Drones and Starlink: Combining Satellite Constellations With Unmanned Navy Ships

Emerging Technologies Topic Week

By Brandon Wall and Nicholas Ayrton

As times change, they demand that military doctrine and strategy change with it. Key to this is ensuring that the American military is ready to act anywhere and with short notice, requiring that it embrace the latest technologies to overcome the latest operational problems. From the reaper drones of the American wars in the Middle East to the Azeri drones that came to define the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, land-based drones are rapidly shaping the battlefields of the modern world. But the maritime domain has yet to fully embrace the use of drone technology.

The area of maritime drones seems to be a field where the civilian sector is more rapidly embracing new technology compared to the military. Norwegian company Kongsberg Maritime has recently concluded initial tests of an unmanned cargo container ship, making its first delivery to a fertilizer company, while South Korean technology giant Samsung is also investigating crewless vessels as a means to cut down on labor and maintenance costs to better stand against its Chinese competitors. It is in this second area of potential for advancements in cost-cutting and smaller crew requirements that the United States Navy (USN) could benefit most due to the increasing problem of an aging fleet of transport ships in need of replacement, as well as a personnel shortage that has only gotten more dire with time. 

Unmanned Solutions to Logistics Problems 

The dire state of naval logistics is hardly anything new, with General Stephen Lyons, current head of USTRANSCOM having said that in the event of a major conflict, there would not presently be sufficient naval sealift capacity to supply the United States military. Indeed, the capacity of the Navy is presently stretched so thin that, by its own admission, it would be unable to defend the military’s maritime supply lines in the event of a large-scale conflict. This is compounded by the nearly obsolete ships that are still in service and declining in numbers. In addition to this, the USN has been facing an ongoing shortage of sailors, falling several thousand below its targeted number year after year. This has led only to more problems, as currently serving sailors are then forced to pull extra weight, leading to overworking, lack of rest, and a generally less effective fighting force. In this area, one then finds a maritime logistics force in need of a modernization effort, coupled with a Navy that needs to either find more recruits or cut down on the number of jobs it needs sailors to fill.

Here unmanned maritime vessels offer a solution, allowing for the logistics ships of tomorrow to be built more cheaply and not requiring bulky spaces for crew compartments, food, water, and other aspects. More efficient designs could better fulfill their mission of carrying supplies where they need to go. Further, if naval logistics could be rendered more autonomous, this would theoretically allow for a much smaller number of sailors to command a much larger fleet of supply vessels, perhaps permitting a single sailor to monitor several largely autonomous ships, with direct control being needed only in particularly critical moments.

While the USN does appear to be looking into autonomous vessels, the focus seems to be on relatively small vessels, only around the size of a corvette, not on the large logistics vessels that would seem to be the most well-suited for automation and heavily demanded in sustained conflicts. While tests with these vessels have been promising, being able to operate without human intervention for all but the most delicate phases of their missions, the Navy’s program still lacks the ambition needed to truly capitalize on the potential for an unmanned naval logistics force. It is currently focusing more on small, rapid-response supply vessels, while continuing to neglect the larger vessels that would be needed for a large-scale conflict. 

Starlink and Commanding Drone Fleets

Extending beyond logistics, there also exists the potential for maritime drones and unmanned ships to be more involved in the observational and informational sides of warfare. Indeed, if admittedly biased sources out of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are to be believed, then the U.S. is already making limited use of maritime intelligence drones, with one having supposedly been captured while operating off the coast of Jiangsu province to the north of Shanghai. If this is to be believed, then it offers the possibility of further using small, risk-worthy maritime drones to conduct surveillance, such as for general intelligence gathering or targeting for fires. A small fleet of semi-autonomous drones could also act as a screening force for operations, acting to provide an extended sensor net and provide greater tactical awareness, be they for combat operations or as an early warning system for unescorted logistics fleets.

However, with these hypothetical drone systems, whether in the form of logistics vessels, intelligence gatherers, or as a sensor net, there still exists the crucial question of establishing a reliable method of controlling them, since even an otherwise autonomous vessel may encounter a situation where a human operator must provide input. Current military communication satellites, while advanced, are also chronically overburdened and fighting for bandwidth with what little is available having to be rationed out to only the most crucial of systems and operations.

