they are independent submarine development projects that are designed for distinctly different operational roles. Indeed, suggestions that the reported flooding casualty suffered by the Type 041 constitutes a major setback in China’s nuclear submarine program is overstated. The development of a smaller nuclear AIP submarine is completely segregated from the Type 095 and 096 production effort – an effort the Huludao Shipyard was enhanced to meet. At worst, the Type 041 mishap is a minor speedbump in China’s overall submarine modernization plans.

If the theories on the nuclear battery propulsion system presented above are confirmed, then the Type 041 SSn is neither fish, nor fowl. It would possess some, but not all, of the benefits associated with a traditional nuclear-powered attack submarine. In short, it would be a tertium quid – a third something – designed to specifically address China’s geographical and geopolitical concerns in the Near Seas.

Dr Sarah Kirchberger is Director of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and Vice President of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). She is the author of Assessing China’s Naval Power and editor of Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?. Formerly an Assistant Professor of Sinology at the University of Hamburg, she has also served as a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS. She holds a M.A. and a PhD in Sinology from the University of Hamburg. 

Christopher Carlson is a retired U.S. Navy Reserve captain and Department of Defense naval systems engineer. He began his navy career as a submariner and transitioned to the scientific and technical intelligence field in both his reserve capacity and in his civilian job. He is one of the co-designers, with Larry Bond, of the Admiralty Trilogy series of tactical naval wargames – Harpoon V, Command at Sea, Fear God & Dread Nought, and Dawn of the Battleship. He has also authored numerous articles in the Admiralty Trilogy’s bi-annual journal, The Naval SITREP, on naval technology and combat modeling.

Featured Image: A PLA Navy submarine steams during a training exercise in the Yellow Sea. (PLA photo)

Wargaming

Building Warfighting Competence: The Halsey Alfa Wargaming Experience

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A shorter version of this piece was originally published by the Surface Navy Association. This longer adaptation is published with permission.

By CDR Anthony LaVopa, USN

During my early days as a Department Head on USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), my Executive Officer advised me to reach out to Professor Jim FitzSimonds and the Halsey Alfa group at the Naval War College. He urged, “Pick their brains and absorb everything you can.” At that time, I had no idea how profoundly this exposure to the Halsey Program would refine my understanding of tactical, operational, and strategic topics. I did not anticipate the extent to which it would challenge my knowledge and assumptions about U.S. capabilities, tactics, and force employment, as well as those of our adversaries. My participation in the Halsey Alfa program, which has focused on war with China for more than 20 years, became one of the most significant and impactful learning experiences of my career. I believe this critical, analytical, and educational opportunity should be mandatory for every unrestricted line officer in the Navy.

With the addition of the Halsey Bravo Program, focused on conflict scenarios with Iran, the Halsey Program leverages subject matter experts and employs continuous free-play, iterative wargaming to educate students. Running three, ten-week wargames each year, the Halsey Program has completed more than one hundred wargames combined across both Alfa and Bravo since 2003. This large base of wargaming experience has created a wealth of valuable insight on operational warfighting, with OPNAV, flag officers, and senior leaders regularly consuming outputs from the Halsey program.

After commanding USS Hurricane (PC 3) and serving at OPNAV N96, I recognized that participating in the Halsey Advanced Research Program (ARP) at the Naval War College was essential before returning to sea and assuming command. I sought to challenge myself in every aspect as a naval officer and warfighter, aiming to sharpen my operational eye – and bring that mindset to my next command. The Halsey program is vital for cultivating the critical thinking and tactical skill required for pacing the rapid evolution of modern naval warfare. By effectively bridging theoretical knowledge with practical application through rigorous wargaming, it prepares naval and joint officers to navigate the complexities of high-end conflict against a peer competitor. 

Why Wargame?

Replicating real-world conflict, especially at the high end, is inherently challenging. Wargaming stands out as one of the most time-tested and effective methods for doing so, offering a realistic way for naval officers to practice their craft. It fosters critical thought and discussions about capabilities, limitations, theater geography, the strengths and weaknesses of allies and partners, and the dynamics of fighting peer competitors, making it the premier method for simulating warfare. In contrast, exercises conducted at sea or with other branches of the Joint Force, allies, or partners typically capture only limited aspects of high-end conflict within a carefully controlled environment. Warfare is inherently complex, involving the integration of multiple domains and intricate kill chains. At its core, warfare requires a deep understanding of technology and the creative application of that knowledge to defeat adversaries. Wargaming serves as an effective framework for exploring these complexities. Successful war planning, operational execution, and future systems acquisition should hinge on relevant combat information, accumulated operational experience, and the conclusions reached in series of wargames.

Wargaming facilitates essential discussions on assessing risks to both force and mission. When introduced in a joint and partnered environment, it helps dispel myths and inaccurate assumptions – inherently dangerous beliefs and variables when discovered “in contact.” Analysis of exam data from new students in the Halsey Program reveals that many officers lack sufficient knowledge of domain integration and have even less familiarity with competitor systems and capabilities.

