Category Archives: Cyber War

Threats, risks, and players in the cyber realm.

Cyber War

Protecting the Maritime Shipping Industry from Cybercrime

4 Comments

By Nicholas A. Glavin

Introduction

The American maritime shipping industry is one of the most vulnerable critical infrastructures (CI) to ransomware and other forms of cybercrime. Maritime shipping accounts for 90-94 percent of world trade; any disruption to this sector will adversely affect the American economy and international trade more broadly. The July 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that affected Maersk, a Dutch maritime shipping company, prompts timely action to protect American maritime infrastructure as the industry is ill-prepared to prevent and respond to attacks of this sophistication and scale. The recommended course of action encourages the U.S. Government to subsidize cybersecurity and training horizontally and vertically across the maritime shipping industry through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).

Cyber Assaulting Maritime Commerce

Any disruptions to global shipping companies, sea lanes of communication, or maritime chokepoints will have potentially disastrous implications for the economies and the supply chains of the U.S. and the global community. The economic impacts of cyber disruptions and damage to ships, ports, refineries, terminals, and support systems is estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Moreover, the second- and third-order effects of a cyber attack are not limited to the maritime sector of CI; if more than one port is disrupted at the same time, a greater impact is “likely to occur” for the Critical Manufacturing, Commercial Facilities, Food and Agriculture, Energy, Chemical, and Transportation Systems of the nation’s CI.

Ransomware attacks eclipsed most other cybercrime threats in 2017.  The July 2017 NotPeyta ransomware attack highlighted the vulnerabilities of the maritime shipping industry to cyber disruptions. One of the most high-profile victims of this ransomware attack included the Dutch maritime shipping company Maersk. The company estimates upwards of $300 million in losses from the attack, the majority of which relates to lost revenue. Maersk continued operating for ten days without information technology (IT) until its networks were back online, despite ships with 10,000 to 20,000 containers entering a port every fifteen minutes. NotPetya shut down several ports worldwide, reduced Maersk’s volume by 20 percent, and forced the company to handle the remaining 80 percent of its operations manually. Maersk was forced to replace 45,000 PCs, 4,000 servers and install 2,500 applications.

The maritime shipping industry is highly vulnerable to cybercrime – in particular, ransomware – because of its lack of encryption, increased use of computer services, a lack of standardized training in and awareness of cybersecurity among crew, the sheer cost of defending the maritime IT enterprise, and industry-wide complacence towards cybersecurity. Several navigation systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) are neither encrypted nor authenticated, thus being a soft target for cyber criminals. Jamming or spoofing of these systems can ground ships or make two collide, which can close a port or shipping channel for days or weeks depending on the severity of the incident. Disruptions to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to injury or death, release harmful pollutants, and lead to extensive economic damage across the maritime shipping industry.

Course of Action A: Federal Subsidies for Mandated Cybersecurity Awareness and Training

A Federal Government-enabled focus on prevention and response would proliferate horizontally and vertically across the maritime shipping community. This approach subsidizes the buy-in for industry to approach cybersecurity as a cost-effective asset. Simultaneously, this educates lower echelons of the workforce on digital hygiene to understand the transmission of ransomware and other forms of cybercrime. A positive consequence is the mitigation of industry lacking robust cybersecurity capabilities due to complacence and overhead costs. This is highly probable due to NotPetya’s wake-up call to industry and the existing public-private cybersecurity partnerships.

As the lead agency responsible for maritime cybersecurity in the U.S., the USCG issued a cybersecurity strategy in 2015 to identify best practices and voluntary measures. However, others may argue it is not the place of the U.S. government to subsidize cybersecurity best practices, facilitate compliance, and serve as the arbiter of how industry should train and defend against ransomware and other forms of cybercrime, thus opting instead for only industry-led approaches.

