“The young officer deals in tactics. That is what he cares about most. While he chafes against other duties, his first focus is meant to be the development of skills to bring combat power to bear on an enemy in circumstances of mortal danger.”–Vice Admiral Cebrowski1
“The disconcerting truth, however, is that the modern naval officer is buried in reports… that deal with everything but how to fight.”–Captain Wayne Hughes2
These quotes from classic naval thinkers underline what has been glaringly obvious for years – every American Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) knows that the community spends less time on tactics than it should. SWOs mainly conceive of their professional identities in terms of their administrative function, such as “I’m the Auxiliaries Officer” or “I’m the 1st Lieutenant,” instead of their tactical or operational roles. The CASREP instruction is more familiar to Ensigns than the classic work Fleet Tactics. These administrative duties take up a massive amount of time and energy, and with the surface fleet’s emphasis on program management and material readiness, tactics consistently fall by the wayside. To state it more bluntly, warships are more ready for inspection than they are for war.3
What if it could be different? Other services and communities fulfill the same duties to man, train, and equip without losing their warfighting ethos. Naval aviators identify themselves by what combat aircraft they fly, focusing on their ability to fight over the administrative role they serve within a squadron. Marines conceive of themselves as riflemen even in the heart of the Pentagon.
The Surface Navy needs to cut itself free of its extraneous entanglements and make concrete changes to how it improves warfighting skill. Our most urgent target for reform should not be improving individual tactics on a piecemeal level. Rather, we should be focusing on systematic changes to the personnel and training systems throughout the Surface Warfare community that will cultivate more tacticians.
The lowest-hanging fruit is in the junior officer detailing process. The fleet is missing a major opportunity to incentivize junior officers to be more lethal, but reform would be relatively simple. When assigning officers in the SWO community, detailers at the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) reward extra points for attaining certain advanced qualifications. Officers who quickly qualify as Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), the top tactical and engineering watches on a ship, often receive first choice of their next assignment due to the number of “extra points” they receive when slating for their next tour. This is a great way to incentivize hard work, but the limited scope of this program is a missed opportunity. The detailing process should also assign point increments to more junior tactical qualifications.
The obvious candidates are Warfare Coordinator (WC) positions – the watchstations subordinate to the TAO that actually employ weapons in combat. It is not feasible for most junior officers to become a TAO – a position normally filled by Department Heads ten years their senior – in the few extra months between earning their SWO pin and transferring to a new command. It is feasible, however, for a hard-charging division officer to learn how to fight a single domain under the TAO’s direction. Giving JOs a point incentive by qualifying these watches would motivate them to go after these qualifications earlier. Detailers could begin rewarding the watchstations listed above right away – and include even more, like Anti-Submarine Warfare Evaluator (ASWE) or Tomahawk Engagement Control Officer (ECO), after changes to the school requirements.
Detailers should also reward qualified Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officers (ATTWOs) with a small point bonus. While not required on most ships, the ATTWO position requires officers to demonstrate calm under fire in a way more academic qualifications fail to achieve. Officers need to confidently know their tactics – but they also need to be mentally prepared to make decisions with limited information, preserve order in chaotic situations, and if needed, order the use of lethal force. Only the ATTWO qualification, with its focus on real-world drills, regularly trains JOs in these skills.
Our proposed model is shown below. BUPERS currently gives 0.25-point bonuses for TAO and EOOW, which are then added to a value calculated off of Fitness Report (FITREP) scores. To minimize confusion – that calculation is fairly complex, and unnecessary for this discussion – our proposal describes fractions of the TAO/EOOW bonuses. When ultimately implemented, the exact scores will also need to be tailored to match those FITREP scores.
A proposed model for adjusting point values for specific SWO qualifications. (Author graphic)
This new model has three main advantages – it will make junior officers more lethal, it will create a deeper bench of experience among more senior officers, and it will incentivize retention.
Today’s SWO qualification process only touches on tactics in the Combat Information Center Watch Officer (CICWO) and Maritime Warfare qualifications. These are cursory quals that provide only the barebones foundation of modern warfare. They cover U.S. Navy capabilities and limitations, but leave major gaps when it comes to other great powers and their tactics and doctrine. Despite earning the qualification, a qualified CICWO has not yet been taught how to track and assess threats, launch missiles, or maneuver the ship in combat. In contrast, the warfare coordinator qualifications, with their emphasis on exact weapon employment, countering specific threat tactics, and coordinating with other tactical watchstanders and units, represent a more serious professional achievement in becoming a skilled warfighter. Incentivizing junior officers to go after these specific quals earlier will make them much deadlier and increase lethality on a fleet-wide scale.
These changes will also benefit more senior officers. Today, most officers in the surface fleet formally learn tactics for the first time when going through the TAO curriculum in Department Head school, after seven to nine years of experience. That is much too late for the complexity of today’s weapons and tactics. Incentivizing early tactical qualifications would give Department Heads a stronger foundation, setting them up for success when they assume the TAO role. A stronger foundation will also allow for more advanced tactical education and training to be administered at later career milestones, further elevating the lethality of the force. Given enough years, it will eventually create more lethal captains and admirals.
Finally, these point incentives would boost retention among junior officers. When interviewed, junior SWOs consistently say that they are not well-trained for combat.5 The current point system feeds that problem by only rewarding the qualifications – TAO and EOOW – that are prerequisites for command. Shifting to the new model would improve combat skills across the fleet, and would send a powerful signal that the SWO community values tacticians at all levels. Bonus points for tactical qualifications are not a silver bullet – but they are a step in the right direction, showing junior officers that the Navy sees their achievements as worthwhile in their own right, and not simply as stepping stones to command. By providing tangible professional incentives that directly strengthen the Navy’s core function – warfighting – the Navy will boost warfighter retention and morale.
The SWO community should keep its big point incentives to create high-quality captains – but recognize that the best ships are ones where top captains are backed by lethal, combat-ready O-2s and O-3s. Today’s JOs are starving for a foundation in tactics. Incentivizing them to pursue tactical qualifications early may be the first step in convincing them that the SWO community prioritizes warfighting, and in turn, convince them to stay and grow into more deadly department heads and captains.
