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NATO Week

A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Anna Matilde Bassoli

After more than a year of disrupted global trade, the Red Sea Crisis appears to have no end in sight. Rather, in a series of leaked messages, senior U.S. officials have cast doubts over U.S. involvement and “having to bail Europe out again.” However, while frustration on each side of the pond is understandable, emotions fail to address the root causes of growing transatlantic distrust. The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy. A coherent NATO naval strategy requires the United States and its European allies to align their postures, without the EU as the third wheel.

On December 18, 2023, the United States called upon allies to respond to the Houthi attacks on global shipping with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. This multinational coalition was intended to include the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and others. However, only the UK, Canada, and Norway upheld their commitment. A few days after this announcement, most European navies withdrew to join the EU-led Operation Aspides, an overlapping defensive mission. Specifically, European navies explicitly rejected US leadership and command in an unprecedented transatlantic schism. The establishment of the EU-led Operation Aspides has resulted in a divided naval commitment and undermined efforts in the Red Sea Crisis in three crucial ways.

First, this divided effort has effectively deprived Prosperity Guardian of European naval assets over the past year. The Italian Navy has committed two destroyers and two frigates to Aspides, contrary to the single frigate initially announced in support of Prosperity Guardian. The French Navy has provided three frigates to Aspides, while it remains unclear what role they would have played in Prosperity Guardian. Similarly, the German and Belgian navies each contributed a frigate. Other European navies have divided their limited commitments between both missions, although it is unclear under which command. For example, the Hellenic Navy provided two frigates to Aspides, while the Royal Netherlands Navy contributed one frigate, a joint support ship, and aviation assets. Even the newest members of NATO, Sweden and Finland, have shown inconsistent commitment, with both countries providing only limited personnel. Despite its initial commitment to the US-led effort, Spain made no contributions. Interestingly, however, Spain’s ports benefited from the crisis, placing the country in an ambiguous position.

These commitments – or lack thereof – contrast sharply with the United Kingdom’s contribution to Prosperity Guardian during the same timeframe. In addition to the destroyers HMS Diamond and HMS Duncan, the Royal Navy provided two frigates and critical air support. While this still pales compared to the US show of force, it demonstrates the UK’s consistency in its transatlantic commitment. The other European powers cannot claim to have done similarly. The Danish Navy, for instance, sent the HDMS Iver Huitfeldt, but ship malfunctions plagued its performance, resulting in the dismissal of the Danish chief of defense. Furthermore, the French Navy has prioritized French-linked vessels, indicating that national interests rather than transatlantic ones drive their participation.

Second, the European decision to withdraw from participation in Prosperity Guardian shows how Europe was already veering towards strategic autonomy before the Trump administration came to the White House. Upon announcement, the Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense specified that Italy, France, and Germany were pushing for an EU-only operation of a purely defensive nature, without land strikes. This European insistence on going solo deserves a deep dive. For starters, Europeans have criticized the Trump administration’s stance on transatlantic relations in recent weeks, calling for renewed unity. However, the lack of European support for the US-led effort demonstrates that European conduct has been inconsistent with their leaders’ rhetoric and parallel maritime commitments. For instance, Europeans have been eager to participate in Indo-Pacific exercises and showcase these efforts as a sign of strong friendship. In the same breath, Spain has actively participated in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean. However, a key question arises: how can the United States truly trust its European allies if they only show up to train and not to engage?

In this respect, the US offensive approach against the European defensive posture demonstrates that the transatlantic allies could not be more distant. By the time European navies were rotating their naval forces in the summer of 2024, some commentators had already started casting doubts on the effectiveness of Prosperity Guardian as a purely defensive mission. In response to this lack of results, the United States doubled down on eliminating the Houthi threat and deterring further attacks with strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen under Operation Poseidon Archer. Once again, however, European commitment has been limited, and preference has been given to the defensive posture of Operation Aspides. The problem plagues transatlantic relations is not the Trump administration’s aggressive stance towards Europe. Rather, the lack of entente between the US’s forward-leaning posture and the EU’s defense posture has eroded trust and partnership across the Atlantic.

Third, the US’s lack of acknowledgment of the EU as a security actor has undermined its efforts. Most recently, Michael C. DiCianna has argued that “Europe needs to fight the Houthis.” However, his analysis focuses only on Prosperity Guardian, as if it were the only ongoing operation in the Red Sea, incorrectly accounting for the European contribution. Similarly, Doug Livermore acknowledges European contributions but employs a US-only perspective to make the case for using force in the Red Sea Crisis. Neither of these authors seems to grasp the actual problem. It is not that Europe does not fight – from the European perspective, they are protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Rather, the European and US perspectives on transatlantic security and interests do not align.

This analytical bias highlights two major problems in the US debate. First, it shows that the United States only views Europe through NATO lenses, while Europeans increasingly look to the EU to bolster their security needs. Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides began while transatlantic relations were still good. So, why did the Europeans part ways with the United States? The most evident answer points to European strategic autonomy, meaning a European defensive approach for European interests within the EU.