Course of Action B: Leverage Manual Operations and Dated Communications Technologies

This no- and low-tech approach encourages the use of manual navigations operations and older long-range navigation (LORAN) systems to circumvent disruptions to navigational and operational systems. A positive consequence of this approach is the standardization of backup operations for seamless continuity of operations on land, while also mitigating the overreliance on technology at sea. This is a probable course of action given the existing LORAN infrastructure and Maersk operating at 80 percent capacity during the NotPetya attack. A negative consequence is a proliferation in ransomware attacks deliberately targeting this industry since the approach would be passive in nature. This is also probable in occurring given the interconnectedness of the maritime sector to other CIs. However, others may argue that manual training and a functional secondary means of communication mitigates adverse costs from future ransomware attacks.

Conclusion

Course of Action A provides the highest return on investment to address the ransomware threat to the American maritime shipping industry. This prevention-focused and proactive approach will induce a top-down, lateral, and public-private approach to address maritime cybersecurity. While Course of Action B identifies the existence and use of alternative approaches to circumvent – or, at worst, mitigate the consequences of – a ransomware attack, it fails to place a premium on industry-wide digital hygiene  which is arguably the most cost-effective, scalable, and fastest approach to ransomware prevention.

Nicholas A. Glavin is a candidate for a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) from The Fletcher School at Tufts University. He previously worked as a researcher at the U.S. Naval War College’s Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent those of the U.S. Government. Follow him on Twitter @nickglavin.

Featured Image: Albert Mærsk in the 70s (Wikimedia Commons)

Cyber War

Port Automation and Cyber Risk in the Shipping Industry

Leave a comment

CIMSEC is committed to keeping our content FREE FOREVER. Please consider donating to our annual campaign now so we can continue to provide free content.

By Philipp Martin Dingeldey 

Introduction

To stay ahead of competing ports and technological developments, automation has been heralded as inevitable. Major transshipment hubs and aspiring ports bet their future on automation, which raises the impact  cyber risks could have in the long-run.

Singapore’s Port Modernization

One example of port modernization is Singapore’s Tuas Port Project. To stay ahead of competing ports in Southeast Asia, PSA International and the city state have bet their future on the fully automated port on the western side of the island. The project is set to almost double the port’s current throughput capacity of twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) and consolidate all its container operations by 2040.

Singapore’s port is ranked second, behind Shanghai’s mega port, by total TEUs handled. Nevertheless, Singapore’s port is the world’s busiest transshipment hub, and therefore immensely important to global supply chains. The port’s volume growth of 6.4 percent for the first half of 2017 indicates that its investments in modernized berths and joint ventures with liners paid off.

While this is great news for the short term, container vessels on Asia-Europe trade routes will inevitably increase in size, requiring higher handling efficiency to achieve fast turn-around times. By the end of 2018, ultra large container vessels (ULCVs) are expected to gain a share of 61 percent of total capacity, pushing established hubs like Singapore to automate its terminals to stay relevant.

At the same time, next generation container vessels will not only be bigger, but also increasingly automated and even autonomous. As ports and the shipping industry are integral parts of global and regional supply chains, their automation and technological modernization raises the impact and potential of cyber risk.

How Good is Automation?

For Singapore’s port, automation is seen to not only strengthen its position as a transshipment hub well into the future, but also helps it keep up with technological developments and industry trends.

The shipping industry has generally been slow in adapting new technologies, due to its conservative nature and the large number of players involved. Currently, only a fraction of global container volume is handled by fully automated container terminals. In 2016, it was estimated that only 4-5 percent of container volume will be handled by fully automated terminals once ongoing projects were completed. Nonetheless, industry pressure and competition have heightened the need for ports to invest and automate, indicating that the number of automated terminals will increase.

Automated terminals allow ports to handle containers more efficiently by using operating systems to plan storage in accordance with collection and transshipment times. This reduces unnecessary box moves, shortens cycle times, and enables consistent and predictable throughput numbers.

Fully-automated terminals have the advantage of low operating costs and reliable operations, but require higher upfront costs, longer development, offer only low productivity increases at peak times, and have the general difficulty to fully automate a working terminal. On the other hand, semi-automated terminals offer the possibility for greater productivity increases at peak times, are generally understood to have the best overall productivity with less upfront costs, but require higher operating costs and are inconsistent when it comes to handling ULCVs.