LTJG Chris Rielage is a Surface Warfare Officer onboard USS BENFOLD (DDG 65) in the Western Pacific. His publications have previously appeared in USNI’s Proceedings and CIMSEC.
LCDR JR Dinglasan currently serves as the IAMD WTI course of instruction (COI) lead at the Surface Advanced Warfighting School (SAWS), Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC). He recently completed his second department head tour as the Combat Systems Officer aboard USS BENFOLD (DDG 65). He is a graduate of the surface warfare community’s IAMD WTI COI and previously served at SMWDC as an advanced tactical training planner and as the lead instructor/tactics developer for Standard Missile-6 surface warfare (SUW) tactical employment.
References
1. Captain Wayne P. Hughs Jr. and RADM Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition, U.S. Naval Institute Press, xxi, 2019.
4. This proposal is designed around an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer, as the US Navy’s most common surface combatant. Other watchstations, like a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Planner on an LCS or Air Defense Warfare Coordinator (ADWC) on an LPD, could also be excellent candidates.
Featured Image: NAVAL STATION ROTA, Spain (Dec. 6, 2021) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) departs Naval Station Rota, Spain, Dec. 6, 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andrea Rumple/Released)
The “Star Wars” franchise continues to build and expand into its 46th year of impact on American and global culture, science fiction and, in some cases, scientific fact. The “wars” side of the story, however, has not always been as accurate as perhaps possible. Hero and villain commanders alike, including General Obi wan Kenobi, Darth Vader, and others are more tactical warriors fighting with lightsabers, lasers, and individual strike fighter spacecraft. Tactical planning for space combat such as the briefing scene for the attack on the first Death Star in Episode IV, A New Hope (the original movie), has a World War II movie fleet of pilots in a ready room, and the space fighter combat that follows of a similar vintage. The great star fleets of Star Destroyers, Rebellion ships, Republic and Separatist ships, and the latest series of films with First Order and New republic warships, is mostly backdrop for character dialogue and decision rather than decisive military planning and action.
The “admirals” of these formations (Ackbar, Holdo, and Piett) are mostly tactical fighters, although the unfortunate Admiral Ozzel from The Empire Strikes Back receives the ultimate punishment from Darth Vader for a low-level poor operational decision (dropping out of light speed too early and alerting the Rebels to a system-wide Imperial attack). Grand Moff Tarkin is the originator of the so-called “Tarkin Doctrine” that advocates a counter-insurgency plan based on terror and retribution using the first Death Star and the Imperial fleet, but that seems more the province of a Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy rather than distinct military operation.
One Star Wars leader, however, stands out as an operational-level war planner and strategist. Grand Admiral Thrawn, the blue-skin humanoid leader of Imperial forces in the wake of the death of Emperor Palpatine, Darth Vader, and thousands of Imperial soldiers and naval personnel in the battle of the Endor moon, seems the one Star Wars character with War College training and mastery of all levels of war. Created by author Timothy Zahn as a composite of historical military leaders, Thrawn is a multi-dimensional character closer to the modern senior military leader than the rest of the one-dimensional, cartoon-like heroes and villains of the Star Wars saga. Zahn described Thrawn as a quite different kind of villain, stating in 2017 that
“Most of the Imperial leaders we see in the movies rule through a combination of fear and manipulation. I wanted to create something different: a commander who could lead through loyalty. The result was Thrawn, a tactical genius whose troops follow him willingly, and who will fight for him whether or not he’s watching over their shoulders.”
A Star Wars Character with a Career Record
Timothy Zahn’s books on the blue-skinned, red-eyed humanoid admiral detail his discovery by an imperial patrol, and his career as essentially an Imperial surface warfare officer, and then a Joint Force commander. Thrawn attends the premier Imperial Naval Academy, and commands increasingly larger and more capable warships across his career up to Star Destroyer size. Along the way, he confronts bigotry, as the Empire is described as somewhat racist and biased in favor of humans over the aliens that make up a large part of the Galactic realm.
Thrawn is an admirable junior officer who speaks the truth to his superiors. He takes risks but involves his subordinates as a team to get results. He successfully fights pirates as a senior Lieutenant and is promoted to the position of executive officer of a light cruiser (a medium-sized imperial warship.) Thrawn performs well in tactical combat. His ship is damaged in a sophisticated drone attack, but he analyzes the attack pattern and destroys the drones. He is again promoted and given command of the cruiser. After more success in fighting rebels and pirates, he is promoted to command a larger Star Destroyer, and after more success, the equivalent of a carrier strike group command (built around a Star Destroyer and its escorts) and later a Fleet Command with multiple capital ships. While his career progression is considered rapid in the books, it is definable and in line with what one would expect for a senior naval leader.
Tactical Prowess
Thrawn is a tactical expert, proficient in the tactical tools of both the Galactic Empire and the Rebellion. He combines these tactical skills in the maneuvering and combat of starships with operational intelligence on his opponents that includes everything from the ship types and weapons to cultural strengths and weaknesses. Legendary naval tactics expert Captain Wayne Hughes said, “To know tactics, know technology.” Thrawn knows the technological capabilities of his force and combines these with cultural knowledge, what the Naval War College calls “intangible” factors, to achieve tactical overmatch like Air Force tactics expert Colonel John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop process.
While Boyd’s scheme was purely based on technologically driven air combat, Thrawn’ s use of intangible knowledge further expands his use of the OODA loop to get even further ahead of his opponents. For example, in an engagement with New Republic forces after returning to take command of the post-Battle of Endor imperial remnant, Thrawn conducts an unorthodox maneuver of his flagship against attacking New Republic ships that his fleet captain predicts will be easily understood and countered. What the Captain does not understand is that Thrawn has made a study of the planetary home world of the Republic commander and knows that that species fears radical change to the point where they are unable to effectively react in a timely matter. Thrawn’ s tactical maneuver confounds the Republic ships and allows him to gain advantage in the decision cycle which results in their defeat. Had Thrawn maneuvered as if he were facing an imperial opponent with the same knowledge base, and mirror-imaged his opponent, he might not have been successful. The combination of Hughes tactical knowledge, Boyd OODA Loop framework, and avoidance of assuming that opponents would act as he would empower Thrawn as a superb tactical operator.