As evident in the Red Sea, none of this concerns the United States. Rather, Aspides attempts to demonstrate that Europe could rely on the EU as a security actor. The strong push behind an EU-led, European-only defense, particularly regarding defense spending and the primary US request since the first Trump administration, is not the result of a sudden storm. Instead, renewed US aggressiveness has further nudged the Europeans towards strategic autonomy. Indeed, Europeans have been most vocal and proactive regarding their security, not within NATO, but in the EU. The EU will never fight for US interests or in the US way. This is not what the EU was created for. On the contrary, this was why NATO was established, making it an organization suited to defend US and European interests in the American way.

This also highlights the second major problem in the US debate. Because the United States ignores the EU as a security actor, it fails to recognize that the EU and NATO rely on two opposite perspectives. Misunderstanding the difference between the EU’s inward-focused posture and the US’s forward-leaning one undermines US attempts to reset transatlantic relations. While US commentators correctly ask Europeans to contribute more, they overlook their counterparts’ perspective. From the US point of view, fighting the Houthis means not only preventing attacks on the seas but also bombing their positions on land. For Europeans, this is excessive, rendering US complaints about their conduct dangerously pointless.

In no other domain has this mistaken approach had more consequences than in the naval domain. The US viewpoint is forward-leaning – hence, offensive – towards protecting SLOCs, involving heavy military force. On the other hand, the European perspective is reactive, building convoy-like defenses around commercial ships. In short, Americans prefer to charge ahead, whereas Europeans tend to build trenches. The Red Sea Crisis exemplifies this dynamic.

The Euro-American split has resulted in two overlapping operations acting from different perspectives without a common end goal. While the EU-led Operation Aspides focuses solely on protecting commerce, US-led efforts have multilayered strategic goals: protecting SLOCs, demonstrating maritime strength on the global seas, and eroding Iran’s influence in the Middle East by striking its proxies. From the US viewpoint, these goals are not isolated but interconnected ends on a dynamic maritime chessboard, where the ultimate objective is to checkmate China. From the European perspective, China is not even on the board.

Indeed, contrary to popular US belief, the Red Sea Crisis is not about European trade; rather, it is about US sea power. The United States is not fighting the Houthis to bail out freeloading Europeans. This view is contrary to US interests and damaging to US strategy. The United States is taking charge of a maritime crisis because it can still be the premier global maritime power. This demonstration of maritime strength sends two messages. First, the United States still dominates the seas. Second, the United States is not a dead sea power to China. Underestimating the value of these messages in the context of strategic competition with China is a fatal mistake for the US.

To be fair, concerns about straining US naval forces are valid and must be addressed. However, once again, these concerns must be addressed in accordance with US naval strategy, not against it. Indeed, an increased European commitment should not continue on the premise of split naval strength. This is an open subversion of all the basic principles of US naval strategy: overwhelming naval power, control of the sea lines of communications, and maritime dominance. If the United States concedes any of these to either friend or foe, the sea power that has supported US freedom and prosperity will crumble.

The United States must leverage NATO to align transatlantic allies. This will require two key steps. First, the United States must tone down its anger towards its transatlantic allies. Autonomy-seeking Europeans might be more incentivized to maintain their defensive posture if they view the United States as an adversary. So far, this trend has been evident, and there is no reason for the United States to make Europeans even less inclined to contribute to transatlantic efforts.

The second step could involve a more structured division of labor in the Red Sea. Throughout history, very few maritime crises involving land-based attacks on commercial shipping have ended without a major deployment of strength. While the United States has a strong interest in striking the Houthis to keep Iran in check, the Europeans have an interest in keeping SLOCs open. The current approach – the United States striking the Houthis from the sea while the Europeans continue their convoy-like missions – is a good starting point. However, the split command and lack of matching European resources must cease. To make this work, the Europeans should reduce their commitments in the Indo-Pacific until the Red Sea Crisis is resolved. This would allow the United States to allocate resources effectively between the two connected theaters. Likewise, the United States should clarify that a unified command is crucial to bring this crisis to a halt.

A better understanding of expectations and goals in the Red Sea could generate premises to mend transatlantic fences. Presently, no one has the perfect recipe to bring this crisis to a halt, and a split approach has likely extended the crisis. Not only have the Houthis taken the lead in messaging victory, but the first true victim of this crisis – the Israeli port of Eilat – has fallen under financial pressure. Time has run out for the United States to complain about Europe without a plan. Likewise, time has proven that the European Union is still not a reliable security actor. An integrated NATO strategy that accounts for both US and European perspectives is the only choice for victory. The alternative option spells defeat.

Anna Matilde Bassoli holds a M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a MLitt in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She also earned a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy. She currently works in the think tank industry, focusing on tech policy and security.

Featured Image: The UK Royal Navy (RN) Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (foreground) and Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond hand over on station as the RN vessel contributing to Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)

NATO Week

Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas 

Based on our experience designing and analyzing recent Naval War College wargames in the Euro-Atlantic theater, U.S. and NATO maritime forces face several challenges in maintaining readiness, enhancing lethality, and accelerating decision-making—core priorities underscored by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The North Atlantic and High North are increasingly contested, as Russian submarine operations and grey zone activities intensify and China extends its influence deeper into strategically critical Atlantic corridors.

