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Mine Warfare Topic Week

Embracing an Unmanned Solution for the U.S. Navy’s Mine Warfare Renaissance

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Mine Warfare Topic Week

By U.H. “Jack” Rowley and Craig Cates

Perspective

For those with stewardship of the U.S. Navy’s mine warfare capabilities, the old saying about meteorological phenomena rings true: “Everyone talks about the weather, but no one does anything about it.” Over the past several decades, the U.S. Navy has articulated a commitment to delivering robust mine countermeasures assets to the Fleet. This “aspirational” vision has yet to be realized. That might have been enough when the United States was the sole superpower with unfettered access to the world’s oceans and the littorals, but today the Navy must accelerate its efforts to field effective mine countermeasures in an era of renewed great power competition.

As Dr. Sam Taylor, Senior Leader, Mine Warfare Program Executive Office, Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC), articulated in his CIMSEC call for articles, Mine Countermeasures (MCM) is one of the most difficult and time-consuming missions for navies to successfully execute. And while the U.S. Navy has made some important strides, such as the MCM package aboard the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the significance of the MCM mission provides both the impetus and opportunity to do much more.

In our collective Navy experience—spanning half a century—this is not a new issue for the U.S. Navy, but one it has struggled with for decades. We contend it is not for lack of want, or even a lack of funding (although MCM resourcing has lagged other procurement priorities), but rather, not having adequately mature technology to address the challenge.

As Dr. Taylor suggests, emerging technologies may offer the Navy the ability to bridge this gap and usher in a true “21st Century renaissance in MCM.” We have first-person experience with technologies that can be readily harnessed and can help the Navy up its MCM game today. We emphasize the near-term because the solution we suggest employs proven commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software that we believe can supply a robust MCM capability to the Navy without waiting for the lengthy planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process to deliver these assets years in the future.

Mine Countermeasures: Not a New Challenge

In terms of availability, variety, cost-effectiveness, ease of deployment and potential impact on naval expeditionary operations, mines are some of the most attractive weapons available to any adversary determined to prevent Joint or coalition forces from achieving access to sea lines of communications or the littorals.

In the past several decades, rogue states have indiscriminately employed sea mines. Libya used mines to disrupt commerce in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. Iran laid mines to hazard military and commercial traffic in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. During the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the threat of mines precluded the effective use of the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary task force off the shores of Kuwait and hazarded all U.S. and coalition forces operating in the Arabian Gulf. The threat posed by mines was so extensive that clearance operations in this confined body of water were not completed until 1997.

Today, the threat posed by potential adversary mining capabilities is even greater. The number of countries with mines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities, and the intention to export mines has grown dramatically over the past several decades. As of this writing, more than 50 countries possess mines and mining capability. Of these, 30 countries have demonstrated a mine production capability and 20 have attempted to export these weapons. In addition, the types, sophistication, and lethality of the mines available on the world market are rapidly increasing.

There is little doubt that adversary sea mines pose one of the most compelling challenges faced by the United States. It falls squarely on the U.S. Navy to provide the MCM capability to enable the Joint Force to operate forward in support of United States’ interests, as well as those of our allies and friends. Indeed, the U.S. Navy’s strategic document A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Design 2.0) articulates the profoundly challenging strategic environment where peer competitors such as China and Russia and lesser (but more unstable) powers such as North Korea and Iran, have impressive naval mine inventories. Design 2.0 notes that, “It has been decades since we last competed for sea control, sea lines of communication and access to world markets.”1 One doesn’t have to be a Sun Tzu or Clausewitz to understand that the threat of naval mines is one of the key challenges that drives our emerging need to once again compete for freedom of movement on the world’s oceans, as well as in the littorals.

Design 2.0 also notes that the U.S. Navy will harness the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption to help shape the modern security environment to ensure that the United States prevails in any future conflict. Mine warfare is one of those key areas, and one that lends itself to harnessing emerging technologies. Sadly, other than the LCS MCM Mission Package, there has been little innovative technology adoption in this area. Dr. Taylor suggests that the Navy needs to harness emerging technologies that go well beyond the added capability coming to the Fleet through the modular LCS MCM Mission Package.

This call for action is not new. For example, in May 1998 the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps issued a document entitled, A 21st Century Warfighting Concept: Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection.2 The publication laid out the magnitude of the worldwide mine threat and proposed solutions. But today, the threat is more compelling, simply because our adversaries now have mines which can deny us access and severely limit our ability to operate forward as a Navy and Marine Corps team.

Through the entirety of our mutual U.S. Navy experience (which began in 1969 and 1988, respectively) we have witnessed the Navy “admire the problem” of MCM. For example, in the late 1990s, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones, signed out the fourth edition of the unclassified and widely distributed Naval Mine Warfare Plan.3 Shortly thereafter came the aforementioned 21st Century Warfighting Concept: Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection. Several years later, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Robert Natter, and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas Fargo, jointly published an unclassified Carrier Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group Mine Warfare Concept of Operations (CVBG/ARG MIW CONOPS).4

Other studies and analyses followed—both within the Navy and Marine Corps—as well as in Congressional Research Service studies, Government Accountability Office reports, think tank reports and in open defense-related media. But the recommended development persistently fell below the funding line, leaving the Navy using and modestly upgrading legacy MCM systems. An article in National Defense Magazine over a decade ago, “Navy Rethinking Mine Warfare,” heralded a new era in the way the Navy addresses the MCM challenge.5 Sadly, not much has happened since then, but it can now, by harnessing emerging technologies.

Leveraging Emerging Unmanned Vehicle Technologies

Due to the extreme challenge of putting manned naval vessels in sea areas where mines are present—witness the severe damage done to USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Tripoli and USS Princeton—we agree with the Navy’s pivot to unmanned vehicles as a primary solution to the Navy’s MCM solution set and to “Take the Sailor out of the minefield.”6 Today, it appears the U.S. Navy does have the desire to accelerate the testing and fielding of unmanned systems.

Some years ago, Captain Jon Rucker, as Program Manager of the Navy program office (PMS-406) with stewardship over unmanned maritime systems (unmanned surface vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles), discussed his programs with USNI News. The title of the article, “Navy Racing to Test, Field, Unmanned Maritime Vehicles for Future Ships,” captured the essence of where unmanned maritime systems will fit in tomorrow’s Navy, as well as the Navy-After-Next. Captain Rucker shared:

“In addition to these programs of record, the Navy and Marine Corps have been testing as many unmanned vehicle prototypes as they can, hoping to see the art of the possible for unmanned systems taking on new mission sets. Many of these systems being tested are small surface and underwater vehicles that can be tested by the dozens at tech demonstrations or by operating units.”7

Speaking at the January 2018 Surface Navy Association Symposium, Captain Rucker continued the drumbeat of the bright future for unmanned maritime systems, noting, “We have been given special authorities to do accelerated acquisitions,” and referenced several USV and UUV programs. He noted that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, as well as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Mr. James Geurts, have been proactive in advocating the accelerated development of unmanned maritime systems. Captain Rucker concluded his remarks by explaining how the Navy will insert unmanned maritime systems into the Fleet:

“As the technology is ready we will insert it into the systems we’re developing, every system I show you, whether it’s an unmanned surface vessel or unmanned undersea vessel, we are ensuring that we develop that modularity and have the interfaces, so as technology is ready we can insert it into the production line—not break the production line—and ensure we stay on track to deliver that capability.”8

This testing has continued—and even accelerated—under the new PMS-406 Program Manager, Captain Pete Small, who noted during the 2019 Navy League of the United States SeaAirSpace Symposium that, “We will bring in Navy program of record weapons systems to incorporate into commercially-derived modular craft.” He also explained how industry is challenged to design scaled-up versions of current USVs, but that this scaling-up initiative is one that is increasingly important to the Navy.9

However, the devil is in the details about how the U.S. Navy intends to bring new technologies to the warfighter. One example from our Navy experience suggests that we must pursue a thoughtful approach to inserting technological solutions to meet Fleet and Fleet Marine Force requirements, rather than depend on promising—but as-yet-unproven—technologies.

