It’s the time of the month again when CIMSECians get hungry and/or thirsty. For February’s DC meet-up we’ll be returning to theOld Dominion Brewhouse in the Convention Center area, just north of Gallery Place/Chinatown. We hope you’ll join us to discuss the maritime issues of the day, recap ourMaritime Futures Project, nominate topics for our next “week” of analysis, or just meet some interesting people.
Time: Tuesday, 12 Feb, 6-10pm Happy hour lasts til 7:00pm
Place: Old Dominion Brewhouse, (look for a sign or ask up front for our area)
1219 9th St., NW (Exit at the Mt. Vernon/Convention Center stop on the red line, on the other side of the convention center tunnel)
All are welcome and no RSVP is required, but if you’re planning on coming drop me a line so we have an idea of how many seats to reserve:[email protected]
The hijacked Luxembourg-flagged tanker MT Gascogne.
Along with the release of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)’s 2012 piracy report come the onslaught of analysts seeking to explain 1) why the crime is decreasing in certain theaters, 2) why it is expanding in others, and 3) where it will spread next.
The top story is that global pirate attacks have hit a five-year low, thanks to a sharp decline in the activities of Somalia’s notorious marauders. When this trend is reported it is almost always followed by the caveat that a “new” piracy epicenter has “emerged” in Nigeria and that the criminal enterprise is now increasing and expanding across the Gulf of Guinea. These types of statements are an oversimplification, however, and mask the complexities of maritime crime in West Africa.
Playing with Numbers
A multitude of criminal actors have parasitically operated in the Nigerian littoral since the country’s oil boom in the 1970s—piracy, kidnapping, and oil theft are by no means “new” to the region. To say that the country has “reemerged” as an epicenter of maritime crime is more accurate, as it wasonly in 2007that Somali waters became more pirate prone than those of Nigeria. The 27 pirate attacks reported for Nigeria in 2012 represents an increase over the past two years, but fall well short of the 42 attacks the IMB recorded in 2007.
One must also be careful (a mistake this author is willing to admit) about reporting an absolute “increase” in the total number of pirate attacks that have taken place in West Africa over the past year. The IMB’s figures display a clear trend: attacks off Nigeria increased from 10 to 27, while those for the region as a whole rose from 44 to 51. These numbers are incomplete, however, as they only include incidents that were directly reported to the IMB; whereas an estimated 50-80% of pirateattacks go unreported.
The larger data set of the Danish consultancy firm Risk Intelligence reveals a decrease in Nigerian and West African piracy. The company recorded 48 attacks in Nigerian waters in 2012, a higher number than the IMB reported, but lower than Risk Intelligence’s 2011 and 2010 figures, recorded as 52 and 73 attacks respectively. The expansion of pirate gangs into the waters ofneighboring statesexplains why attacks may have decreased in Nigeria, but it is also noted that the total figure for West African waters has fallen from 116 in 2011 to 89 in 2012.
Table 1: Incidents of Piracy off Nigeria and West Africa: 2008-2012 (Risk Intelligence)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Nigeria
114
91
73
52
48
West Africa Total
138
120
110
116
89
Nigerian Incidents as Percentage of Regional Total
82.6%
75.8%
66.3%
44.8%
53.9%
Not More, but Different
An overall decline in the total number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea does not mean that the problem is being a solved. TheJanuary 16 hijacking of the Panamanian-flagged product tanker Itri andFebruary 4th hijackingof the Luxembourg-flagged tanker MT Gascogne, both off Côte d’Ivoire, attest that the threat remains high, but has shifted in terms of its targets and scope.
The rampant maritime crime and insurgency that plagued Nigeria in the mid-to-late 2000s displayed a mixture of communal, political and economic motives and was frequently directed towards supply vessels and fixed assets operating in oil and gas fields off the Niger Delta. A 2009 amnesty offered by the federal government essentially served to buy off thousands of Delta militants,rewarding some of themwith huge security contracts to protect the waters they had previously hunted in. It is this change in the security environment that is credited with the sharp decline in pirate attacks in Nigerian waters seen in Table 1.
Heightened security in the Nigerian littoral appears to have had a Darwinian effect on maritime criminals, as more sophisticated and politically connected syndicates have thrived at the relative expense of opportunistic “smash-and-grab” pirates.