Wargaming is unlike any other game. There are no simple rules for either side and no pre-defined outcomes. There seem to be three major areas in wargaming that I have observed after almost two years in the Halsey Program: the operational environment (the game board) which is driven by the strategic context of politics and a desire to contain conflict, the friendly and opposing forces (the game pieces), specifically what forces exist and how they move, and the third area is the rules of force interaction (combat assessment factors). The brilliance of the Halsey experience is that politics, policy, bureaucracy, and other factors are also discussed, but at the end of the day, the game’s outcomes are driven by what is technologically possible. The results can help inform policymakers, acquisition professionals, and naval commanders on what the art of the possible could and should be.

Many visitors to the Halsey spaces often ask whether the U.S. wins or loses. They are looking for a definite answer and a “recipe card” for success. Although winning or losing is complex based on which metrics and objectives each side is given, the true gold mine of insight in more than twenty years of Halsey wargaming is the set of identified factors that most strongly influence the prospects of red or blue victory in particular domains. These combat interactions between forces are the most complex because the net assessments between red and blue entities are often game-specific and dependent upon a personal point of view – realistic or optimistic. This is not to suggest that a wargame is wholly subjective, but rather it can be limited in effectiveness based on the limits of player knowledge and experience, as well as the control team’s ability to understand and adjudicate force interactions based on known and proven capabilities. A singular and biased viewpoint has the potential to impact the entire game, from the conduct of the game, to the adjudication of force interactions, and the outcomes reached.

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Nov. 18, 2015) Guided-missile destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class P. Sena/Released)

The essence of a wargame lies in the assessment process itself. This process cannot occur in isolation or in small groups lacking transparency, especially when security classification limits collaboration. An inclusive discussion, conducted at the appropriate classification level, is essential for shaping game assumptions and determining outcomes. It is crucial to recognize that the fleet and joint force primarily operate at the Secret level. While some individuals may have access to higher classification programs and capabilities, a “black box mentality” should not dictate wargame results. This mentality can introduce significant uncertainty and unwarranted optimism, leaving players unable to assess the validity of the capabilities in question. In both wargames and real-world operations, players must prioritize managing uncertainty to enhance mission effectiveness while maintaining acceptable risk to force. Exquisite capabilities that are not integrated with more common tactics or are not adequately trained can be detrimental, providing a false sense of confidence that may ultimately cause more harm than good.

Often, military capabilities are viewed in a sterile, non-human way—as mere technologies tied to specific platforms delivering defined effects. This perspective fails to capture the reality of warfare, where human intuition and judgment, shaped by years of experience, drive tactical and operational decisions. Wargaming can illuminate the asymmetrical technological advantages of different sides, but it also offers crucial insight into the human element of decision-making, especially in complex, full-spectrum warfare. The experience should immerse players in mental, emotional, and psychological stress as they pursue their objectives and help them understand how this stress influences operational decision-making.

Many assume that peacetime rules and Command and Control (C2) structures will function effectively in future conflicts, yet skepticism persists, particularly regarding the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) model. Originally designed to defend carrier strike groups and their air wings, the CWC has marginally evolved but remains the default structure for operations—prioritizing capital ship defense to hopefully enable offensive power projection. However, if the carrier and air wing are removed from the equation, what C2 structure best supports a transition to an offensive campaign at sea? A key objective of wargaming is to explore the relationship between technology and human decision-making and test alternatives. This skillset cannot be developed in just a few days, it requires weeks or months of dedicated study of adversarial capabilities, employment methods, and C2 processes to understand how best to counter capabilities or change our own. In essence, effective wargaming not only challenges our assumptions about military operations, but also cultivates the critical thinking and adaptability needed to navigate the complexities of future conflict.

The Essence of the Halsey Program

The Halsey program’s core values are an absolute allegiance to reality and a deep skepticism of both technological and operational capabilities – by all sides – that have not yet been proven in peer combat. These values align well with the lessons of history and how unproven capabilities introduce major uncertainty and risk when high-end combat finally takes place. Another core value of the program is developing deep expertise in capabilities of rivals. It is challenging to distill nearly two years of experience into a few pages, but the opportunity to spend dedicated time every day reading and learning about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its components (Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force) has been professionally rewarding, and I believe beneficial as I turn my focus to returning to sea in command.

PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Wuxi attached to a unit under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou)

Unfortunately, I am in the three-percent club at the Naval War College. Less than three percent of the in-residence, non-international graduates each year can be involved with the Halsey programs, specifically the ability to wargame at the classified level. Unclassified wargames can achieve some of the critical thinking effects of a classified wargame, but are not sufficient to effectively assess real-world strategy and combat outcomes. It is perplexing that during a time of heightened tensions with the Chinese Communist Party, specifically regarding claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea, that almost 97 percent of my peers from the Naval War College can go through a year’s curriculum of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at the Navy’s premier strategic and operational center of excellence with only limited classified discussions, no requirement to conduct net assessments at the classified level, nor conduct any classified wargames.