From Concept to Technology Adoption: Often a Bridge Too Far

Far too often the technological promise of a concept is so compelling that a solution is rushed to the Fleet with profoundly disastrous results. There is no better example to make this case than an unmanned system the U.S. Navy built and fielded decades ago, the QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter).

As the United States became involved in the Vietnam War during the early 1960s, the Navy renewed its efforts to find a way to field unmanned systems to meet urgent operational needs. At that time, all sea-based aviation was concentrated on the decks of Navy aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious assault ships. Surface combatants—cruisers, destroyers and frigates—had no air assets at their disposal.

The solution was to adapt a technology that had been in development since the late 1950s and field the QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter). In April 1958, the U.S. Navy awarded Gyrodyne Company a contract to modify its RON-1 Rotorcycle, a small twin coaxial rotors helicopter, to explore its use as a remote-controlled drone capable of operating from the decks of small ships. By 1963 the Navy approved large-scale production of the QH-60C, with the ultimate goal of putting these DASH units on all its 240 FRAM-I and FRAM-II destroyers.

In January 1965 the Navy began to use the QH-50D as a reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle in Vietnam. Equipped with a real-time TV camera, a film camera, a transponder for better radar tracking, and a telemetry feedback link to inform the remote-control operator of drone responses to his commands, the QH-50D began to fly “SNOOPY” missions from destroyers off the Vietnamese coast. The purpose of these missions was to provide over-the-horizon target data to the destroyer’s five-inch batteries. Additionally, DASH was outfitted with ASW torpedoes to deal with the rapidly growing Soviet submarine menace, the idea being that DASH would attack the submarine with homing torpedoes or depth charges at a distance that exceeded the range of a submarine’s torpedoes.

A QH-50 DASH anti-submarine drone on board the destroyer USS Allen M. Sumner (DD-692) during a deployment to Vietnam. The photo was taken between April and June 1967. (Eric Bollin, USN, via Wikimedia Commons)

By 1970 however, DASH operations had ceased fleet-wide. Although DASH was a sound concept, the Achilles heel of the system was the electronic remote-control system. The lack of feedback loop from the drone to the controller accounted for almost 80 percent of all drone losses. While apocryphal to the point to being a bit of an urban legend, it was often said the most common call on the Navy Fleet’s 1MC general announcing systems during the DASH-era was, “DASH Officer, Bridge,” when the unfortunate officer controlling the DASH was called to account for why “his” system had failed to return to the ship and crashed into the water. Compared to technologies used to control unmanned systems today, that of the 50s to early 70s was primitive at best. In many cases, what was attempted with drones was, literally, a bridge too far.

Leading the Mine Warfare Renaissance with Tested and Proven Technologies

While the challenges of the Navy’s DASH systems are one example, we have witnessed other cases where technologies were inserted as solutions to Fleet or Fleet Marine Forces’ needs, only to fail—often spectacularly—to live up to the promise their developers hoped for. That is why we believe the U.S. Navy would be well-served to leverage—and combine—technologies that have been examined by commercial and other government agencies, and tested extensively in Navy exercises, experiments, and demonstrations to field a near-term MCM capability.

Over the past several years, in a series of Navy and Marine Corps (and other Service) events as diverse as the Ship-to-Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation and Advanced Naval Technology Exercise (S2ME2 ANTX), the Battlespace Preparation in a Contested Environment, the Surface Warfare Distributed Lethality in the Littoral demonstration, the Citadel Protect Homeland Security Exercise, Dawn Blitz, Steel Knight, Military Ocean Terminal Concept Demonstration (MOTS CD), the Bold Alligator exercise series, and Valiant Shield, operators have field-tested a diverse number of emerging technologies.

Technologies proven in these, as well as other events, were the MANTAS Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV), the Mine Neutralization System Remote Operated Vehicle (MNS ROV), and a suite of sensors developed and fielded by Teledyne Technologies Incorporated. We believe that the serial development of the MANTAS USV and MNS ROV, enabled by Teledyne sensors can provide an MCM capability for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps today at low cost and with minimal technical risk.

Given the compelling need to creatively apply new, innovative technologies to address the operational and tactical challenges posed by mines, as well as the need to expand the use of unmanned systems to tackle MCM challenges, the ability to meet this need with commercial-off-the-shelf hardware and software—and not wager on emerging technologies that will take years to develop, mature and field—should be a priority for Navy and Marine Corps planners.

From Concept to Capability: What Would Such a System Look Like?

We hasten to emphasize that the components of this system-of-systems are not based on just concepts or drawings or early-stage prototypes. Rather, every component has been in the water and tested in the operational environment. The basic elements of our proposal are based on a multi-modal, multi-domain, modular approach and include several platforms.

As the hub of a best-in-class autonomous COTS MCM capability, the Navy should consider a scaled-up version of the T12 (twelve-foot) MANTAS high-speed catamaran proven in the exercises, experiments and demonstrations listed above. This T38 is similar in size to an eleven-meter RHIB carried by many U.S. Navy ships and thus can be easily integrated aboard most U.S. Navy warships. In comparison to an 11m RHIB, the T38 is 2 feet longer, 5 inches wider, drafts 17 inches shallower at max displacement, and boasts a cross-section height over 8 feet lower, making it extraordinarily hard to detect. The maximum displacement of the T38 is 40 percent lower than an 11m RHIB, while capacity for mission module sensors and systems is 25 percent higher; it carries more and is easier to handle. The T38 can operate in up to sea state five, has a cruise speed equal to, and a maximum speed twice that of an 11m RHIB, and a range four times that of the 11m RHIB. The T38 has an aft-mounted tow station for a mine-hunting sonar system and mine neutralization ROVs, and a submerged aft-hull well-deck configuration for simple autonomous launch and recovery of subsystems. The T38 can be fitted with a wide variety of sensors such as SeaBat F and T (series) sonars, X-Band Radar, Navigation Radar, SeaFLIR 230 Gyro Stabilized Hi-Res Camera, M400 Gyro stabilized EO/Thermal Camera, AIS and LIDAR Collision Avoidance system—among others—providing it with the ability to be closely controlled by a remote operator or operated autonomously.

The MANTAS features a suite of integrated sensors controlled by an Integrated Common Control Architecture housed in an installed or mobile control console. This unified design provides communications management, automated target recognition, and data management and processing. There are two primary MCM subsystems carried aboard the MANTAS.