While full automation gives large ports like Singapore’s the advantage of reliable, full-time operations at low operating costs, it requires long development times to fix bugs and offers only gradual productivity increases at peak times. On top of that, full automation also increases their vulnerability to cyber risks. This is due to the use of technologically advanced and networked systems.

The investment threshold to enter automation for ports is high, while not necessarily offering major increases in productivity. What automation does offer major port hubs is better predictability and consistency of container moves per hour. Additionally, automation reduces the room for human error, making operations safer. At the same time, automation reduces the environmental impact since terminals are mostly electrified, giving ports an additional competitive edge in an industry increasingly focused on sustainability.

Cyber Risks

The shipping industry and ports are seen by many insiders as underprepared for cyber threats. Even though major players in the shipping industry have recognized and acted on the risks posed by cyber threats, the majority have been slow to recognize potential business risks. Even though awareness has grown, the need for better information sharing persists. Automation further increases the exposure and impact of cyber threats for ports, highlighting the importance of data and system integrity.

The reality of cyber threats to automated terminals was demonstrated in the “NotPetya” cyber-attack in June 2017. The attack forced Maersk to interrupt operations at multiple terminals worldwide, causing logistical havoc for weeks after the attack. Overall, it cost Maersk roughly US$300 million, even though the attack was not specifically directed at the company. The “lucky hit” against one of the industry leaders showcases that even well-prepared firms can suffer financial losses due to cyber threats.

The difficulty with protecting automated terminals from cyber risks lies with their complexity. These terminals use industrial control systems that translate sensorial data and commands into mechanical actions. The network links between mechanical equipment and sensors are exposed to the same threats as data networks. The complexity is further increased by the months and years it can take to figure out and fix bugs and weaknesses in automated systems. In an automated system, different system components have to effectively work together as one, stretching the time needed to figure out and fix bugs. This involves mainly software issues that have to be fixed while also moving boxes of cargo at the terminal.

While ports have to secure themselves from a broad range of risks, cybercriminals can choose from a number of entry points. For example, external vendors, terminal operating systems, and unaware employees may be vulnerable to phishing attacks. Operational systems and data networks are not always up-to-date or properly secured, allowing criminals to gain comparatively easy access to information. To prevent the ports and shipping industry from most attacks, regular operating system updates, stronger passwords, secure satellite connections, resilience exercises, information sharing, and employee awareness campaigns should be practiced.

On top of that, modern ships bear the risk of spreading viruses onto port systems simply via Wi-Fi or other data networks. Industrial control systems are not designed with cyber risks or active network monitoring in mind. This is especially true for ships’ control systems, but can also affect the system components of ports.

Nevertheless, this is only addressing the technical side. The human factor still plays a major role in mitigating cyber risks. Personal details of ship crews can still be easily accessed, making them more vulnerable to social engineering via phishing or other techniques, unknowingly granting access to systems.

Human factors can take the form of criminals, terrorists, competitors, disgruntled employees, and more. Workers at mostly manual terminals, for example, generally do not like automation because it makes their jobs largely redundant. To reduce the chance for cyber threats stemming from or aided by disgruntled employees, ports can offer training and job guarantees to their workforce to make the transition to automation more incremental.

Port authorities, registries, and all major organizations in the shipping industry are increasingly aware of cyber threats and are responding through raising awareness or offering training courses. These are simple steps to better protect information and navigation systems on board ships. For example, BIMCO, the world’s largest international shipping association, made cyber security an important issue for the shipping industry three years ago via an awareness initiative. The association has further advocated the need for guidelines to evolve with the threats, launching the “Guidelines for Cyber Security Onboard Ships” in July 2017, which was endorsed and supported across the industry.

In addition, the Liberian ship registry started a computer-based two-hour cybersecurity training program in October 2017, offering a comprehensive overview of cybersecurity issues aboard ships. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these courses and campaigns are enough to protect the industry. While it is a step in the right direction, more needs to be done through regulations.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Since 2016, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has put forward voluntary guidelines regarding cyber risks. Only after 2021 does the IMO plan to enforce a set of binding regulations on cybersecurity. This might be too late for many companies in the industry. Shipping companies should not wait until 2021, but should begin now to implement simple measures, like using firewalls and stronger passwords, to deter criminals from trying to exploit current weaknesses.