The ongoing analysis and education in the Halsey program, facilitated by continuous wargames, have revealed several key trends. The trends are applicable at the operational level of war – meaning, the potential success of a tactical-level engagement is overshadowed by the effect at the operational level of a campaign. The reason these trends are significant is that unlike many other wargames, Halsey only games two years into the future. This prevents a series of “perfectly executed acquisition cycles” from impacting the game. The students go to war with the military we already have.

Two of the largest trends I have observed include the decreasing relevance of the aircraft carrier and tactical aircraft based within 2,000nm of the fight, as well as hardkill cruise and ballistic missile defenses. There was an inflection point that occurred somewhere around the mid-2010s that triggered the decreasing relevance of these U.S. capabilities and tactics based on advances in PLA missile technology.

However, the two largest trends I have observed for increasing relevance are penetrating ordnance rather than penetrating platforms, and passive missile defenses. In his July 2012 Proceedings article “Payloads Over Platforms: Charting A New Course,” then-CNO Admiral Greenert clearly articulated the necessity to shift our focus to payloads, specifically decoupling platform development from payload development.1 That shift has yet to occur, and while our peer competitor continues to turn out one anti-ship weapon after another, we are still struggling to bring meaningful, offensive, anti-ship payloads into the fleet on a relevant timeline.

Wargaming Must Lead to a War Mindset

The primary expectation of a wargame is to produce quantifiable evidence of whether the employed technology effectively achieved desired outcomes. However, the most critical aspect is ensuring these results reach the appropriate levels to influence the fleet more broadly. Rarely if ever are the findings from the Global series of wargames communicated at the tactical level within the fleet, even as we strive for a “warfighting first” mentality.

As part of the Halsey program, we brief every Prospective Executive Officer (PXO), Commanding Officer (PCO), and Major Commander (MCO) course at the Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) in Newport, Rhode Island. The consistent feedback from these classes is, “I wish someone in the fleet was sharing this information. Why aren’t we using it?” Despite challenging students to critique our analyses, not one has been able to find fault in over twenty-five briefings, supported by more than twenty years of continuous gaming and learning.

Merely encouraging a war-focused mindset with words alone is insufficient. For the average sailor or officer, “war” often translates to routine maintenance, administrative tasks, or unit-level certifications. We need to create opportunities for sailors to think critically about war and wargaming, fostering discussions that lead to meaningful training and education. While deploying units participate in the culminating month-long event known as COMPUTEX (Composite Unit Training Exercise), this is arguably the sole instance during a 36-month Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) where they experience a challenging tactical environment at the high-end, combined arms level. Aside from that fraction of sailors who are about to deploy, many other shoreside sailors have little access to tools for practicing their high-end warfighting skills at the operational level of war.

If the Naval War College is truly the Navy’s premier center for strategic and operational excellence, its wargaming results must permeate all levels of fleet education. The fleet-wide curriculum across all training commands should be adaptable to incorporate continuous updates on tactics and technology from both U.S. forces and peer adversaries. Without this integration of knowledge and a mindset focused on preparing for war, the outputs of the Halsey program and the Naval War College risk becoming merely PowerPoint presentations of good ideas, wargaming outcomes, and recommendations to commanders. In a 1912 Proceedings article, “The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” Captain W. McCarty Little writes, “In the game of war, the stake is life itself, nay, infinitely greater, it may be the life of the nation, certainly its honor. We are its champions: what sort of a figure shall we cut when, at the tournament, the trumpets sound the charge, and it is found that we have neglected to practice in the joust.”2

For me, returning to the fleet means applying my Halsey experience from day one, just as I did during my previous command tour. I view everything through a warfighting lens. On Hurricane, I encouraged my sailors to understand the significance of their daily actions from this perspective. When we faced degraded equipment, the focus was not just on repairs but on understanding the implications for warfighting capability. This empowered my crew to prioritize effectively and raise issues that did not align with our warfighting culture, enabling me to address concerns that might otherwise be seen as mere resource drains. Returning to sea, I will expect the wardroom and CPO mess to share this mindset as we prepare our ship and crew, highlighting the essential distinction between leadership and management – leading people versus managing equipment and process. This warfighting focus at the unit level is as crucial now as it was on December 7, 1941.

The Right Players on the Field

During the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, the Naval War College used a Halsey program-like approach to educate its line officers through continuous wargaming. This academic effort was coupled with fleet exercises to trigger changes to tactics and produce realistic war plans. Due to this structure and effort, nearly all the Navy’s flag officers graduated from the wargaming programs during the interwar period. It was essentially a requirement for flag rank. These programs provided a critical forum for testing and socializing warfighting concepts into naval officers over weeks or months, rather than the handful of days typical of current large-scale games.