The first is a tow-body mounted Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS) designed to search for mine-like objects (MLOs). This in-production COTS system can survey 3.5 km2/hr at a resolution sufficient for MLO classification. The system is programmable for bottom following, terrain referencing, and obstacle avoidance. As data comes aboard the USV, Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) will identify likely MLO anomalies, which will then be presented in near-real-time to the man–on-the-loop for verification as an MLO. Verified MLOs will be added as a waypoint for validation, while invalid MLOs will be discarded or passed to the navigation database as a hazard to navigation. Verified MLOs will be continuously updated to a recommended route for the Mine Neutralization System (MNS) Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV). This route can be influenced by the watch team for various priorities such as route efficiency, most-valid to least-valid MLOs, or other operational considerations. After the area search is complete, the T38 will immediately transition from hunting to neutralizing by conducting a stern submerged well-deck recovery of the tow-body and launch of the tethered MNS ROV. This capability is a key feature in achieving Single Sortie Detect-to-Engage (SSDTE).

The MNS ROV conducts the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work previously conducted by classes of U.S. Navy ships by providing real-time HD video validation of mine-like objects. The MNS ROV autonomously executes the MLO route for final classification and man-on-the-loop validation of each MLO while the T38 shadows and supports it as an over the horizon communications link and countermine charge supply link. The classification, validation and engagement processes are then repeated until the field is cleared. The countermine charge detonation sequencing may be altered to detonate in any order and at any time desired to achieve mission success.

If this technical and operational solution sounds simple and achievable it is just that—a capability that exists today in its commercial subsystems that can be delivered to the U.S. Navy far more rapidly than anything the traditional acquisition system can provide. Navy officials have been provided with the details of this solution in a series of white papers and briefings and initial reactions have been positive. But that is not enough—not by a long shot.

While the individual components of this mine countermeasures solution have been extensively field tested with, collectively, thousands of hours of in-water use, the full-package of components has not yet been brought together in an exercise, experiments, and demonstrations such as those listed above so that Fleet operators can truly experience what this system-of-systems solution can provide. This milestone is slated for limited demonstration in Trident Warrior 2020.

Moving Forward with Effective—and Timely—Mine Countermeasures

During our decades of collective service in the operational Navy, we deployed to the Arabian Gulf a total of seven times—the same body of water where our shipmates on USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Tripoli, and USS Princeton were seriously injured by mines. Because ships and sailors operate daily in harm’s way, we need to embrace an unmanned solution to dealing with deadly mines. We have the components for such a system, and it can reach fruition in the near-term.

If the U.S. Navy wants to buy-down inherent technical risk and challenge the paradigm of long-cycle FAR acquisition in the deadly serious business of MCM, then it is time to put a near-term solution in the water. While complex programs of record continue to develop next-generation technology, we should invest in parallel-path solutions that leverage mature subsystems ready to “Speed to Fleet” today. Once the Fleet sees the COTS solution that can be delivered with the system described above, we will be well on our way to providing the Navy with a way to defeat today’s mine threat.

LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley (USN – Retired) is a career Surface Warfare and Engineering Duty Officer whose 22 years of active duty included nine years enlisted service before commissioning. As a career destroyer sailor, he has served both in the Western Pacific as well as in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. Since his retirement, he has had extensive experience with the Oil and Gas Workboat community, and was the SAIC Lead Engineer on the early stages of the development of the DARPA Sea Hunter USV Trimaran. He is now the Chief Technology Officer for Maritime Tactical Systems, Inc (MARTAC).

 SOCS Craig Cates (USN – Retired) is the Special Operations Team Lead for Teledyne Brown Engineering, Maritime Systems, a position he has held since transition from active duty in 2016. He served 27 years as a Sea Air Land (SEAL) Special Warfare Operator, including 14 years of Combat Development and Evaluation and Department of Defense Acquisition experience. His notable posts were: Seal Delivery Vehicle Pilot and Navigator, and Science and Technology Analyst. He continues to serve as an SDV OEM Test Pilot, and Diving Supervisor qualified in all SCUBA, semi-closed, and closed-circuit diving.

References

[1] Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Washington, D.C.:  Department of the Navy, 2018), accessed at: https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf.

[2] A 21st Century Warfighting Concept: Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, May 1998) accessed at: https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/docs/mcm.htm.

[3] U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Plan, Fourth Edition, Programs for the New Millennium (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, January 2000).

[4] Draft report for comment, in the author’s possession.

[5] Grace Jean, “Navy Rethinking Mine Warfare,” National Defense Magazine, January 2008.

[6] “Take the Sailor out of the minefield,” is a common phrase in U.S. Navy parlance. Beyond saving lives, as one example of how unmanned systems would be vastly more cost effective for the Navy, consider an Avenger-class MCM vessel and an unmanned surface vessel. The Avenger-class MCM Vessels is a legacy system that is a purpose-built, dedicated ship. It is crewed by a nominal 85 officers and sailors. This means that every one hour of mine hunting/sweeping/clearing costs 85 man hours. Conversely, an autonomous unmanned system would be monitored by a watch stander crew of two to three sailors who only actively participate when higher-level decision authority is required. This represents an effort to effect ratio of 1:24 instead of 85:1.

[7] Megan Eckstein, “Navy Racing to Test, Field, Unmanned Maritime Vehicles for Future Ships,” USNI News, September 21, 2017, accessed at: https://news.usni.org/2017/09/21/navy-racing-test-field-unmanned-maritime-vehicles-future-ships?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=fb4495a428-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-fb4495a428-230420609&mc_cid=fb4495a428&mc_eid=157ead4942.

[8] Jon Harper, “Navy Officials Speed up Acquisition of Unmanned Maritime Systems,” National Defense Magazine Online, January 11, 2018, accessed at: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/1/11/navy-officials-under-pressure-to-speed-up-acquisition-of-unmanned-maritime-systems. See also Richard Burgess, “Navy Acquisition Chief: ‘Reliably Deliver Capable Capacity,’” SEAPOWER Magazine Online, January 11, 2018, accessed at: http://seapowermagazine.org/stories/20180111-geurts.html.

[9] George Galdorisi, “Supporting Expeditionary Force Logistics with USV Technology,” SLDinfo.com, accessed at: https://sldinfo.com/2019/08/supporting-expeditionary-force-logistics-with-usv-technology/.

Featured Image: 190607-N-SB587-1203 GULF OF THAILAND (June 7, 2019) The Royal Thai Navy Lat Ya-class mine countermeasures ship HTMS Lat Ya (MHS 633), left, and the Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship USS Pioneer (MCM 9) observe a controlled mine detonation while conducting a joint mine countermeasures exercise during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Thailand 2019. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Corbin Shea)

Mine Warfare Topic Week

The U.S. Navy Needs AWNIS for Mine Warfare

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Mine Warfare Topic Week

By LT Colin Barnard, USN

Earlier this year, General Scapparotti, former Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO forces, sounded the call for a greater U.S. Navy presence in the Euro-Atlantic region to counter Russian aggression. The U.S. Navy has been increasing its presence in the region since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, most notably conducting patrols in the Baltic and Black Seas. More recently, the U.S. Navy reestablished U.S. Second Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia, the commander of which will also head NATO’s new Joint Force Command in the same location, and is providing the flagship for Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 for all of 2019, one of four groups that make up NATO’s Standing Naval Forces.

