Scholars Catherine Lila Chou and Mark Harrison join the program to discuss their recent book, Revolutionary Taiwan: Making Nationhood in a Changing World Order. Their book discusses the making of the Taiwanese nation, which sees itself as a state and a homeland in its own right, despite having not achieved formal international recognition. In addition, the book explains why democratization in Taiwan constituted a revolution, changing not just the form of government over the island, but also how Taiwanese people conceptualized the land in which they live.
Catherine Lila Chou is Assistant Professor of History at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. For six years prior, she taught at Grinnell College in Iowa, where she was promoted to Associate Professor in 2024. She holds a PhD in early modern European history from Stanford University.
Mark Harrison is Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Tasmania, Australia. He holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. He is co-editor of the Brill Taiwan Studies Series and an Expert Associate of the National Security College of the Australian National University.
French maritime strategy has been on full public display with the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from November 2024 to April 2025, carrying out an extended deployment across the Indo-Pacific in the furthest ever Operation Clemenceau.
The French Carrier Strike Group included various components:
FS Charles de Gaulle: nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
Loire-class offshore support and assistance vessel
The air wing included 22 Rafale Ms, two E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and three helicopters. The CSG, commanded by Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard, left Toulon on November 28.
Initially the French CSG was deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, where France, like Italy, has concerns over Russian basing in Libya. It was initially accompanied for escort duties in the Mediterranean by the Italian frigate ITS Virginio Fasan. The CSG then transited the Suez Canal on December 24 and on April 10. The Houthis did not interfere in the CSG’s transit on its way to and from the Indian Ocean.
Strategic Interests
France is a resident state in the Indo-Pacific, with around 1.5 million French citizens inhabiting its overseas territories of Mayotte, La Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. These parts of France are located south of the Equator, spread across the southern reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and are key to France having the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with 90 percent of it located in the Indo-Pacific. Freedom of navigation and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) are wider concerns for France in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, under threat from Houthis in the Red Sea and China in the South China Sea. Maritime cooperation and maritime partnerships with other countries has been a particular feature of French strategy. France’s President led from the top in visits to Australia and New Caledonia in 2018 where Macron talked of an “Indo-Pacific axis” (l’axe Indo-Pacific) amongst China-concerned states; amongst which “France is a great power (une grande puissance) of the Indo-Pacific.”
French maritime strategy for the Indo-Pacific has focused around three planks. First are its maritime holdings in the southern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally Reunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia), and the base in Djibouti. Second are deployments from metropolitan France. Third are varied strategic partnerships around the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally India and Japan) region. The latter two were very much on show with the deployment of its Carrier Strike Group for Operation Clemenceau.
Maritime interests require maritime assets to defend and maintain them. Here the French Navy is the only European navy, along with the British Royal Navy, that has a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and an aircraft carrier.
January 2025: Sailors from the Charles De Gaulle carrier strike celebrate the new year while deployed in the Indian Ocean as part of Mission CLEMENCEAU 25. (French Navy photo)
Carrier Capability
The nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle is the flagship of the French Navy. The ship, commissioned in 2001, is catapult-equipped for its three squadrons of Dassault Rafale M warplanes, which also allows for operations by U.S. Super Hornets. Its full load displacement is 42,500 tons, surpassing France’s earlier and conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau and the Foch, which served from 1961 to 2000 and had a full load displacement of 32,780 tons.
With the successful construction of the Charles de Gaulle, there was initial consideration during the 2000s of building a second aircraft carrier, to be called the Richelieu, in collaboration with U.K. designs being used for the construction of HMS Queen Elizabeth. However, that co-development route was abandoned in 2008, and the 2013 French Defense White Paper likewise abandoned the pursuit of a second French carrier. In retrospect, might this have been a strategic error in force design?
Instead, attention eventually turned to a long-term replacement of the Charles De Gaulle. Macron’s announcement in 2020 was for another nuclear-powered New Generation Aircraft Carrier (Porte-avions de nouvelle generation, or PA-NG) which leaves France as a one-carrier navy. Nevertheless, this represents a jump in capacity, a super-carrier of 75,000 tons displacement, that was also longer and wider than the Charles de Gaulle. The main construction and assembly is envisaged between 2032-2035 with initial sea trials on nuclear power in early 2036. If this timetable can be met, then the ship is scheduled to commission in 2038, ready for the de-commissioning of the Charles De Gaulle.
