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Do You Have To Do “Analysis” To Call It A Wargame? Actually, No.

By BJ Armstrong and Marcus Jones

“If my career were ahead instead of behind me, I should endeavor to the extent of my ability, and at the earliest opportunity, to acquire as thorough a knowledge of the principles of the art of war as possible, and should neglect no opportunity to train myself in their application by playing competitive war games.” –Admiral William Sims, 1921

With enemy destroyers approaching from the southern end of the Philippine archipelago, the commander faced a critical decision: Should he launch a risky strike with his dwindling VLS weapon supply, or chart a course eastward to evade and regroup in the vast Pacific for a future battle?

This scenario was the challenge for a Midshipman Fourth Class, serving as the commander of American forces in a recent wargame hosted by the Naval Academy Wargaming Society in collaboration with Bancroft Hall’s training program. Facilitated by CDR Ken Maroon, PhD, these combat scenarios in and around the contemporary South China Sea have become a staple of Saturday mornings in the Wargaming Lab beneath Mahan Hall. Acting as part of a makeshift Maritime Operations Center, Naval Academy Plebes in this scenario not only reinforced their professional knowledge of American naval forces, but also grappled with the complexities of naval decision-making and critical thinking in a dynamic, high-pressure environment.

Phil Pournelle’s recent article “Does it Matter if You Call It a Wargame? Actually, Yes,” calls on CIMSEC readers and the larger military and national security community to consider the taxonomy of how we think about the events that are commonly called “wargames.” He offers vital distinctions and a way to think about the teleology of exercises that often fall into a rather large kitchen sink. However, there is an important element of the wargaming enterprise which is overlooked, when the focus is only on analysis and the operations research outcomes that good wargames can provide, but not their education value.

Educational wargaming is not merely an exercise in concept development in the upper reaches of command. It is a crucible for forging the decision-making skills, adaptability, and intellectual overmatch required for contemporary naval challenges in the earliest stages of a young officer’s development. Wargaming, particularly at the pre-commissioning level, transforms the learning experience by engaging participants in narrative-rich, synthetic environments that mimic the pressures of real-world decision-making. Drawing on historical precedents and recent innovations, we see a central role of wargaming in cultivating the next generation of naval leaders at the U.S. Naval Academy. 

More Than Concept Development and Analysis

Since the 19th century, wargaming has been an invaluable educational tool for the U.S. military. Early efforts, including Kriegspiele at U.S. Army schools after the Civil War, were followed by Lieutenant McCarty Little’s development of a wargaming curriculum in the early years of the U.S. Naval War College. Later, the interwar games conducted there shaped the strategies and tactics for victory in the Pacific during World War II and were transformative not only because they tested operational concepts but because they prepared commanders for the cognitive and emotional challenges of command. This historical precedent underscores the enduring value of wargaming in creating synthetic experiences that sharpen the mind for future crises.

In the 21st century as they did then, these efforts offer a low-cost, low-risk environment for naval professionals to test tactics, strategies, and operational concepts, shape their knowledge of past and contemporary military scenarios, and condition their decisions within them. At USNA, a host of recent initiatives have laid the keel of our midshipmen’s knowledge of the maritime world and established their understanding of the core concepts of American seapower.

The Naval Academy is doubling down on the educational value of wargames through Saturday morning battalion training sessions, the activities of the student-led Wargaming Society club, wargame scenarios in history department classrooms, and the incorporation of wargame modules into the new Maritime Warfare (NS300) course taught by the Professional Development Department.

The resurgence of wargaming in military education over the past decade underscores its value in achieving an intellectual overmatch against today’s potential adversaries. In 2015, then Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus described wargaming as invaluable for testing new ideas in a low-risk environment. Former Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger later emphasized that wargaming is essential for practicing decision-making against a thinking enemy, while then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown highlighted the role of wargaming in adapting continually to a shifting global strategic landscape. ​Despite this, current military education often delays wargaming exposure until mid-career, resulting in missed opportunities for developing decision agility and professional competency from the outset of a naval professional’s development.

Introducing wargaming at the pre-commissioning level lays the groundwork to address the Department of the Navy’s admitted deficiency in wargaming literacy at the operational and strategic levels of war. By introducing the practice of wargaming as early as possible in an officer’s development, we cultivate a mindset that embraces complex, multi-layered, competitive decision-making and innovative thinking about enduring military problems and concepts. Early exposure also mitigates later-career reliance on professional civilian wargamers and facilitates the operational integration of wargaming principles into military organizations. This in turn enhances the role and value of wargaming later in officers’ careers.