Enter Starlink. SpaceX’s new Starlink satellite constellation provides many options for military communications, provided the network could be rendered secure enough. The Starlink constellation currently consists of over 1,600 satellites, with plans to have thousands more of the mass-produced small satellites in low Earth orbit in the coming years. If successful, such a program would be theoretically able to provide easy and reliable connectivity for a globally-operated network of maritime drones that could be set up with only minimal infrastructure, allowing for large numbers of these units to be commanded.

A batch of 60 Starlink satellites awaiting deployment. (Photo via SpaceX)

The main issues are testing if the basic premise could function and if the system could be rendered secure. The first issue is whether a commercial system currently designed to provide connectivity to a variety of static locations could work as a command-and-control network for a fleet of autonomous vessels traversing the world’s oceans. Similarly, the United States Air Force has already begun the process of testing if Starlink technologies could function onboard a moving aircraft, likely a far more difficult task than connecting a relatively slow-moving ship onto which one could fit a larger array of communications equipment.

Secondly, concerns have been raised about the security of Starlink for military applications, as the network relies on communication with several ground-based hubs to function, while the military tends to prefer direct satellite-to-satellite optical communications. However, this too seems to be a solvable problem, with ten Starlink satellites with intra-network communications capability having been launched into a polar orbit this past January. Indeed, SpaceX has recently confirmed that all future Starlink satellites will be launched with the capability to use laser communication systems between satellites. If SpaceX could successfully work with the Defense Department, it could be feasible to bring the network’s security up to the standards needed to coordinate a fleet of maritime drones.

Conclusion

It is these two emerging technologies, maritime drone vessels and large satellite communication constellations, that could allow for the Navy to solve some of its ongoing issues and permit the creation of a more nimble, lean, and modern force able to better confront the rising security threats facing the United States in the years and decades to come.

Brandon Walls is an undergraduate student at the University of California, Davis. 

Nicholas Ayrton is a U.S. Navy veteran and current undergraduate student at the University of Arkansas.

Featured Image: A stack of Starlink internet satellites just before a launch. (Photo via SpaceX)

Human Factors Meets New Technology in 2025

Emerging Technologies Topic Week

By John Cordle and Robert Sweetman

A glimpse of what the future could hold in Human Performance Monitoring – and Improvement

This article is an exercise in “visualization,” looking at the art of the possible in combining science and technology— and changing Navy culture—to improve shipboard human performance. 

The year is 2025. Onboard USS Halberg (DDG 217), my fictitious grandson, who we will call LTJG “J.T.,” is about to take the watch as Officer of the Deck. In accordance with the Navy’s Force Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management instruction, signed by the CNO in 2023, he is standing a circadian watch rotation (three hours on watch, nine hours off) which is based on decades of research demonstrating the advantages of a repeatable, stable schedule to the body’s internal clock, a policy supported (as we shall see) by modern technology that creates a holistic assessment of his performance over time. 

After the deadly DDG collisions in 2017 and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Fatigue Management and Crewing in 2021, the Navy re-examined its response to the 2017 Comprehensive Review and (finally) realized that the human is the most important part of any weapon system. This led to a fundamental shift in priorities as manpower requirements—which had long been underfunded and under-executed by as much as 15%— were made the number one priority, as GAO had recommended that “The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Office of Chief of Naval Operations uses crew requirements to project future personnel needs)” and the Department of the Navy (DON) concurred.1

Even as new technology allowed for fewer people to man the DDG Flight IIIA warships in their multi-mission role, the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act mandated 100% funding to the sea duty manpower account and ordered the Navy to measure against the full Ship’s Manning Document (SMD) requirement, instead of the funded portion. With its ability to coordinate manned and unmanned surface and airborne vehicles, which use artificial intelligence (AI) to learn about the environment and adjust tactics to an ever-changing threat, the ship is an awesome example of the implementation of the newest technology. But the heart of its warfighting capability—what makes this now fully-manned crew so formidable—is a well-honed team that is attuned to its own strengths and weaknesses thanks to human factors science and technology.