Work has already started on the new French super-carrier. The commitment to the program was demonstrated by the placing of contracts for long lead items in April 2024. This included elements of the nuclear propulsion system and preparatory infrastructure work at the Chantiers de l’Atlantique shipyard. General Atomics landed a $41.6 million contract in December 2024 to design cutting-edge Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for the envisaged carrier.
With regard to general French maritime strategy the Charles de Gaulle is a particularly powerful aircraft carrier, its nuclear propulsion nature unmatched in Europe where the U.K. (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales), and Italian aircraft carriers (ITS Cavour) remain conventionally powered. Only the U.S. has nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 11 in all: CVN-68 to CVN-78, made up of 10 Nimitz-class carriers and one Gerald R. Ford-class carrier.
However, France remains hampered by its single status aircraft carrier, powerful though it is. China, India, and the U.K. have two aircraft carriers, which enables one to remain active while the other is refitted and maintained. The Charles de Gaulle’s mid-life refit between February 2017 and September 2018 removed her from operations for 18-months. Given this limitation, the French Navy’s decision to deploy this sole carrier to the Indo-Pacific for five months is all the more significant.
Aims of Operation Clemenceau
The operation was announced in November 2024. Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard announced that the deployment had “4 main objectives:”
(1) First of all, contribute to national and European operations in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean. These operations are meant to strengthen the maritime security in the area.
(2) To develop interoperability with partners and allies in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
(3) To promote through this deployment a free, open and stable Indo Pacific with our regional partners in the frame of international law.
(4) Finally, to contribute to the protection of our population and of our interests in the Indo Pacific where France is a coastal nation, and it must exercise its sovereignty on all its overseas territories.
In going across the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific various exercises were carried out with various partners and allies in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, in effect a focus on objectives 3 and 4. However, in actually not deploying to French possessions in the southern reaches, the CSG did not particularly meet objective 4, where local forces continued to maintain French presence.
French Navy aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle sets sail for Operation Clemenceau on Feb. 21 2021. (French Navy photo)
Activities of Operation Clemenceau
Operations with India were in two phases. The first was after friendly port call at Goa, the CSG carried out varied exercises off Kochi on January 9. Tactical evolution maneuvers were carried out by the CSG with INS Mormugao, during which the fleet replenishment tanker FNS Jacques Chevallier refueled the Indian vessel; while Rafale fighters from the Charles de Gaulle carried out joint anti-aircraft drills with Indian Sukhoi and Jaguar fighters.
Operations in the Indonesia Sea commenced with a historic port call at Jakarta, the first ever by a French carrier. This was followed by the 5th iteration of the multinational exercise La Perouse, from January 16-24, in which the French CSG led maritime security and cooperation drills with the Indian, Australian, Canadian, U.K. and U.S. navies. In addition to these established partners and allies, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore participated in La Perouse for the first time.
La Perouse was divided into three components, in the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits locations reflecting the French mission statement that the exercise was designed and located “to secure strategic maritime lines.” The Malacca Strait phase ran from Thursday to Sunday, with the Forbin drilling first with RMN corvette KD Lekir (FSG26), training ship KD Gagah Samudera (271), an RMN fast combat boat, and two Royal Malaysian F/A-18D Hornet fighters in the Malacca Strait. These drills included a simulated local air-defense exercise, a surface firing exercise, and an advance interdiction and boarding exercise. The Forbin then conducted drills with the Singapore littoral mission vessel RSS Independence in the Singapore Strait, which joins the Malacca Strait’s southern exit. The Jacques Chevalier also pulled into Singapore for a logistical stop. In the Sunda Strait phase Indonesia provided base support for two French Navy Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) participating in La Perouse, which had arrived on January 11, after a four-day trip from Lann-Bihoue naval air base in France with a logistics stopover in India.
French Navy destroyer Forbin departing from her homeport of Toulon ahead of the Clemenceau 25 deployment. (Photo by Hervé Dermoune)
The largest part of the exercise, the Lombok Strait phase, involved the CSG drilling with established partners. Commanding officers from Australia’s destroyer HMAS Hobart, the Canadian frigate HMCS Ottawa, India’s destroyer INS Mumbai, the U.K. offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey and the U.S. Littoral Combat Ship USS Savannah gathered aboard the carrier Charles De Gaulle on Saturday for a pre-exercise meeting. This six-state format was yet another permutation within the flexible Indo-Pacific strategic geometry that has evolved in response to China. Further spin-offs from the Carrier Strike Group were the friendly port call of the Forbin and Provence to Bali from January 28 to February 3, and the Jacque Chevallier to Darwin on February 4.