Laying the keel with early wargaming experiences embeds key cognitive attributes in young officers, preparing them to think deeply and creatively about history and its relation to contemporary warfare. The initiatives at USNA introduce midshipmen to the complexities of naval decision-making early in their careers, fostering the critical thinking and adaptability essential for future operational challenges. By embedding these skills at the pre-commissioning level, USNA prepares its graduates to contribute meaningfully to advanced wargaming processes later in their careers.

Wargaming as Interdisciplinary Thinking and Applied History

The educational program at USNA is admirably multidisciplinary, with particular focus on the study of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Integrating wargaming into this educational framework puts specific aspects of STEM education into context, demonstrating how these disciplines contribute to the multi-domain operations of today’s Joint Force. For example, understanding hypersonic technology’s impact on military operations or how cyber capabilities enable traditional land, sea, and air operations provides a deeper and broader understanding of modern warfare. Additionally, wargaming offers invaluable practical applications for the disciplines of math and economics by highlighting the central role of risk and probability in the adjudication at the heart of wargame processes, allowing midshipmen to apply theoretical concepts to real-world strategic and tactical scenarios.

Done well, educational wargaming serves as a form of applied history, offering midshipmen a unique way to engage with historical events, processes, causation, and outcomes. By building and working through historical scenarios, students develop a deeper understanding of the complexity and contingency of historical decision-making, amplifying their growth as leaders at every level. Midshipmen learn to ask the hard questions and wrestle with complex answers in ways that apply both to thinking about the past and reasoning through the operational and strategic challenges of the present.

Critical thinking and decision-making skills are, of course, buzzwords of the moment in higher education generally and officer development especially. More than just asking hard questions, however, thinking critically involves being willing to explore disruptive and alternative ideas. The process of designing, playing, and analyzing wargames requires students to think strategically, anticipate opponents’ moves, and make quick, informed decisions under pressure. These skills are directly transferable to real-world military and civilian leadership roles, where effective decision-making can have significant consequences. Of course, poorly designed scenarios can reinforce false assumptions or oversimplify complex realities, leading to flawed conclusions. As Peter Perla warns, the danger lies in creating narratives that are emotionally compelling but factually misleading.

To maximize their educational value, wargames must strike a careful balance between realism and abstraction, ensuring that participants grapple with the uncertainty and complexity of real-world operations without succumbing to simplistic or sanitized portrayals. Moving forward, wargaming activities at the Naval Academy must remain engaged with the Fleet’s contemporary posture and challenges, lest the practice of wargaming become abstract and fall into irrelevance.

Charting a Course on the Severn

Wargaming has a long history on the banks of the Severn River, though perhaps not as long as in Narragansett Bay. In the 1930s and 1960s, Naval Academy professors developed wargames for class use to enhance historical and contemporary understanding. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Academy relied on computer-based Navy Tactical Game (NAVTAG) to provide valuable opportunities for professional development and competition between companies and classes. The NAVTAG provided both educational and training simulation opportunities to the Brigade, but was sunset because of lack of financial and technical resources with the end of the Cold War.

In 2020, the Naval Academy Museum and History Department launched a wargaming initiative which created two main lines of effort. For a few years the History Department offered an experimental historical wargaming class, where midshipmen intensively studied an historical scenario and developed a wargame based on it. Concurrently, the Combat Action Lab was established, an Extra-Curricular Activity (ECA) today called The Wargaming Society, for Midshipmen to engage with the practice in an informal, midshipman-led setting. These efforts have developed over four years to include professional development events on Saturday mornings and the introduction of contemporary wargaming problems as the crowning experience in the new Maritime Warfare course. Efforts to bring these and other multidisciplinary lines of effort together, with the necessary resourcing and organizational structure, offer much promise for a robust future wargaming enterprise at USNA.

When today’s naval professionals and veterans think of wargaming, they often map it to operations research analysis, Pentagon decision-making, and mid-to-senior career development. There is great value in the analytical games, as described by CDR Anthony LaVopa in his recent article “Building Warfighting Competence: The Halsey Alpha Wargaming Experience,” and in their staff and war college level use. But, wargames are ‘story-living experiences’ that transcend traditional methods of teaching and analysis at all levels of seniority and experience including at the precommissiong level. By immersing participants in synthetic environments where decisions have tangible consequences, they provide a powerful means of cultivating the intellectual and emotional resilience essential for leadership in today’s demanding operational environments. As the U.S. Naval Academy continues to expand its wargaming initiatives, it is laying the keel for a generation of officers prepared to confront the uncertainties of a rapidly changing strategic landscape.