There are several areas where greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces could enhance warfighting readiness and crisis response. These include streamlining command relationships, enhancing maritime domain awareness, harmonizing rules of engagement, strengthening maritime logistics, integrating NATO into North American defense planning, and improving amphibious force employment. While NATO navies bring significant capability to bear, optimizing these areas will ensure that the alliance is positioned to deter aggression, enhance decision advantage, and maintain maritime superiority in an increasingly complex and contested security environment.

This article offers insights and recommendations based on our wargaming experience to help U.S. and NATO naval leaders strengthen operational integration, refine force employment, and better prepare for future maritime challenges in the Euro-Atlantic theater.

Streamline Unity of Effort in the Atlantic and High North

With multiple U.S. and NATO maritime commands operating across the Atlantic and High North, there is a valuable opportunity to enhance unity of effort by refining command relationships, synchronizing force employment, and accelerating decision-making. Effective coordination among U.S. Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), and Striking Forces NATO (SFN) ensures that Allied maritime forces can operate seamlessly in a contested environment. Wargame insights consistently emphasize the importance of shared mission awareness, mission command, and persistent training to reinforce operational alignment and clarify multinational naval task force responsibilities.

Recent initiatives have bolstered deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic theater, such as the establishment of a second maneuver fleet under NAVEUR’s temporary control and a forward deployed expeditionary Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in Europe. These efforts have improved multi-echelon coordination and operational flexibility between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, demonstrating the benefits of closer integration. Additionally, refining command integration between SFN and MARCOM—two key NATO maritime components—presents a further opportunity to strengthen transatlantic force employment. SFN, responsible for high-end maritime strike capabilities, reports directly to SACEUR, while MARCOM serves as both NATO’s Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) and the Maritime Component Commander for multiple Joint Force Commands (JFCs). Ensuring secure communications, clear command authorities, and persistent joint training will enhance NATO’s ability to employ maritime forces rapidly and effectively at the task force and task group levels.

Another key step toward greater unity of effort is elevating JFC Norfolk to a 4-star command. As NATO’s only transatlantic operational command, JFC Norfolk serves a vital role in linking U.S. and NATO maritime operations, yet its current structure requires balancing U.S. and Allied priorities across multiple echelons. Elevating JFC Norfolk would enhance command focus on transatlantic operations, improve decision-making agility, and better align command relationships within NATO’s maritime architecture. Most importantly, structuring Allied maritime commands for crises and conflict—rather than peacetime—will ensure standing U.S. and NATO maritime forces and planners are ready and integrated to deter aggression and respond decisively in the Atlantic and High North.

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness and Situational Awareness

U.S. and NATO maritime forces have a unique opportunity to sharpen their maritime domain awareness (MDA) and situational awareness by strengthening intelligence-sharing and coordination across the Atlantic and High North. Both forces field some of the world’s most advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, but their full potential can only be realized through seamless integration of policies, technologies, and operational procedures. Enhancing coordination between key commands—NAVEUR, NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN—will create a more comprehensive and real-time picture of the maritime battlespace, enabling faster threat detection, more agile decision-making, and greater operational effectiveness in contested environments.

A critical step toward this goal is developing a federated Common Operating Picture (COP) that integrates multi-domain sensor data from both U.S. and NATO maritime forces. This approach would reduce ISR fragmentation, allowing commanders to detect, track, and respond to threats with greater speed and precision. Whether countering adversary submarine movements, grey-zone activities, or long-range maritime threats, a more connected ISR network would enhance decision-making, improve force employment, and reinforce deterrence, ensuring NATO and U.S. maritime forces maintain a strategic advantage in dynamic operational theaters.

However, technology alone is not the answer. Persistent joint training, operational scenario-driven wargames, and multinational staff exchanges will be essential to refining intelligence-sharing processes and breaking down procedural barriers. Regular stress-testing of ISR coordination in realistic threat conditions will enhance interoperability, clarify authorities, and increase confidence across the alliance. By taking these steps, U.S. and NATO maritime forces will build a more unified, resilient, and responsive transatlantic naval force—one that can anticipate, deter, and decisively respond to emerging threats in an increasingly contested maritime security environment.

Maximizing Authorities and Rules of Engagement 

In fast-moving maritime operations, commanders need the ability to act swiftly and in sync with their allies. U.S. and NATO forces operate under different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and authorities, but instead of seeing this as a constraint, there’s an opportunity to leverage these differences to enhance operational agility. A deeper understanding of how each nation’s approval processes work—who can authorize what and when—can reduce delays, increase interoperability, and open the door to more flexible force employment. When commanders operate with shared awareness of authorities, they are better equipped to act decisively and prevent adversaries from exploiting procedural gaps.

Expanding this understanding is a practical step toward greater coordination and combat effectiveness. If commanders know when and how NATO and U.S. assets can operate under each other’s authorities, they can more effectively integrate forces in real time. For example, U.S. and NATO surface and submarine forces could be tasked interchangeably in a crisis, making force posture more dynamic and responsive. Instead of working around bureaucratic seams, commanders could focus on maximizing the collective strength of the alliance to deter and respond to threats with greater speed and cohesion.