Operational and Strategic Commander
U.S. Naval War College Graphic Showing a Military Center of Gravity.
At the end of the first Thrawn book, one sees the newly minted Flag Officer Thrawn conduct a system-wide campaign against the nascent forces of the rebellion with the Imperial equivalent of a U.S. Navy carrier strike group. Thrawn quickly identifies the “military center of gravity” of the operation as a group of planetary defense weapons protected by an impenetrable shield. He gathers intelligence on the defenses to determine that the weapons are fully effective. Thrawn first employs deception and maneuver, using his Star Destroyer’s escorts as a decoy to distract his opponent and gain knowledge of his opponents’ weapons and weaknesses, while his flagship remains out of range of planetary weapons. Then Thrawn uses what War College curriculum would call “enabling fires” onto the rebel planet’s oceans, with resulting tidal waves that cause electrical casualties to his opponent’s weapon systems and shields. With their force protection measures neutralized, the rebel garrison is forced to surrender or face direct fire from Thrawn’ s battle group. This is just the beginning of a sector-wide operation by Thrawn to eliminate the rebel threat in the sector and restore safe passage for imperial trade. The Imperial Admiral also employs intangibles aspects of center of gravity analysis through decisive leadership of his own forces and estimating his opponent’s culminating point being the destruction of the energy shield by the tidal waves.
Thrawn finally comes into his own as a strategic commander with his return from the so-called “unknown regions” in the wake of the Imperial collapse following the defeat at the Battle of Endor and the deaths of Emperor Palpatine, Darth Vader, Admiral Piett, and many other senior imperial leaders in the disastrous engagement. Thrawn re-organized the Imperial remnant as a striking force, sought disruptive technologies that would limit Jedi communication powers, and identified the center of gravity of New Republic forces as a strategic shipyard and warships it produced still waiting to be delivered. The Republic victory at this engagement (Battle of Sluis Van) only comes from a lack of Imperial jamming that the Republic exploits to turn imperial uncrewed platforms against the ships they were trying to capture. Mass takeover of combat platforms through essentially hacking them is a common science fiction element, appearing more recently in the opening episode of the Battlestar Galactic reboot of the 2000s. While Thrawn’ s planning displayed sound operational art, the knowledge of technology and networks is essential for both attack and defense. The U.S. military’s own desire to manage mass uncrewed system operations could benefit from a review of science fiction.
Thrawn Lessons Learned
Grand Admiral Thrawn eventually goes down to defeat, stabbed in the back by his own bodyguard, a sad fate for such a talented strategist, operational planner, and tactician. He remains, however, the most believable, senior military commander in the Star Wars universe and a cut above other officers such as the hapless Admiral Ozzel, Darth Vader’s subordinate Admiral Piett, and the rebel/New Republic commanders like Admirals Ackbar and Holdo who act primarily as tactical commanders. The character of Thrawn offers some useful examples of exceptional operational planning and tactical execution for military planners and wargamers to follow. One can hope that the forthcoming TV appearance of the blue-skinned imperial commander will be as inspiring as the literary versions of his persona.
Popular culture does not always offer significant military lessons, but the Grand Admiral Thrawn character possesses tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war skills worth emulation by the U.S. armed forces. Thrawn’ s command of technology enables his tactical success. His meticulous planning and execution of complex operations echo Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke’s statement that there is genius in diligence. Finally, Thrawn’ s ability to see multiple operations in progress through to conclusion reflects his skill in grand strategy. Thrawn does not raise his voice, use expletives, or “force choke” his subordinates, but mentors them and freely shares his own thoughts and wisdom. Thrawn seeks to understand his opponents’ goals and methodology through their art and culture, and often uses this understanding to gain operational and tactical advantage.
Yes, Thrawn is a villain, and his objectives are often cruel, but that said, his fictional campaigns are worthy of study. As further proof of this applicability, see Strategy Strikes Back, a collection of essays that examines real warfare through a Star Wars lens. While focused on tactics, the book by the same name from legendary fleet tactics expert Captain Wayne Hughes is another useful tool through which to understand what Thrawn attempts to do in the books. Hughes suggests that operational doctrine is the “glue of tactics,” and Thrawn’s own doctrine emerges across the book series as one that uses a mix of technology, maneuver, and application of fires from unlikely locations to achieve tactical and campaign-level success in the books. The Thrawn Trilogy series itself details the admiral’s full career, and readers can explore in depth Thrawn’s operational planning skills across multiple campaigns. In a world where many may not know the great strategists of history, Thrawn may be a good start in getting more young people interested in strategy, operations, and tactical thinking.
Dr. Steven Wills currently serves as a Navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the United States. He is an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy and U.S. Navy surface warfare programs and platforms. After retiring from the Navy in 2010, he completed a master’s and a Ph.D. in History with a concentration on Military History at Ohio University, graduating in 2017. He is the author of Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning, published by Naval Institute Press in July 2021 and, with former Navy Secretary John Lehman, Where are the Carriers? U.S. National Strategy and the Choices Ahead, published by Foreign Policy Research Institute in August 2021. Wills also holds a master’s in National Security Studies from the U.S. Naval War College and a bachelor’s in History from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.
Featured Image: Grand Admiral Thrawn as he Appears in the New Disney “Ahsoka” series played by actor Lars Mikkelsen (credit: Disney+).
Will unmanned forces transform naval campaigning? Given recent events following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, maritime transformation appears to be well underway. Autonomous and semi-autonomous aircraft and surface vessels have damaged or destroyed Russian surface combatants, air defense systems, and supply depots. Land warfare also has seen its share of innovative applications of autonomous and semi-autonomous technology, from swarming drone attacks against urban areas to single hand grenades precisely dropped on lone soldiers in slit trenches dug into the Ukrainian steppe. One could also point to recent press reports about a flurry of drone activity across the U.S. Navy. In September 2023, two unmanned surface vessels sailed from Hawaii to participate in exercises with Carrier Strike Group 1 in the Western Pacific, while the Navy’s Task Force 59 based in Bahrain has become the de facto U.S. Navy drone innovation center with its ongoing experimentation with small autonomous vessels as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.1 The Navy needs to consider how else it can leverage unmanned systems in campaigns, and how these systems can open up unique options for enhancing naval campaigns in pursuit of deterrence.