The first evidence of this is in the crew makeup. The Agile Manpower Model (AMM)2 uses AI to track and continually recalculate requirements. Gone are the days of manual calculations on a 3-year rotation by ship class; this has been replaced by an increasingly agile system that uses artificial intelligence and ever-adapting, comprehensive workload calculations, as well as a four-section Condition III watch rotation instead of the three-section model that had been used (with no real scientific basis) for decades. 

AMM does not exist, but given advances in AI and the complexity of the manpower management system, it is probably just a matter of time until it does.

This approach was formally adopted in 2022 as OPNAV policy, via change to OPNAVINST 1000.16, as a necessary foundation for the unique combination of work and watch that a Navy crew needs to maintain the ship, adding a formal requirement for eight hours of protected sleep time; this despite the fact that it resulted in a slight increase in the cost (less than ten percent) of manpower. Human factors research (including a 2008 study that showed a positive correlation between manning levels and lower mishap rates)3 tipped the scales in favor of the idea that it was in fact “worth it” to man ships to the calculated requirement. In addition, improvements in technology and a focused manpower analysis showed that the idea of underfunding manpower (previously funded at only 95% and manned to 95% of that) was not conducive to optimal performance and, in fact, not cost effective when balanced across the lifecycle maintenance cost of the ship; so in 2024 the Navy decided to leverage savings in other programs to fully fund the manpower account. 

It was only through an intense collaboration of Navy research centers, including the Naval Health Research Laboratory, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Center for Naval Analysis, and others that science eventually carried the day. The Expanded SURFMEX model was a big help, matching sailor experience to fleet needs and enhancing the detailing process.4 Lots of barriers had to come down to make that happen, including making human physiology research a funded program of record instead of an ad-hoc set of independent programs, but the resulting manpower modeling software, combined with AI protocols that inject real time data from the Fleet, made this process possible. 

While there have been great strides in planning, executing, and funding an improved manpower and manning process, much has been done to improve the command’s awareness of the well-being and performance of the individual crew members and teams as well. Warrior Toughness training, implemented along with the Expanded Operational Stress Control program way back in 2020, uses science to teach skills such as mindfulness, mediation, nutritional science, and exercise that have all combined to make the sailors of 2025 tougher and more resilient upon arrival, and build on that toughness throughout their career. The initiative to add Deployed Resiliency Counselors and a Chaplain to each deployed ship has paid off, as has the Behavioral Health Technician program that gives Independent Duty Corpsmen the ability to assess crew readiness and stress levels and get them assistance—before they become unplanned losses. 

Other psychology and physiology-based programs such as the Command Resilience Team, the Human Factors Council, and the availability of remote psychological counseling via unclassified video teleconference have expanded the level of mental health and resilience support to those on the front lines. All of these are examples of what is special about the human factors field, where technology and knowledge combine to provide increased awareness of the human condition – and how to improve it. 

There are new shipboard technologies as well. As J.T. heads to watch, he takes off the colored and lighted glasses that he put on when he awoke, designed to complement the body’s natural endocrine response that occurs during the transition from sleep to wakefulness in a process called “circadian entrainment”. He has another pair of glasses that he wears before going to bed to minimize the negative effects of blue light.5 The rack he slept in was not that of his father and grandfather— it has been replaced by the Advanced Rest and Recovery Integrated System (ARRIS). This was his safe place to retreat and recover from the stresses of the workday.6 In 2023, after the GAO report, and a series of research efforts by the Naval Postgraduate School,7 ARRIS were mandated to curb the fatigue epidemic in the Navy.

ARRIS does not exist, but it could. This would represent a new “human-factors centered” approach to a complete makeover of the Navy rack, turning it into a temperature and noise controlled environment. It includes a mattress tailored to individual preference, a full spectrum LED light to facilitate sleep and wakefulness using the optimal light wavelengths, and a set of noise reducing headphones that are also tuned to provide the sailor with a choice of white noise, natural sounds, or music as he falls asleep, bring him back to wakefulness with a gradual noise increase, and sound any ship alarm or emergency announcement that may occur during his protected sleep period. It also includes a passive heart and temperature monitor that (much like his computerized watch does at home) records his sleep quality and any disturbances that might impede his performance during his next work/watch period.