To further streamline decision-making, establishing pre-approved Crisis Response Options and real-time coordination cells would allow forces to act immediately when needed. Setting clear engagement triggers across all warfare domains—surface, subsurface, air, cyber, and electronic warfare—would synchronize responses across NATO and U.S. maritime forces, closing decision-making gaps that adversaries might otherwise exploit. Aligning ROE where possible, increasing transparency of authorities, and enabling faster approvals will ensure that U.S. and NATO maritime forces can operate as a unified force, projecting deterrence and strength in an increasingly complex security environment.

Enhancing Operational Resilience

Sustaining maritime operations in the Atlantic and High North is not just about moving fuel, munitions, and supplies—it’s about ensuring forces can stay in the fight when and where they’re needed most. The ability to rapidly resupply ships at sea, repair battle damage, and sustain operations away from fixed infrastructure is what separates an agile, combat-ready force from one that risks being sidelined when it matters most. Wargaming has provided a valuable way to stress-test sustainment strategies, identify weak points before they become real-world problems, and explore new ways to keep fleets operational in contested environments.

A major takeaway from these efforts is the importance of stronger coordination between key sustainment commands like NAVNORTH, NAVEUR, MARCOM, and SFN. In fast-moving operations, small misalignments in logistics planning can lead to big problems. Establishing dedicated logistics coordination cells and integrating sustainment planning more deeply into operational decision-making can help ensure the right resources are available at the right time. The more aligned NATO and U.S. sustainment efforts become, the better prepared forces will be to sustain prolonged operations across the Atlantic.

Another critical piece is expeditionary logistics—the ability to keep ships on station without having to pull back to port for resupply and repairs. While the U.S. has made significant advances in vertical replenishment (VERTREP) and at-sea rearming, many NATO warships still rely on fixed facilities, which limits flexibility. Expanding interoperability in afloat logistics, forward-deploying repair capabilities, and developing mobile resupply facilities will keep ships in the fight longer. Additionally, prepositioning sustainment stockpiles across North America and Europe will help reduce dependence on major ports and ensure forces remain operational regardless of access challenges. Logistics isn’t just a support function—it’s a warfighting necessity. The ability to sustain combat operations anytime, anywhere will be a decisive factor in maintaining maritime superiority in the Atlantic.

Expanding U.S.-NATO Naval Integration for North American Defense

As security dynamics in the Atlantic and High North continue to evolve, there is a growing opportunity to strengthen U.S.-NATO naval integration and expand cooperation in North American defense. Traditionally, NATO’s maritime forces have focused on collective defense under Article 5, while homeland defense responsibilities have remained largely within national command structures. However, as adversaries increase activity across the Atlantic, greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces can enhance deterrence, improve crisis response, and provide more flexible force employment options.

One way to achieve this is by better integrating NATO maritime forces into existing U.S. defense planning and operations. Coordination among NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN has often been episodic rather than institutionalized, making it more reactive than proactive. By establishing routine collaboration, expanding NATO’s operational footprint in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, and refining joint maritime situational awareness, NATO and U.S. commanders alike can improve force synchronization and enhance maritime domain awareness. This approach would allow for faster response times, increased interoperability, and a stronger deterrent posture in the event of a crisis.

There are several practical steps that could further this integration. Embedding NATO liaison officers within NAVNORTH and NORTHCOM would improve real-time coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint maritime-air defense planning. Additionally, posturing NATO naval and air assets for homeland defense missions in the North Atlantic and Arctic would provide an immediate and credible deterrent while ensuring NATO forces are better aligned with U.S. homeland defense efforts. Expanding NATO’s ISR capabilities—such as maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and early warning systems—into NAVNORTH’s defense networks would significantly strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), reducing strategic surprise and improving early threat detection.

Looking ahead, the current rotation of Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) between JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples means that JFC Norfolk lacks dedicated forces assigned during competition, limiting its ability to establish a continuous deterrent presence and provide a rapid response in the Atlantic and High North. Given the operational demands in both European and transatlantic theaters, relying solely on the existing SNMG rotation is insufficient to maintain persistent maritime presence and readiness. To address this, SACEUR should consider establishing an additional SNMG and a dedicated Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) detachment under JFC Norfolk. This would ensure a standing force capable of sustained ASW, surface warfare, and air defense operations in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, reinforcing NATO’s ability to deter aggression and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Strengthening U.S.-NATO Amphibious Integration

As maritime security threats evolve, U.S. and NATO amphibious forces have a unique opportunity to enhance integration, ensuring they are prepared for rapid employment in contested littorals. NATO fields highly capable amphibious units—including the U.S. Marine Corps, UK Royal Marines, Dutch Korps Mariners, and French, Italian, and Spanish Marine forces—yet their combined employment under NATO command remains a work in progress. Without a standardized framework for command relationships, questions around operational and tactical control can arise, creating opportunities to refine how these forces are assigned, tasked, and employed in competition, crisis, and conflict.