Doubts About Drones
Despite mounting evidence drawn from recent battlefield experience and enthusiastic recognition of the growing effectiveness of these systems, Navy officers are still expressing reservations about the impact of drones in the maritime domain, especially in the western Pacific.2 They note, for instance, that the Navy is already stretched to the breaking point by the effort to maintain and supply its existing manned surface fleet and that it cannot create the infrastructure needed to support hundreds of medium sized and large autonomous surface vessels in the relatively short time envisioned by current shipbuilding plans. Others suggest that the weapons payload carried by most drones is too small to create more than a nuisance. Instead of a five-pound warhead, a one-thousand-pound warhead would be more appropriate when it comes to disabling a major surface combatant. Unmanned systems also need a range of thousands, not hundreds, of miles to operate in the Pacific. Drones may have requirements that make them more of a liability than an asset in a contested Pacific, such as drones with limited battery life, or that have to be transported and deployed within reach of sophisticated adversary systems, or drones that require weeks of lead time to be moved into operational areas, or that create windows of vulnerability when they need to be retrieved or serviced in the battlespace. A semi-autonomous drone armed with a Hellfire missile might in fact be the perfect weapon to end Ayman al-Zawahiri’s retirement in downtown Kabul, but using an autonomous weapon to hit a modern multi-mission warship on the high seas is another matter.3
Who has it right, the optimists or the pessimists? They both are correct, which creates an “innovation paradox” that was recently addressed by a survey of past efforts at maritime innovation. Vincent O’Hara and Leonard Heinz looked at the operational history surrounding the introduction of mines, the automobile torpedo, radio, radar, submarines, and aircraft from about the turn of the 19th century to World War II.4 Their analysis suggests that the process of innovation and weaponization is a moving target that is shaped by the maturity of the technology involved, tactical and operational considerations, strategy, doctrine, organizational acceptance of new weapons and platforms, and the countermeasures possessed by the opponent. Innovation also is slowed by the fact that significant warfare at sea is mercifully rare.
Without the only test that really matters – battle itself – it is difficult for visionaries to assess the capabilities created by their new weapons against likely opponents and countermeasures. What O’Hara and Heinz discovered is that myriad considerations, which are often circumstantial, transitory, or linked to shortcomings in ancillary systems or doctrine, can limit the performance and impact of new weapons. “Successful” innovations do not spring forth spontaneously, but involve a process of refinement and maturation that can take decades to produce an effective weapon, regardless of the enthusiasm surrounding the new technology or system.
O’Hara and Heinze suggest that the assessment of the future role and impact of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems has more to do with psychology than technology. There is a shared collective bias in viewing technology as a “full up round,” so to speak, not a work in progress.5 There is a tendency to extrapolate from successful evolutions observed in the skies above Kabul or the waters off Crimea and to expect the same results in the western Pacific. There also is a tendency to treat technology as a weapon, and to treat new weapons as silver bullets – a one-size-fits-all solution to whatever the opponent might bring to bear.6 Or in the words of Hiliare Belloc, “whatever happens, we have got the Maxim, and they do not.”7
By contrast, to be effective, technology must be subjected to a process of weaponization, where it is integrated into an existing strategy, force structure, doctrine, and logistical scheme. It also is helpful if the officers charged with operating these new weapons understand the science behind them, how they work, and the limits of their performance, instead of first confronting their knowledge deficit at the worst possible time – in battle. Recent descriptions of the night naval battles off Guadalcanal, for example, paint a disturbing picture of officers who did not understand the limits of their radar or how to exploit its advantages. Some of them did not even understand the nature of the information that was being collected and displayed by their new sensors.8 It cannot be assumed that naval forces will always know how to fight with the technology they are equipped with, and that includes capability that has existed in fleets for much longer than drones.
Overcoming the Innovation Paradox: Integrating the Sea Hunter into a Naval Campaign
Treating innovation as a component of campaigning – the conduct and sequencing of logically linked military initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined strategy-aligned priorities over time – offers a promising way of taming the innovation paradox. It increases the likelihood that new weapons can be used to meet operational and strategic objectives. To be more specific, how can the Sea-Hunter unmanned surface vessel be integrated into campaigns in the Western Pacific?
The campaign would begin by acknowledging that the U.S. has adopted a strategy of deterrence based on denial, where in the event of deterrence failure, U.S. forces will focus on preventing the opponent from achieving their objectives. The goal of a deterrence strategy is not to engage in conflict, but to preserve the peace, prevent some unwanted fait accompli, and to ensure that change occurs through democratic and rules-based processes. Indeed, the outbreak of hostilities would represent a failure of strategy, a complete failure of the U.S. military to deter conflict, and a political and humanitarian catastrophe, forcing the nation to engage in an unwanted war. So how can a campaign using Sea Hunter strengthen deterrence, and in the unfortunate event of deterrence failure, how can the campaign be used to deny the opponent their objectives?
The Sea Hunter could be quickly integrated into the fleet by creating many hybrid (crewed and uncrewed) surface action groups. The Sea Hunters might serve several roles – as decoys, as ISR platforms, or as carriers of containerized weapons as a cost-effective way to increase firepower. The precise mission force mix is a technical or operational matter, best left to operators to resolve after they are informed by analysis. Organizing a campaign around such deployments would strengthen deterrence in several ways. First, as they are deployed and undergo the process of integration into the fleet, they will create a dynamic problem for the opponent. Instead of a static force posture that barely changes year to year, operations that feature experimentation with Sea Hunter can complicate an opponent’s planning, reducing their confidence in various schemes to use surprise or novel military evolutions to earn a fait accompli.9 Efforts to bolster deterrence create a “reveal-conceal” issue, that is, how much capability should be revealed to bolster deterrence and how much capability should be concealed to bolster warfighting effectiveness in the wake of deterrence failure. Resolving this issue could even be undertaken with a campaign philosophy – new capabilities might be revealed from time to time to keep the opponent off balance or during a crisis to reduce the opponent’s confidence in their existing military preparations.