The next event for Operation Clemenceau was the CSG participation in Exercise Pacific Steller 2025, a Multi-Large Deck Event (MLDE) hosted by the French Navy in the Philippine Sea from February 8-18. For this first iteration, 14 units from the three participating nations deployed in the Philippine Sea. The French CSG was joined by the Japanese Self Defense Force’s JS Kaga helicopter carrier and the destroyer JS Akizuki, and by the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the destroyers USS Princeton, USS Sterett, and USS William P. Lawrence, and one P-8A maritime patrol aircraft.
PHILIPPINE SEA (Feb. 12, 2025) Ships and aircraft from the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (VINCSG) and Charles De Gaulle French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) travel in formation in the Philippine Sea with ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) during Pacific Steller 2025 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Pablo Chavez)
This tri-carrier exercise was visually striking, and the first of its kind between the three states. The high-level training drills included anti-submarine warfare, air defense, cross-decking aircraft, and replenishment at sea exercises. Cross-deck operations included F/A-18F Super Hornets and a CMV-22B Osprey from Carl Vinson landing on and taking off from Charles De Gaulle. In turn, Charles De Gaulle’s embarked Rafale fighters landed on and launched from Carl Vinson. The Jacques Chevalier performed a replenishment at sea for the Kaga, Princeton, and Sterret.
This high-powered trilateral carrier exercise was criticized in the Chinese State media, on February 9 in the Global Times, under the headline “Steller 2025 exercise shows Philippine attempts to expand foreign military presence in SCS.” The North Korean state-state Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also denounced the trilateral exercise as involving “foreign invasion forces.” France responded by sending the frigate Alsace and oiler Jacque Chevallier from the CSG to Okinawa on February 13 to help in monitoring operations in support of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. One of the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft dispatched for La Perouse were also sent on to Okinawa.
The next stop for the CSG was the South China Sea, where the CSG paid a port call to Subic Bay (Manila) on February 23. Its significance was three-fold. Firstly, this was the first ever appearance in the Philippines by a French aircraft carrier. Secondly, this visit was preceded by the largest bilateral drill between the two sides. Thirdly, the exercising with the Philippine Navy took place in the South China Sea waters off Western Luzon in the Philippine EEZ. The exercising involved the French CSG, the Philippine flagship BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Gregorio del Pilar, as well as French Rafale and Philippine FA-50PH fighter jets. Their exercise focused on aerial and anti-submarine warfare. This was a deliberate signal to Beijing and an equally measure of support to the Philippines which had faced rising Chinese pressure over the South China Sea during 2024. French trilateral exercising with the US and the Philippines in the South China Sea the previous year had been denounced in China.
The Provence was detached from the French CSG to carry out a week-long visit to Ho Chi-Minh City from March 1-7. Port call visits were combined with joint maritime search and rescue missions off the Vietnamese coast.
The final substantive operation for Operation Clemenceau, following friendly port calls at Singapore and Colombo, was the bilateral Varuna exercise with India from March 19-22. This involved dual carrier operations between the French Charles de Gaulle CSG and the India INS Vikrant CSG. This second round of exercising with India was an indication of the particularly strong maritime links developing between France and India.
Local Assets
Part of French maritime strategy is to base units in its island territories, and from there deploy around the Indo-Pacific. This is a complement to the periodic more powerful deployments from the French metropolitan waters, witnessed with the CSG between November 2024 and March 2025.
FNS Floreal was dispatched for CTF-150 operation in the Arabian Sea, for Eagle Claw One and Eagle Claw Two in November and December 2024, alongside Pakistan’s PNS Zulfiquar. Even as the CSG was operating in the Western Pacific in Pacific Steller, the French frigate FNS Vendemiaire (based at New Caledonia) docked in Denpasar, Bali, on February 14 as part of its participation in the multilateral exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy from February 14-17. Spring 2025 witnessed the Prairial visiting various places in the South Pacific, including the Cook Islands on February 27, whose government welcomed the visit as “strengthening regional security efforts” and demonstrating “Pacific solidarity.” The context for this is Chinese penetration of South Pacific island states. In a tidy local division of labor, the 2-yearly Southern Cross exercise hosted by France at Wallis and Futuna Islands from April 22 to May 3 brought together forces from Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand. Colonel Frederic Puchois, Chief of the Joint Staff in New Caledonia announced its purpose was to test French “capacity to project forces” from New Caledonia.