Further, even though the IMO adopted guidelines on maritime cyber risk management into the International Safety Management Code this year, ports and the shipping industry still need to establish a stronger culture on cybersecurity.

Major shipping hubs are part of large and less resilient supply chains, which are essential for regional and international trade. These supply chains depend on a small number of key ports, which are vulnerable to shocks from other ports. To make supply chains and port hubs more resilient to cyber risks, the shipping industry as a whole will have to adjust and prepare.

Companies will have to work together and share information on previous or ongoing attacks, so that experiences and best practices can be shared directly. Unfortunately, this has been difficult to achieve due to worries about how competitors may use the shared information. Singapore has set up the Port Authorities Focal Point Correspondence Network to further the exchange of information on past and current incidents. It remains to be seen if this network has worked to encourage the sharing of information.

Ports are logistical hubs where many companies compete for business, making information sharing naturally difficult. Currently, port security is based on the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which is heavily focused on the physical aspects of security. In order to make cyber risks a much more important issue for port security, the whole sector needs to step up and make it a priority.

Cyber risks are not just a technological matter, but require adequate awareness and planning to strengthen a port’s resilience. Training employees actively in security protocols and procedures with information systems is one way of achieving this. At the same time, ports need to engage in contingency and scenario planning to be better prepared should an attack occur. On top of all this, national bodies (e.g. institutes of standards) need to give better guidance on security testing and planning for ports, which should be supplemented by binding guidelines on reporting and information sharing mandated by global bodies like the IMO.

Philipp Martin Dingeldey is a Research Analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. For questions and follow-ups he can be reached at research.pmdingeldey@gmail.com.

Featured Image: Port of Singapore (XPacifica/Gettyimages)

Cyber War, History

To Rule the (Air)Waves

Leave a comment

By Tim McGeehan and Douglas Wahl

A new domain of conflict emerges as America transitions onto a wartime footing. Military, commercial, and private interests debate how to balance security, privacy, and utility for new technology that unleashes the free-flow of information. The President issues Executive Orders to seize and defend the associated critical infrastructure for exclusive government use for the duration of the conflict.

This is not the plot for a movie about a future cyber war, nor is it a forecast of headlines for late 2017; rather, the year was 1917 and the “new” technology was wireless telegraphy.

Long before anyone imagined WiFi, there was wireless telegraphy or simply “wireless.” This revolutionary technology ultimately changed the conduct of war at sea, making the story of its adoption and wartime employment timely and worthy of re-examination. While these events took place last century, they inform today’s discussion as the U.S. Navy grapples with similar issues regarding its growing cyber capabilities.

Wireless Unveiled

In 1896, Guglielmo Marconi filed the first patent for wireless telegraphy, redefining the limits of long range communication.1 Wireless quickly grew into a means of mass dissemination of information with applications across government, commerce, and recreation. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 provided a venue to demonstrate its wartime utility, when Japanese naval scouts used their wireless to report critical intelligence concerning the Russian Fleet as it sailed for Tsushima Strait. This information allowed the Japanese Fleet to prepare a crippling attack on the Russians and secure victory at sea.2 

People came to believe that wireless communication was not only invaluable, but invulnerable, as described in 1915 by Popular Mechanics: “interference with wireless messages… is practically impossible. Telegraph wires and [submarine] cables may be cut, but a wireless wave cannot be stopped.”3

Naval Implications

Command and Control

Wireless profoundly impacted command and control (C2) at sea. Traditionally, on-scene commanders exercised C2 over ships in company via visual signals; once over the horizon, units relied on commander’s intent. Wireless changed this paradigm. By enabling the long-distance flow of information, wireless allowed a distant commander to receive reports from and issue orders to deployed units in real time, increasing a commander’s situational awareness (SA) and extending their reach. A 1908 newspaper article even referred to the Royal Navy’s wireless antenna at the Admiralty building as the “Conning Tower of the British Empire,” and that the First Sea Lord, “as he sits in his chair at Whitehall,” can “survey the whole area of possible conflict and direct the movements of all the fleets with as much ease as if they were maneuvering beneath his office windows.”4