Second, the Sea Hunter can bolster the credibility of the maritime deterrent threat by increasing the survivability of the fleet’s second-strike capability, a force that takes on especially outsized importance if U.S. strategy fails in the Pacific.10 Because conventional deterrent threats are “contestable,” that is, the opponent has a say when it comes to their execution, steps must be taken to win the battle of the opening salvo.11 In other words, because the United States embraces a deterrence strategy, it is unlikely it will fire the first shot in a conflict, which would bring about the war Washington wants to avoid in the first place. A deterrence strategy must envision a way to defeat or misdirect an opponent’s effort to fire effectively first.
Here the Sea Hunter’s ability to act as a decoy provides an important, even strategic capability to the fleet. A decoy could exhibit the signatures of larger combatants and posture itself in such a way that it complicates the opponent’s planning and misdirects its opening salvo. Decisions about concealing or revealing capabilities become crucial in this regard. The ability to lead the opponent to activate sensors, fire, reveal their position, and miss will constitute a significant tactical success if deterrence fails. It can also make for a strategic success if aggressive designs are revealed by an opening strike on unmanned systems that the adversary believed were warships filled with thousands of sailors. Instilling in the opponent’s mind the idea that the previous sequence of events is a distinct possibility would also do much to increase the survivability of conventional second-strike forces, thereby increasing the overall credibility and effectiveness of U.S. deterrence strategy.
Conclusion
The way forward is clear. Strategists and tacticians cannot simply take existing autonomous and semi-autonomous systems and operations that were successful in past battles, transfer them to a new geo-strategic setting, and expect to achieve the same results. Instead, the process of weaponization must continue by developing new applications of autonomous and semi-autonomous technologies to solve specific problems at hand. Solving this force development problem and devising war winning strategies is especially difficult when it comes to new technology.12 In other words, the chances of successful innovation increase if new weapons are integrated into a campaign to achieve tactical and operational goals that contribute to overall strategic and political objectives. There is no doubt that the promise of new autonomous technologies is growing. Nevertheless, their successful application requires the active participation of those who will have to employ new systems and weapons at sea. Planners also must abandon the perennial quest to produce war-winning “silver bullets” and instead focus on developing systems that provide modest advantages and cost-effectiveness at the margins, such as autonomous weapons that cost less than their intended targets or possible counters.
With these criteria in mind, several missions could be quickly undertaken by drones in the Western Pacific. For instance, the resilient and expendable ISR platforms under development by Task Force 59 could be adapted to monitor areas of interest across the Western Pacific. Data collected would help improve maritime domain awareness, enriching the information available to improve indications and warning intelligence. Better warning could increase the survivability of U.S. forces while decreasing the prospects that the opponent might be able to launch a successful fait accompli by providing the time necessary for U.S. units to posture toward some point of contention.
None of the applications mentioned are especially creative. They constitute little challenge to the state of the technological art. None hold out the prospect of becoming a silver bullet. Nevertheless, they all can bolster deterrence in the Western Pacific, but only if Navy officers embrace the process of weaponizing unmanned systems seriously by devising novel campaigns to overcome challenges and achieve strategic objectives in the Western Pacific.
James J. Wirtz is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is the co-author of The US Navy and the Rise of Great Power Competition (Routledge 2024) and War, Peace and International Relations 3rd edition (Routledge 2024).
References
1. Sam LaGrone, 2 Navy Ghost Fleet Unmanned Ships Now in the Western Pacific,” USNI News September 21, 2023 https://news.usni.org/2023/09/21/2-navy-ghost-fleet-unmanned-ships-now-in-the-western-pacific; Sam Dagher, “US Planning More ‘Robots at Sea’ in Middle East to Combat Iran,” PMN Business May 5, 2023. https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/us-planning-more-robots-at-sea-in-middle-east-to-combat-iran
2. As Colin Gray repeatedly noted, recent battlefield experience provides evidence that is ignored at great peril because battle “is the only test that counts.” Nevertheless, observers have to still asses if recent experience is relevant in a future setting. See Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 19.
3. Jim Garamone, “U.S. Drone Strike Kills al-Qaida Leader in Kabul,” DOD News August 22, 2022. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3114362/us-drone-strike-kills-al-qaida-leader-in-kabul/
4. Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz, Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2022).
5. Jeffrey E. Kline, James A. Russell, and James J. Wirtz, “The US Navy’s Generational Challenge,” Survival Vol. 64, Issue 4, 2022, pp. 123-136.
6. James J. Wirtz, “A Strategists Guide to Disruptive Innovation,” Military Strategy Magazine Vol. 8, Iss.4 Spring 2023, pp. 4-9/
7. Hilaire Belloc, The Modern Traveller (London: EArnold, 1998). N.p.
8. Vincent P. O’Hara and Trent Hone, Fighting in the Dark: Naval Combat at Night 1904-1944 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2023).
9. James J. Wirtz, “Theory of Surprise” in Richard K. Betts and Thomas Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 101-116.
10. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234.
11. James J. Wirtz, “How Does Nuclear Deterrence differ from Conventional Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2018, pp. 58-75.
12. James J. Wirtz, “Winning Left of Battle: The Role of Analysis,” Military Strategy Magazine Vol. 7, Issue 4, Winter 2022, pp. 4-8.
Featured Image: (Oct. 31, 2018) Sea Hunter drone pictured in Pearl Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo)
Integrated naval campaigning refers to a series of operations aiming to achieve strategic and operational objectives through military, diplomatic, and non-military activities.1 Such a naval campaign encompasses multiple domains and the integrated approach features joint and interagency partners of the U.S. government.2 As emphasized in the U.S. National Defense Strategy of 2022, there is a requirement for an integrated approach to gain military advantage, enhance deterrence, and address gray zone challenge.
The demand for U.S Navy engagement in the Indo-Pacific region is stronger than at any time in the preceding three decades.3 Such urgency is well-understood upon the assumption that that the naval dominance of the U.S. Navy paves the ability of the U.S. to project joint power globally. As integrated naval campaigning in the Indo-Pacific region gains traction, the U.S. Navy’s role in deterrence by denial encourages it to focus on countering gray zone operations. Therefore to achieve national objectives, the U.S. Navy requires new fleet-wide operational and campaigning concepts to compete with the gray zone activity of competitors.