With near-peer competitors and regional actors expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the ability to project power and secure key maritime terrain is becoming more critical. Wargame insights have highlighted how U.S. and NATO amphibious forces could serve as a key element of deterrence, enabling fleet maneuver while limiting adversary freedom of action. At the same time, the current NATO command structure—where Striking Forces NATO (SFN) oversees high-end strike capabilities and MARCOM serves as the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)—presents an opportunity to clarify how amphibious forces integrate into larger NATO maritime operations. Further alignment with Joint Force Commanders in Norfolk, Naples, and Brunssum will ensure these forces are positioned for effective and decisive employment.

To strengthen interoperability and readiness, aligning amphibious operations within a cohesive U.S.-NATO framework will be essential. This includes refining mission requirements across the continuum of competition, crisis, and conflict, as well as integrating these forces into routine joint planning, training, and execution cycles. Regular multinational exercises, wargames, and professional military education programs will reinforce interoperability, build familiarity between U.S. and NATO amphibious units, and enhance their ability to respond rapidly when called upon. By institutionalizing these efforts, NATO’s amphibious forces will be better prepared to operate as a unified, combat-ready force capable of deterring aggression and securing key maritime terrain in crises and conflict.

Way Ahead

Wargaming has long been a powerful tool for refining strategy, testing assumptions, and strengthening operational effectiveness. Over the past several years, we’ve seen firsthand how it can shape real-world planning and decision-making. By stress-testing command structures, exploring new approaches to force employment, and fostering greater integration between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, wargames have directly informed adjustments that enhance unity of effort across the Atlantic. These insights have helped refine coordination among key commands, sharpen deterrence, and improve readiness to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly complex security environment.

Looking ahead, there is an opportunity to build on this momentum by further aligning command structures, intelligence-sharing, sustainment networks, and amphibious operations. As the maritime domain becomes more contested, ensuring seamless coordination between U.S. and NATO forces will be essential for maintaining freedom of movement, deterring aggression, and preparing for high-end conflict. Strengthening transatlantic maritime integration will not only enhance crisis response but also enable a more agile and lethal force, ready to operate across the spectrum of competition and conflict.

To sustain maritime superiority, the focus must remain on proactive planning, persistent training, and continued investment in warfighting capabilities. As adversaries seek to exploit operational seams, U.S. and NATO forces must stay ahead by reinforcing their deterrent posture and refining how they fight together. Through deliberate efforts to streamline command relationships, improve operational integration, and expand warfighting capabilities, the alliance will ensure it is ready—not just to compete, but to prevail in any future conflict.

Dr. Walter Berbrick is a senior military analyst with Netsimco, a Saalex Company, and the Lead Analyst of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa. He served 15 years on the Naval War College’s faculty, leading the research design and analysis for the Trans-Atlantic Maritime Command and Control (TAMC2) wargame series from 2019 to 2024.

Dr. Terence Nicholas is an Assistant Professor in the Wargaming Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. He currently serves as the Lead Designer of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official positions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government organization. Wargames, including the TAMC2 series described here, are not predictive and do not forecast future events; they serve as independent analytical research events intended to provide insights and inform decision-making.

Featured Image: HMS Prince of Wales and the embarked Air Wing leads NATO maritime forces as part of Joint Warrior 24-1, part of NATO’s Steadfast Defender exercise series. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)

Podcast

Sea Control 571: Revolutionary Taiwan with Catherine Lila Chou and Mark Harrison

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By Brian Kerg

Scholars Catherine Lila Chou and Mark Harrison join the program to discuss their recent book, Revolutionary Taiwan: Making Nationhood in a Changing World Order. Their book discusses the making of the Taiwanese nation, which sees itself as a state and a homeland in its own right, despite having not achieved formal international recognition. In addition, the book explains why democratization in Taiwan constituted a revolution, changing not just the form of government over the island, but also how Taiwanese people conceptualized the land in which they live.

Catherine Lila Chou is Assistant Professor of History at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. For six years prior, she taught at Grinnell College in Iowa, where she was promoted to Associate Professor in 2024. She holds a PhD in early modern European history from Stanford University.

Mark Harrison is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Tasmania, Australia. He holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. He is co-editor of the Brill Taiwan Studies Series and an Expert Associate of the National Security College of the Australian National University.

Download Sea Control 571: Revolutionary Taiwan with Catherine Lila Chou and Mark Harrison 

Links

1. Revolutionary Taiwan: Making Nationhood in a Changing World Order, by Catherine Lila Chou and Mark Harrison, Cambria, 2024.

2. Taiwan’s 400 Year History: Anniversary Edition, by Su Beng, 施朝暉, 2017.

3. Catherine Lila Cho Twitter account.

4. Mark Harrison Twitter account.

Brian Kerg is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at [email protected].

Addison Pellerano edited and produced this episode.

NATO Week

French Maritime Strategy – Carrier-Led and Indo-Pacific Focused

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NATO Naval Power Week

By David Scott

French maritime strategy has been on full public display with the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from November 2024 to April 2025, carrying out an extended deployment across the Indo-Pacific in the furthest ever Operation Clemenceau.

