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Ask the Public for Material Sacrifice to Narrow the Civ-Mil Divide

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Michael D. Purzycki

The civilian-military divide is often framed as a problem of cultural misunderstanding. And certainly, in an era where most Americans have not served in the military, it is natural that those who have served would feel misunderstood by those whose safety and freedom they defend. However, there is another aspect of the divide, one that if addressed forthrightly by military leadership, can narrow the gap in a more tangible way.

Given that the military is one of the most highly regarded public institutions in American society, its members are well-positioned to ask for material sacrifice from the general public. This would give civilians a chance to go beyond saying, “Thank you for your service,” and contribute in a financially meaningful way to the nation’s defenses. In an era of frequent budgetary uncertainty, any step that could help ensure a reliably funded military is worth considering.

For example, the Navy could point to the amount of petroleum it would need at its disposal to fight and win a conflict with the People’s Liberation Army over the fate of Taiwan. It could then ask Congress for a specific number of barrels of petroleum to be taken out of the civilian economy and added to Navy reserves, to ensure there is no gap between the fuel needed and the fuel available for contingencies. In the process of this request, it could quantify the increase in gasoline prices American drivers could expect to experience. Similar initiatives could be applied to other militarily significant resources and assets.

Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph. Evoking past Americans’ experience of rationing, Victory Gardens, war bonds, and the introduction of income tax withholding, while asking today’s Americans to endure a little pain at the pump, could narrow the civ-mil divide as well as help prepare the nation for future major conflict. As politically difficult as requests for sacrifice from ordinary Americans will be, scrambling to adequately resource America’s defenses in the midst of a war would likely be even more difficult.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. In addition to CIMSEC, he has been published in Divergent Options, Merion West, the Washington Monthly, Wisdom of Crowds, Charged Affairs, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki. The views expressed here are his own.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct. 3, 2023) Sailors load a MK-46 torpedo into a surface vessel torpedo tube on the boat deck aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup (DDG 86) while conducting routine operations in the Sea of Japan, October 3. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo)

Sea Control 469 – The Importance of Studying Abroad with Midshipman Natalie Schirmacher

By Ed Salo

Midshipman Natalie Schirmacher is a third year student at Villanova University and has studied abroad in Amman, Jordan and Buenos Aires, Argentina. Her experiences in NROTC and studying abroad led her to write for Proceedings about the need for more variety in study abroad programs.

Download Sea Control 469 – The Importance of Studying Abroad with Midshipman Natalie Schirmacher

Links

1. “The Navy’s Study-Abroad Programs Need Better Variety,” by Natalie Schirmacher, Proceedings, February 2023.

Ed Salo is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at [email protected].

Nathan Miller edited and produced this episode.

Improve the Culture and Mechanisms of Naval Learning

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Commander Art Valeri

The “Get Real Get Better” campaign initiated a transformative process to address performance shortfalls in the spirit of increasing readiness. However, the practical method of achieving that readiness deserves more attention in considering broad naval mission sets and thoughtfully influencing change within the Navy.

Addressing such a varied group of personnel and missions across the spectrum of being, and supporting, the warfighter is challenging. It may prove beneficial to widen the scope beyond a negatively focused look at poor performance at sea. Although the study of catastrophic failures is absolutely necessary, other industries suggest ways to improve organizational performance. An interdisciplinary approach might uncover the behaviors and practices of units delivering preferred outcomes despite limited resources across both line and staff communities. The Navy might appreciate ways to emulate success as equally valuable in our approach to readiness, rather than strive to narrowly avoid irreversible failure. As much as we “embrace the red,” we might also “perceive the green.” Although difficult, we might even aspire to rediscover a tolerance toward recoverable failures as opportunities to learn.

A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory. Across the Navy, such victory might represent better surgical outcomes in the operating room, improved liaison relationships with partner nations, and commanding officers unafraid to emphasize boundary spanning, all of which reinforce asymmetric advantages. Although often a short-term advantage, a reliance on superior technology is not enough to ensure victory. Institutions should sense and steer the mechanisms that support individual and organizational learning, manage the barriers and pitfalls that inhibit this learning, and invest in better learning and leading methods.