Despite these increases, General Scapparotti was correct to say that an even greater U.S. Navy presence in the region is needed. However, greater U.S. Navy presence in Europe means greater involvement in NATO; and greater involvement in NATO requires greater use of NATO doctrine, some of which is not currently practiced by the U.S. Navy.

One such doctrine is the Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System, or AWNIS, which is crucial for conducting military operations at sea, especially mine warfare, while minimizing disruption to merchant shipping. This crucial doctrine can help modify and reroute sea lines of communications as they become threatened and endure combat operations. But unfortunately, the U.S. Navy knows very little about this system, its processes, or its merits.

What AWNIS Is

AWNIS is not a technical system but rather “instructions for the promulgation of navigational dangers during times of war,” as the first NATO Military Committee document described it in 1952. AWNIS is necessary to conduct operations at sea while minimizing disruption to the maritime domain because it provides the procedures to promulgate Safety and Security of Navigation (SASON) information on navigation hazards that result from military operations—e.g. sea mines—fulfilling legal obligations specified in international humanitarian law and conventions such as Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).

To accomplish this, AWNIS collates inputs from tactical units—e.g. mine countermeasure (MCM) forces—then disseminates the information to merchant and military ships based on classification level. To promulgate the information to merchant ships, AWNIS uses the existing civilian Worldwide Navigation Warning System (WWNWS) architecture to transmit Navigation Warnings (NAVWARNs). To promulgate the information to military ships, AWNIS uses the Q-Message system. More information on AWNIS processes can be found in the primary AWNIS publication, Allied Hydrographic Publication 01 (AHP-01). The Q-message system is specified in a classified supplement to AHP-01.

AWNIS’ Origins

The British Royal Navy, in conjunction with what is now called the U.K. Hydrographic Office (UKHO), developed the AWNIS doctrine in response to lessons learned during WWI and WWII. During WWI, Central Powers sank more than 5,000 allied and neutral merchant ships in the North Atlantic Ocean with projectiles, torpedoes, and mines, creating navigational dangers for all seagoing vessels, including submarines. However, there was no procedure in any navy at the time to track the shipwrecks and sea mines, or disseminate their locations while taking into account operational security. Additionally, mine clearance and salvage operations take time, as do chart corrections.

Without a procedure in the military to identify and share information about navigational hazards during the war, civilian institutions had to locate and mitigate these hazards when the war ended. To this day, shipwrecks from the wars of the 20th century and, more dangerously, sea mines, are still being discovered in the waters around Europe. Germany placed over 40,000 mines around the British Isles during WWI alone. A key part of the AWNIS doctrine is post-conflict stabilization, which ensures all hazards to navigation that emerge during a conflict are tracked, then declassified and shared with civilian institutions to ensure restoration after the conflict is over.

AWNIS and Mine Warfare

In NATO, the AWNIS doctrine facilitates Mine Danger Areas (MDAs) and Q-Routes, in addition to other threats to safety and security of navigation. AWNIS Officers embarked with MCM forces draft MDA requests to the AWNIS lead, known as the Safety of Navigation Information Coordinator (SONIC), who is co-located with the MDA establishing authority, usually the Maritime Component Commander.

While it is crucial that MDAs be reported to all friendly naval forces, this detailed information is classified and cannot be shared with merchant shipping. If merchant shipping were told where MDAs are established, the enemy responsible for laying the mines would know which mines have been found. Thus, the details of an MDA are classified and distributed via the Q-Message system only. To fulfill the legal obligation to inform merchant shipping of the mine threat, NAVWARNs are used to establish Areas Dangerous to Shipping (ADS), which can cover a wider area than actually affected in order to maximize the safety of the merchant mariner and, ideally, freedom of maneuver for naval forces. Similar to a Maritime Exclusion Zone, which is also established by NAVWARN, an ADS should be carefully planned in order to ensure the least disruption to the maritime domain. Another doctrine exists in NATO and works closely with AWNIS in this effort—Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS).

AWNIS and NCAGS

More than 50,000 merchant ships sail the world’s oceans, carrying more than 90 percent of the world’s trade. Conversely, only 1,500 warships sail the world’s oceans, of which approximately 200 are at sea at any given time, the rest remaining in port for maintenance and training. While vastly outnumbered, what warships do at sea can greatly affect merchant shipping, potentially disrupting its free movement and thus the global economy. AWNIS and NCAGS work in concert to reduce this potentiality.

While the AWNIS doctrine is responsible for managing the environment on which both military and merchant ships sail, the NCAGS doctrine provides the procedures for military forces to cooperate with and guide merchant shipping, effectively assisting shipping to travel from point A to B safely, i.e. freedom of navigation. This can be accomplished using basic routing guidance like Sailing Information, or through more tactical measures like group transit and lead-through operations. NCAGS relies on the AWNIS overview of the environment to accomplish this task. In the event of lead-through operations, NCAGS also relies on Q-Routes, which are pre-planned channels and routes surveyed during peacetime. Utilizing the Q-Message system, Q-Routes are activated as needed to ensure access to ports or other areas of operational importance for military and merchant ships.

AWNIS and SLOC Protection

In addition to closely cooperating with mine warfare and NCAGS, AWNIS also collates information necessary for the Maritime Component Commander to efficiently position assets to protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs). When navigational hazards like minefields and shipwrecks caused by mines, torpedoes, or missiles are plotted, the Maritime Component Commander is able to visualize the battlespace and the threats to SLOCs. Overlay the operational intelligence picture of the adversary’s naval and anti-access capabilities, especially coastal missiles, and the picture becomes mostly complete.

NCAGS officers have the means to recommend routes for both merchant shipping and strategic sealift around these threats, effectively establishing a SLOC. This also aids in the deconfliction of military activity from merchant shipping. For example, during a scenario in which merchant ships must sail from the U.K. to Norway during a major conflict, NCAGS would rely on AWNIS to show where all recent missile and mine strikes have occurred at sea or in ports, all MDAs, and activated Q-Routes in order to accurately advise the ships where to sail. NCAGS officers deployed in ports or on merchant vessels would be used to communicate sensitive information such as the details of a Q-Route.

AWNIS and Hybrid Warfare

The AWNIS doctrine is increasingly relevant in the context of an aggressive Russia that is openly challenging the laws of the sea through hybrid maritime activity. In November 2018, Russia closed the Kerch Strait to innocent passage, first by promulgating a false NAVWARN, then by placing a merchant vessel under the Crimean Bridge to block the strait. More recently, Russia has been promulgating NAVWARNs for naval exercises in the Black Sea that cover larger areas than necessary, seemingly with the intent of disrupting freedom of navigation. In most cases, the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) does not fully use these exercise areas.

While the RFN is ultimately responsible for the safety of merchant vessels passing in or near these exercise areas, accidents are possible. Even worse, it is difficult to foresee how the international community would respond to such an accident, especially if there were indications the accident was intentional, e.g. to disrupt the passage of a merchant vessel bound for a Ukrainian port. Regardless, as long as Russia continues to abuse the international systems in place for disseminating SASON information, the international shipping community would be right to distrust information promulgated by and for the RFN. Conversely, the U.S. Navy and NATO need to take care to always use these systems correctly, which the AWNIS doctrine seeks to ensure. In peacetime, crisis, and conflict, the U.S. Navy and NATO stand ready to be recognized as trusted brokers of SASON information.