Ultimately, the model used in the interwar years was successful because the players involved in the game respected reality and were willing to make significant changes in the face of changing technology and operational concepts. These wargames brought Navy leadership together around common frameworks for understanding fleet battles and theater campaigns, frameworks that proved integral to the Navy’s success in WWII. One of Admiral Nimitz’s most famous postwar quotes argued that the rigorous and repeated Naval War College wargaming had ensured “nothing that happened during the war was a surprise…except the kamikaze tactics.”3

Unfortunately, this model has long been abandoned by the Naval War College and the fleet, with classified wargaming now relegated to the fringes of naval education. In his January 2013 Proceedings article, Naval War College Professor Milan Vego wrote that, “The Navy’s readiness and ability to fight and win at sea depends on the quality and skills of its top commanders and their staffs—yet it does not send many promising officers to attend the resident program at Newport, Rhode Island’s, Naval War College. Today’s Navy officer corps’ knowledge and understanding of naval theory and military history is far from adequate.”4 The Halsey program is helping to turn the tide, but at a small and inadequate rate.

The ability to further scale the Halsey program is limited by the number and quality of the war college faculty and the ability to accurately assess complex game moves. The rudder needs to be put hard over as we prepare for high-end conflict against a peer competitor, potentially within this decade. The rapid advances in warfare represent a double-edged sword to be leveraged or victimized by. The knowledge and experience I have gained as a student in Halsey has been invaluable – and has set a course of continual learning that will endure when I depart Newport. Daily discussions with officers, faculty, and guest flag and general officers have enhanced my experience at the Naval War College beyond expectation. It is this experience that continues to drive my thirst for knowledge, understanding, and research. It drives me to share what I know with wardrooms, ready rooms, and everyone with whom I interact. In the spirit of CNO Admiral Franchetti’s “more players on the field,” the Navy also needs the right players on the field. The Halsey program prepares naval and joint officers to be the right players on the field for when it matters most.

Commander Anthony LaVopa graduated from the U.S. Naval War College in March 2024 as a Halsey Alfa Fellow. He commanded USS Hurricane (PC 3) and is the Prospective Executive Officer (P-XO) for USS Bulkeley (DDG 84).

The opinions expressed are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of the U.S. Navy or any other entity of the U.S. government.

References

1. Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” Proceedings 138 (July 2012), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/july/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course.

2. W. McCarty Little, “The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” Proceedings 38 (December 1912),

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1912/december-0/strategic-naval-war-game-or-chart-maneuver

3. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz speech to U.S. Naval War College, 10 October 1960, Folder 26, Box 31, RG15 Guest Lectures, 1894–1992, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport RI; quoted in John M. Lillard, Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for WWII, PhD dissertation, George Mason University, 2013, 1.

4. Milan Vego, “Study War Much More,” Proceedings 139 (January 2013), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/january/study-war-much-more.

Featured Image: PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Wuxi attached to a unit under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou)

Book Review

Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy

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Toshi Yoshihara, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, Georgetown University Press, 2023. 176 pages, $34.95.

By Brandon Tran

This review discusses the content and implications of Toshi Yoshihara’s book, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, starting with the author’s background and followed by chapter breakdowns. This review also evaluates the implications of Yoshihara’s research, considering how the historical circumstances behind the creation of the People’s Liberation Army/Navy (hereafter PLA Navy, or PLAN) informs its present-day actions vis-à-vis Taiwan.

As detailed by Yoshihara, the complexity and difficulty of conducting combined arm/joint multi-domain amphibious assaults dispels the idea of a set, determined timeline in the near future for when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) takes action against Taiwan. The failure of Communist forces to take Jinmen in the Chinese Civil War of 1949 and other outlying islands held by Nationalist forces also refutes the notion that a rapid Chinese seizure of Taiwan is a foregone conclusion. What these findings portend is that Taiwan, with its allies and partners, do have time to take action and overcome the pacing threat. Whether this window of opportunity is only a few years, or more than a decade is not certain, and so preparations must be executed in earnest.

Toshi Yoshihara was a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,* with a long history of studying seapower and naval strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. He is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies (CSBA). In Mao’s Army Goes to Sea:, Yoshihara expands on his previous research, exploring the decisions made by the PLA to establish a navy and conduct operations to drive out Nationalist forces towards the end of the Chinese Civil War. Utilizing Chinese language sources, Yoshihara illustrates how navy-building, sea combat, and contested amphibious assaults have had a lasting influence on the PLA Navy. This work situates China’s recent maritime developments in the proper historical context and provides insight into how the PLAN may operate in the future. 

 Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy is composed of nine chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. Yoshihara has included maps to illustrate the areas of contention and the progress of the campaigns. The author’s intended audience includes all who have a vested interest in defense studies, East Asian history, and Indo-Pacific affairs. His writing is clear and straightforward, free of the excessive technical details that would preclude those unfamiliar with naval warfare and China studies from grasping his key points.