One manner in which this is evident is target selection. Attacks against support vessels operating close to shore have declined over the last five years (and with them, the total number of incidents), but this has coincided, since 2010, with a surge in tanker hijackings. According to the records of one corporate security manager operating in Nigeria, there were 42 attacks against supply vessels in 2008 (one of the worst years of the Niger Delta insurgency), but only 15 in 2012. Conversely, there were just 8 attacks against tankers and cargo ships in 2008, but 42 in 2012. In total,Risk Intelligence has recorded78 attempted attacks on product tankers and 27short-duration hijackingssince December 2010.
This shift in targets might explain why commenters incorrectly refer to rising levels of piracy in the region, as the hijacking and short-term disappearance of tankers owned by international companies garners far greater media attention than the robbing of supply ships, despite the fact that these types of attacks were more frequent.
Latest piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (Courtesy OCEANUSlive.org)
Bigger and Better
While boarding a supply vessel and robbing it of valuables is a relatively low-tech affair, hijacking a product tanker and pilfering vast quantities of fuel over several days requires a high degree of organization and sophistication. Theconfessions of four captured pirates, believed to be behind the hijacking of the Energy Centurion off the coast of Togo on August 28, 2012, reveals the intricacies of such an operation.
According to one testimony, criminal syndicates are “sponsored by powerful people,” including Nigerian government officials and oil industry executives, who provide advanced payment and information about the cargo, route, and security details of ships that have been targeted. Theseintelligence-led operationshave become increasingly multinational with gangs based in Nigeria planning attacks off the coasts of Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire, often with theassistance of nationalsfrom these countries.
Once a vessel has been hijacked, pirates have been known to go to great lengths to make sure that the ship ‘disappears’ while preparations are made to offload the cargo. For example, the gang that hijacked the product tanker MT Anuket Emerald made sure to damage all the ship’s communication equipment and loading computer, repaint its funnel, change the tanker’s name, and remove its IMO number. The offloading and black market sale of stolen product is equally complex, requiring a network of“oil mafia” insiderswho facilitate fuel storage at numerous depots across Nigeria and then organize for onward distribution.
Money over Everything
Though fewer ships are being attacked, the current crop of West African pirates (and their financial backers) are seeing greater returns. The group that recently hijacked the Itri was able to siphon off the ship’s entire cargo of fuel,valued at $5 million. Captured pirates involved in tanker hijackings (dubiously) claim thatpayoffs rangefrom $17,000 for new recruits to over $60,000 for ‘commanders.’ The value of large-scale oil theft exceeds many of the ransom sums made by Somali pirates and is acquired without months of hostage negotiations. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, notes piracy expert Martin Murphy, is now“the most lucrative in the world.”
The West African modus operandi is also more secure, as Nigerian pirates are not subjected to the same risks as their Somali counterparts—namely extended voyages in treacherous open ocean, the combined pressure of the world’s greatest navies, and the widespread use of professional armed guards aboard merchant vessels. Endemic corruption in Nigeria assures that even if pirates are caught, they are unlikely to face serious consequences. The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency and Joint Task Force have made dozens of arrests in recent months, butlack the authorityto detain or prosecute suspects as this is the responsibility of other security agencies. Bribes to these agencies, captured pirates note, are set aside as an operational expense, meaning most suspects arereleased without charge.
In terms of numbers, overall pirate attacks may be declining in the Gulf of Guinea, but the gangs responsible appear to have increased both their operational sophistication and target selectivity. Given the increased value of each operation and the small risk of punishment their crimes show no signs of disappearing.
James M. Bridger is a Maritime Security Consultant and piracy specialist with Delex Systems Inc. He can be reached at [email protected]
The following is a guest post inspired by the questions in our Maritime Futures Project. For more information on the contributors, click here.Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.
Maritime Futures Project, Question 8:What advice would you give to a smaller nation on the maritime investments it should pursue, and why?
Coming from the archipelagic nation of the Philippines with a 36,000 nautical mile coastline, 7,107 islands and islets, and a large population that depends on the sea as their lifeline, our maritime environment is a vital part of our strategic interests.
The Croation Mobilni Obalni Lanser system is an appropriate mobile ASM option for defending a multitude of coastlines.
As a result, air, surface, and subsurface assets are of prime importance. Guided-missile frigates and corvettes for offshore control, and a large number of fast-missile and patrol gunboats for the littorals would be appropriate. Long-range maritime patrol aircraft, ship-based multi-purpose helicopters, and naval light-attack aircraft along with a system of land-based radars in central chokepoints would also be an indispensable investment in the protection of an archipelagic nation’s maritime domain. Adding a flotilla of submarines (of the shallow-water attack type) and forming coastal anti-ship missile batteries would further extend a nation’s strategy of defense in depth. This could all be supported by pooling and developing manpower resources and skills.