Practicing the AWNIS Doctrine

The U.S. Navy should look to other NATO navies in order to establish AWNIS expertise for its own purposes. The already well-established U.S. Navy NCAGS community, part of the Reserve Component, should become the primary AWNIS expertise for the U.S. Navy. This is how the navies of the U.K., Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium manage the system. As AWNIS and NCAGS are inseparable in practice, the majority of reserve officers with warfare backgrounds in the U.S. Navy NCAGS community should be trained in both. From this new U.S. Navy AWNIS and NCAGS community, every numbered fleet commander should be assigned a Staff AWNIS and NCAGS Officer, acting as the principal adviser on SASON and ready to act as the SONIC in the event of an operation. If MCM forces are involved, reserve officers should be ready to support them with AWNIS expertise.

The central location for AWNIS and NCAGS expertise in NATO is the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), part of NATO Maritime Command in Northwood, U.K. Though tasked with wider maritime situational awareness responsibilities, the NSC should play a role in establishing AWNIS expertise in the U.S. Navy, bearing in mind that AWNIS is not only relevant to the littorals of Europe. The mine threat is equally existential, if not more so, in the Strait of Hormuz and Taiwan Strait.

With the AWNIS organization in place, military units at sea and merchant shipping could be confident in the U.S. Navy’s ability to manage SASON information during crisis or conflict. More importantly, the Joint Force Commander could be confident in the Maritime Component Commander’s ability to protect SLOCs and help both merchant shipping and strategic sealift make it to their destination, whether to support the civilian population or the Land Component Commander.

AWNIS is not the only NATO doctrine the U.S. Navy needs to practice, but it is fundamental. No longer can the crew of a destroyer wait until they “chop” under NATO operational control to dust off the NATO publications on the back shelf. As recently argued by VADM Lindsey and members of his staff at NATO’s Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence (CJOS-COE), U.S. Navy knowledge gaps in NATO doctrine need to be identified and filled to ensure successful integration and interoperability with NATO forces. The U.S. Navy’s mine warfare community is already ahead of other warfare communities in this endeavor, through participation in NATO exercises like DYNAMIC MOVE. Adopting AWNIS is a natural next step.

Lieutenant Barnard is serving as a staff operations and plans officer at NATO Maritime Command in Northwood, U.K. He was previously gunnery officer onboard USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51) and weapons officer onboard USS FIREBOLT (PC 10), and he was recently selected to be a foreign area officer in Europe. He graduated from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland with a master’s in terrorism studies and holds a bachelor’s in political science from Abilene Christian University in Texas. His views are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.

Featured Image: HMCS St. John’s performs manoeuvres with other members of Standing NATO Maritime Group One while on Op REASSURANCE in the Baltic Sea, March 21, 2018. (Photo: CPL TONY CHAND, FIS)

Mine Warfare Topic Week

Meeting the Mine Warfare Challenge with Unmanned Systems

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Mine Warfare Topic Week

By Andrea Daolio

“We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” –Rear Admiral Allen E. “Hoke” Smith

Mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare share many features, from the fact that both are very difficult and time-consuming tasks (often akin to finding a needle in a haystack). And despite how both submarines and mines achieved tremendous wartime success in the past, the peacetime effort and resources dedicated toward countering them are usually far less than what is required. By harnessing unmanned systems and machine learning, the U.S. Navy can bridge the gap between its own mine countermeasures capability and the growing mine warfare threat.

Historical Successes of Mine Warfare

During World War II, Operation Starvation which mined Japanese home waters severely disrupted Japanese maritime traffic and sunk more than 1.2 million tons of shipping for the loss of only 15 airplanes, while demanding only 5.7 percent of the XXI Bomber Command’s total sorties. Yet a few years later the U.S. Navy was unprepared when it had to face enemy mines itself in the Korean War, resulting in the delay of the amphibious landing at Wonsan. At the end of the war, the mine countermeasures forces, which accounted for less than two percent of all UN naval forces, had suffered 20 percent of naval casualties.

The 1987-1988 and 1991-1992 Gulf crises once again showed how deadly mines can be even for a totally superior force, damaging the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), the flagship for Airborne Mine Countermeasures operations USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and the USS Princeton (CG-59). Since World War II, mines have damaged or sunk four more times more US Navy ships than all other weapons.

U.S. Navy mine casualties chart. (From “21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare” Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare – Expeditionary Warfare Directorate – US Navy 2009)[Click to expand]
These events have been studied in detail by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and other potential adversaries of the U.S. like Iran and North Korea, and all those nations have significant mine arsenals. China has a fleet of 33 mine warfare vessels and over 50,000 mines (some put the estimate as high as 80,000 or even 100,000), consisting of over 30 varieties of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water pressure and mixed reaction sea mines, remote control sea mines, rocket-rising and mobile mines.1

Russia has a fleet of 47 Mine Warfare vessels and inherited an arsenal of “upwards of 250,000” mines from the Soviet Union, while Iran is estimated to have between 3,000 and 20,000 mines and North Korea is said to have 50,000 mines.2 As if these numbers were not threatening enough, Iraq was able to damage two U.S. Navy ships by deploying only around 1,000 mines, many of them old types dating back to before World War I that can be replicated cheaply (contact mines cost as little as $1500) even by third world nations. More than 30 countries produce and more than 20 countries export mines, and even highly sophisticated versions of the weapon are available in the international arms trade.

Chinese mine depot with warshot and training mines. The bands on the ninety-eight mines on the left side of the image indicate that they are exercise shapes, and could support a robust exercise program. The solid colors on the similar number of mines to the right suggest that they are warshots. (From Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, 2009)

NATO on the other hand has the largest MCM fleet in the world with 149 ships (as of 2016), but those ships are becoming old and obsolete (many are second-hand vessels retired by their original owner and then sold to smaller NATO countries). And only 7 percent of these vessels are part of the U.S. Navy. The need to renovate and enlarge this force is immediately apparent.

Countering the Threat

Mines can be put in place by aircraft, surface ships, pleasure boats, submarines, and combat divers and even from pickup trucks crossing bridges. They can be found from the surf zone to deep water (greater than 200 feet) and can be of many different and increasingly capable types. These range from simple contact mines to more complex magnetic, acoustic or pressure mines; from advanced mines that are a combination of the preceding types to computerized mines that can be even set to be detonated only by some specific ship type.

Mines are increasingly difficult to detect. The underwater environment is already a difficult medium to search through, as the currents, differences in salinity and temperature, and seafloor clutter (which is often littered with a vast array of debris) impede search. Meanwhile, mines are becoming even more elusive as stealthy mines made of fiberglass can be extremely difficult to detect. Furthermore, modern sonars are hardly capable enough to find advanced types of mines buried under the seafloor.

Types of naval mines: A-underwater, B-bottom, SS-submarine. 1-drifting mine, 2-drifting mine, 3-moored mine, 4-moored mine (short wire), 5-bottom mines, 6-torpedo mine/CAPTOR mine, 7-rising mine. (Wikimedia Commons)

But even if mines have always had an advantage over mine countermeasures, new technologies are emerging that will be able to greatly reduce or even eliminate this advantage.

