Notes to the New CNO Series

By Victor Sussman

The U.S. Navy faces myriad challenges in a dynamic multipolar world, yet risks a sclerotic response to threats. This is most apparent in the surface force where a predilection for high-end multi-mission platforms risks an unbalanced fleet unable to meet threats across the spectrum of conflict. To rectify this, the Navy must recommit to the vital role of small ships in meeting its obligations.

A commitment to smaller combatants offers benefits for naval operations, the supporting industrial base, and for leadership development. Small ships enable the consistent presence that can deter escalation. As J.C. Wylie states in Military Strategy, “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun.” High-end combatants cannot be omnipresent and effective, and they are not risk-worthy enough to be forward postured in tense crises. A numerically larger low-end force plays a critical role in durable presence, developing relationships with regional partners, and deterrence of adversaries.

Construction of less exquisite platforms in greater numbers would reinvigorate an industrial base that has pursued consolidation to survive in the face of inconsistent demand. A reliable need for smaller ships will encourage the growth of smaller yards and suppliers, foster competition, and revive interest in the skilled trades and expertise needed to design and build ships.

A focus on smaller ships facilitates the development of command skills and judgement. Smaller ships increase opportunities for taking command earlier in career paths. Developing capable leaders before the O-5 level furnishes them with the skills and judgement needed to succeed in larger complex billets and provides the Navy with a deeper bench of talent. Benefits also propagate down the chain by creating more opportunities for junior officers to gain proficiency and have meaningful shipboard roles, reducing the problem of too many JOs on one ship.

To begin this transformation, two courses of action are suggested. First, split the Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC) into two PEOs: one focused on small surface combatants (PEO SSC) and one focused on unmanned vessels (PEO USV). Unmanned systems offer immense potential, but lower technical readiness than small ships. Separate PEOs will have the focus to deliver better solutions for their areas of responsibility.

Second, N96 should establish an office to promote small combatants on the OPNAV staff and to Congress, as they often lack the advocates common to higher-end ships. As such, the SSC N96 office would focus on key but underserved areas including constabulary operations, gray zone competition, irregular warfare, and mine warfare. Additionally, such an office should work closely with the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for these warfare areas, and the numbered fleet commands to familiarize the value of small combatants in achieving objectives in their areas of operation. Finally, such an office should partner closely with both the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard to define requirements and identify opportunities for savings through joint development or multi-service partnerships to procure the force the Navy needs to meet tomorrow’s threats without delay.

Victor Sussman is a senior research scientist specializing in catalyst R&D at a Fortune 500 chemical company, and holds a Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of Minnesota. He is interested in the technology and tactics that will enable the sea services to succeed in the 21st century. He has previously written for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and is glad to make his first contribution to CIMSEC.

Featured Image: The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Uhlmann (DD-687) underway at sea, in the 1960s. (U.S. Navy photo)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

Given how 20 to 30 percent of the fleet’s platforms could be replaced by 2045, a thoughtful and imaginative force design process must go beyond measuring the relative importance of existing and planned platforms and capabilities. The Navy needs to divorce itself from its affinity of conceiving capability as a function of traditional naval platforms, such as surface combatants or range-hobbled carrier air wings, and pursue a more holistic concept.

The Navy’s force design should be oriented on the strategic intelligence estimate of the future joint operating environment, the naval enduring functions (missions), and the overlapping required capabilities espoused by the Joint Warfighting Concept. Focusing on the platforms, people (through recruiting, training, and education), and doctrine required to effect operational concepts will allow the Navy to cover its enduring missions and provide needed capabilities. Additionally, the Navy can meaningfully contribute to the Joint Warfighting Concept and effectively defend its budget requests by clearly articulating an integration pathway through the joint force.

The Navy should design its force utilizing hierarchical tiers of sea control. For example, the Navy shall ensure supremacy in the U.S. near seas with the ability to protect the homeland’s approaches to ports and coastline. For the next tier, it shall provide naval superiority in the vital sea lanes that are the economic lifelines to the homeland and her allies. It should also be able to contest the seas where superiority is not possible, but where necessary logistics must transit. Lastly, as the final tier, it can provide sea denial in the areas where an adversary is strongest. These differentiated tiers, overlayed with the future joint operating environment, will demand discrete capabilities that drive a bespoke high-low force mixture. Furthermore, lower-end capabilities provide greater integration opportunities with regional allies and partners, the true strategic center of gravity.