Having consumed a cup of coffee (energy drinks are generally frowned upon unless recommended by the Personal Performance Profile, PPP), another notional program that could provide a comprehensive look at each sailor’s daily alertness and fatigue levels. He checks in at the Physical Readiness Kiosk and gets a readout on his fatigue and performance level. J.T. completes a short self-assessment, where he rates his alertness level as a 6 out of 7, knowing that he fell short of the required eight hours of sleep due to an equipment casualty in his division that required overtime and supervision. 

The Navy has monitored the temperatures and pressures of its fluid systems, and the voltage and current of its electrical ones, for literally centuries; the idea of doing the same for its people was a long time coming. To assess his alertness, J.T. then looks into the eyepiece of a Psychomotor Vigilance Self-Test (PVT) machine, pressing the mouse with each flash of light, speaking into the voice machine, and after three minutes is cleared, by a series of proven technologies leveraged together, to take the watch. 

The PVT is used in various forms throughout industry; for example, on the International Space Station a Reaction Self-Test provides crewmembers with feedback on neurobehavioral changes in vigilant attention, state stability, and impulsivity. It helps crewmembers objectively identify when their performance capability is degraded by various fatigue-related conditions that can occur as a result of ISS operations and time in space (e.g., acute and chronic sleep restriction, slam shifts, extravehicular activity, and residual sedation from sleep medications).

 Lessons learned (and applied) from past incidents (e.g., the bombing of the USS Cole, and collisions involving USS Fitzgerald, USS John S. McCain, and other near misses) have shown the need not just for toughness—the ability to recognize, analyze, and mitigate stress though mental and physical readiness—but also for resilience, since when a missile or a mine puts a hole in the ship, the first minutes—and the next 48 to 72 hours—will test the mettle of the entire crew. During these crises the crew (including the Captain) start at whatever level of personal readiness—or fatigue—that they had when the water started coming in. 

J.T. remembers reading the GAO Report from 2021 where one of his (then) peers was quoted as seeing “fellow officers taking the watch in a state of senselessness driven by fatigue, unnoticed by shipboard leaders who looked the other way and ignored crew endurance principles.” My, how times (and culture) have changed! 

At the end of his three-hour watch, J.T. downloads his actigraph from the motion detecting “wearable” that he wears at all times in the form of either a ring or a watch, so that his information can enter the continuous monitoring data feedback stream under the Crew Readiness, Endurance, and Watch standing (CREW).8

CREW is a pilot program to “create a decision support tool so that you can understand how fatigued people are and how much sleep they are or are not getting,” explained Dr. Rachel Markwald, a sleep physiologist from NHRC. “We can then determine how those fatigue levels correspond with the health of the individual so that we can provide a way or course of action to offset some of the risks that come with fatigue and poor health.”  The long-term goal of CREW is to aid command leadership in making educated decisions about a sailor’s sleep pattern and/or their level of fatigue, capturing this data and combining it with the rest of the crew to place a real-time picture of the crew’s readiness at the CO’s fingertips. Each sailor’s data is secure, restricted from being used for any punitive measure, and and is not tied to him personally, but is available as a means of monitoring his own watch standing and work performance. 

A huge part of the culture of readiness is the idea that one’s own psychological and physiological readiness relies heavily on the concept of personal responsibility. 

Going over his past 24 hours and noting any deviations or issues, J.T. remembers that, in addition to the next watch cycle, he has to man the boat deck for an underway replenishment, one of the evolutions that is tagged for an Individual Risk Assessment. Looking ahead at a Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST)9 printout of the next 24 hours, J.T. sees that in order to be at peak performance for the evolution that follows his next watch, he needs to take a 45-90 minute nap during the next nine hours. He programs that into his rack display, a monitor that shows his schedule for the next 24 hours so that anyone entering his stateroom will know that he is in a “protected sleep” period (if they did not see the red light outside the door, indicating such). J.T. calls it the “NORP” light, short for “Naval Officer Rest Period”. He learned that from his dad. 