The introduction takes the reader through a brief overview of the conditions that characterized the People’s Liberation Army as it drove the Nationalist forces from the Chinese mainland in campaigns from 1949-1950, along with the leaders that were instrumental in laying the foundations for the PLA Navy. The introduction also outlines Yoshihara’s salient points, that is, the events surrounding this time period inform the current state of the PLA and the PLA’s specific evolution is a direct result of the outcome of Mao’s littoral campaigns. Subsequent chapters recall the actions taken by the PLA to construct a navy practically from scratch, a chronological account of the littoral campaigns, and lessons learned in the aftermath of the campaigns. Yoshihara concludes with areas for future research and places where study of Chinese history intersects with current US assessments of the PLA.

In Chapter 2, Yoshihara describes the sources and methodology he used for this historical study. Drawing upon open-source Chinese language sources from the PLA, he presents a new perspective on Chinese military affairs. Chapter 2 also includes a literature review, where Yoshihara contends that Western scholarship on the PLA Navy is incomplete, outdated, and consisting of erroneous assumptions. He notes that previous scholarship neglects the 1949-1950 offshore islands campaigns that he covers, and that the literature draws excessively from a few English language sources. What hindered scholarship on the PLA Navy is the assumption that the PLA only began considering naval problems in the 1980s, and unquestioningly took on Soviet naval doctrine. By his study of the offshore islands campaigns, Yoshihara refutes this notion, and instead illuminates the fact that the PLA is self-aware and consistently reviewing its performance. His work then serves to illustrate how the PLA sees itself and explains what actions it has taken in response to its own perceptions.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 detail the institutional formation of the PLA Navy and its earliest battles. After ousting the Nationalists from mainland China, Mao’s officers now had the task of creating a completely new armed service. These officers had to undertake a paradigm shift, as the PLA up to this point has been a ground-focused fighting force, with many of its personnel having never even seen the ocean. In constructing the PLA Navy, the communist party officials found that the skills, attitudes, and expertise that had served them well on land, must be reevaluated for nautical operations. PLA Navy planners found themselves having to rely on Nationalist defectors for expertise, needing to compromise the ideological purity of the revolution in order to achieve practical results on the battlefield. The PLAN’s formation is a story of pragmatism and compromise, and as time passed, the navy bears the marks of its hybrid influences. 

Chapters 5 and 6 detailed the progression and outcomes of the major littoral campaigns. Emboldened by their riverine victories, the PLA Ground Force and PLA Navy embarked on operations to take offshore islands from the Nationalists. Starting with Xiamen, the Communist forces swiftly took the island garrison, and made preparations to besiege Jinmen. The Xiamen campaign revealed underlying issues that the PLA had still not reconciled when planning for amphibious assaults, but the speedy nature of the battle prevented any reflection. As a result, the PLA was dealt a significant and conclusive defeat at Jinmen and suffered heavy casualties in the subsequent campaign to take Zhoushan. In the aftermath of these setbacks, Mao exercised increased control over the PLA and ardently advised his commanders to recall the oversights that surrounded Jinmen and Zhoushan. With these lessons in mind, the PLA embarked on its first large-scale amphibious operation and its first joint army-navy operation, capturing Hainan and Wanshan respectively, and dealing heavy blows to the Nationalists.

Chapter 7 synthesizes the major themes that were found in the preceding chapters with an institutional assessment of the PLA Navy and Chapter 8 considers how lessons from the past manifest themselves in the PLAN’s present behavior. Yoshihara asserts that the PLAN was not an afterthought, but rather carefully organized with compromises and support from many sources in order to confront the very particular set of challenges that faced the PLA with regards to decisively defeating the Nationalists. With such a nuanced origin, Yoshihara notes that much can be gleaned about the PLA just based on how they tell the story of the PLA Navy and Chinese seapower. The tactics, strategies, and doctrine employed by the PLA at the time inform present-day PLAN’s operations, such as the application of People’s War in naval operations resulting in a consistent emphasis on winning the psychological fight. Also, the PLA’s requisition of civilian maritime vessels has morphed into the employment of the Maritime Militia and the concept of Military-Civil Fusion. Balancing the need for competence with party loyalty has remained a consistent struggle for PRC leaders.

Yoshihara leaves us with avenues for future research and concluding thoughts on assessments of the PLA. He encourages the study of PLA offshore campaigns that take place during the Taiwan Strait Crises, Taiwan’s reporting of the 1949-1950 campaigns, and how the PLA assesses amphibious assaults by other militaries. Yoshihara makes it clear that when talking about China’s maritime goals, the point of emphasis should not be on strictly naval operations and assets, but rather a broad look at how China projects its seapower through both conventional and irregular means. His goal with this book and the accompanying study is to dispel disparaging misconceptions surrounding PLA history and capabilities, and in doing so, promotes further research and discourse on the topic to enable proper appraisals of PLA seapower. Failure to understand this crucial part of the PLA’s identity will consistently lead to distorted assumptions and underestimations of the PLA, all to detrimental effect.

