Notes to the New Administration Week
By Peter Dombrowski
Even citizens who rarely follow naval affairs are likely aware of the troubles the United States Navy has faced over the last decade. The service has suffered scandals from the Fat Leonard affair to the dockside fire that destroyed the Bonhomme Richard. Even worse, there is a growing sense that the USN has been surpassed in numbers of ships and vigor by the PLA Nav. Meanwhile the Houthis have thumbed their noses at American power in the Red Sea, the Navy has expended hundreds of munitions without yet deterring or degrading Houthis capabilities sufficiently to allow commercial shipping to resume at normal levels.
To begin the long voyage back, the new administration must insist that the Navy write a new maritime strategy in the spirit of the famous Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. In the words of former Reagan administration Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, “A critical lesson from the Maritime Strategy is that the Navy must restore credibility with Congress and the public that it knows what kinds of ships, aircraft, and technologies are needed.” And, of course, Congress must ensure that budgets allow current shipbuilding plans are fulfilled.
A new maritime strategy must be far more ambitious than the strategic visions offered by the last several chiefs of naval operations. Since the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and Advantage at Sea, the navy’s strategic documents (FRAGOs and NAVPLANS) have been small bore, inwardly focused, and not easily understandable to members of Congress or the America public.
The Trump administration’s civilian naval and defense department leaders must encourage the Navy to develop a compelling service vision by paying attention to the following prerequisites for sound strategy development.
Audience. A new strategy must focus on a handful of core audiences, such as the American people, their elected representatives, and the new president. Recent service documents have tried to address too many potential stakeholders—sailors, Navy families, international partners and rivals, the Department of Defense, and the naval industrial sector. But this dilutes the impact of the documents.
Process. Strategy development should be deliberate, it should be inclusive, and it should not be outsourced to contractors. Like all successful organizations, the Navy should prioritize and own its new maritime strategy.
Enduring. If the Navy makes an effort to meaningfully commit a new strategy, then the strategy must be able to shape the Navy for a decade or more. With the support of the incoming Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations must draw upon the next generations of leaders so that they become plank holders in the new vision. A new CNO should not simply upend the past CNO’s strategic guidance without sufficient reason.
Embedded. The Navy strategy must closely mesh with the new administration’s National Security and National Defense Strategies. Otherwise, it will be dead on arrival and of little value for Navy supporters in Congress or the intermittently attentive public.
Implemented. One grave criticism levied against most Navy strategies since the Reagan era’s Maritime Strategy is that they have had negligible impact on how the Navy actually operates much less how it mans, trains, and equips its forces. A new strategy must be operationalized to direct and accountable implementation.
Tri-service. The U.S. Navy should collaborate with the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard to write a comprehensive vision for the three sea services.
Truthful. The Navy must honestly confront its evident shortcomings while proposing realistic ways and means to remedy them. The released strategy must be accompanied by classified annexes fully informed by current intelligence assessments, realistic budget projections, and emerging operational concepts.
No one is naïve enough to believe that a service-level strategy can solve the many problems facing the Navy. But an ambitious new maritime strategy will help the Navy raise more resources, generate positive attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and win appropriate congressional guidance to set the Navy on the right course for the coming decade. If the Navy is to meet the pacing threat posed by the PLA Navy, it must rally public support, galvanize Congress, and convince the world that the United States fully remains the world’s premier naval power.
Peter Dombrowski is the the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics in the Strategic and Operational Research Department of the U.S. Naval War College.
The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Naval War College or any other U.S. government department or agency.
Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (June 27, 2012) The amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) steams alongside coalition partner ships during a formation sailing event while participating in the War of 1812 Fleet Exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Petty Officer 2nd Class (AW/SW) Gretchen M. Albrecht/RELEASED)