The geostrategic situation in the Bay of Bengal reflects the need for a concept of integrated naval campaigning in support of a rules-based Indo-Pacific. The significance of this maritime zone is looming larger in the strategic calculus of the Indo-Pacific region and has become a central arena for gray zone competition, especially between Indian and Chinese maritime forces.4 The gray zone competition entrenched in the Bay of Bengal has long preceded the recent calls for integrated campaigning from U.S. forces.
The Bay of Bengal is a key maritime zone of interest and influence for the U.S. Navy to promote regional security and rules-based order through campaigning. The Bay is a key geographic crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean through which extensive maritime traffic transits, making the competition over rules-based order especially salient. The gray zone activities in the Bay of Bengal demand specific attention from the U.S. Navy, and will demand operational innovation and partnership-building specifically tailored to the complexities of the local gray zone competition. These efforts will serve the U.S Navy well in informing its broader campaigning throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s Gray Zone Campaign in the Bay of Bengal: Appraising the Situation
The term ‘gray zone’ first started to appear in the policy documents of Japan and the United States.5 Gray zone situations can refer to almost anything below the threshold of high-intensity military conflict, or a large variety of non-military means of competition. It is fundamental to any gray zone situation that the adversary country deliberately extends its gray zone efforts to achieve enough coercive power to undermine the target state’s sovereign control. In the case of targeting littoral states, this can include impeding rightful economic exploitation, hampering the use of maritime zones for safe passage, and other unfair manipulations of norms in the maritime domain.6 In other words, the adversary country utilizes gray zone activities to assert their maritime interests at the expense of other states and the broader norms of the maritime system.7 In comparison to high-end military operations, any gray zone situation naturally belongs to the low-end spectrum of warfare.8 Gray zone campaigns can also seek to inflict long-term political and military costs, facilitate a favorable reinterpretation of the situation with respect to public opinion, and a gradual change of circumstances and behavior in favor of the adversary country’s policy preferences.9
The significance of the Bay of Bengal is looming larger in the maritime calculus of the Indo-Pacific region.10 The geostrategic importance of the Bay of Bengal11 as a critical maritime crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean has serious implications12 for China’s multi-pronged ambitions towards shaping global governance.13 Mainly from the 1980s, China has been deepening relationships with the Bay’s littoral states and pulling those countries into economic and military partnerships.14
China’s ceaseless endeavor to penetrate into the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka has been a maritime security challenge to rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Over recent decades, these littoral states have depended on China for economic, military, and infrastructure development. China has constructed ports, roads, pipelines, and railway tracts in these littoral states. Developing maritime infrastructure and facilitating economic dependencies in littoral states function as critical enablers for China’s gray zone campaign in the Bay of Bengal.
China’s economic relations with these littoral states have raised two concerns, namely the potential use of infrastructure for enhancing China’s military access in the region, and China earning significant political leverage over the decision-making of those countries, to the detriment of democracy and the rule of law. In recent years, such hegemonic influence has acquired a more virulent form. For example, when ASEAN announced its outlook policy on the Indo-Pacific, some littoral states in the Bay of Bengal opted for a cautionary reaction, likely reflecting how China would prefer they receive the policy declaration. The littoral states of this region are also reluctant to clarify their observations towards integrated deterrence in the Bay of Bengal.15 For example, in Bangladesh’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific strategy, there lacks any integrated deterrence measures and maritime security objectives in the Bay of Bengal.16
For many littoral states of the Bay of Bengal, China is the major supplier of military hardware.17 A key example is Bangladesh’s recent operationalization of the country’s only submarine base, BNS Sheikh Hasina, constructed with Chinese financial and technical assistance. Bangladesh also acquired China’s modern VT5 light tank. Thailand has signed deals with China to acquire surface warships and submarines for its navies.18 Myanmar’s airstrip extensions and construction of aviation hangers on the Great Coco Island suggests Chinese involvement and potential uses for maritime surveillance.19 Furthermore, China’s involvement in developing infrastructure in these countries points to a strategy of facilitating a long-term presence in the Bay of Bengal, as well as laying steppingstones for blue water activities in the broader Indian Ocean.20
Chinese Survey Vessels in the Gray Zone Campaign: Pruning Hooks into Spears
There are three broad categories of Chinese gray zone operations in the Bay of Bengal. These include its development of maritime infrastructure, oceanographic survey vessel activity, and undersea operations. In particular, the frequent activity of Chinese oceanographic survey vessels over the past few years are a key indicator that China is seeking a better understanding of the undersea environment in the Bay of Bengal. These activities pave the way for submarine operations, which encourage a comprehensive understanding of water currents, seabed topography, and seasonal variation of the maritime environment.21,22 This data on undersea conditions is also useful for understanding how submarine stealth will fare in the area.23 With respect to gray zone campaigns, submarine and subsurface assets provide multiple advantages, including creeping coercion and operational uncertainty for targeted states.24
Several Chinese oceanographic vessels have been at the forefront of this effort. The Shi Yan 1 was used in the Indian exclusive economic zone adjacent to the Andaman Nicobar Islands.25 The Xiang Yang Hong 06 conducted joint scientific surveys in the territorial sea of Myanmar in February 2020.26 This same oceanographic survey vessel, prior to the Myanmar visit, conducted research on the seabed of Sri Lanka’s territorial sea.27 In select offshore zones of Bangladesh, Chinese survey ships conducted 2D seismic survey projects.28
In pursuing gray zone activities in the Bay of Bengal, these Chinese survey vessels repeat common operational patterns. First, these maritime research vessels, some of which have ballistic missile and satellite tracking capability, seek clearance for replenishment purposes, to be conducted at littoral state infrastructure.29 These survey vessels also often switch off their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders, which makes it difficult to track their locations and activities.30 After coming under international pressure Sri Lanka sought to delay a port visit by China’s Yuan Wang 5 ballistic missile and satellite tracking ship, but China applied pressure and was able to get the decision reversed. Sri Lanka allowed the ship to dock with certain stipulations, including having the ship keep its AIS transponder on.31, 32, 33
Workers wave the Chinese and Sri Lankan national flags upon the arrival of China’s research and survey vessel, the Yuanwang-5 at Hambantota port, Sri Lanka on August 16, 2022. (Photo via VCG)
It is worth drawing particular attention to the Indian Navy’s efforts at maritime domain awareness in the Bay of Bengal, since it is complementary to the U.S. Navy’s goals and the integrated campaign approach required for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Center for the Indian Ocean Region exchanges information and facilitates communication with select partners.34 The littoral states of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar are among the partners in this security collaboration structure.35 The Indian Navy’s deployment of coastal surveillance radar systems in Bangladesh,36 Sri Lanka, and Myanmar highlights not only its proactive efforts37 in addressing gray zone situations,38 but also its concern about the growing competitiveness of Chinese gray zone operations. A salient feature of the surveillance system is that the system can quickly detect, locate, and monitor movements of dhows and vessels in any given surveilled area.39
Because of these surveillance assets in particular, the Indian Navy would be a useful partner for the U.S. Navy in a Bay of Bengal integrated naval campaign to counter China’s gray zone activity.40 To compete with China’s gray zone operations, it is vital for the U.S. Navy to form regional partnership with the navies and coast guards of littoral states and improve their capabilities.41 But the U.S. Navy mostly focuses its operations in the vicinity of East Asian littoral states, leaving much to be desired in the waters west of Malacca.42
China’s Undersea Strategy in the Bay of Bengal
The frequent operations of Chinese submarines and oceanographic survey vessels in the Bay of Bengal, the increased detection and protests by the Indian Navy, and Sri Lanka’s replenishment of Chinese vessels highlight a complex gray zone situation in the Bay of Bengal. The situation may be even more complex than previously thought due to the hidden nature of Chinese submarine operations in the area.