Implications

Toshi Yoshihara’s book illustrated historical key weaknesses that the PLA is keenly aware of, and this self-awareness informs their present-day actions. To address shortcomings, Xi Jinping seeks to promote commanders with operational experience and draws from other branches of the PLA in order to bring China’s military towards its concept of Intelligentized Warfare. Under this ideal, the PLA will be able to seamlessly execute multi-domain operations with varying intensity in war and peace. The PLA still struggles to integrate its branches into a coordinated fighting machine, given decades of an entrenched “Big Army” mindset where Army officials dominated top command posts. Indeed, while the reorganization of the PLA into brigade formations and theater commands have enabled smoother function, an overwhelming number of theater commanders and political commissars hail from the PLA Ground Force, much like the composition of the Central Military Commission. In fact, there is currently only one Air Force and one Navy officer serving as a theater commander and commissar respectively. The appointment of Dong Jun then, should come as no surprise given this information.

Of the six members of the 2022 CMC, four of these officials are PLA Ground Force officers, one is a Navy officer who was originally a Ground Force officer, and one is a Rocket Force officer, with no Air Force representation in the CMC. While not yet a part of the CMC, the appointment of the PLAN commander Dong Jun as Minister of Defense replaces a staff Ground Force officer on the CMC with a Navy officer possessing operational command experience. Dong Jun’s successor as commander of the PLAN, Hu Zhongming, has decades of experience on submarines, a strategically important component of China’s maritime strategy. Taken together, the leadership transitions at the highest echelons of the PLA illustrate the strategic posture that Xi Jinping wants his military to have: aggressive commanders that can make Xi’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific come to fruition.

What has prevented the PLA from effectively enacting the already tedious military reform is the nature of the PRC’s government. Xi Jinping has had to balance prioritizing loyalty of his officers with expertise in his bids to expand his power against other Chinese Communist Party members, and so competent officials may be passed up in favor of those that Xi does not consider a threat to himself. Indeed, even if Xi was not in power, PLA reforms would still consistently consider both political and military factors. As the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, the PLA cannot be separated from it, and party loyalty will always feature prominently, sometimes even to the detriment of readiness. As Yoshihara has described, the PRC has had a land-based focus since its inception, and so a significant number of Xi’s close allies hail from the PLA Ground Force. In some cases, these officers have ties to his family and hometown since the early days of the Chinese Communist Party. 

Given these circumstances, PLA and CCP officials do not believe that the PRC is currently able to effectively contend with the United States, even admitting as such. Acknowledging historical experience, Chinese military planners recognize that the objective of taking Taiwan is quite challenging and requires a level of readiness and proficiency that the PLA current doesn’t have. Having failed to capture Jinmen at the close of the Chinese Civil War, the PRC unsuccessfully attempted to seize the island by force during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The close proximity to the PRC and the small size of the island suggests that it would be considerably easier to capture Jinmen than Taiwan, and the PLA still proved incapable. With warfare becoming more complex and more states becoming involved in the Taiwan Strait dispute, the matter of organizing and executing a successful invasion has become more difficult than before. As well, the recent corruption purges of the technical services of the PLA make it hard for the PRC to diversify away from the Ground Force and become proficient in joint operations. Taking all of this into consideration, the U.S. and its partners must take advantage of this window of opportunity to reestablish their military capabilities in order to overcome the pacing threat. 

Conclusion

Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy provides a nuanced retelling of the history of the PLA Navy’s earliest days and the lessons derived from its engagements with the Nationalist army. This book will greatly benefit readers who seek to understand the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the military considerations and circumstances surrounding any potential conflict with Taiwan. For those interested in China studies or security studies, Yoshihara’s book provides a comprehensive review of PLA operations, utilizing Chinese documents that reported on the events he detailed.

A recurring theme in the book is that in the PLA’s operations, being able to field a joint, multi-domain force that is able to synergize effectively is of paramount importance in any undertaking. During the Cold War, the great powers raced to achieve nuclear supremacy. Today, the great powers are engaged in a race to achieve a truly joint force, with seamless interoperability as its defining characteristic. With this in mind and given the current geopolitical climate, this book is a critical read for those with a military background regardless of the service, be it Navy, Army, Air Force, or Space Force. There are no foregone conclusions when it comes to China, and the armed services must learn from history and each other to prepare for the challenges that lie ahead. 

CDT Brandon Tran is an international affairs and Chinese double major at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has interned with the Center for Naval Analyses, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Army War College. At all of these places, he worked on China and Asia-Pacific defense issues and has written extensively on warfighting and Indo-Pacific security. He has been published in The Diplomat, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, the Modern War Institute, and more. Brandon hopes to commission as a military intelligence officer.

The views expressed are solely personal and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of West Point, the US Army, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

*This article originally described Yoshihara as a current professor at the Naval War College, but was corrected to include his current position at CSBA.

