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West African Navies Coming of Age?

By Dirk Steffen

On 11 February 2016, fourteen Nigerian and Ghanaian pirates in two speedboats attacked the product tanker MAXIMUS (ex-SP BRUSSELS) 70 nm south of Abidjan, Ivory Coast. They hijacked the ship with the intention to steal part or all of its 4,700 metric tonne diesel fuel cargo, sailing it to a position ca. 300 nm south of Lagos, Nigeria over the next few days. The case ended with an opposed boarding of the tanker by the Nigerian Navy, which left one pirate dead and six apprehended; the remainder fled on their support vessel, taking two crewmembers of the MAXIMUS as hostages.

What began as just another product tanker hijacking developed into a model case for regional maritime security cooperation under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The first asset to track the hijacked tanker was the Military Sealift Command’s expeditionary fast transport vessel USNS SPEARHEAD, stationed in the region for training and exercise support as a part of the African Partnership Station. SPEARHEAD identified the hijacked ship and shadowed it for two days as it sailed from Ivorian into Ghanaian waters. Then the CTF 63, Capt. Heidi Agle, handed over to the Ghana Navy, which continued to shadow the ship until it crossed the extension of the maritime boundary to Togo, about 200 nm offshore at that point. While Benin and Togo were not able to mobilise vessels to that distance from the shore, Nigeria was.

USNS SPEARHED leaving Douala in March 2015 (Photo: Dirk Steffen).
USNS SPEARHED leaving Douala in March 2015 (Photo: Dirk Steffen).

On 17 February the MAXIMUS, now re-named MT ELVIS-5 by the hijackers, had reached a position about 300 nm south of Lagos, roughly north-west of the island nation of Sao Tome and Principe. While an unknown mother ship had probably supported the actual attack on the tanker, another vessel, the small Cambodian-flagged tanker DEJIKUN, was likely used by the pirates in an attempt to steal part of the MAXIMUS’s cargo. The DEJIKUN was tracked heading south from Lagos on 16 February, arriving in the general area of the MAXIMUS on midday of 18 February.

The hijacking of the product tanker MAXIMUS and the tracks of the pirate support vessels between 8 and 19 February 2016 (source: MaRisk by Risk Intelligence).
The hijacking of the product tanker MAXIMUS and the tracks of the pirate support vessels between 8 and 19 February 2016 (source: MaRisk by Risk Intelligence).

Close on her tail was the Nigerian offshore patrol vessel NNS OKPABANA followed by NNS SAGBAMA. Meanwhile, the Nigerian Navy’s Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP), Rear Admiral Henry Babalola, obtained permission to operate in Sao Tomé and Principe waters although the MAXIMUS was technically in international waters (albeit inside the Sao Tome and Principe exclusive economic zone). What followed on 19 February were eight hours of negotiations via VHF before a Nigerian Navy boarding team from NNS OKPABANA boarded the MAXIMUS in the evening of 19 February. The pirates briefly offered resistance, before one of their number was killed and the remaining six on board the MAXIMUS fled into the engine room where they eventually surrendered.

Both from an operational point of view, especially with regards to regional co-operation as well as from a tactical perspective, the mission was a success. None of the MAXIMUS’s crewmembers were injured, although several pirates escaped with two hostages onto the DEJIKUN. The ship was later found drifting off Benin, abandoned by the pirates who had also taken the hostages with them.

Nigerian Navy SBS team (Photo: German Navy/Steve Back).
Nigerian Navy SBS team (Photo: German Navy/Steve Back).

The liberation of the MAXIMUS was lauded as a model of regional co-operation under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, even though Sao Tome and Principe, a nation with virtually no maritime security capacity, never reported to Nigeria or to the relevant Zone D reporting centre in the region (contrary to the official statements) when the MAXIMUS or DEJIKUN entered her waters. Nigeria eventually asked for permission to pursue the MAXIMUS into the Sao Tome and Principe exclusive economic zone under a bilateral agreement, which in the end achieved its objective, but also exposed some of the still extant weaknesses in the regional framework and capacities.

While diplomatically relevant, the message that the operation sent to the criminals was equally important: Gulf of Guinea states are increasingly willing and able to suppress maritime crime. It may only have been a beginning, but it may well be that the prospect of a forceful naval intervention has upset the plans of would-be tanker hijackers at a time when the economic situation in Nigeria is becoming increasingly conducive to the theft and smuggling of fuel into the country.