While wireless did improve communication, it did not achieve harmony between the Fleet and its headquarters. A second 1908 article appeared with a self-explanatory title: “Fleet Commanders Fear Armchair Control During War by Means of Wireless.”5 Much as today, officers considered increased connectivity a mixed blessing; they appreciated the information flow but feared interference with their ability to command.6

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

While wireless increased SA, it introduced new vulnerabilities. The discipline of Signals Intelligence grew with the ability to intercept communications from adversary ships. While Marconi claimed to have a secure means of transmission, this was quickly disproven in the 1903 “Maskelyne Affair,” when a wireless competitor hijacked Marconi’s public demonstration and transmitted an obscene Morse code message that was received in front of Marconi’s audience.7  This “spoofing” foreshadowed similar episodes in World War I (WWI) where false messages were sent by adversary operators impersonating friendly ones.8

Militaries understood the vulnerabilities of wireless even before the outbreak of WWI. The day after declaring war on Germany, the British cut five German undersea telegraph cables. This action degraded the Germans’ long-distance communications capability and forced them to rely on less secure wireless transmissions, which were vulnerable to interception.9

While the “internals” (content) of these signals held strategic value by revealing an adversary’s plans and intentions, the “externals” (emission characteristics) held tactical value. With the advent of direction finding (DF) capabilities, friendly units could locate transmitting adversary platforms (to include a new menace, the submarine). When combined with known locations of friendly units (self-reported by wireless), these positions provided a near-real time common operating picture (COP).

Mitigations and Countermeasures

Ships could mitigate some vulnerability by maintaining radio silence to deny adversary DF capabilities. A complementary tactic was the adoption of Fleet broadcasts, with headquarters transmitting to all units on a fixed schedule (analogous to today’s Global Broadcast System).10 This “push” paradigm allowed ships to passively receive information, vice having to transmit requests for it (and risk disclosing their location to adversary DF).

In 1906, The Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas described early countermeasures, specifically jamming techniques, where in “war games one Fleet has kept plying its wireless apparatus incessantly thereby blocking the signals of its opponents until it has passed clear.”11 It analyzed the ‘recent’ Russo-Japanese War, noting that while Russian ships sortied from Port Arthur, “the powerful station on shore began to grind out the Russian alphabet, thus paralyzing the weaker [wireless] outfits of the Japanese pickets.”12 It criticized the Russians for not continually transmitting on their wireless to interfere with the Japanese scouts reporting on their position in the run up to Tsushima Strait.13 In 1915, Popular Mechanics even described how to counter jamming, by “making frequent changes of wave length at known intervals,” a practice known today as “frequency hopping.”14

Wireless, WWI, and the U.S. Navy

On the day America entered WWI, President Wilson issued Executive Order (EO)-2585, which directed “radio stations within the jurisdiction of the United States as are required for Naval communications shall be taken over by the Government…and furthermore that all radio stations not necessary to the Government of the United States for Naval communications, may be closed.”15 The New York Times ran the headline “GOVERNMENT SEIZES WHOLE RADIO SYSTEM; Navy Takes Over All Wireless Plants It Needs and Closes All Others.”16 Weeks later EO-2605A went further and directed the removal “all radio apparatus” from stations not required by the Navy.17 In addition, EO-2604 titled “Censorship of Submarine Cables, Telegraph, and Telephone Lines” gave the Navy additional authority over all submarine cables and the Army authority over all telegraph and telephone lines.”18 Thereafter, the military controlled all means of telecommunication in the United States.

Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Daniels had provided rationale for wireless seizure in 1916, when he explained that “control of the Fleet requires a complete and effective Naval radio system on our coasts” and instances of “mutual interference between the Government and commercial stations, ship, and shore, are increasing.”19 He saw no way to resolve the issue “except by the operation of all radio stations on the coast under one control” (the Navy).20

Class in session, at the Wireless School at the Washington Navy Yard, D.C. December 1904. Note schematic diagram on blackboard, and apparatus in use. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

Officials prohibited foreign ships in U.S. ports from using their wireless, sealed their transmitters, and sometimes even removed their antennae. The government shut down amateur operators altogether. Two years earlier, The Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas opined the “Government would have a tremendous task on its hands if an attempt should be made to dismantle all privately-owned stations, as more than 100,000 of them exist.”21 Nonetheless, that is exactly what happened.

Federal agents worked to track down and secure unauthorized wireless sets and their rogue operators. The Navy assigned operators at newly commissioned “listening-in stations” to monitor signals in specific frequency bands for their geographic area.22 When a suspicious signal was detected, multiple stations triangulated the transmitter and “Naval investigators would immediately [be dispatched to] reach the spot in fast automobiles.”23 The Electrical Experimenter featured a series about a “radio detective” who worked tirelessly to hunt down wireless operators. The detective described false alarms, but also the genuine discovery of hidden antennae disguised as clotheslines, tracing wires to buildings, and catching rogue operators and foreign agents.24

It is worthy to note that even after seizing control of the wireless enterprise, the government recognized the economic impact of wireless and therefore directed the Navy to continue passing commercial traffic. In 1917, SECNAV Daniels reported that the Navy made a profit providing this service and submitted $74,852.59 to the Treasury.25

Comparisons

The wireless actions of 1917 projected into cyber actions of 2017 would be analogous to the Navy seizing control of the Internet, passing traffic on behalf of commercial entities (for profit), censoring all email, and establishing domestic monitoring stations with deployable teams to round up hackers. The backlash would be epic.

However, rebranding the story with different terminology makes it palatable. In 1917, the Navy “seized control of the spectrum” by operating all wireless infrastructure as a “warfighting platform,” thus ensuring it was “available, defendable, and ready to deliver effects.” Censoring traffic and closing unnecessary stations (and private sets) was “reducing the attack surface.”  Navy listening stations “conducted tailored Signals Intelligence” to detect enemy activity. This language should all sound familiar to Navy cyber personnel today, as “Operate the Network as a Warfighting Platform,” “Deliver Warfighting Effects through Cyberspace,” and “Conduct Tailored Signals Intelligence” are all goals extracted from the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet (FCC/C10F) Strategic Plan.26 Like wireless, cyber capabilities are key to ensuring the flow of information, building a COP (associated FCC/C10F goal: “Create Shared Cyber Situational Awareness”), and enabling C2. While a crack team of Sailors might not jump into a “fast automobile” to hunt down an unauthorized Internet hotspot, the function is analogous to Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) responding to intrusions on the DoD’s network.27 

While security partnerships between government and industry still exist, there are significant differences from 1917’s arrangements. The Navy could not seize control of the entire Internet as it did with all wireless capability in 1917. Wireless was in an “early adopter” phase and did not impact daily life and commerce to the extent of today’s Internet. Likewise, given the volume of email and internet traffic, censorship on the scale of 1917 is not feasible – even  if it was legal. Finally, while the Navy passing commercial traffic during WWI seems unusual now, the Navy actually had been routinely handling commercial traffic since 1912, when the Act to Regulate Radio Communication required that it “open Naval radio stations to the general public business” in places not fully served by commercial stations.28 That act effectively required the Navy to establish a commercial entity (complete with accounting) to oversee all duties of a commercial communication company; today this would essentially mean operating as an Internet Service Provider.29 In 1913, Department of the Navy General Order #10 opened all Naval ship communications to public business while in port; today’s Navy will most likely not turn its shipboard communications systems into public WiFi hotspots.30

Information Systems Technician 3rd Class John Erskine, Chief Information Systems Technician Jennifer Williams, Cryptologic Technician (Networks) 2nd Class Tyrone Fuller, and Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Amanda Kisner work together to assess the security of the computer networks aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). (U.S. Navy photo)