The French Carrier Strike Group included various components:

  • FS Charles de Gaulle: nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
  • FS Forbin: air defense destroyer,
  • FS Provence: anti-submarine frigate,
  • FS Alsace: air defense frigate
  • FS Duguay-Trouin: nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN)
  • FS Jacque Chevallier: logistics support ship
  • Loire-class offshore support and assistance vessel

The air wing included 22 Rafale Ms, two E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and three helicopters. The CSG, commanded by Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard, left Toulon on November 28.

The planned operation had been denounced in the Chinese state media, in the Global Times on November 4, under the headline “French aircraft carrier’s planned deployment panders to NATO’s expansion into Asia-Pacific.”

Initially the French CSG was deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, where France, like Italy, has concerns over Russian basing in Libya. It was initially accompanied for escort duties in the Mediterranean by the Italian frigate ITS Virginio Fasan. The CSG then transited the Suez Canal on December 24 and on April 10. The Houthis did not interfere in the CSG’s transit on its way to and from the Indian Ocean. 

Strategic Interests

France is a resident state in the Indo-Pacific, with around 1.5 million French citizens inhabiting its overseas territories of Mayotte, La Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. These parts of France are located south of the Equator, spread across the southern reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and are key to France having the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with 90 percent of it located in the Indo-Pacific. Freedom of navigation and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) are wider concerns for France in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, under threat from Houthis in the Red Sea and China in the South China Sea. Maritime cooperation and maritime partnerships with other countries has been a particular feature of French strategy. France’s President led from the top in visits to Australia and New Caledonia in 2018 where Macron talked of an “Indo-Pacific axis” (l’axe Indo-Pacific) amongst China-concerned states; amongst which “France is a great power (une grande puissance) of the Indo-Pacific.”

French maritime strategy for the Indo-Pacific has focused around three planks. First are its maritime holdings in the southern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally Reunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia), and the base in Djibouti. Second are deployments from metropolitan France. Third are varied strategic partnerships around the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally India and Japan) region. The latter two were very much on show with the deployment of its Carrier Strike Group for Operation Clemenceau.

Maritime interests require maritime assets to defend and maintain them. Here the French Navy is the only European navy, along with the British Royal Navy, that has a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and an aircraft carrier.

January 2025: Sailors from the Charles De Gaulle carrier strike celebrate the new year while deployed in the Indian Ocean as part of Mission CLEMENCEAU 25. (French Navy photo)

Carrier Capability

The nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle is the flagship of the French Navy. The ship, commissioned in 2001, is catapult-equipped for its three squadrons of Dassault Rafale M warplanes, which also allows for operations by U.S. Super Hornets. Its full load displacement is 42,500 tons, surpassing France’s earlier and conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau and the Foch, which served from 1961 to 2000 and had a full load displacement of 32,780 tons.

With the successful construction of the Charles de Gaulle, there was initial consideration during the 2000s of building a second aircraft carrier, to be called the Richelieu, in collaboration with U.K. designs being used for the construction of HMS Queen Elizabeth. However, that co-development route was abandoned in 2008, and the 2013 French Defense White Paper likewise abandoned the pursuit of a second French carrier. In retrospect, might this have been a strategic error in force design?

Instead, attention eventually turned to a long-term replacement of the Charles De Gaulle. Macron’s announcement in 2020 was for another nuclear-powered New Generation Aircraft Carrier (Porte-avions de nouvelle generation, or PA-NG) which leaves France as a one-carrier navy. Nevertheless, this represents a jump in capacity, a super-carrier of 75,000 tons displacement, that was also longer and wider than the Charles de Gaulle. The main construction and assembly is envisaged between 2032-2035 with initial sea trials on nuclear power in early 2036. If this timetable can be met, then the ship is scheduled to commission in 2038, ready for the de-commissioning of the Charles De Gaulle.

Work has already started on the new French super-carrier. The commitment to the program was demonstrated by the placing of contracts for long lead items in April 2024. This included elements of the nuclear propulsion system and preparatory infrastructure work at the Chantiers de l’Atlantique shipyard. General Atomics landed a $41.6 million contract in December 2024 to design cutting-edge Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for the envisaged carrier.

With regard to general French maritime strategy the Charles de Gaulle is a particularly powerful aircraft carrier, its nuclear propulsion nature unmatched in Europe where the U.K. (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales), and Italian aircraft carriers (ITS Cavour) remain conventionally powered. Only the U.S. has nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 11 in all: CVN-68 to CVN-78, made up of 10 Nimitz-class carriers and one Gerald R. Ford-class carrier.

However, France remains hampered by its single status aircraft carrier, powerful though it is. China, India, and the U.K. have two aircraft carriers, which enables one to remain active while the other is refitted and maintained. The Charles de Gaulle’s mid-life refit between February 2017 and September 2018 removed her from operations for 18-months. Given this limitation, the French Navy’s decision to deploy this sole carrier to the Indo-Pacific for five months is all the more significant.

Aims of Operation Clemenceau

The operation was announced in November 2024. Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard announced that the deployment had “4 main objectives:”

(1) First of all, contribute to national and European operations in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean. These operations are meant to strengthen the maritime security in the area.

(2) To develop interoperability with partners and allies in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

(3) To promote through this deployment a free, open and stable Indo Pacific with our regional partners in the frame of international law.