Political Underpinnings
The CSG deployment was not only complemented by ongoing use of local French assets, but also given political support from the highest level during 2025. In January Macron announced at the Ambassadors’ Conference that the Indo-Pacific “is obviously a priority for us.” Ministers also maintained this support.
India enjoys a very high profile for France, already indicated by the two rounds of exercises held by the CSG with India, in January and March. Strategic convergence was reflected in the 7th India France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue held in New Delhi on January 14. It was co-chaired by Shri Pavan Kapoor, Deputy National Security Advisor and Alice Rufo, Director General for International Relations and Strategy, Ministry for the Armed Forces. Their Joint Declaration recorded their common interest in freedom of navigation and need to “support free and secure access to sea lanes of communication.”
On January 28, the French Carrier Strike Group made a port call to Jakarta, to lead the La Perouse exercise. Three days later, on January 31, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Sebastien Lecornu, flew into Jakarta to meet with President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Foreign Minister Sugiono. In the Philippines, the French Joint Commander for Asia Pacific, Rear Admiral Guillaume Pinget, met with Lt. Gen. Jimmy Larida, Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City on February 13, to push forward a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The French Foreign Minister’s visit Jean-Noel Barrot’s visit to Indonesia on March 26 brought their signing of the Indo-Pacific Port Security Project. Finally, President Macron’s Keynote Address at the IIIS Shangri La Dialogue on 30 May, made during his state visit to Indonesia, re-emphasized French interest and commitment to the Indo-Pacific.
The French CSG deployment fits into this pattern of growing European maritime involvement in the Indo-Pacific during the past few years. Indeed, the 2023 U.K.-France Summit had agreed on “the sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific.” In this vein, the Italian CSG deployment in the second half of 2024 was followed by French CSG deployment in the first half of 2025 and immediately followed by U.K. deployment in the second half of 2025. The French CSG group can be seen as a “force multiplier” in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the event of a U.S.-China confrontation.
Uncertainties
It remains to be seen how far the downturn in U.S.-Europe cooperation witnessed in splits over Ukraine arising in Spring 2025 will affect European juggling of resources between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. With Macron’s address on March 5 identifying Russia as a “threat to France and to Europe,” might France now focus on deploying in European waters rather than across the Indo-Pacific? In light of growing concerns about Russia and signals of American retrenchment from Europe, there may be a shift towards greater French focus on the Mediterranean, given Russian influence in Libya, and up to the Black Sea, in light of Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine. However, and perhaps crucially, France’s resident sovereignty and associated EEZ give France a continuing anchor in the Indo-Pacific, and interests to maintain, that other European actors do not have.
Dr. David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. A prolific writer on Indo-Pacific maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at [email protected].
Featured Image: April 25, 2024 – The French Navy carrier Charles de Gaulle off the coast of Toulon. (NATO photo)
For the next several years, European security is likely to appear less prominent within United States foreign policy. Even if the U.S. remains militarily present in Europe and the North Atlantic, it may demand some form of financial compensation for doing so, as evidenced by the potential U.S.-Ukraine natural resources deal. Although the increase in defense spending by many NATO members since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a positive development for European security writ large, it will likely be years before European navies are ready to face Russian aggression independently, should the U.S. withdraw its support.
To keep the U.S. engaged in the waters around Europe, European NATO members must find areas of common interest with the U.S. The threat of China to both European and American security interests creates many such opportunities. By monitoring China’s activities in the Arctic, becoming more active in the Indo-Pacific, and buying American, Europeans can maintain a strong military and industrial link to the U.S. even if U.S. military presence in and around Europe shrinks in the near future.
Guarding the Arctic
The Arctic has become an arena for great power competition between the U.S., Russia, and China. China recently declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” and is establishing mining and drilling operations in the region. By collaborating with Russia, China has expanded its economic and military presence in the far north. China launched its first domestically built polar icebreaker in 2019 and its container ships have transited the Arctic Ocean more than 100 times since 2013. In late 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard spotted a joint Chinese-Russian naval patrol within 12 nautical miles of the Alaskan coastline. By drawing attention to China’s presence in the Arctic, either by China itself or China in partnership with Russia, Europe can increase the chances of America looking north.
Throughout the Cold War, the High North was an area of concern for NATO. For decades, surveilling Soviet submarines navigating the GIUK gap (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) was a critical task for NATO forces. American-built naval systems are already present in NATO forces with a major stake in the Arctic. Both Britain’s Royal Air Force and the Royal Norwegian Air Force use the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, while Germany is beginning to acquire P-8s of its own. As the U.S. begins to operationalize its response to China’s growing Arctic presence, it can look to NATO’s latent, modernized maritime patrol capability to bolster its efforts, one that is perfectly suited to sustain a watchful eye over the High North.