The wireless story is also a cautionary tale. Even after the war was over, the Government did not want to relinquish control of the airwaves. Among multiple Executive Branch witnesses, SECNAV Daniels testified to Congress that “radio communications stands apart because the air cannot be controlled and the safe thing is that only one concern should control and own it” (the Navy).31 The President voiced his support, spurring headlines like “Wilson Approves Making Wireless a Navy Monopoly.” However, industry applied political pressure and successfully lobbied to restore wireless to commercial and private use in 1919.32 

Takeaways

It is tempting to think that this story is about technology. However, the most important lessons are about people. The final goal in today’s FCC/C10F Strategic Plan is to “Establish and Mature Navy’s Cyber Mission Forces”; the Navy of 1917 had similar challenges developing a workforce to exploit a new domain. Some of their approaches are applicable today (indeed, the Navy is already pursuing some of them):

  • The Navy of 1917 leveraged outside experience by strategically partnering with industry and amateur organizations to recruit wireless operators. In 1915, with war looming, the Superintendent of the Naval Radio Service foresaw a dramatic increase in the requirement for radio operators. He contacted wireless companies to request that they steer their employees towards obligating themselves to Government service in the event of war – the companies enthusiastically complied. He also contacted the National Amateur Wireless Association, which shared its membership rosters. By 1916, it had chapters organized to support their local Naval Districts and helped form the Naval Communication Reserve the following year.33 Patriotic amateurs even petitioned Congress to allow them to operate as “a thousand pair of listening ears” to monitor wireless transmissions from Germany.34  Today the opposite of 1917 happens, where the Navy loses trained, experienced personnel to contractors and commercial enterprise. While the Navy creates its own cyber warriors, it should continue tapping into patriotic pools of outside talent. Deepening relationships with companies by expansion of programs like “Tours With Industry” could help attract, train, and retain cyber talent.
  • The Navy established a variety of demanding training courses for wireless operators. One of the Navy’s earliest courses had non-trivial prerequisites (candidates had to be “electricians by trade” or have similar experience), lasted five months, and was not an introductory but rather a “post-graduate” course.35 Later, a growing Fleet and requirements for trained radiomen necessitated multi-level training. The Navy established radio schools in each Naval District to provide preliminary training and screen candidates for additional service. In 1917, it established a training program at Harvard. These programs provided the Navy over 100 radio operators per week in 1917 and over 400 per week by 1918.36  Today’s Navy should continue expanding its portfolio of cyber training courses to more fully leverage academia’s facilities and expertise.
Recruiting Poster: “What the Navy is Doing: Live and Learn” Showing students in the Navy radio wireless school, at Great Lakes Illinois, circa 1919. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
  • During the war, the Navy looked past cultural differences (and indiscretions) when drawing personnel from non-traditional backgrounds. The “wireless detective” described rogue wireless operators as “being of a perverse turn of mind,”37 and “a reckless lot – at times criminally mischievous.”38 However, the Navy leveraged these tendencies and employed former amateurs “who were familiar with the various tricks anyone might resort to in order to keep their receiving station open” to hunt secret wireless apparatus.39 Today’s cyber talent pool may not look or act like traditional recruits; however, they possess skills, experience, and mindsets critical to innovation. The Navy should weigh traditionally disqualifying enlistment criteria against talent, capability, and insight into adversarial tactics.
  • The Navy of 1917 offered flexible career paths to recruit skilled operators. Membership in the Naval Communication Reserve only required citizenship, ability to send/receive ten words per minute, and passing a physical exam.40 New members received a retainer fee until they qualified as “regular Naval radio operators” when their salary increased. There was no active duty requirement (except during war) and a member could request a discharge at any time.41 Today’s Navy should continue expanding flexible career paths allowing skilled cyber professionals to enter and exit active duty laterally (vice entering at the bottom and advancing traditionally).

Conclusion

There are several parallels between the advent of “wireless” warfare last century and today’s cyber warfare. In modern warfare, cyber capabilities are potential game changers, but many questions remain unanswered on how to best recruit, employ, and integrate cyber warriors into naval operations. Like wireless in 1917, it is easy to become focused on the technical aspects of a new capability and new domain. However, to fully wield cyber capabilities, the Navy needs to focus on the people and not the technology.