Captain Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, PhD is an Associate Professor of War Studies and Naval History and the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Dr. Marcus Jones is an associate professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy.

The thoughts and opinions expressed by the authors of this article are offered in their personal and academic capacities and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the U.S. Navy or any government agency. 

Featured Image: U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Jan. 1, 2013) An F/A-18C Hornet of the Warhawks of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 97 launches from the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kenneth Abbate/Released)

Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Jason Lancaster

The Navy’s annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan should be replaced with a congressionally-appropriated fleet act. This act would fund the construction of the fleet the nation needs. Over the past 10 years of annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans the fleet has shrank, not grown. U.S. shipbuilders lack the capability to build the required ships because there is little consistency in U.S. warship procurement.

Annual budget changes destroy consistency in the annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. The table below displays the ever-shrinking fleet. The fleet in fiscal year (FY) 27 and 44 are highlighted. FY44 was used instead of FY49 for consistency throughout the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans.

During the late 19th century and early 20th century, the United States, Imperial Germany, and AustriaHungary used fleet acts to fund desired force designs. Congress funded the Two-Ocean Navy Act in 1940 to expand the fleet by more than 70 percent. One would think that the imperial governments of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary would only have to persuade their Kaiser, but both nations’ Chiefs of Navy had to have their shipbuilding plans approved by their respective parliaments.

The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 provides a framework for a similar congressional act. In 1940, Congress authorized:

(a) Capital ships, 385,000 tons
(b) Aircraft carriers, 200,000 tons
(c) Cruisers, 420,000 thousand tons
(d) Destroyers, 250,000 tons
(e) Submarines, 70,000 tons

This act provided significant funding for ships, munitions, and shipyard expansions. It would help give the Navy a running start on wartime expansion by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor more than a year later.

In Imperial Germany, Admiral Tirpitz proposed a fleet act that requested a Navy of a certain size. This plan assumed a replacement ship for each battleship after it reached 25 years of service life. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were passed in 1898, 1900, 1908, and 1912. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were based principally on assessments of the UK Royal Navy’s strength and requirements to defend overseas colonies.

Austria-Hungary had a similar system. After Italy began building battleships, Admiral Montecuccoli’s initial fleet plan was denied due to domestic politics. Admiral Montecuccoli eventually persuaded a shipyard to produce the first two ships. He secured a personal loan of 32 million Austrian Crowns to begin construction on the Viribis Unitis and Tegethoff while promising the government would procure the ships the following year.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy dealt with partisan politics. Montecuccoli was an expert at balancing political factions to accomplish his fleet plan. Czech delegates publicly voted against the Navy bill for partisan reasons, but privately supported it. The Czech company Skoda Works produced steel armor and battleship guns, offering well-paying jobs for Bohemia and Moravia, but the central government was antagonistic toward Czech independence.

Today, we have witnessed the Navy attempt to back out of block buys designed to reduce cost because annual DoD budgets did not support additional ships for the navy. A fleet act would provide the steady demand signal for ships that would enable companies to invest in required materials to sustain affordable shipbuilding for the long term.

It took decades for the Navy to reach this state. It will take steady and consistent funding to return the Navy to its desired size. A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.

Commander Jason Lancaster, USN, is a student at the National War College. He has served at sea in destroyers, amphibious ships, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: 1994 – A view of various ships under construction at the Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Front to back are the guided missile cruiser Port Royal (CG-73), the guided missile destroyer Stout (DDG-55) and the guided missile destroyer Mitscher (DDG-57). Inboard of Stout is the guided missile destroyer Ramage (DDG-61) and inboard of Mitscher is the guided missile destroyer Russell (DDG-59). (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Francis Crozier

Time and time again the Navy seems to have to reckon with three irreconcilable questions:

1. What does the Navy want to do with its global reach?
2. What legitimate global interests does the Navy have?
3. Does the Navy have the logistical capability to stay in proximity to those interests?

Issues like these have stood out during Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led effort to protect international shipping passing through the Red Sea. Two issues in particular stand out, with the first being the problems faced by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the second being the regular retasking and deployment extensions of warships.

The MSC backbone for fleet replenishment is often understaffed and underfunded, with few oilers in the 5th fleet area of responsibility. USNS Alan Shepard and USNS Big Horn were taken out of action after running aground in May and September of last year, leaving only USNS Amelia Earhart to replenish coalition and U.S. warships.