Contributing to Indo-Pacific Security
There are economic and political reasons for Europe to reduce its dependence on China, even if it does not result in a “decoupling” to the extent some have advocated for the U.S. to achieve. Europe has lost numerous manufacturing jobs to China, akin to the “China shock” discussed in America. The Center for European Reform has warned of a second China shock in the near future.
However, the damage done by further manufacturing outsourcing would pale in comparison to that done by outright war. In 2023, then-U.K. Foreign Secretary James Cleverly warned that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would effectively destroy world trade, harming European as well as Pacific Rim nations:
“About half of the world’s container ships pass through these vital waters [the Taiwan Strait] every year, laden with goods bound for Europe and the far corners of the world. Taiwan is a thriving democracy and a crucial link in global supply chains, particularly for advanced semi-conductors.”
In December 2024, Luke Patey, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, warned European policymakers that “the European Union needs a China contingency,” to prepare for the effects of a Chinese-Taiwan conflict on the availability of such vital products as semiconductors, solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles.
It is not out of the realm of possibility that European vessels may find themselves fighting alongside Taiwanese and American ships against the People’s Liberation Army Navy. If Washington prioritizes competition with China for the next several years, European countries willing to share the burden would likely see the U.S. reciprocating in European security affairs.
How to accomplish this? The playbook is already well established. Several European navies have operated in the Indo-Pacific in recent years. In 2021, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabethcarried American and British F-35s through the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. After striking ISIS targets in the Levant, the bilateral task force participated in Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021 with Australian and Japanese forces.
Meanwhile, France, the only country besides the U.S. with a nuclear-powered carrier, recently deployed its flagship Charles de Gaulle to the Pacific for the first time, taking part in the exercise Pacific Steller alongside Japan and the U.S. Italy, though maybe not known as a country with Indo-Pacific interests, deployed its carrier Cavour to the region last year in a trip that included a visit to Japan. Germany too deployed frigates to the Pacific in 2024, asserting the importance of freedom of navigation to China’s disapproval. NATO partners should consider more of the same, by embedding in U.S.-led task forces and operations in the Indo-Pacific to further advance U.S.-European partnerships.
Buying American
Buying U.S. defense products allows Europe to keep the U.S. close. At a time when Europe’s most important ally seems to have grown fickle in its friendship, Europeans may find they have an interest in placing political considerations before strictly military ones.
Take the Constellation class frigate (FFG-62) for example. Norway is considering this design for the replacement for its current frigates, along with British, French, and German bids. If those four European countries desired to ensure an American role in building up NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Arctic Ocean, it may be in their interest to collectively ensure Norway chooses the Constellation class.
To be sure, FFG-62 has issues that might make it a suboptimal pick from a strictly military perspective. The fact that Fincantieri Marinette Marine has announced that the delivery of USS Constellation to the U.S. Navy will be delayed, from 2026 to 2029, must give the Royal Norwegian Navy pause about selecting it. Nevertheless, keeping America involved in North Atlantic maritime security may be worth the downside of Norway not procuring its first choice.
Greece is another nation considering the Constellation class. Since Athens has declined the chance to purchase soon-to-be-decommissioned littoral combat ships from the U.S., the Hellenic Navy choosing FFG-62 despite technological qualms can do significant good for transatlantic relations. Former U.S. Coast Guard cutters are another item European fleets may look at. The U.S. has already sent such vessels as Excess Defense Articles to European nations including Georgia and Greece. Would it be worth European navies purchasing cutters instead, if the incoming money kept Washington’s eyes on the Mediterranean and Black Seas?
A large number of NATO members buying American-designed ships will likely be of particular worry to one influential member of the alliance: France. Arms exports are an economic and defense priority for the French government – all parties involved remember the row caused in 2021 when Australia cancelled its planned purchase of French diesel-electric submarines to build nuclear-powered boats with America and Britain through AUKUS.
How can America and France both sell arms to their own benefit in a way that also ensures a continued American role in NATO at sea? Perhaps with a de facto cartel. Paris and Washington can decide among themselves who will sell systems to a given third country, rather than the two continuing to fiercely compete. The defense industries in both countries will benefit, as will transatlantic security. If World War II-era America was the Arsenal of Democracy, this Franco-American partnership can become a Cartel for Democracy.