Featured Image: Type 903A  supply ship Kekexilihu (Hull 903) attached to a combat support ship flotilla under the Chinese PLA Navy provides liquid supply to Type 055 Destroyer Lhasa (Hull 102) via replenishment-at-sea during a multi-subject maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Xu Taotao)

Latin America

Serious About Building Maritime Capacity in the High Latitudes? Look South

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By Aaron Delano-Johnson and Myles McCarthy

Introduction 

Sporting the distinctive racing stripe worn by many of the globe’s coast guards, the world’s newest polar-capable research vessel left the protected waters of the Gerlache Strait behind as it prepared to cross the Southern Ocean after completing its maiden voyage to Antarctica earlier this year. This cutting-edge vessel was not from a NATO country, Russia, or China, but Colombia, as it set sail from its homeport of Cartagena joining the ranks of South American countries operating ice-capable vessels and research stations on the seventh continent. As the United States and its allies struggle to project surface presence in the high latitudes, the ARC Simon Bolivar (PO-151) joins Chilean icebreaker CNS Almirante Viel (AGB-46) as the second domestically built polar-capable vessel to be commissioned in South America in the last 12 months. If the United States is serious about building capacity to operate at-sea in the high latitudes, it is time to look south. 

The challenge of building high latitude maritime capacity 

The National Strategy for the Arctic Region calls to expand the “U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet to support persistent presence in the U.S. Arctic and additional presence as needed in the European Arctic.” Likewise, United States Policy on the Antarctic Region also identifies the need to expand the United States polar icebreaker fleet to maintain an active and influential presence in the region to support United States interests across the Antarctic Treaty System. 

The struggles to meet either goal are well-documented with critiques of the U.S. Coast Guard’s current icebreaker fleet, Polar Security Cutter program, and the broader state of United States shipbuilding continually in the news. What is not addressed in this debate about icebreaker capacity at-sea is that once the United States polar icebreaker fleet is recapitalized through new construction, or commercially procured stop-gap options, who will operate and maintain these ships in the harshest of environments?

Partnerships with traditional Arctic allies are a natural fit to build knowledge, skills and abilities of high latitude operations, but with a dearth of opportunities onboard both United States and NATO vessels operating in the polar regions, where else should the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy turn to learn from those with these skills and platforms? Look south.

South America’s Efforts in Antarctica

Stories of the Arctic and Antarctic studied in the United States tend to focus on the achievements of polar explorers from Shackleton to Amundsen, Soviet nuclear icebreakers, the indigenous peoples of the Arctic or perhaps the U.S. Antarctic Program’s work at McMurdo Station. Few are aware of the high-latitude capacity possessed by nations across South America, the same countries who are the closest partners of the United States in countering transnational organized crime, operating in the joint naval domain, and addressing illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing at sea.

Amongst them are upwards of 30 research stations, to include year-round presence at 12, a variety of aircraft launching from Chile and Argentina to support operations on Antarctica, and numerous icebreakers or polar research vessels by their navies or respective maritime services.

In a flurry of activity over recent years, the domestic construction or commercial procurement across South America’s polar fleet includes: Argentina will double its heavy icebreaker fleet with the construction of a second Polar Class 4 vessel set for the late 2020s to sail alongside ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5), the Peruvian Navy commissioned the BAP Carrasco (BOP-171) Polar Class 7 oceanographic and research vessel (2017), the Colombian General Maritime Directorate’s (DIMAR) ARC Simon Bolivar (PO-151) Lloyd’s Register Ice Class 1C FS (2023), the Chilean CNS Almirante Viel (AGB-46) Polar Class 5 was commissioned in July, while the Brazilian Navy awaits delivery of its next-generation, and domestically built icebreaker, dubbed the Antarctic Support Ship expected to be launched in 2025. Finally, Uruguay procured the R/V Mount Whitney, an ice-strengthened research vessel re-flagged in September as the Oyarvide (ROU-22), to reinvigorate support for scientific investigation and logistics for its Antarctic operations.

Polar expertise can also be found ashore. The School of Marine Sciences of the Argentine Navy hosts the International Maritime Organization (IMO) certified courses of Basic and Advance Navigation in Polar Waters while their Chilean Navy counterparts at the Maritime Training and Instruction Center offer a similar Basic and Advanced Polar Water Operations Course. Both courses are requirements for senior officers serving on their nations’ respective Polar Icebreakers, and each routinely welcomes international students, principally from Europe. 

While the United States’ ongoing attempt to recapitalize the ice breaking fleet languishes with delays, it is clear that United States Allies, partners, and adversaries continue, with greater frequency, to put ships into the ice.

Icy Operations: How U.S. Forces Are Engaging the Polar South

Collaborating with South American partners allows the United States to take advantage of a simple fact of geography: when summer precludes cold weather training in the Northern Hemisphere, opportunities abound south of the equator.