The Navy is fortunate to have the ability to contract private oilers on short notice that are U.S.-Navy certified and capable of refueling warships at sea. But this service comes at triple the cost of contracting MSC oilers and cannot always be relied upon if a large naval conflict were to kick off. The MSC also cannot support a global Navy with global reach if it is actively sidelining vessels to ensure proper manning to those ships it deems critical to sustain operations. Contracting private oilers is a stop-gap and not a permanent solution.

Second, Operation Prosperity Guardian required repeated retasking of critical assets from theaters where arguably the U.S. has greater strategic interests. In order to allow the Eisenhower CSG to return to Norfolk, covering the Red Sea required retasking the Theodore Roosevelt CSG from her deployment to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility. The Abraham Lincoln CSG was also retasked to the Middle East before they even entered the 7th fleet AOR. These decisions left no operating CSG in the 7th fleet for the first time since 2001, despite repeated Navy and administration pronouncements of China being the number one national security threat.

The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment. The new administration should make a comprehensive reassessment of global force posture and consider optimizing the Navy’s presence against China, especially with the Navy focused on a potential conflict in 2027.

Francis Crozier is a pseudonym for a sailor who holds a Bachelors Degree in World Politics focusing on Russian Affairs and Economic Development from the Ohio State University. He currently serves as a Petty Officer Second Class on board a U.S. destroyer.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Mitchell Parcell, a V-22 tiltrotor crew chief assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a native of Montana, observes the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Luzon Strait Oct. 8, 2024. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Amelia Kang)

Strengthen America’s Maritime Borders

Notes to the New Administration Week

By David Ware

As a retired U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Customs and Border Protection Supervisor in Hawaii, I have done warrantless border searches of yachts and fishing vessels as well as large commercial vessels. We apprehended many violators with arrest warrants from all over the United States. Seizures of weapons, including an AK-47, were made. Illegal drugs were often encountered. Illegal immigrants were taken into custody.

Intelligence and enforcement must go hand-in-hand. Many of these small boats simply pop over the horizon without notice or warning. Customs, Coast Guard, and the state of Hawaii cooperated to ensure a seamless approach. That was 30 years ago. In 2003, everything changed with the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In the aftermath of 9/11, Customs and Immigration inspections were combined into CBP, and their respective investigations were combined into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)/Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). This was a mistake because Customs’ role in border security was subjugated to strictly admissibility and immigration issues. We became part of DHS, a government entity still trying to define its mission today in 2025.

The United States has an enormous coastline, including the Pacific, the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and also the Great Lakes which we share with Canada. For political reasons, enforcement across the Great Lakes, including at the Port of Buffalo, NY, was curtailed several decades ago. But after 9/11, Customs reinforced the northern border before the southern border because it was considered more of a threat for terrorist penetration. There was also intelligence after the 9/11 attacks that suggested Al-Qaeda would put a weapon of mass destruction in a cargo container on a vessel, possibly coming across the Pacific from China or Japan, potentially into or via Hawaii.

What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.

Maritime security extends far beyond the continental United States. While illegal vessels come up from Mexico and Latin America on both the east and west coasts, the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia seek to dominate and control the high seas in strategic waters near U.S. allies and territories. It is not just PLA Navy warships that threaten America, it is China’s comprehensive maritime power and gray zone strategy, which includes a substantial coast guard and paramilitary element for which we have no commensurate response. Consider Chinese vessels approaching the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without a visa, or illegally entering Guam on boats. Both are U.S. territories of strategic value. Chinese coast guard vessels and maritime militia are also on the frontlines of encroaching upon U.S. partners and allies in day-to-day operations, and could serve many wartime roles as well.

The new administration should focus on maritime security, both at home and abroad, because it has long been neglected. The number one threat to maritime security is China. Unguarded seacoasts are America’s greatest vulnerability.

David Ware is a retired federal officer with 42 years of combined military and civilian federal service. He served in the U.S. Air Force, with service in the Philippines and Okinawa during the Vietnam War era. He has extensive experience dealing directly with Pacific nations and territories in Project Cook and the Customs Asia-Pacific Enforcement Reporting System (CAPERS). He is a retired U.S. Customs and Border Protection supervisor and analyst.

Featured Image: A Coast Guard Cutter Diligence pursuit team interdicts a “go-fast” boat suspected of smuggling illegal drugs (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Cutter Diligence/Released)