Conclusion
European maritime security is in a state it has not been in since the Second World War. The extent to which the U.S. will contribute to peace and stability in the North Atlantic is in flux. To increase the chances of the U.S. continuing to be active in the region, European countries must endeavor to marry their maritime security to the greatest extent possible to that of the U.S. In the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, and in defense industrial policy, Europe has chances to keep America engaged. It must take advantage of these opportunities.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any government organization.
Featured Image: NATO forces in exercise Trident Juncture 21. (NATO photo by WO FRAN C.Valverde)
Despite significant and ongoing losses suffered as a result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains a significant threat to NATO members. As NATO restructures to address this new reality, NATO’s naval forces must also restructure to both exploit NATO’s enlargement and better address simultaneous threats in NATO’s waters.
The accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO, two states with highly capable navies, has fundamentally changed the alliance’s military maritime geography. The Baltic Sea is now an operational area dominated by NATO members. Nevertheless, it is not yet a NATO lake with Russia, operating out of St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, capable of creating a range of below-the-threshold and wartime operational effects. At the same time, Russia’s Northern Fleet has largely avoided the force degradation experienced by Russian land forces and continues to pose a challenge in the High North and the North Atlantic.
NATO should create a third Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) dedicated to operations in the Baltic. This would fully exploit the operational benefits of Finland and Sweden joining NATO and take advantage of ongoing force developments in other Baltic NATO navies, including Poland and Germany.
Not only would the new SNMG-3 be drawn largely from Baltic states, but it would also leverage their somewhat bespoke capabilities and regional knowledge. It would also be designed to work closely with regional NATO land and air components, a necessity given the littoral nature of the operating theatre. Furthermore, it would allow SNMG-1 to concentrate fully on its primary area of operations in the North Atlantic without being pulled out of area to manage contingencies and demonstrate presence in the Baltic. NATO will have access to sufficient forces to maintain an extra SNMG and should therefore take advantage of this opportunity.
The Russian Threat in the North Atlantic and the Baltic
At sea, Russia poses a range of threats across the competition continuum to NATO and its members. According to multiple intelligence agencies, Russia’s Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, remains fully operational. While doubts persist over the quality of the fleet’s surface assets, particularly for high-intensity combat and sustained operations, there is consensus that Russia’s undersea platforms pose a significant threat to the alliance. Not only do they have potent warfighting capabilities, but they enable and conduct hybrid operations such as disrupting undersea infrastructure.
At the same time in the Baltic, Russia’s Baltic Fleet and civil maritime presence poses if not an equal but still potent threat to NATO interests. Although Russia is isolated, with every other littoral state a member of NATO, this does not mean the Baltic is a so-called NATO lake. The Baltic fleet and Russian civil and shadow maritime presence have a range of hybrid and traditional warfighting capabilities. The numerous cases of disruption to undersea cables are likely examples of this capability.
The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad presents a significant if not insurmountable challenge to NATO forces. In particular, Russian aircraft, anti-ship, and anti-air missiles deployed at Kaliningrad present an ever-present risk to NATO maritime and air forces. NATO’s solution to this problem is likely a joint approach where a combination of the maritime, land, and air components allow NATO to establish and maintain an advantage.
NATO’s Current Maritime Posture
NATO’s primary warfighting force at sea in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea is SNMG-1. SNMG-1’s overarching wartime mission is to secure transatlantic SLOCs and conduct operations on NATO’s northern flank to establish limited sea control or conduct sea denial activities in areas vital to NATO’s reinforcement. In competition and crisis phase operations, SNMG-1 is tasked with participating in exercises, contingency response, and monitoring Russian activities in the High North, including Russian submarines deployments from the Kola Peninsula. The presence of a robust maritime group in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, and even as far north as the Barents Sea is assessed to be one of the deterrence mechanisms NATO uses in peacetime.
Vitally, NATO relies on SNMG-1 not only to operate in the North Atlantic but also in the Baltic. This divides the group’s operational focus and leaves occasional gaps in NATO’s maritime presence in both vital strategic areas. For example, SNMG-1 regularly participates in the large, annual U.S.-led BALTOPS exercise. SNMG-1 also lent its operational support to the NATO Operation Baltic Sentrywhich is designed to increase NATO’s maritime presence and domain awareness to protect critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic.