In the end, J.T. rests easy, knowing that he has done his part to leverage the science and technology of Human Factors to maximize his own readiness, and by extension , the performance of his team and the safety of the crew that was able to sleep soundly while he had the watch. During his Protected Sleep Period (PSP) J.T. retires to his ARRIS. The Navy had acknowledged fatigue as a major contributor to errors in judgement, mental health and operational lethargy. J.T. enters his ARRIS to begin his breathing exercises and relaxation techniques. He knows from his training that the stressors of managing the ship are carried with him in the form of nor-adrenaline as he transitions to sleep. If he wants to have restful sleep, he needs to trigger a physiological change in his brain first. Much of this knowledge was provided during pipeline training and periodic updates and under the Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management program, a Navy- wide initiative that was expanded in response to the 2021 GAO report. 

In this version of the future, the implementation of human factors technology and fatigue management/crew endurance expertise, along with the combination of science, education, and technology—and finally, culture change—has been a game changer. Since the program’s inception, satisfaction at work has shot up dramatically, along with retention and operational performance scores. Reductions in mishaps and unplanned losses, combined with the savings from maintenance by fully-manned and less fatigued crews, has more than paid for the cost of research and development as well as the extra manpower that it justified. The Navy has (finally) made the decision to put sailors first and the results have been astounding. Granddad would be proud.

Dr. John Cordle is a retired Navy Captain who commanded two warships, USS Oscar Austin and USS San Jacinto, and was recognized with the 2010 Navy League Award for Inspirational Leadership, the Navy Bureau of Medicine Epictetus Award for Innovative Leadership, and the 2019 American Society of Engineers Solberg Award for his contribution to Navy Crew Endurance. This article is a figment of his active imagination built upon scientific research as it exists today – and as it could be.

Robert Sweetman is a former US Navy SEAL who served for eight years before being medically retired. He completed two tours at SEAL Team Seven, and one as an instructor at Naval Special Warfare Advanced Training Command. After retiring and following the suicide of a SEAL teammate, Mr. Sweetman continued his education at the University of California where he focused on sleep science, the link between sleep health and mental health, and designing technology to help with that problem.

Endnotes

[1] GAO 21-366, Actions Required to Address Crew Fatigue and Manning, May 2021.

[2] AMM is a capability that does not yet exist, but it could, using existing technology.

[3] Lazaretti, Patrick and Shattuck, Nita, HSI IN THE USN FRIGATE COMMUNITY: OPERATIONAL READINESS AND SAFETY AS A FUNCTION OF MANNING LEVELS, NPS Thesis, December 2008.

[4] Eckstein, Megan, “SWO Boss: Pilot Programs for Training, Manning Will Lead to More Experienced Fleet,” USNI News, 13 January 2021.

[5] Roza, David, Navy submariners are testing out their own version of ‘birth control glasses’ Make the Silent Service well-rested again. Task and Purpose, May 17, 2021.

[6] ARRIS is another capability that does not exist, but it could, using existing technology.

[7] Matsangas, Panagiotis Lewis Shattuck, Nita, Habitability in Berthing Compartments and Well-Being of Sailors Working on U.S. Navy Surface Ships, NPS Calhoun, May 2021.

 [8] Harkins, Gina, “Why 300 Sailors and Marines Deployed on an Amphibious Ship with Smart Rings,” Military.com, 14 Apr 2021.

[9]  FAST is one of many fatigue modeling tools used by industry to predict levels of performance degradation based on fatigue.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 10, 2021) Aviation Machinist’s Mate 2nd Class Armando Herrera, a native of Albuquerque, New Mexico, assigned to the “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147, inspects an F-35C Lightning II on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Tyler Wheaton)

Sea Control 271 – Navigation in Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas with So Yeon Kim

By Jared Samuelson

So Yeon Kim joins the program to discuss “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,” their increasing politicization, and how states use them to protect sensitive ecosystems.

Download Sea Control 271 – Navigation in Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas with So Yeon Kim

Links

1. “Problems and Processes of Restricting Navigation in Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,” by So Yeon Kim, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, June 3, 2021. 