Once in the water, mines are difficult to detect, but even if mines can sometimes remain deadly for an extended period of time (such as how fishermen still get injured or killed in the Baltic Sea by leftover mines from the world wars), the damaging effects of the marine environment (from corrosion to marine growth) mean that mines can’t be reliably set in the sea for long periods of time.

Therefore an adversary will likely have to deploy mines shortly before a confrontation, and that will give the U.S. a golden opportunity to stop mines before they are deployed via a more favorable preventative strategy.3

Satellites and High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) drones will be able to detect signs of the major logistical efforts necessary to take mines from ammunition depots to the ports and then load them onto platforms, offering military and diplomatic opportunities to halt the mining operation.

Even if an enemy wants to place only a few mines, persistent surveillance (such as through satellites or unmanned systems with a long endurance capabilities) can monitor the area for signs of strangely behaving ships (the capture of the Iranian-improvised minelayer Iran Ajr is a good example of American forces stopping a mining operation before the mines are deployed).

Using unmanned aircraft for the task will ensure that the area will be monitored for long periods of time at a fraction of the cost and without risking lives. Machine learning and AI systems are already used for guiding military and civilian UAVs4 and even for monitoring,5 therefore these systems can be implemented in the software of an UAV to automatically tell the signs of suspect behavior of enemy assets without humans having to painstakingly watch hours of video feed and thus reducing the workload of the crew. Likewise, a fleet of small Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUVs) can loiter in the suspected area and identify telltale signs of mining operations to stop it before it is too late. Similarly, underwater hydrophone arrays like those of the DADS and the Autonomous Off-Board Surveillance Sensor (AOSS) programs,6 even if intended to track quiet diesel-electric submarines, are capable of detecting airplanes, ships, and submarine mine-laying operations and monitor the water entry and the bottom impact of mines.

If these systems fail to stop the deployment of mines, once these are in the water, then the task gets more difficult and dangerous. Yet, unmanned systems and new technologies can greatly help the U.S. Navy in the task. Knifefish UUVs and Fleet-class USVs (Unmanned Surface Vessels) are already part of the MCM module of LCS ships and are a great step forward for mine countermeasures.7 The Knifefish has an endurance of up to 16 hours and uses onboard synthetic aperture sonar to detect floating or buried naval mines, identify them thanks to an onboard database and analytical computer, and mark them for the successive removal.

Various types of mines. (Image from “21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare”. Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare – Expeditionary Warfare Directorate – US Navy 2009)

Machine learning and algorithms can also improve the ability of a UUV to recognize mines and identify objects on the seafloor. The NATO Science and Technology Organisation,  Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (STO CMRE) of LaSpezia (Italy) has recently developed an advanced algorithm that will automate the time-consuming task of mine identification and disposal and further advances in this field will greatly improve MCM operations.8 Moreover, adding an advanced lightweight hydrophone array to UUVs will improve the capability to detect and localize underwater objects (and will give the UUV an improved secondary ASW capability).9

Likewise, unmanned systems can greatly help MCM operations in the air and on the surface. The experience gathered by DARPA with the ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) could be used to create an advanced and completely autonomous MCM ship. Using powerful sensors, advanced automation software and MCM gear, an MCM ACTUV will be able to take many of the tasks now given to the Avenger-class minesweepers. A fully autonomous large fleet of inexpensive unmanned UUVs and USVs could sweep large portions of the sea while avoiding all risk to sailors.

While ships, USVs, and UUVs are the best platforms to neutralize mines, airplanes and helicopters are the fastest platforms to sweep the sea. The laser-based ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) and the unmanned COBRA (Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System) have recently entered service, but more systems can be deployed in the future.10 UAVs are the perfect choice for persistent reconnaissance and can be adapted for the MCM task and augmented to field the COBRA and ALMDS systems.

While the Navy arguably gives less attention to mine countermeasures than it deserves, it gives even lesser attention to its own offensive mining capability. If the U.S. Navy wants to maintain a solid deterrent against rivals then it should improve and expand its own mine arsenal. The new Hammerhead mine and the Clandestine Delivered Mine (CDM) are a good step in the right direction and more should follow.11 But the vast majority of U.S. mines are Quickstrike mines converted from general-purpose bombs. Dedicated bottom and buried advanced mines (similar to the advanced British Stonefish mine) should be developed and the number of platforms able to deploy mines should be expanded to include UAVs, USVs, and UUVs. Moreover, air-launched mines should get extended-range winged kits similar to those employed by the HAAWC High Altitude ASW Weapons Concept torpedo to give launching aircraft the ability to deploy the mine much further away from enemy positions.12

U.S. Air Force employees calibrate MK62QS MOD3 naval mines at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, July 10, 2018. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Ted Daigle/released)

Conclusion

“Hoke’s right: when you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is the rock-bottom foundation of all our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week.” –Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN Chief of Naval Operations October, 1950

Until recently the task of minesweeping has been extremely dangerous for sailors, but with new technologies such as unmanned systems and machine learning, it is time to invest heavily in these avenues of capability and convert a greater part of the U.S. Navy to fully autonomous and unmanned MCM operations.

The importance of mine warfare and of mine countermeasures for any modern Navy can never be stressed enough. Given how mining can achieve great results and inflict huge losses with relatively low risk and cost argues for greater investment in these weapons and the means to counter them.

Andrea Daolio, from Italy, has an engineering background and a longstanding passion for wargaming and for geopolitical, historical, and military topics. He has been a finalist in New York’s MTA Genius Transit Challenge. He is currently collaborating with video game developer Slitherine on the popular wargame Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations. His views are his own.

References

[1] Andrew Erickson, Chinese Mine Warfare, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/China-Maritime-Study-3_Chinese-Mine-Warfare_Erickson-Goldstein-Murray_200906.pdf

[2] Sydney J. Freedberg jr., Minefields At Sea: From The Tsars To Putin

[3] Sydney J. Freedberg jr., Sowing The Sea With Fire: The Threat Of Sea Mines

[4] Marcus Roth, AI in Military Drones and UAVs – Current Applications, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-drones-and-uavs-in-the-military-current-applications/

[5] Luis F. Gonzalez , Glen A. Montes , Eduard Puig , Sandra Johnson , Kerrie Mengersen  and Kevin J. Gaston , Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Artificial Intelligence Revolutionizing Wildlife Monitoring and Conservation, https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/16/1/97/htm

[6] Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10176/naval-mine-warfare-operational-and-technical-challenges-for-naval-forces

[7] Sydney J. Freedberg jr., From Sailors To Robots: A Revolution In Clearing Mines

[8] NATO CMRE, Autonomous Naval Mine Countermeasures, https://www.cmre.nato.int/about-cmre/fact-sheets/1292-autonomous-naval-mine-countermeasures-1/file

[9] Venugopalan Pallayil, Ceramic and Fibre Optic Hydrophone as Sensors for Lightweight Arrays – aComparative Study, https://arl.nus.edu.sg/twiki6/pub/ARL/BibEntries/venu_oceans_anchorage17.pdf