Prior to 2010, there was little evidence of Chinese submarine operations in the Bay of Bengal. However, the situation appeared to change in 2014 when a Type 039 Song-class diesel-electric attack submarine berthed at the Sri Lankan port of Colombo twice: from September 7-14 and from October 31- November 6.43 The Song class is much quieter than its predecessors due to its seven-bladed propeller, and the combat and command systems of the submarine are upgraded versions of the systems aboard the Type 035 Ming-class submarine.44
Considering the similarity between Type 039 and Type 035 classes, it is noteworthy that China sold two Type 035 G Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh45 in 2016, and a B-variant Ming-class submarine to Myanmar46 in 2021. China’s submarine deals with Bangladesh and Myanmar have paved the way for Chinese submarine crews to be posted to these nations for training purposes.47 These deals allow the Chinese Navy to gradually increase the presence of its personnel and Chinese-sourced hardware in the Bay of Bengal’s littoral states, which increase the competitiveness of its gray zone strategy.
These developments should be a source of concern for the U.S. Navy’s integrated naval campaign against gray zone operations. China’s undersea operations challenge the maritime domain awareness architecture covering the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral states have relatively little in the way of anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Chinese submarine presence is therefore acutely felt in this region, even if it cannot be precisely perceived. The U.S. Navy could provide vital expertise in enhancing awareness of the undersea domain and conducting anti-submarine warfare operations.
How the U.S. Navy can Lead an Integrated Campaign against Gray Zone Challenges
The present-day top leadership of the U.S. Navy views this decade as a decisive one and requires that the Navy improve itself as a self-assessing, self-correcting, and always learning organization to deliver warfighting advantage.48 The leadership of the U.S. Navy understands the importance of changing skillsets and culture in relation to the competition.49 The U.S Navy, in many of its warfighting skillsets and operations, focuses on competing in the low-end spectrum of operations.50 This reflects an appropriate calculation of risk when it comes to allocating focus toward more likely challenges to be encountered in the operating environment, when the competition is staying below the threshold of war.51,52
The U.S. Navy needs to focus on effective gray zone counters that emphasize prompt and precise responses. However, the challenges to gray zone competitiveness are multifaceted and include the cost of providing physical naval presence, as well as managing the competition over regional narratives that frequently accompany gray zone campaigns. Therefore the U.S Navy cannot confront gray zone operations alone. It must integrate with the partner navies of the littoral states of the Indo-Pacific region.53 These partner navies must also take the initiative themselves to understand the U.S. Navy’s perspectives and capacities to influence the gray zone competition in the Bay of Bengal, and develop options for working together through an integrated campaign.
In the post-Cold War decades, the U.S. Navy partnered with the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal for the purposes of promoting shared interests and engaging in naval capacity building, including through bilateral and multilateral exercises. Through the Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET), the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Malabar Exercise, the U.S. Navy has helped regional navies support maritime security and maritime domain awareness in the Bay of Bengal. Given this history of cooperation, the U.S. Navy is poised to take the lead on formulating an integrated naval campaign for the Bay of Bengal. The substance of these exercises and their focus areas can be adjusted to better fit the gray zone challenges these partner nations are facing from China.
Bay of Bengal (April 14, 2012) The Indian navy guided-missile corvette INS Kulish (P63), top, and the Indian navy frigate INS Satpura (F48), bottom, and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) are underway in formation during Exercise Malabar 2012. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class James R. Evans/Released)
The Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) event is a four-week long exercise where U.S. Naval Special Warfare and the U.S. Special Forces units train regional littoral navies to enhance their combat readiness and maritime crisis response tactics.54 The CARAT event is a military-to-military bilateral exercise designed to highlight the ability of both the U.S. Navy and the regional littoral navy (e.g., Bangladesh) to reiterate shared concepts on maritime security, stability, and prosperity. The collaborative initiative of CARAT is conducted at two phases: ashore and at sea.55 The sea phase of the CARAT includes at least three exercises suitable to gray zone situations.56 First, the cooperative ability to track and pursue targets together through the coordinated deployment of surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft (i.e., navigation and tactical maneuvers). Second, bridge simulations designed to practice navigation maneuvering within proximity to other vessels.57 Third, screening proficiency exercises to defend ships from potential threats.