(4) Finally, to contribute to the protection of our population and of our interests in the Indo Pacific where France is a coastal nation, and it must exercise its sovereignty on all its overseas territories.

In going across the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific various exercises were carried out with various partners and allies in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, in effect a focus on objectives 3 and 4. However, in actually not deploying to French possessions in the southern reaches, the CSG did not particularly meet objective 4, where local forces continued to maintain French presence.

French Navy aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle sets sail for Operation Clemenceau on Feb. 21 2021. (French Navy photo)

Activities of Operation Clemenceau

Operations with India were in two phases. The first was after friendly port call at Goa, the CSG carried out varied exercises off Kochi on January 9. Tactical evolution maneuvers were carried out by the CSG with INS Mormugao, during which the fleet replenishment tanker FNS Jacques Chevallier refueled the Indian vessel; while Rafale fighters from the Charles de Gaulle carried out joint anti-aircraft drills with Indian Sukhoi and Jaguar fighters.

Operations in the Indonesia Sea commenced with a historic port call at Jakarta, the first ever by a French carrier. This was followed by the 5th iteration of the multinational exercise La Perouse, from January 16-24, in which the French CSG led maritime security and cooperation drills with the Indian, Australian, Canadian, U.K. and U.S. navies. In addition to these established partners and allies, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore participated in La Perouse for the first time.

La Perouse was divided into three components, in the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits locations reflecting the French mission statement that the exercise was designed and located “to secure strategic maritime lines.” The Malacca Strait phase ran from Thursday to Sunday, with the Forbin drilling first with RMN corvette KD Lekir (FSG26), training ship KD Gagah Samudera (271), an RMN fast combat boat, and two Royal Malaysian F/A-18D Hornet fighters in the Malacca Strait. These drills included a simulated local air-defense exercise, a surface firing exercise, and an advance interdiction and boarding exercise. The Forbin then conducted drills with the Singapore littoral mission vessel RSS Independence in the Singapore Strait, which joins the Malacca Strait’s southern exit. The Jacques Chevalier also pulled into Singapore for a logistical stop. In the Sunda Strait phase Indonesia provided base support for two French Navy Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) participating in La Perouse, which had arrived on January 11, after a four-day trip from Lann-Bihoue naval air base in France with a logistics stopover in India.

French Navy destroyer Forbin departing from her homeport of Toulon ahead of the Clemenceau 25 deployment. (Photo by Hervé Dermoune)

The largest part of the exercise, the Lombok Strait phase, involved the CSG drilling with established partners. Commanding officers from Australia’s destroyer HMAS Hobart, the Canadian frigate HMCS Ottawa, India’s destroyer INS Mumbai, the U.K. offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey and the U.S. Littoral Combat Ship USS Savannah gathered aboard the carrier Charles De Gaulle on Saturday for a pre-exercise meeting. This six-state format was yet another permutation within the flexible Indo-Pacific strategic geometry that has evolved in response to China. Further spin-offs from the Carrier Strike Group were the friendly port call of the Forbin and Provence to Bali from January 28 to February 3, and the Jacque Chevallier to Darwin on February 4.

The next event for Operation Clemenceau was the CSG participation in Exercise Pacific Steller 2025, a Multi-Large Deck Event (MLDE) hosted by the French Navy in the Philippine Sea from February 8-18. For this first iteration, 14 units from the three participating nations deployed in the Philippine Sea. The French CSG was joined by the Japanese Self Defense Force’s JS Kaga helicopter carrier and the destroyer JS Akizuki, and by the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the destroyers USS Princeton, USS Sterett, and USS William P. Lawrence, and one P-8A maritime patrol aircraft.

PHILIPPINE SEA (Feb. 12, 2025) Ships and aircraft from the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (VINCSG) and Charles De Gaulle French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) travel in formation in the Philippine Sea with ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) during Pacific Steller 2025 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Pablo Chavez)

This tri-carrier exercise was visually striking, and the first of its kind between the three states. The high-level training drills included anti-submarine warfare, air defense, cross-decking aircraft, and replenishment at sea exercises. Cross-deck operations included F/A-18F Super Hornets and a CMV-22B Osprey from Carl Vinson landing on and taking off from Charles De Gaulle. In turn, Charles De Gaulle’s embarked Rafale fighters landed on and launched from Carl Vinson. The Jacques Chevalier performed a replenishment at sea for the Kaga, Princeton, and Sterret.

This high-powered trilateral carrier exercise was criticized in the Chinese State media, on February 9 in the Global Times, under the headline “Steller 2025 exercise shows Philippine attempts to expand foreign military presence in SCS.” The North Korean state-state Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also denounced the trilateral exercise as involving “foreign invasion forces.” France responded by sending the frigate Alsace and oiler Jacque Chevallier from the CSG to Okinawa on February 13 to help in monitoring operations in support of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. One of the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft dispatched for La Perouse were also sent on to Okinawa.