For the Navy, this approach requires a new way of thinking. It must be permissive in nature and firmly grounded in becoming a learning organization. To effect such a change, a doctrinal publication formally instituting learning as a strategic priority is a necessary and natural complement to Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare as a first step. This articulated position would serve to orient all naval communities to embrace, value, and reward those activities necessary to our survival despite modern and forthcoming challenges. Without such a fundamental reference to socialize these concepts into the organization, the bureaucracy which is the U.S.  Navy might unintentionally stifle performance, slow its momentum, and limit its potential to make progress. The Navy must become a better learning organization if it is to realize its warfighting potential and sustain its competitive edge.

Commander (Dr.) Art Valeri is an Operative Dentist and Naval Postgraduate School PMBA student stationed at NMRTC Great Lakes serving as Dental Department Head, Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher Medical and Dental Clinic, Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center, North Chicago, IL.

Featured Image: Naval Aircrewman (Helicopter) 3rd Class Taquan West, assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 5, keeps watch over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) and the fast combat support ship USNS Arctic (T-AOE-8) on June 28, 2022. (U.S. Navy Photo)

Prototype the Bi-Modal Naval Force

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Shelley Gallup

In past wars, small and well-armed ships, such as destroyer escorts, torpedo boats, and riverine craft have been a necessary complement to large combatant force structure. This need is being exacerbated by the U.S. Navy’s currently small yet top-heavy fleet structure. This contrasts with the force structure and operational concepts of Chinese maritime forces, which have been highlighted by the intrusions of PRC naval, Coast Guard, and maritime militia ships into the territorial waters of the Philippines. The Philippine Navy has only three ships to meet these threats, creating demands for U.S. naval presence that is already stretched thin among its relatively few large combatants. China’s numerous small combatants and maritime auxiliary forces would surely have important wartime roles to play as well, and U.S. large combatants may not be available to address these threats.

Innovation in maritime warfare is strategically significant, continuous, difficult to achieve, and must fight its way through an existing paradigm. Often, by the time innovation is adopted, another construct is appearing on the horizon, resulting in a continuous tail-chase. The U.S. Navy continues to push after esoteric technologies, rather than adopting near-term and less costly capabilities. The proposal here, in support of the bi-modal fleet concept featuring a mix of sea denial and sea control vessels, is the LMACC (Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability) system. This small combatant vessel concept extends autonomy, machine learning, resilient comms, and passive sensor fusion within a cloud shared by a flotilla or other forces.

The bi-modal fleet structure includes a combination of small, crewed, and autonomous systems working as a networked flotilla. The crewed LMACCs and uncrewed autonomous surface vessels can be built and armed for much lower costs and greater capability than the cost of building one or two more destroyers or frigates. In this systems view, it is the holistic flotilla network that is the capability, rather than the individual platform. The uncrewed vessels act as sensors, and the LMACCs serve as decision arbiters and weapons carriers.

A depiction of the LMACC vessel. (LMACC program graphic)

LMACC will also serve a critical function in developing future combat leaders. In today’s destroyer-centric surface fleet, platform command opportunities only appear after more than a decade of service. LMACC is intended as an O-3 command, affording naval officers an opportunity to command earlier in their careers and develop critical leadership skills, including initiative, adaptability, and tactical acumen. Autonomous systems will become increasingly important, but cultivating warrior skillsets earlier in careers will be central to victory.

LMACC is the culmination of three years of research and development at the Naval Postgraduate School, via OPNAV N96F sponsorship with the Naval Research Program (NRP). It is now being considered as an Innovation Capstone Program (ICP), for potential transition to an industry partner for prototype acquisition. At an estimated cost of about $100 million per ship, built in small yards, it is much more affordable than other Navy surface combatants, and will invigorate diversification of the shipbuilding industrial base.

Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy, and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to fund and build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla innovations.

Dr. Shelley Gallup is a retired surface warfare officer. As an Associate Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Gallup has spent 25 years assisting the Navy in developing large-scale experiments at sea. His current work includes research in human-machine partnerships, the role of emergence in combat at sea, and leads the small warship LMACC project at NPS.

Featured Image: The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) leads the formation in a photo exercise with the unmanned surface vessels Ranger and the USV Mariner during Integrated Battle Problem (IBP) 23.2, Sep. 7, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse Monford)