Reflecting on Colonial Approaches to the China-Vietnam Dispute in the South China Sea and the Tribute System,”  by So Yeon Kim, Journal of the History of International Law, January 31, 2021.

Jared Samuelson is Executive Producer and Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].

This episode was edited and produced by Keagan Ingersoll.

Responding to the Proliferation of Uninhabited Underwater Vehicles

Emerging Technologies Topic Week

Sections of the following article are adapted from a forthcoming master’s degree thesis, titled The Hunt for Underwater Drones: Explaining the Proliferation of Uninhabited Underwater Vehicles

By Andro Mathewson

In late May 2021, the Israeli armed forces destroyed an armed underwater uninhabited vehicle (UUV)1 operated by the terrorist group Hamas. This kamikaze-UUV was used in an attempt to attack Israeli offshore gas and oil installations, which Hamas had unsuccessfully targeted in the past using rockets and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). This is possibly the first use of an armed UUV by a non-state actor, but UUVs have been in use since the 1950s, with the United States and Russia leading the charge. UUVs are now owned by over fifty nations across the world. Understanding why and how this technology proliferates is crucial to recognizing the role of such new technologies in international security and preparing effective responses. Based on this common understanding, the international community can counter further UUV proliferation by establishing a framework of norms and agreements, while security forces and military industries can focus on advancing effective counter-UUV technology.

Why Examine the Proliferation of UUVs?

UUVs are becoming an important tool within the realm of international security. Naval forces across the world are quickly developing and acquiring a variety of UUVs due to their furtive nature, dual-use capabilities, and multifaceted functionalities. While the technology is still in relatively early development stages and leaves much to be desired, UUVs have quickly become an integral element of modern navies but also appear in the arsenals of lesser developed armed forces and non-state actors due to their utility as an asymmetric tool for sea denial. With advancements in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, UUVs are becoming essential assets in the maritime forces of states across the world. Although still predominantly used in an unarmed and surveillance capacity, UUVs have recently also been both adapted and designed to carry explosive ordnance and act in an offensive capacity. While the United States and Russia are at the forefront of UUV development, over fifty other states have either developed or acquired UUVs, as the following map shows.  

Countries in possession of UUVs as of May 2021.2

There is also considerable interest in underwater drones and their diverse applications from militaries, private corporations, civil society organizations, and journalists alike.3 Their broad applications explain why the global UUV market size is projected to grow from USD 2.0 billion in 2020 to USD 4.4 billion by 2025. Despite the increasing interest in UUVs, many commentaries about their proliferation and use are based on speculation rather than on empirical analysis. Finally, examining the early proliferation of UUVs offers opportunities to explore, in-depth, the initial stages of a technology’s adoption by actors in the international arena, make predictions for the future, and prepare effective responses. While several of the patterns identified in this article might not persist moving forwards, it is nonetheless an opportunity to attempt to understand the wider motivations of governments and decision-makers on a global scale, including the role of security alliances, conflict, geography, economics, and international law.

UUV Proliferation

While at least 30 states have the indigenous capacity to manufacture UUVs, at least 55 states own or have previously owned UUVs.4 This demonstrates that there has been significant technology transfer and diffusion between states. UUVs, and the majority of the technologies they incorporate, are fundamentally dual-use, and the export thereof is often restricted by states and allowed only in a very small set of circumstances. For example, in 2009, the Egyptian Navy signed a deal under the United States Foreign Military Sales program for the delivery of  the U.S.-based Columbia Group’s Pluto Plus UUV system, intended primarily for mine identification and destruction. More recently, in 2016, the United States donated two Remus autonomous underwater vehicles to the Croatian Navy to upgrade their countermine capabilities. While the majority of UUV proliferation is based on such authorized transfers between nations and global corporations or domestic development, there have been numerous cases of unwanted UUV technology transfer through smuggling, intellectual theft, and capture.