The adage is a ship is a fool to fight a fort. The Navy should avoid the temptation to believe that more ships or traditional platform-centric models of force design will effectively compete with pacing threats, especially when competitors have fielded holistic, land-based networks of capability (forts) oriented toward the maritime domain. Furthermore, the Navy must not repeat the experience of using expensive, high-end systems designed for peer combat in low-level engagements persisting below the level of conflict. To do so, the Navy’s force structure should incorporate more economical platforms for cooperation and competition, preserving the lifespan and readiness of higher-end vessels.

Historically, the Navy pursued a force design independent of the other services, and a force posture the Navy felt was required to win a war within the maritime domain on its own. The practice led to duplications of capability, but the modern defense industrial base does not afford the luxury of excess. Today offers an opportunity for the Navy to change course on force design, which will require strong leadership to redirect the accumulated inertia.

Commander Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is a U.S. naval flight officer and prospective executive officer of Strike Fighter Squadron TWO TWO. He recently completed a fellowship with the Halsey Alfa advanced research program at the U.S. Naval War College and is a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN). CDR Tenbusch is Space Policy and Nuclear Public Policy fellow at Nonproliferation Education Center, and is pursuing a Master’s in Space Systems at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Commander Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is a U.S. naval aviator and a special operations joint terminal attack controller instructor. He currently serves as the Joint Close Air Support division officer at the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center where he follows unmanned systems employment and tactics. CDR Phillips-Levine is a Nonproliferation Education Center Space and Nuclear Public Policy Fellow, and is pursuing a Master’s in Systems Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Featured Image: An aerial view of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Bremerton, Washington (USA), on 24 November 2012. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Lt. Upton Wallace

There are two key areas that, if addressed strategically, can enhance the effectiveness of our Navy – empowerment of division officers and stability for our sailors.

The empowerment of division officers is critical yet undervalued in the U.S. Navy. In other branches of the military, officers at similar levels are given a broader scope of authority and responsibility, which fosters a more efficient chain of command and enhances leadership development. Division officers in the Navy should be afforded the same level of trust and autonomy. This can be achieved by reducing micromanagement, promoting a culture of calculated risk-taking and innovation, and providing clear guidelines on the extent and limits of their authority.

An empowered division officer can make quicker decisions, reduce red tape, and foster a more responsive and agile team. Most importantly, it enhances the leadership growth of these officers, preparing them for higher roles and responsibilities. It is crucial that we create an environment where our officers are trusted to lead and are given useful mandates for developing their leadership skills.

Secondly, we should address the issue of sailor stability. The frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves can disrupt the personal lives of sailors and their families, affecting their morale and overall effectiveness. While we understand the operational need for such moves, a more strategic approach can mitigate the negative impacts.

Possible strategies include extending tour lengths where feasible, providing more predictable rotation schedules, and exploring options for geo-batching. This would allow sailors to achieve a better work-life balance, thereby enhancing their commitment and productivity. It is time the Navy gives more careful consideration to the human element of our operations, ensuring our sailors are not just effective, but also content and stable.

These two areas of focus – empowering division officers and enhancing sailor stability – are interconnected. A more empowered division officer will better understand and address the unique needs of their sailors, including their need for stability. More content and stable sailors will be more responsive to their officers, creating a more trusting and effective chain of command.

As we move into this new era of naval operations, we must ensure that our leadership structures and policies respect the realities of our personnel’s lives and the operational environment. By addressing these areas, we can foster a Navy that is not only effective in its operations, but also a more rewarding place to serve.

Lieutenant Upton Wallace is a division officer at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FRS (HSM-40) based in Mayport, Florida. Originally hailing from St. Andrew, Jamaica, Wallace began his Navy career in 2003, enlisting as an aviation structural mechanic, and advanced to the rank of aviation structural mechanic chief. In 2017, Wallace earned a commission through the Limited Duty Officer program. He has participated in Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Sixth Fleet operations responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 28, 2020) Chief Fire Controlman Reynard McNeil Jr., from San Diego, communicates with the combat information center prior to a close-in weapons system live-fire exercise aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)