For the navies of the region, especially the Nigerian Navy, success may become self-reinforcing. The Nigerian Navy has long labored under its dismal performance and reputation relative to its assets and manpower potential. It remains beset by corruption and inefficiency, but it appears that the change that the Buhari presidency has brought over Nigeria may have begun to affect the navy as well. The Nigerian Navy had already responded with some alacrity to the brief hijacking (turned kidnapping) of the LEON DIAS on 29-31 January, the attempted kidnapping of crewmembers from the SAFMARINE KURAMO on 5 February near Bonny River Fairway Buoy and more recently, assisting the BOURBON LIBERTY 251, which had two crewmembers kidnapped on 23 February 2016. In all cases, the Nigerian naval vessels arrived well after the attacks, although in the case of the SAFMARINE KURAMO the attackers had to abandon their attempt to extract the crew from their citadel and were forced to leave the ship. While not entirely satisfactory to those involved, it is progress over previous years. Before, the navy hardly ever responded to distress calls at all, and when they did, it more often than not created bad blood between them and the merchant marine community through heavy-handed practices.

It is likely that the response to similar incidents will remain hit-and-miss for some years to come, especially if the circumstances are less favorable than in the MAXIMUS case. The MAXIMUS episode benefited from the presence of the USNS SPEARHEAD, which was conveniently deployed in the area for the upcoming African Partnership Station’s OBANGAME EXPRESS 2016 exercise (17-25 March 2016) as well as from some serious tactical mistakes made by the pirates. However, amongst other contingencies, the OBANGAME EXPRESS exercise series rehearses responses to precisely this type of scenario. In a way, the incident therefore reflects the journey the navies of the regions have made since the inception of OBANGAME EXPRESS and it will surely provide interesting input for the upcoming iteration of the exercise. The Nigerian Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral Ibok- Ete Ekwe Ibas, has credited OBANGAME EXPRESS with meeting its objectives. His challenge will now be to follow up and maintain, as he said, the “resolve of the navy to deploy more ships to maintain the current record of sea patrol in order to tackle maritime security challenges.”

Dirk Steffen is a Commander (senior grade) in the German Naval Reserve with 12 years of active service between 1988 and 2000. He took part in exercises OBANGAME EXPRESS 2014 and 2015 both at sea and ashore for the boarding-team training and as a Liaison Naval Officer on the exercise staff. He is normally Director Maritime Security at Risk Intelligence (Denmark) when not on loan to the German Navy. He has been covering the Gulf of Guinea as a consultant and analyst since 2004. The opinions expressed in this article are his alone, and do not represent those of any German military or governmental institutions.

Sea Control 111 – Vietnam-Era Drones (QH-50)

seacontrol2We discuss the Vietnam-era drone, the QH-50 DASH, with Peter Papadakos – engineer, historian, and son of the DASH’s inventor. We go through the program’s origins, its original purpose, the field modifications made by enterprising Vietnam-era officers, and the challenges that came with its operation and the institutional resistance to its use. This podcast was inspired by BJ Armstrong’s Armed Forces Journal Article, Unmanned Naval Warfare: Retrospect and Prospect.

DOWNLOAD: Vietnam Era Drones

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REAL TIME STRATEGY 5 – METAL GEAR SOLID V: THE PHANTOM PAIN

The RTS crew returns with a discussion on “Metal Gear Solid” with a focus on “MGS V: The Pantom Pain.” Join us as we explore the role PMCs play in the game, the Cold War setting, and how the ‘mystic reality’ creates an interesting narrative.

RTS_Logo2-150x150“Real Time Strategy,” is a discussion on the lessons and non-lessons of the simulations we use to both learn and entertain in the realm of military strategy, tactics, and history.

 

DOWNLOAD:  METAL GEAR SOLID V PODCAST

 

iTunes Link

February Members’ Roundup Part One

By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part one of the February 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including recent Indian Navy maritime policy developments, aspects of the U.S. Navy’s defense procurement program, components of a notional South China Sea naval conflict between China and the U.S. and capability challenges for the U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

Beginning the roundup at Offiziere, Darshana Baruah discusses India’s Cold War non-aligned strategy and the implications this strategy has had on India’s maritime security policy in the post-Cold War period. Ms. Baruah explains that India must realize that non-alignment does not equate to non-engagement and that committing to a policy of engagement is critical to manage the complexities of the developing Asian maritime security environment. She references the bilateral MALABAR naval exercises between the U.S. and India as well as the Maritime Security Strategy document released by the Indian government as developments hinting to a changing Indian maritime policy.

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Ankit Panda, at The Diplomat, also discusses India’s maritime strategy with an analysis on potential joint patrol operations in the South China Sea between Indian and U.S. navies. Mr. Panda highlights that there is no indication whether these jointly conducted patrols would reflect recent U.S. FONOPs or less contentious passing patrols, however, he notes that the potential for these patrols to occur reflects a shift in India’s maritime doctrine to ‘act East’. Also at The Diplomat, Mr. Panda explains the conditions and challenges of completing a Boeing-India F/A-18 Super Hornet deal where the Indian Defense Forces would receive an advanced multi-role fighter to supplement its next-generation indigenously built Vikrant-class aircraft carrier and raise the potential for increased technology sharing between the U.S. and India.