This situation was acceptable when NATO members restructured their forces in the post-Cold War world and the perceived threat from Russia was diminished. Indeed, in that period the SNMG’s operational priorities moved away from high-end deterrence and toward a set of constabulary-type operations including peace enforcement, counterpiracy and counter-narcotics operations. Moreover, due to strategic inertia within NATO and shrinking fleet sizes, all NATO SNMGs struggled to maintain required force levels with often only two or three vessels assigned to each group, which would be temporarily reinforced during exercises.
Although national contributions to the four NATO standing maritime groups have increased since 2022, the current strategic and operational situation requires a new solution, one that would provide NATO with standing maritime forces in all key operational areas.
Baltic Naval Forces and SNMG-3
During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea fell under Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, then based at Kolsås in Norway. The maritime component of the command, NAVBALTAP, had the primary mission of denying the Soviet Baltic Fleet entry to the North Sea through the Baltic approaches while also disrupting Warsaw Pact operations in the Baltic itself. By sealing off the Baltic Sea, this ensured that ports vital to NATO resupply were secure and that the Soviet Baltic Fleet could not support the Northern Fleet for operations in the Norwegian Sea.
The situation has now changed. Whereas previously the only Baltic NATO states were Denmark and West Germany, now Russia is surrounded by NATO members. This changes NATO’s operational priorities for the Baltic, where NATO no longer has to deny the Soviet Union the free use of the Baltic. Instead, it must now attain sea control to ensure that the vital SLOCs and undersea infrastructure that sustain many Baltic states are protected, as is the territorial sovereignty of all member states. In addition, NATO can fully exploit its naval superiority in the Baltic Sea and deliver a variety of offensive effects across and through the Baltic theatre should war break out.
Before Finland and Sweden joined NATO, it could be argued that Baltic Sea NATO members did not have sufficient capabilities to maintain an SNMG dedicated to their waters. The situation has now changed. Not only do Sweden and Finland bring new capabilities to NATO’s force structure, they also join other NATO Baltic states – Poland, Germany, and Denmark – that are currently investing in new naval platforms. Combined, these new ships will provide NATO with sufficient surface capabilities around which to form a new SNMG, which as with other SNMGs, would have one commander and flagship that would rotate from country to country.
Finland is currently in the process of strengthening their navy with four new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes. The first of these 4,300-ton vessels is scheduled to be commissioned in 2027. Armed with anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-air capabilities, these vessels represent a significant enhancement in Finnish naval capabilities. Alongside the four Hamina-class fast attack craft, these new corvettes will provide NATO with a potent set of naval platforms for operations in the Baltic.
Sweden’s navy is also undergoing substantial change. In 2020 the Swedish government decided to add an additional four surface combatants to the Swedish fleet. Initially, this was going to be a second generation of the already existing and highly capable Visby-class corvette. The ambition for this second generation was to make it more suited for NATO operations, equipped with modern anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-submarine torpedoes. However, in 2023 Sweden cancelled these plans and decided to procure four new Luleå-class corvettes instead. With a length of over 120 meters, initial reports suggest the new corvettes will have an anti-air warfare focus. The first of these new vessels will be commissioned by 2030. Alongside the Visby-class ships, they will provide Sweden with a total of nine powerful vessels suited to littoral Baltic operations.
Poland is building the first of three new 7,000-ton Miecznik-class frigates. The class is based on the British Arrowhead 140 design that is also being used as the basis for the new Type 31 frigate of the Royal Navy. The first ship, ORP Wicher, is due to be launched in 2026. Poland also has an option for an additional five ships. This new surface fleet marks a sea change in capability for the Polish Navy and will contribute significant maritime capacities in the Baltic Sea.
While the German Navy is one of the more powerful in NATO, the ships assigned to the Baltic are based in Kiel as part of Einsatzflotille 1. These include five K130 ocean-going corvettes with another five planned to be commissioned in the next few years. Germany regularly contributes with ships to SNMG-1 and for many years has provided the group with an at-sea replenishment ship. With funding in place to purchase four new F-127 class frigates, Germany will be able to maintain its commitments to SNMG-1 while also operating in a new SNMG-3.
The forward half of K130 Batch 2 corvette “Karlsruhe” is lowered in the water in Kiel on August 14, 2021. (German Navy photo)
Denmark is one of the largest shipping nations in the world and has since 2007 contributed regularly to maritime operations in NATO and coalition frameworks. It has also regularly committed vessels to SNMG-1. Although situated on the mouth of the Baltic, Denmark is also an Arctic nation with responsibilities related to maintaining good order at sea and defending the waters around Greenland. This gives the Danish Navy a broad array of roles, particularly given the arguably worsening strategic situation in the Arctic. Partly to mitigate this dilemma, in March 2025 Denmark awarded contracts to build three new Arctic patrol vessels, replacing the old and under-gunned Thetis-class. Denmark also operates two 2 Absalon-class and 3 Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates which, together with a future new class of frigate, will allow them to remain a reliable contributor to SNMG-1 while also providing vessels to a new Baltic SNMG.