[10] Captain Danielle George, U.S. NAVY Mine Warfare Programs, https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/MineWarfare-George.pdf?ver=2019-01-17-133139-817

[11] Joseph Trevithick, US is betting big on Naval Mine Warfare with these Sub-launched and Air-dropped types, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25235/the-u-s-is-getting-back-into-naval-mine-warfare-with-new-sub-launched-and-air-dropped-types

[12] MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo and High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability (HAAWC), https://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2017/pdf/navy/2017mk54.pdf

Featured Image: September 22, 1987 – Contact mines partially covered by a tarpaulin on the deck of the captured Iranian mine-laying ship Iran Ajr (PH3 Cleveland, U.S. National Archives)

Capability Analysis

Aviation as the Key to Navy-Marine Integration

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By Carl Forsling

Marine Aviation Needs to Enhance Naval Integration

The Corps has drifted away from the Navy over the last two decades, and it didn’t need the Navy in Iraq or Afghanistan. Shortages of amphibious shipping combined with a need to justify force structure gave birth to shore-based SPMAGTFs. This trend has led to less-than-seamless integration between the Marine Corps and Navy. In the future fight, this gap leaves amphibious forces more vulnerable and less deadly than they should be. 

The new Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, said in his planning guidance, “…there is a need to reestablish a more integrated approach to operations in the maritime domain.” By virtue of their range and speed, aviation assets are inherently able to bridge gaps. Amphibious forces usually take this as meaning between the sea and the land, but it also bridges gaps between forces at sea.

Amphibious ships can no longer serve merely as transportation for their embarked Marines. In the future anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, they have to be part of the open-ocean kill chain. If the naval services are to enhance their survivability and lethality against the medium- and high-threat fights of the future, they have to combine their efforts and their assets. The keystone of that effort will be the aviation assets of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). They must be reconfigured to better exploit aviation platforms such as the V-22 and F-35B, and turn the Corps into a force for sea control.

The strength of the Navy and Marine Corps team is the use of seaborne mobility to achieve effects on land. New aviation platforms can reinvigorate this for the 21st century, making both the Navy and Marine Corps more survivable, deadly, and integrated.

Ospreys Enable Naval Distributed Operations

In Marine parlance, “distributed operations” mean small units scattered throughout a given ground commander’s area of responsibility. In Navy parlance, distributed maritime operations are those within a naval commander’s area of responsibility. Rarely are the two domains intertwined, but now they need to be.

Marines routinely practice distributed operations within the ships of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) – performing “split-ARG” ops at widely separated locations. But this is much less common among the ships of the larger Expeditionary Strike Group, which adds attached surface combatants and often a submarine. 

It is virtually unheard of to detach Marines to other ships, such as those in a carrier strike group. The ARG typically does not integrate much with the rest of the Navy, but in the future, it will need to in order to survive. To that end, why are Ospreys tethered to ships at all, much less particular ships? Ospreys are easier to maintain on land. With the two KC-130Js normally assigned to the MEU, they can reach anywhere in most theaters within hours. 

SPMAGTF-CR-AF’s Ospreys can reach much of the 6th Fleet area of operations on one tank of gas from Moron, Spain. They could reach even further from a centrally located base like Sigonella. SPMAGTF-CR-CC can reach most of the CENTCOM AOR from its base in Kuwait. The Pacific isn’t quite as easy to traverse, but the Osprey has proven itself unique among rotorcraft in covering those distances, having already transited from Hawaii to Australia for the Marine Rotational Forces in Darwin.  

The tiltrotor squadron assigned to SPMAGTF-CR-CENTCOM and the half-squadron with SPMAGTF-CR-AFRICOM are burning out aircraft and people for little operational benefit. By making the MEU MV-22s and the tiltrotor company land-based, the SPMAGTFs are made redundant. Eliminating those would save six deployed MV-22s in the Mediterranean and 12 in CENTCOM. That would strengthen the VMM community and allow it to better support the MEUs. 

Instead of having a SPMAGTF in a given theater in addition to MEU assets, the MEU VMM, tiltrotor company, and KC-130Js would shadow the MEU from shore instead. In Europe, for example, they might primarily work out of Sigonella, but could move to Djibouti to support operations in the Horn of Africa or Romania to counter Russian moves in the Balkans. 

If the rest of the MEU is needed, the tiltrotor-borne unit could be a rapidly deployable advance element, or conversely, remain in strategic or operational reserve. The base tiltrotor squadron, KC-130J detachment, and tiltrotor infantry company would essentially be an airmobile split ARG, capable of independent action, but rejoining the MEU main body when necessary. They could immediately take spots on the air plan ferrying Marines ashore, recovering aboard ship, or to an airfield as the situation dictates. 

For many missions, there is no need to commit the entire Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) or ESG when V-22s can take Marines almost anywhere in theater. It saves these warship formations from having to steam for days. It also affords another way to split the MEU besides just between the ships in the ARG, increasing flexibility and the MEU’s ability to respond to multiple contingencies. In certain threat environments, staging Marines from ships other than amphibious platforms may be the most survivable option, offering greater distribution and putting a greater number of the enemy’s shore bases at risk of amphibious assault. The enemy will never be entirely sure which vessels present that threat, complicating their threat analysis.

Once the MEU doesn’t have to be in one place, or even two, options expand. Amphibious ships aren’t the only vessels Marines can stage from. Ospreys can land on many other naval vessels, even if they can’t support sustained flight operations. The Ospreys could embark, or they might just deliver a contingent of Marines, by alternate insertion means (FAST rope, hoist, etc.) if necessary. Then the ship’s organic air and surface assets would come into play.

With the right preparation, much of the Navy’s fleet could become staging areas for Marines. 

Aircraft carriers are certainly capable of supporting MV-22s. CVNs typically carry two squadrons of H-60s and will soon have their own CMV-22s Ospreys, so have a robust organic insertion capability. They also have sufficient billeting for any GCE Marines. If MV-22s deliver Marines to destroyers or cruisers, those also often have their own helicopters. While they typically carry the MH-60R, not optimized for troop transport, Marines could still use those ships as lilypads for certain missions. Those ships could also deploy small craft with Marines aboard. That would typically be for naval missions like interdiction and counterpiracy, but could also include going ashore for embassy reinforcement or humanitarian assistance. In permissive environments, even USNS vessels could provide staging areas for a small GCE. 

Strike – A Primary Mission

Moving the Ospreys and the tiltrotor company off the ship or distributing these assets across more ships frees up plenty of space above and below deck. This allows for other assets that are more dependent on shipboard space compared to more flexible aviation assets. Those can bring new capabilities such as increased lethality.

Given the number of active theaters today, the 11 big-deck carriers are not enough. However, with the F-35B amphibious strike capability is no longer just providing bomb trucks for low-threat sideshows new amphibious assault formations can strike targets in high-threat environments.

The F-35B is not just a replacement for the AV-8B. It is a 5th generation multirole fighter, capable of penetrating integrated air defenses. But six F-35s per MEU is not sufficient. Due to the situational awareness the F-35 provides pilots, its preferred maneuver element is a division of three or four aircraft, vice the sections of two that AV-8Bs typically employ. Given 75 percent availability, eight aircraft are required to make two light divisions, and thus support sustained combat flight operations. With eight F-35Bs, both the strike and counter-air capabilities of the MEU are dramatically improved. Having a baseline detachment of eight F-35s per MEU will enable a full spectrum of missions, especially a fairly robust offensive and defensive counter-air capability, which the AV-8B was only able to perform in relatively permissive environments. 