There are at least four documented cases of UUVs being seized either by nations or non-state actors. Perhaps the most prominent example is that of China seizing a USN UUV in the South China Sea in late 2016. However, this is not how China first acquired UUV technology, yet it is a possibility that the Chinese Navy deconstructed the UUV to understand and reconstruct the technologies within. While China later returned this drone, it had previously been able to smuggle protected American UUV technology via middlemen out of the United States. Other examples include the capture of a US Remus UUV by Houthi forces off the coast of Yemen in 2018, the seizure of an American early-model mine reconnaissance UUV in 2005 by North Korea, and the capture of a Chinese underwater glider by Indonesian fishermen in 2020. While it remains unknown if these captured UUVs were later remodeled to be operational by their new owners, these incidents showcase both a lesser-known method of technology proliferation and an inherent vulnerability of UUVs.

The legal status of UUVs is a factor that has presently had little influence on their proliferation, partially due to their relative novelty in the international arena as well as due to the currently very unclear legal boundaries concerning unmanned underwater vessels. However, due to the ability of regulatory systems and international law to limit said proliferation or direct it solely to allied states, essentially weaponizing both limitation and regulation, this unclarity is unlikely to continue. Additionally, the distinctive ethical character of war at sea generates several novel ethical dilemmas regarding the design and use of UUVs, which have yet to be answered by international law but certainly require attentiveness.

Country Likelihood of UUV Adoption
Romania .886
Libya .812
Chile .780
Slovenia .751
Argentina .692
South Africa .653
Algeria .588
Cyprus .559
Ukraine .553
Iraq .462

 

Keeping track of new government acquisitions of UUV technology is an important first step in developing adequate responses. Thus, looking to the future, the database created for this article and the subsequent analysis thereof can help identify possible future adopters of UUVs.5 While exact foretelling is nigh impossible, the following table lists the ten most likely future adopters of UUV technology based on the author’s model.   The majority of the nations listed have extensive military requirements. As UUVs become less cost-prohibitive and countries become wealthier, their proliferation may reach a tipping point where they become a widespread and almost ubiquitous technology, possibly following the route of UAVs, which are now present in almost every military across the globe. One other possible explanation for the future acquisition of UUVs by these listed states is their involvement in ongoing maritime disputes as UUVs are useful tools for monitoring vessel movements in contested spaces.

Responses to UUV Proliferation

Due to their relative novelty, both responses to their use and mitigation strategies are presently scarce. Countering global UUV proliferation should be an imperative for the United States Navy, its allies, and international organizations alike. Despite the clear recent increase in proliferation over the past decade, there are currently no national or international agencies in charge of a response to military purpose UUVs, while their ambiguous legal status has led to a de-facto underwater arms race. Nevertheless, there are two possible answers to these challenges: risk mitigation and counter-UUV technology. However, a dual-pronged approach addressing both simultaneously will most likely have the most effective results.

The first option relies on a rules-based international system and the adherence of states to international agreements and regulations. Risk mitigation strategies attempt to minimize the risk of conflict through international cooperation. In the case of military technologies, this is primarily via arms control agreements, the effectiveness of which is hotly contested. While arms control has been somewhat effective for several weapons, such as cluster munitions, its ability to restrict the proliferation of other uninhabited vehicles, such as aerial drones, has been generally deemed unsuccessful. Similar to UAVS, the place of UUVs in the international legal framework is highly uncertain. Many issues remain unanswered: Is a UUV part of its state of origin and thus immune from legal seizure by other nations? Should they operate only on the surface in another nation’s territorial seas? Can it legally operate there at all?  (This is only a snippet of the many questions on UUV legality).

Deciding upon the legal status of UUVs in both domestic and international law is crucial for the security of states and the reduction of risk in the international arena. For example, classifying UUVs as ships or extensions thereof would categorize them under the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This would allow UUVs to act correspondingly in the regions of the sea as determined by UNCLOS, illuminating where they may be legally deployed and for what reasons. Within the different zones, states could apply the rules currently affecting maritime vessels to UUVs, restricting the available legal actions of the UUV-controlling state. However, UNCLOS is not inviolable. Amongst many others, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, reducing its coercive power. Many other states, including Russia and China, often criticize and neglect its stipulations. International law enforcement is also often ineffectual. Thus, although enforcing UUV use under the clauses of UNCLOS could alleviate some tensions, it is far from a panacea. Consequently, states must also develop more reliable defensive strategies and technologies to thwart antagonistic UUV deployments.