The Malabar exercise is an Indo-Pacific military interoperability exercise which encompasses two phases.58 The first phase includes air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and replenishment-at-sea between ships, whereas the second phase of Malabar involves mobile anti-submarine training target exercise, cross-deck helicopter operations, and surface gunnery exercises.59 Each of these skillsets are relevant to gray zone operations, particularly kinetic exchanges at the low-end spectrum of warfare, and monitoring undersea activity. In 2021, the U.S. Navy hosted the second phase of Malabar in the Bay of Bengal. It is also relevant to mention that the Malabar exercise was first conducted in 1992 as a bilateral exercise between the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy, with more than 27 iterations since then.60 As the exercise series continues, it can consistently update its content to ensure it enhances capabilities that are most relevant to the nature of the regional competition.
Conclusion
The presence of the U.S. Navy is waning in comparison to a Chinese navy, coast guard, and maritime militia that is rapidly growing and becoming more aggressive.61 Therefore an effective integrated naval campaign is not something that can be implemented solely by the U.S. Navy or a partner fleet. Rather, integrated campaigning demands the active participation of all Indo-Pacific stakeholders that are interested in enhancing rules-based order in the maritime domain.
The strategic visions of the U.S Navy envision greater cooperation with international partner navies.62 The U.S. Navy should identify how to increase collaboration to bolster deterrence and effectively compete below the threshold of war. It is imperative to formulate a shared framework for early diagnosis and prompt reaction to any prospective gray zone activities.63 Operational cooperation between the U.S Navy and the regional navies of the Bay of Bengal can be a regular matter of discussion to sort out shared maritime security challenges, and develop an integrated campaign that can competitively advance rules-based order.64
Mohammad Rubaiyat Rahman is a Teaching Assistant at the University of Texas at El Paso. He is a subject matter expert in maritime security, irregular migration, counterinsurgency (COIN), and border disputes with a concentration in the Indo-Pacific region. He contributed as a reviewer at the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, a professional journal of the U.S. Department of Air Force, andCoastal Management (Taylor & Francis, 2022). He has published in the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Journal of Territorial & Maritime Studies, and the Diplomat. He has presented papers at the Asian Society of International Law, National University of Singapore, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology.
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[2] Ibid.
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[8] Ibid, p. 55.
[9] Ibid.
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[23] Ibid.
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[45] Rahman, ‘Kilo Impact in the Bay of Bengal’.
[46] Xavier Vavasseur. ‘Myanmar Commissions Type 035 B Ming-Class Submarine from China’. Naval News. December 27, 2021. URL: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/12/myanmar-commissions-type-35b-ming-class-submarine-from-china/ (Accessed on November 2, 2023).
[47] Captain Ariful Haque. ‘Next-Generation ISR Dominance: Accelerate Change or Lose Bangladesh’ Wild Blue Yonder. October 27, 2022. URL: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/3198619/next-generation-isr-dominance-accelerate-change-or-lose-bangladesh/#_edn16 (Accessed on November 6, 2023).
[48] Admiral Lisa Franchetti, ‘Message to the fleet’, August 23, 2023, url: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23917551/nav23188.pdf (accessed on October 25, 2023).
[49] Ibid.
[50] Dmitry Filipoff, ‘A fleet adrift: The mounting risking of the U.S. Navy’s Force Development’. CIMSEC, February 13, 2023. URL: https://cimsec.org/a-fleet-adrift-the-mounting-risks-of-the-u-s-navys-force-development/ (accessed on October 22, 2023).
[51] Dmitry Filipoff, ‘Organizing for training and experimentation’ in Learning to Win: Using operational innovation to regain the advantage at sea against China (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2022), p. 21.
[52] Ibid, p. 32.
[53] Lt Commanders Andrew Kramer and Martin Schroeder, U.S. Navy. 2020. “The Navy Needs a Gray-Zone Strategy”. The U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 146/6/1, 408; available at url: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/june/navy-needs-gray-zone-strategy (accessed on 25 October 2023).
[54] U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh. ‘U.S. Navy Concludes training with Bangladesh Navy’. News & Events. November 10, 2022. URL: https://bd.usembassy.gov/28790/ (Accessed on: November 5, 2023).
[55] U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh. ‘U.S.-Bangladesh Navy Commence CARAT Exercise’. News & Event. November 5, 2018. URL: https://bd.usembassy.gov/u-s-bangladesh-navy-commence-24th-carat-exercise/ (Accessed on November 6, 2023).
[56] Ibid.
[57] U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs. ‘U.S., Philippine Navies Conduct Bilateral Sail to Enhance Interoperability’. Press Office: America’s Navy. Sept. 4, 2023. URL: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3514805/us-philippine-navies-conduct-bilateral-sail-to-enhance-interoperability/ (Accessed on November 4, 2023).
[58] Ministry of Defense: Australian Government. ‘Australia to host exercise Malabar for the first time’. Media Release. August 11, 2023. URL: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-08-11/australia-host-exercise-malabar-first-time (Accessed on November 1, 2023).
[59] Carrier Strike Group 1 Public Affairs. ‘Australia, India, Japan, and U.S. Kick-off Phase II: MALABAR 2021’. Press Office: America’s Navy. October 13, 2021. URL: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2808152/australia-india-japan-and-us-kick-off-phase-ii-malabar-2021/ (Accessed on November 6, 2023).
[60] Jennifer Parker. ‘Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging’ The Strategist. August 10, 2023. URL: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-another-naval-exercise-malabars-vital-messaging/ (Accessed on November 2, 2023).
[61] Blake Herzinger. ‘The Navy should take more academics to sea’. American Enterprise Institute. January 6, 2023. URL: https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-navy-should-take-more-academics-to-sea/ (accessed on October 25, 2023).
[62] Kevin Delamer, ‘Analysis: The U.S. Navy’s High-Low Mix’. USNI News, June 10, 2013. URL: https://news.usni.org/2013/06/10/analysis-the-u-s-navys-high-low-mix (accessed October 21, 2023).
[63] Anastasia Kapetas. ‘Challenges for the US and Australia in the grey zone’. The Strategist. May 6, 2021. URL: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/challenges-for-australia-and-us-in-the-grey-zone/ (accessed on October 27, 2023)
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Featured Image: A submarine attached to a submarine flotilla with the navy under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams in the sea during a maritime drill on torpedo attack and defense, submarine control, etc. on October 25, 2022. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Shi Jialong)