The next stop for the CSG was the South China Sea, where the CSG paid a port call to Subic Bay (Manila) on February 23. Its significance was three-fold. Firstly, this was the first ever appearance in the Philippines by a French aircraft carrier. Secondly, this visit was preceded by the largest bilateral drill between the two sides. Thirdly, the exercising with the Philippine Navy took place in the South China Sea waters off Western Luzon in the Philippine EEZ. The exercising involved the French CSG, the Philippine flagship BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Gregorio del Pilar, as well as French Rafale and Philippine FA-50PH fighter jets. Their exercise focused on aerial and anti-submarine warfare. This was a deliberate signal to Beijing and an equally measure of support to the Philippines which had faced rising Chinese pressure over the South China Sea during 2024. French trilateral exercising with the US and the Philippines in the South China Sea the previous year had been denounced in China.

The Provence was detached from the French CSG to carry out a week-long visit to Ho Chi-Minh City from March 1-7. Port call visits were combined with joint maritime search and rescue missions off the Vietnamese coast.

The final substantive operation for Operation Clemenceau, following friendly port calls at Singapore and Colombo, was the bilateral Varuna exercise with India from March 19-22. This involved dual carrier operations between the French Charles de Gaulle CSG and the India INS Vikrant CSG. This second round of exercising with India was an indication of the particularly strong maritime links developing between France and India.

Local Assets

Part of French maritime strategy is to base units in its island territories, and from there deploy around the Indo-Pacific. This is a complement to the periodic more powerful deployments from the French metropolitan waters, witnessed with the CSG between November 2024 and March 2025.

FNS Floreal was dispatched for CTF-150 operation in the Arabian Sea, for Eagle Claw One and Eagle Claw Two in November and December 2024, alongside Pakistan’s PNS Zulfiquar. Even as the CSG was operating in the Western Pacific in Pacific Steller, the French frigate FNS Vendemiaire (based at New Caledonia) docked in Denpasar, Bali, on February 14 as part of its participation in the multilateral exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy from February 14-17. Spring 2025 witnessed the Prairial visiting various places in the South Pacific, including the Cook Islands on February 27, whose government welcomed the visit as “strengthening regional security efforts” and demonstrating “Pacific solidarity.” The context for this is Chinese penetration of South Pacific island states. In a tidy local division of labor, the 2-yearly Southern Cross exercise hosted by France at Wallis and Futuna Islands from April 22 to May 3 brought together forces from Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand. Colonel Frederic Puchois, Chief of the Joint Staff in New Caledonia announced its purpose was to test French “capacity to project forces” from New Caledonia.

Political Underpinnings

 The CSG deployment was not only complemented by ongoing use of local French assets, but also given political support from the highest level during 2025. In January Macron announced at the Ambassadors’ Conference that the Indo-Pacific “is obviously a priority for us.” Ministers also maintained this support.

India enjoys a very high profile for France, already indicated by the two rounds of exercises held by the CSG with India, in January and March. Strategic convergence was reflected in the 7th India France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue held in New Delhi on January 14. It was co-chaired by Shri Pavan Kapoor, Deputy National Security Advisor and Alice Rufo, Director General for International Relations and Strategy, Ministry for the Armed Forces. Their Joint Declaration recorded their common interest in freedom of navigation and need to “support free and secure access to sea lanes of communication.”

On January 28, the French Carrier Strike Group made a port call to Jakarta, to lead the La Perouse exercise. Three days later, on January 31, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Sebastien Lecornu, flew into Jakarta to meet with President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Foreign Minister Sugiono. In the Philippines, the French Joint Commander for Asia Pacific, Rear Admiral Guillaume Pinget, met with Lt. Gen. Jimmy Larida, Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City on February 13, to push forward a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The French Foreign Minister’s visit Jean-Noel Barrot’s visit to Indonesia on March 26 brought their signing of the Indo-Pacific Port Security Project. Finally, President Macron’s Keynote Address at the IIIS Shangri La Dialogue on 30 May, made during his state visit to Indonesia, re-emphasized French interest and commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

The French CSG deployment fits into this pattern of growing European maritime involvement in the Indo-Pacific during the past few years. Indeed, the 2023 U.K.-France Summit had agreed on “the sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific.” In this vein, the Italian CSG deployment in the second half of 2024 was followed by French CSG deployment in the first half of 2025 and immediately followed by U.K. deployment in the second half of 2025. The French CSG group can be seen as a “force multiplier” in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the event of a U.S.-China confrontation. 

Uncertainties

It remains to be seen how far the downturn in U.S.-Europe cooperation witnessed in splits over Ukraine arising in Spring 2025 will affect European juggling of resources between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. With Macron’s address on March 5 identifying Russia as a “threat to France and to Europe,” might France now focus on deploying in European waters rather than across the Indo-Pacific? In light of growing concerns about Russia and signals of American retrenchment from Europe, there may be a shift towards greater French focus on the Mediterranean, given Russian influence in Libya, and up to the Black Sea, in light of Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine. However, and perhaps crucially, France’s resident sovereignty and associated EEZ give France a continuing anchor in the Indo-Pacific, and interests to maintain, that other European actors do not have.

Dr. David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. A prolific writer on Indo-Pacific maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at [email protected].

Featured Image: April 25, 2024 – The French Navy carrier Charles de Gaulle off the coast of Toulon. (NATO photo)