For island nations with smaller EEZs, development may be limited to capable patrol gunboats and multi-purpose ships for its Coast Guard, supported by rotary, fixed wing, and amphibious aircraft. The creation and training of coast-watchers from shore based villages would also be a positive development.
LCDR Mark Condeno is a member of the Philippines Naval Auxiliaries.
On April 9, 1979 a fuel line ruptured in the boiler room aboard USS Manley (DD 940). An officer standing nearby was soaked with fuel which then burst into flames. LT Gilbert Johnson was burned over two thirds of his body as his polyester uniform melted to his skin and continued burning. Eight other Sailors in the boiler room received only minor burns. They were all wearing cotton, or cotton blend, uniforms. Three weeks after the fire LT Johnson died of his burns.
During a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the uniform, Peter Brown, a professor of textiles and clothing at the University of Minnesota said that the polyester uniform would be suitable for normal activities, but that “It does melt. It does ignite. It does continue to burn.” According to other depositions in the case the Navy certified the used of polyester uniforms in 1972 but never tested them for flammability. Despite the testimony, there is no indication that the Navy took action against the wear of 100% polyester uniforms aboard ship following the death of LT Johnson.
USS Conyngham (DDG 17)
In May 1990, a predawn fire killed the operations officer and injured a dozen sailors aboard USS Conyngham (DDG 17). The blaze forced the captain to evacuate the bridge and the combat information center while the crew battled the main engine-room fire and a series of secondary fires.
The fire erupted in the main boiler room at 5:35 a.m. as the 437-foot ship was sailing about 80 miles off the coast of North Carolina in what the Navy calls the Virginia Capes Operating Area, officials said.
“The fire spread to the combat information center spaces, which caused the captain to evacuate the combat information center and the bridge, temporarily leaving the ship without communications and dead in the water,” White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said.
The Conyngham’s skipper, Cmdr. W. R. Williams, reported that the main fire was extinguished within two hours but that the crew fought secondary blazes until noon.
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
At 4 a.m. on October 5, 2010 a fire broke out in the deck department office aboard USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). The fire burned for over 90 minutes, cutting off access to repair locker 2 and requiring assistance from neighboring ships and the base fire department before being put out. The fire was ultimately traced to the improper use and storage of linseed oil. As part of the investigation, the Naval Safety Center recommended that the new Navy Working Uniform, a 50/50 cotton/nylon blend, not be used by fire fighters or first responders. This recommendation was later modified to allow first responders to be in the NWU.
In October 2012, the Navy conducted a seemingly unplanned and unrelated flammability test. The test, now much talked about, found that the NWU was not flame resistant, and when set alight would “burn robustly until consumed”.
MI-6 originally designed the fabric of NWUs as a way to assassinate Soviet naval leadership.
In subsequent media releases the Navy disclosed that the requirement for a flame retardant uniform aboard ship had been rescinded in 1996 and that the NWU met current requirements for shipboard use. These comments are very similar to the Navy comments about the use of CNT uniforms aboard ship in 1979. Despite the fire onboard Manley, the Navy continued to allow the wear of CNT uniforms aboard ship until after the attack on USS Stark (FFG 37) in 1987. Corfam shoes and polyester uniforms were banned aboard ship following the attack and subsequent fires.
Now, these are three cases over almost forty years. There have been at least 60 major fires aboard ships and submarines since 1979. Fewer than two dozen Sailors were killed in those fires. One could easily make the case that fire occurs so rarely that a fire retardant uniform is unnecessary.
Yet, take a look at the time of day and circumstances of the fires listed here. Pre-dawn. Fires occur to their convenience and not ours and marginal increased cost of a fire retardant should not be outweighed by peacetime statistics. We fight like we train.
If we cannot equip our Sailors with a fire retardant or flame resistant uniform, at the very least the removal of a shipboard uniform that melts and burns until consumed should be an easy first step. It was done 25 years ago, we should be able to do it today.
CAPT Junge is a Naval War College Professor and career surface warfare officer with afloat service in frigates, destroyers, and amphibious assault ships. His afloat career culminated in command of USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). Ashore he has served as an officer recruiter and with four different Washington DC staffs. A graduate of the US Naval Academy he also holds graduate degrees from the US Naval War College and The George Washington University.