The development of counter-UUV technology is in its infancy, primarily due to two factors: the novelty of UUVs and the fact that they are predominantly still unarmed and used mainly for surveillance and intelligence gathering. However, the sooner the United States and its allies invest in and develop effective counter-UUV technologies and strategies, the more prepared they’ll be more future encounters. Due to the dual-use nature of UUVs, the true intentions behind their deployment are almost indistinguishable. Thus, states must prepare an extensive response toolkit, which requires both economic and political investments. Countering a technologically advanced threat requires the development of new defense mechanisms. In the case of UUV’s this could be new countermeasure methods of detection, tracking, and tracking – for example – acoustic or magnetic tripwires, to determine underwater movements through sensitive passages like harbors or straights. Another option is a more aggressive approach, such as the development of new systems to capture or outright destroy UUVs operated by adversarial states, including more precise torpedoes or more advanced naval mines capable of targeting and destroying UUVs.

Conclusion

The current status of aerial drones and their widespread use across the world offers militaries, policymakers, and international organizations the opportunity to prevent a similar scenario from occurring with underwater drones. While UAV technologies come with certain benefits to state military forces, such as surgical precision airstrikes, their indiscriminate use by non-state actors and terrorist groups has wrought havoc across the Middle East. Preventing a similar outcome with the continued proliferation of UUVs is vital to the security of the global ocean and the ships upon it. This will require concerted efforts and significant international cooperation from governments, international organizations, and civil society groups alike. While the successful control of UUV proliferation is not impossible, states must also prepare for the adverse outcome and develop effective and efficient counter-UUV strategies and technologies.

Andro Mathewson is a Research Fellow at the Arctic Institute, a Capability Support Officer at the HALO Trust, and an International Relations MSc student at the University of Edinburgh. His dissertation explores the proliferation of uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUVs) on a global scale. He is interested in international security, military technologies, and naval warfare. Andro has previously contributed to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Texas National Security Review, the Wavell Room, and the UK Defence Journal. Before his current studies, he was a research fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, where he also received his Bachelor of Arts in PPE and German. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of The HALO Trust.

Endnotes

1. For the purposes of this article, the term uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUV) will be used throughout. There is no generally accepted nomenclature, thus “UUV” in this paper will encompass all types of uninhabited underwater vehicles, regardless if armed, unarmed, military, civilian, autonomous, or remotely operated. UUVs are also known as underwater drones or undermanned underwater vehicles and include autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUVs), and underwater gliders. However, it is also important to note that this essay focusses exclusively on government owned UUVs.

2. The map illustrates states and their militaries that are in possession of UUVs, regardless if those are armed or not, or how they were acquired (developed, bought, co-owned, transferred, or captured).

3. Part of this is driven by their dual-use nature and multifaceted abilities, including, for example, wreck salvage and environmental survey, as well as by the growing number of deep-water offshore oil & gas production activities and increasing maritime security threats.

4. This data is based on an original cross-sectional database produced in May 2021, containing information on the UUV capabilities of 196 states and 2 non-state actors. I use the term “at-least” for two reasons: (1) Due to the military nature of UUVs, it is safe to assume that there is significant information pertaining to their proliferation that is publicly unavailable, and (2) despite extensive research, there is always the possibility that there are lapses in my data.

5. To analyse this data, I use a probit regression model, focusing on two dependant variables (government UUV ownership and domestic production capacity) and the following independent variables: Access to the global ocean; Ratification of the United Nationals Convention on the Laws of the Sea; Submarine ownership; UAV ownership; NATO membership; Ongoing Maritime Disputes; Military Expenditure; and GDP per capita. This model shows an estimated probability that a state with a set of particular characteristics (the independent variables) will either own UUVs or have the domestic capacity to produce them. Based on this model, the list shows states most likely to acquire UUVs next, compared to the overall characteristics of states already owning UUVs.

Featured Image: Unmanned underwater vehicles, assigned to Commander, Task Group 56.1, are pre-staged before UUV buoyancy testing. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Julian Olivari/Released)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.