Who has looked south to expand opportunities for gaining proficiency in extreme conditions? The U.S. Army’s storied 10th Mountain Division, the 1st Marine Division, U.S. Special Operations Command South, and U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School have all attend the Chilean Mountain Warfare School while U.S. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center instructors have trained alongside the Argentinian Marines in Ushuaia practicing cold weather tactics and exchanging experiences. Likewise, troops from the Argentinian Mountain Warfare School and Chilean Marines have trained with their U.S. Army counterparts at the Northern Warfare Training Center and the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center. In addition to ongoing activities in Chile, recent key leader engagements with Argentina have advanced discussions on additional cold weather operations subject matter exchanges. 

The U.S. Coast Guard of course does have partnerships and conducts international engagements across the region from exercises to Security Cooperation. But for as much success as USCGC James’ had during its recent port visits along the east coast of South America as the ship conducted illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing operations in the South Atlantic, efforts by the U.S. to bolster polar cooperation in the region have been much more limited.

Most recently, while returning from their annual mission to re-supply McMurdo Station during the 2023 Antarctic season, USCGC Polar Star deviated from their normal trans-Pacific route to visit Punta Arenas and Valparaiso, Chile. These were the first visits to Chile by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in over seven years and the first to Punta Arenas since 1987, and though the ship enjoyed a warm reception by their Chilean hosts including bilateral engagements, no repeat visit to the continent was made during the ship’s 2024 deployment. 

How to Build High Latitude Bench Strength at Sea

What would polar partnerships in South America offer to the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy? To begin, the need for added bench strength of operators with high latitude experience is real. Currently the U.S. Coast Guard’s high latitude efforts focus on preparing the heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Star and medium icebreaker USCGC Healy for annual missions to Antarctica and the U.S. Arctic respectively. Healy and Polar Star represent the only two platforms in the United States’ combined fleet capable of training ice pilots, the essential qualification for operating ships in ice. On average, each qualifies just four to five new ice pilots a year, and given the rate of attrition in the U.S. Coast Guard’s Cutterman community, this leaves a very small candidate pool from which to fill current command cadre needs. And projected forward, this trajectory will leave the service critically short of the crews necessary for the nation’s envisioned future icebreaking fleet of Polar Security Cutters.

Since 2018 the U.S Coast Guard has looked to the Afloat Ice Breaking Training Program to help fill these gaps. However, the program is imperfect, and proposals to expand it are stymied by a critical factor: in an average year the United States only has one ship breaking international ice at a time, limiting space for trainees. So why not look to the rapidly expanding South American polar fleet for assistance? Precedent already exists for personnel exchanges in the region. Currently, the U.S. Navy has Surface Warfare Officers participating in two year exchange programs in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, and Chile, with some calling to expand the program even wider. 

And personnel exchanges should work in both directions, as the U.S. Coast Guard can offer invitations to join icebreaking deployments to officers from South American countries in the same way these opportunities are currently extended to their NATO, Australian, and New Zealand counterparts. Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet recently concluded Operation Nanook, a Canadian led multinational exercise that while focused on the Arctic and NATO partnerships would certainly offer many lessons learned to South American nations with Antarctic interests. Put another way, polar officers need to know more than just the mechanics of how to operate a ship in ice, they need to understand the interests, ideology, and capabilities of all partner nations in the rapidly evolving high-latitudes. 

Potential opportunities to build bench strength are not just limited to expanding the Icebreaking Training Program. Junior officers aboard Healy and Polar Star could take advantage of their ships’ lengthy annual maintenance periods to seek temporary duty opportunities either aboard a ship or even by attending the aforementioned polar navigation courses in Argentina or Chile.

Finally, it takes herculean efforts in logistics to keep the aging U.S. icebreakers on mission. Forging mission support partnerships is often an afterthought that operational commanders scramble to expedite in times of crises. Establishing strategic logistics relationships with partner maritime services that can facilitate spare parts deliveries, conduct at highly capable shipyards across South America, and streamlined agreements for diplomatic clearances should all be a priority for engagement in the region. 

Conclusion

Afloat operations in the polar regions are fraught with risk. The United States needs to come to the region with not just capable ships, but with strong international partnerships and well-trained crews. With an icebreaking fleet that has historically relied upon on-the-job training to qualify the next generation of polar explorers, the U.S. Coast Guard’s “red hull” community currently struggles to support that model due to a lack of assets and opportunities with traditional partners. But polar force projection is of growing national significance, and the United States needs to look at the White Continent with a wide aperture lens. Logistics, memorandums of understanding, alliances, and certainly world-class ships and crews will all be essential in achieving future high latitude goals.

Aaron Delano-Johnson is an active duty officer in the U.S. Coast Guard. A ship captain and international affairs officer, he has served across Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Myles McCarthy is an active duty officer in the U.S. Coast Guard and an Olmsted Foundation Scholar completing a master’s degree at La Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. A ship captain, he hopes to return to sea upon completion of his studies.

The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: ARC ship “Simón Bolívar” conducts Antarctic operations. (Colombian Navy Photo)