By Nathan Sicheri
Introduction
The 2027 scenario rests on the notion that President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to conquer Taiwan by force no later than 2027. Defeating an invading force will require more than establishing sea control, it will require sustained material support to Taiwan to resupply its armed forces and citizens while fending off a great power invasion. American delays in ship deliveries and the time of technology acquisition within the Department of Defense make it increasingly likely that the force the Navy sails in 2024 will be largely the same in 2027. The next three years of intensive exercises and warfighting development will do more to shape readiness for the conflict than any single capability. These efforts must focus on the key missions and skills that will have outsized impact on wartime success.
Convoy operations for sustaining Taiwan will offer a key method for strategic success. But if the PLA successfully isolates and invades Taiwan, U.S. and allied forces will have only several months at most to effectively resupply Taiwanese defenders. Unknown factors of American public support, Taiwanese political will, and Taiwan’s ability to sustain resistance may mean that decisive sea control may come too late to supply and support Taiwan within the shrinking window of opportunity. The U.S. must carefully consider how to provide logistical support to a besieged island deep within an adversary’s weapon engagement zone and with little enabling sea control.
Blockade Considerations
The debate on how Taiwan should prepare to deter or defeat the PLA includes asymmetric concepts using numerous affordable capabilities, or employing larger conventional assets.1 Regardless of the approach, a central operational problem will be how to sustain Taiwanese defenses and society if the PLA were to blockade the island. Taiwan may not be able to survive a PLA blockade or invasion for more than a few months, whether due to a material, political, or military collapse. Taiwan will require substantial American support to survive.2
Some officials recognize that a Taiwan contingency will likely begin with a PLA-imposed blockade, and how America responds to the blockade will determine whether Taiwan can survive Chinese aggression.3 In a blockade the PLA will likely refrain from firing the first shot to claim some sort of diplomatic high ground, daring America or its allies to shoot first and overtly break the peace. Breaking a blockade can mean different things, including running the blockade, forced entry, or a show of force. But all risk escalation unless the blockading force backs down. Breaking the blockade by force risks outright conflict, potentially leading to a PLA invasion of Taiwan and strikes against American and allied forces in the region. But not breaking the blockade will eventually lead to Taiwanese capitulation. Political calculations amplify the problem, as there is a lack of unanimity amongst the American people for their support of Taiwan against aggression. A 2023 poll showed Americans split on using the Navy to “break a Chinese blockade,” with a majority of Americans opposing putting U.S. troops in Taiwan to fend off an invasion.4
Supporting Taiwan in Contested Seas
Currently the U.S. Navy and allied forces are escorting vessels during strait transits in contested seas, as recently highlighted by Operation Prosperity Guardian, the ongoing defense of vessels in the Red Sea from Houthi attack. While providing critical experience for the sailors under fire, it is crucial that the lessons learned reach the fleet and are adapted to the more complex scenarios that could apply to escort missions in the Western Pacific. As of September 2024, the Houthis have used short-range ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive aerial and surface vehicles, and cruise missiles to attack warships and neutral shipping from the eastern shores of the Red Sea.5 The PLA inventory is far more complex and lethal.6 Most of the weapons employed by the Houthis have been subsonic threats within an enclosed sea, which is much different than the open Philippine Sea where vessels will be susceptible to multi-axis attacks from a wide variety of modern forces.
How modern convoy escort missions work in practice will require considerable time to sort out, hence its importance to begin training for an escort contingency prior to the outbreak of conflict. The Battle of the Atlantic was a continuous work in progress to figure out the multinational coordination required to effectively move men and material across the ocean, initially using lessons learned in the First World War but eventually integrating air power and intelligence to counter 1940s wolfpack tactics. In the modern era, the U.S. Navy went almost 35 years without conducting an exercise specifically focused on screening a cross-Atlantic convoy operation.7
Resupplying Taiwan will be far more complex and demanding due to the PLA’s extensive capability. Integrating numerous resupply ships into a CSG affords them a measure of protection but also creates a distinctly concentrated target that is more inviting of air and missile attack. Distributed operations may disperse the convoys but forces them to rely on the organic missile inventories of their limited numbers of escorts to fend off aircraft and missile raids. Distributed operations, especially for lightly armed supply ships, will shift the key source of survivability to counter-targeting rather than kinetic defense. How may convoys integrate into the counterintelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and counter-targeting concepts of an information warfare commander?8 The tactical problems of survivability and counter-targeting are essential to getting resupply ships into the WEZ and hopefully penetrating deeply enough to resupply a Taiwan under invasion.