It should be noted that the three remaining Baltic NATO members, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all possess patrol and mine warfare vessels. This would limit their role in SNMG-3 but the navies of these nations already contribute to one of NATO’s standing mine countermeasure groups.
The Benefits of SNMG-3
The primary benefit of creating an SNMG-3 would be, as described above, the permanent presence of NATO naval groups in two areas of strategic importance. There would be little need for SNMG-1 to spend several months at a time outside its primary area of concern. The maritime groups from both areas could also be expected to regularly meet and conduct exercises as part of building interoperability and shows of force.
Ships of SNMG1 and SNMCMG1 steam together during Exercise Northern Coasts 16. (Spanish Navy photo by PO ESP-N Sánchez Oller)
The creation of SNMG-3 would also allow for the development of a more bespoke command relationship that matches NATO’s new regional plans and the integration of new headquarters. Currently, all NATO SNMGs fall under the peacetime control of NATO MARCOM based in Northwood in the United Kingdom. A permanent NATO naval group in the Baltic would possess the added benefit of being able to establish and maintain C2 relationships with a range of NATO commands. SNMG-3 would allow for the development of a permanent C2 relationship between the group at sea and the newly formed Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic). One of NATO’s structural problems with the Baltic Sea is the arguably competing roles of JFC Norfolk (a predominantly maritime command) and JFC Brunssum. SNMG-3 would most likely have to establish a command relationship with both JFCs.
In addition to representing a permanent and available force for the two JFCs, a standing maritime group in the Baltic Sea would also allow commanders in the existing NATO MNCNE, based in Poland and the future NATO MCLCC, in Finland to develop joint warfighting plans for the Baltic Sea Region based on the assumption of immediately available ships.
A SNMG-3 would provide a rotating tactical-level command at sea held by one of the Baltic States. Not only would this provide NATO Baltic members with combined command experience, something that the Danes and Germans have the most experience with, but it would also develop a cadre of officers and crews across the Baltic with experience in working together in operational groups. This would build upon the recent experience of both Sweden and Finland which in January 2025 formally joined SNMG-1 when they participated in surveillance operations under the framework of NATO’s Baltic Sentry maritime surveillance activity in the Baltic Sea.
A Baltic SNMG would also facilitate operations with other allies and force structures, such as periodic US. Navy involvement with SNMG-1 and SNMG-2. When it comes to SNMG-1, the U.S. has only contributed a ship under the command of NATO when they have command of the group. The last time this occurred was in 2019. This does not mean however that the U.S. Navy does not operate alongside NATO SNMG as U.S. vessels regularly participate in exercises that include SNMG.
The U.S. Navy has traditionally deployed ships to the region. During the Cold War and even afterward, this was designed to demonstrate to Eastern European navies that they could not dominate the Baltic Sea. One example of this is the BALTOPS exercise. BALTOPS is not a NATO-led exercise, but an annual U.S.-led exercise arranged by NAVEUR since 1971. In regards to U.S. participation in a new SNMG-3, we assess that it is not likely that ships from the U.S. Navy will participate under NATO command in a permanent new SNMG-3. But with regular deployments of U.S. ships into the Baltic Sea it can be expected that warships from the U.S. Navy will participate in activities and exercises alongside SNMG-3.
Conclusion
NATO’s return to its core mission of deterrence and the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area has been made only more necessary by Russia’s continued aggressive actions both above and below the threshold of war. Ongoing restructuring of the operational components of the alliance is focusing on regional clusters of mutually supporting states. It is time for the maritime component to evolve in the same way the air and land components are. An SNMG-3 focused on the Baltic would not only allow SNMG-1 to concentrate on its core operational area in the North Atlantic, but it would also send a powerful signal of NATO’s intent to undermine and deter Russian malign actions in the region.
Steinar Torset is a Captain in the Royal Norwegian Navy and is the Head of Section for Military Strategy at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College.
Ian Bowers is a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College.
Featured Image: The Royal Swedish Navy corvette HMS Nyköping (K34) underway in Trondheim Fjord, Norway, on October 30, 2018, as part of NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2018. (U.S. Navy photo)