Bryan McGrath, at War on the Rocks, discusses the concept of distributed lethality and recent weapons tests and developments that have brought this concept to maturity for the U.S. Navy’s surface force. Mr. McGrath explains how the successful launch of a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) from a U.S. Navy destroyer has now increased the anti-surface warfare combat range of about 90 U.S. cruisers and destroyers currently operating with the Vertical Launch System (VLS) to 1000 miles. Mr. McGrath also identifies the additional capability introduced to the long-range supersonic SM-6 missile, now capable of engaging enemy surface combatants, as a critical development for distributed lethality implementation across the fleet.

Kyle Mizokami, for Popular Mechanics, discusses the planned purchase of 14 F/A-18 Super Hornets as a result of the fighter shortfall in carrier air-wings caused by delays in the Joint Strike Fighter Program. He explains that the delays will also reflect the slow introduction the F-35C will have entering into service within the Navy with only four planes to be purchased in 2017. Mr. Mizokami also outlines surface combatant purchases included in the Navy’s FY2017 budget, highlighting the procuring of two Virginia-class attack submarines and two Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers – the destroyers to be equipped with the new Air and Missile Defense Radars that boost the ship’s ballistic missile defense capabilities. Also at Popular Mechanics, Mr. Mizokami provides an analysis on the U.S. Navy’s LCS live fire exercise against an enemy fast-attack swarm that demonstrated potentially serious flaws in the ships design, revealed by combatants entering the ‘keep-out’ range of the ship and technical issues arising throughout the test – albeit the exercise only tested certain weapon and fire control systems.

To conclude the roundup in the Asia-Pacific, Harry Kazianis for The National Interest provides an outline of potential tactics China’s PLA would emphasize during a notional conflict with the U.S. Navy. Mr. Kazianis explains that over the past two decades China has feared the U.S. ability to rapidly deploy naval assets throughout multiple domains in China’s areas of interests largely due to limited PLA capabilities. Mr. Kazianis identifies the employment of large volumes of rudimentary sea-mines and missiles as a simple mechanism for overwhelming U.S. Navy defenses and a feasible strategy to achieve an asymmetric edge over U.S. fleets in theatre.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the first part of February:

  • Chuck Hill, for his Coast Guard Blog, discusses the possibility that the U.S. Army may develop an anti-access/ area-denial (A2AD) strategy along the First Island Chain in the Asia-Pacific and the implications these anti-air and anti-ship systems would have on the Army’s role in U.S. domestic coastal defense. In a second article for his CG Blog, Hill outlines the participants and talking points of a multi-lateral coast guard meeting between the U.S., Japan, Australia and the Philippines.
  • At USNI News, Sam LaGrone discusses the Request for Proposal Naval Air Systems Command is set to release later this year concerning the Carrier Based Refueling System (CBARS) or the unmanned aerial refuelling tanker. Mr. LaGrone explains how the CBARS is a follow-on program that will incorporate many components and systems from the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program (UCLASS).
  • Robert Farley, for The National Interest, provides an analysis on the Zhenbao Island conflict between the Soviet Union and China in 1969 and how the sovereignty dispute nearly escalated to a nuclear confrontation. Mr. Farley explains the avenues of escalation that may have led to Soviet tactical strikes on Chinese nuclear facilities and the implications this would have had on U.S.-NATO-Soviet stability in Europe.
  • James Stavridis, for Nikkei Asian Review, provides five strategies for Pacific-Asian countries that will reduce the potential of an outbreak conflict in the region. Mr. Stavridis suggests that direct military-to-military contact can create a framework of deconfliction procedures thereby reducing escalatory conditions within the region. He also explains how the use of international negotiation platforms to resolve territorial disputes can contribute to a sustainable stability. In an article at The Wall Street Journal, Stavridis highlights the ‘icebreaker gap’ the U.S. has developed with only four large icebreakers to be active by 2020 while Russia will have at least 42. He explains how acquisition processes to close this gap are extremely strained with the current defense budgetary restrictions the government is experiencing.
  • Dave Majumdar, for The National Interest, explains how the next generation of U.S. Navy surface combatants will incorporate digital and information technologies into the core foundations of ship design to allow for time and cost efficient technological upgrades. In a second article at The National Interest, Majumdar highlights the strategy shift that has occurred within the U.S. Navy’s UCLASS approach. The article outlines how the move to CBARS away from the UCLASS ISR and light strike capability will assist the Navy in developing a sophisticated unmanned aviation infrastructure for future carrier operations.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.

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