America’s most significant advantage is its international partnerships and its ability to generate coalitions. America has four key treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific theater – Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. Japan is the best geographically positioned and maintains modern military capabilities. The Philippines is another likely partner but lacks naval power to contribute to convoy operations and sea control, principally providing staging and basing access for American forces. Australia provides basing farthest from the direct conflict area and a capable naval arsenal. Lastly, South Korea is positioned similarly to Japan to provide support for American operations. Allied bases and territories provide potential staging grounds and multiple axes to facilitate resupply, complicating the situation for the PLA. International exercises should integrate Indo-Pacific allies for contested convoy operations from their territories and between key points of resupply.
If convoys approach Taiwan unescorted, the PLA Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and possibly the Chinese Maritime Militia would redirect them, board, or attack them. The 2024 Philippine-Chinese dispute over the Second Thomas Shoal forewarns possible tactics for contesting resupply: violent boardings and shoulderings.12 The Second Thomas Shoal and nearby reefs do not hold nearly the same level of political importance as Taiwan, so one can assume vessels inbound towards Taiwan during a blockade or conflict will face more robust threats.
Conclusion
Maritime escort has taken a backseat in recent conflicts due to land route access and uncontested seas, but Taiwan will differ significantly from previous and ongoing 21st-century conflicts. Unlike Taiwan, Ukraine maintains a land border with friendly nations while Israel maintains sea control via allies and access to major sea ports for importing critical equipment. The success of Ukraine fending off Russian aggression without direct American military support, and Israel defending against Iran and its proxies, albeit with direct support, highlights the importance of military resupply. Taiwan suffers from being an island nation dependent upon imports in peacetime, let alone during a conflict. Sealift will be the only way to deliver necessary supplies at scale over a sustained period of time. Airlift and undersea forces can deliver some lightweight resources, but they cannot deliver nearly the same mass as sealift.
The United States must overcome the tyranny of time and distance to preserve Taiwan’s sovereignty. The U.S. Navy will not have the time nor capacity to establish sea control. It must train for contested maritime convoy operations unseen since World War II and develop innovative operational approaches that enable maritime resupply through heavily contested seas. Operation Prosperity Guardian has highlighted the importance of this problem set in the missile age, but the challenge America will face in a confrontation with China will involve far more lethal threats.
Protecting shipping will become a major operational requirement during a 2027 conflict, yet modern U.S. naval doctrine and training places little emphasis on this critical mission. This will prove shortsighted for sustaining Taiwan given how the nation’s survival will be on a short timer for resupply once a major invasion or blockade begins. If America waits for a Mahanian victory to enable unfettered resupply then it may risk strategic defeat, potentially ceding Taiwan to the PRC and having to plan for an even more costly amphibious counter-invasion to liberate the island.
Maritime convoy protection is not simply a byproduct of sea control, but rather a necessary and prominent mission for keeping allies in the fight. It is a fundamental expression of how U.S. naval power underwrites American alliances, yet it is a neglected operation America’s Navy must quickly relearn.
LT Nathan Sicheri commissioned from Virginia Tech NRTOC as a surface warfare officer in 2019. He served as the gunnery officer and repair officer on board USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) during a Middle East deployment. His second assignment was as the Training Officer onboard PCU JOHN BASILONE (DDG 122) in Bath, Maine. He is currently assigned to Cryptologic Warfare Activity 66 at Fort Meade, MD as a Cryptologic Warfare Officer. He has written previously for USNI.
References
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Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (February 10, 2024) — The Zumwalt Class Guided Missile Destroyer USS Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) approaches the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) to take on fuel. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark D. Faram)