Having more F-35s doesn’t just mean more bombs on target. F-35s make every other combatant around them more effective. For example, F-35Bs are capable of directing SM-6 intercepts, HIMARS strikes, and providing in-flight retargeting support to other networked munitions. The SM-6 is not only a capable SAM, but can also be used to engage surface targets. The HIMARS is not limited to working ashore, but can also be fired from a ship’s deck, filling the long-neglected gap in naval gunfire support. Ship-launched HIMARS could also provide amphibious platforms with a powerful new anti-ship capability without requiring launch cells, further expanding the high-end mission set to include sea control.

The F-35 links the ships of the ESG together into something far more deadly and survivable than before. Big-deck amphibs can become formidable strike platforms, reaching out not just with the F-35Bs themselves, but also with their networking support for other shooters distributed across the battlespace.

HSC to VSC?

If LHAs and LHDs are to be legitimate strike and counter-air platforms, they are going to need greater logistics and search-and-rescue (SAR) capability. The current Navy SAR detachment aboard the LHD/LHA is only capable of relatively short-range recovery in secure areas, generally overwater “planeguard” duty. But soon the Navy will be fielding its own enhanced variant of the MV-22, the CMV-22.

A CMV-22 detachment would enhance the capability of both the Navy and the Marine Corps team. With CMV-22s aboard, the Navy could reclaim the long-range SAR mission. This is key if amphibs are going to routinely serve as strike platforms and perform a greater role in sea control. With the right equipment and personnel, this could provide a capability well up the SAR decision matrix, making a VSC detachment valuable as a joint theater personnel recovery asset.

Using more F-35Bs means using more engines, including those the CMV-22 is uniquely suited to carry, not to mention the additional bombs and missiles a “lighting carrier” would need. This is in addition to the benefits of being able to conduct longer-range resupply in general, especially at the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific. The CMV has an 1150nm range, roughly 300nm greater than an MV.

That is not a small investment on the part of the Navy. Replacing the expeditionary MH-60S with CMV-22s would require 22 aircraft, assuming that the squadron and the ship keep similar deploy-to-dwell ratios. With additional Fleet Replacement Squadron, pipeline, and attrition aircraft, the ultimate requirement would be 25 to 30 CMV-22s to sustainably outfit all the big-deck amphibs. That said, the MH-60S is starting to come up on the point when recapitalization is necessary. With the CMV-22 already being purchased for COD, expanding that community to include the gator Navy offers a huge increase in capability for a marginal increase in cost.

In exchange for that investment, the Navy and Marine Corps can make a leap from a marriage of convenience in their rotorcraft fleets to a truly synergistic and integrated partnership.

Room to Grow

Even with the addition of F-35Bs and trading MH-60Ss for CMV-22s, there is still significant room for adding capability.

One of the recurring complaints about the MV-22 is that it is too large for certain missions, such as VBSS (Visit Board Search and Seizure). While the UH-1N was not able to do significant troop lift, the UH-1Y can. That means the aviation combat element (ACE) needs at least four, not the typical three aircraft. At a readiness rate of 75 percent, that would allow a section of UH-1Ys to be devoted to assault support, especially in support of special missions and hard hits. The third would be able to perform any other tasks in the utility mission set. The Marine Corps has already purchased attrition aircraft over its T/O requirement that could be used to fill this need immediately. If this employment proves useful, additional UH-1Ys could be purchased to preserve this capability into the future.

There are normally four AH-1Zs assigned to the ACE. With a typical four aircraft to make three, the addition of that extra UH-1Y would allow an extra mixed section of skids to provide CAS and FAC(A) when shooting becomes the priority. The Yankee brings significant CAS capability, including Precision Guided Munitions – for now just APKWS rockets, but in the future, likely Hellfire missiles as well. 

Unmanned Systems 

The Marine Corps and the Navy are working past each other when it comes to UAS. The Marines field small tactical platforms and the Navy seeks to enhance sea control with larger systems. Neither of those efforts reaches the other, nor provides top cover for the critical period when Marines transition ashore.

The Marine Corps has begun the MAGTF Unmanned Expeditionary program (MUX), looking to acquire a large UAS capable of vertical takeoff. For CAS and persistent ISR, it requires a Group 5 UAS, a huge asset in normal MEU operations. Just as importantly, a VSTOL UAS with a reconfigurable payload and long endurance would make every platform around it, both Navy and Marine, more capable.

Currently the ESG does not have an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability. Its organic sensors are limited by line-of-sight from just above the waterline, or at best from the radars of MH-60Rs from surface combatants, which can provide coverage for only a few hours at a time, even if they are near enough. Sea-skimming threats traveling below the radar horizon would pose a considerable threat, making an organic AEW capability fundamental for awareness and survivability in a high-end threat environment.

Currently an LHD or LHA flight deck is able to support only eight to twelve hours of flight operations a day. A long-endurance UAS would extend this coverage greatly, staying in the air even when ships aren’t at flight quarters. With two, ideally three, AEW-equipped units, MUX would enable almost continuous coverage.

AEW would allow the F-35Bs to stay on the deck in an alert status appropriate for the threat, vice burning hours overhead performing the same AEW function. MUX could also detect and cue air or surface targets for other shooters. Long-range weapons like Tomahawk and the Long Range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM) work best when standoff observation and in-flight retargeting support is readily available, and where unmanned aviation platforms can be more readily risked to provide time-critical networking support.  

Marines are still Naval Infantry

In the future, we can’t assume that we will possess uncontested sea control, whether in the objective area or in transit. The ESG may have to fight its way there. Every asset aboard every ship, including manned and unmanned aircraft, whether they have “Marines” or “Navy” painted on the side, must work in concert. We need to move beyond the construct where the Navy exists only to move Marines to an objective, into one where elements of both are a cohesive fighting team from embarkation to debarkation.

With V-22s, every ship can have access to a Marine detachment when needed. We do not always need CVNs for strikes if we have F-35B-capable amphibious ships. With additional UH-1Ys, the ACE can execute more direct action missions and CAS, relieving other high-demand assets. And with the right UAS providing overwatch, the ESG should never be surprised.

Once we stop thinking of the Navy and Marine Corps as operating in distinct domains, the survivability and lethality of the ESG and the MEU, and even carrier strike groups and surface action groups will be increased. Employed correctly, emerging Marine and Navy aviation platforms, such as the F-35B, CMV-22, and MUX, combined with the assets of the MEU, ARG, and ESG, will make the integrated Navy-Marine team more capable and deadly. 

Carl Forsling is a retired Marine officer and pilot with multiple deployments flying the CH-46E and MV-22B as well as advising Afghan security forces. He currently works in the aerospace industry and is a senior columnist at Task&Purpose. He is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and Boston University. He is married with two children and lives in Arlington, Texas.

Featured Image: BAB EL-MANDEB STRAIT (Aug. 18, 2019) The amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) transits in formation through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dalton S. Swanbeck/Released)