Tim McGeehan is a U.S. Navy Officer currently serving in Washington.  

Douglas T. Wahl is the METOC Pillar Lead and a Systems Engineer at Science Applications International Corporation.

The ideas presented are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the views of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or Science Applications International Corporation.

References

[1] Tesla- Life and Legacy, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/tesla/ll/ll_whoradio.html

[2] Steel Ships at Tsushima – Five Amazing Facts About History’s First Modern Sea Battle, June 9, 2015, http://militaryhistorynow.com/2015/06/09/the-battleships-of-tsushima-five-amazing-facts-about-historys-first-modern-sea-battle/

[3]  G. F. Worts, Directing the War by Wireless, Popular Mechanics, May 1915, p. 650

[4] W. T. Stead, Wireless Wonders at the Admiralty, Dawson Daily News, September 13, 1908

[5] Fleet Commanders Fear Armchair Control During War by Means of Wireless, Boston Evening Transcript, May 2, 1908

[6] B. Scott, Restore the Culture of Command, USNI Proceedings, August 1915, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-08/restore-culture-command ; D.A. Picinich, Mission Command in the Information Age: Leadership Traits for the Operational Commander, Naval War College, May 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a583531.pdf

[7] Lulz, Dot-dash-diss: The gentleman hacker’s 1903, New Scientist, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228440-700-dot-dash-diss-the-gentleman-hackers-1903-lulz/

[8] H. J. B. Ward, Wireless Waves in the World’s War, The Yearbook of Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony, 1916, pp. 625-644, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1916war.htm

[9] Porthcurno, Cornwall: Cable Wars, May 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01wsdlh

[10] Navy’s Control of Radio a Big Factor in War, New York Herald, December 12, 1918,  http://earlyradiohistory.us/1918navy.htm

[11] H.C. Gearing, Naval Wireless Telegraphy on the Pacific Coast, Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas, June 9, 1906, p. 309

[12] H.C. Gearing, Naval Wireless Telegraphy on the Pacific Coast, Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas, June 9, 1906, p. 309

[13] H.C. Gearing, Naval Wireless Telegraphy on the Pacific Coast, Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas, June 9, 1906, p. 309

[14] G. F. Worts, Directing the War by Wireless, Popular Mechanics, May 1915, p. 650

[15] Executive Order 2585, April 6, 1917,  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75407

[16] Government Seizes Whole Radio System; Navy Takes Over All Wireless Plants It Needs and Closes All Others, The New York Times, April 8, 1917

[17] Executive Order 2605A, April 30, 1917, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75415

[18] Executive Order 2604, April 28, 1917, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75413

[19] 1916 Annual Reports of the Department of the Navy, pp. 27-30

[20] 1916 Annual Reports of the Department of the Navy, pp. 27-30

[21] G. F. Worts, Directing the War by Wireless, Popular Mechanics, May 1915, p. 650

[22] P.H. Boucheron, Guarding the Ether During the War, Radio Amateur News, September, 1919, pp. 104, 141, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1919spy.htm

[23] P.H. Boucheron, Guarding the Ether During the War, Radio Amateur News, September, 1919, pp. 104, 141, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1919spy.htm

[24] P.H. Boucheron, A War-Time Radio Detective, lectrical Experimenter, May, 1920, pages 55, 102-106, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1920spy.htm

[25] 1917 Annual Reports of the Navy Department, p. 45

[26] U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020, http://www.navy.mil/strategic/FCC-C10F%20Strategic%20Plan%202015-2020.pdf

[27] P.H. Boucheron, Guarding the Ether During the War, Radio Amateur News, September, 1919, pp. 104, 141, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1919spy.htm

[28] An Act to Regulate Radio Communication, SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS. Session II, Chapter 287, August 13, 1912, pp. 302-308, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/62nd-congress/session-2/c62s2ch287.pdf

[29] An Act to Regulate Radio Communication, SIXTY-SECOND CONGRESS. Session II, Chapter 287, August 13, 1912, pp. 302-308, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/62nd-congress/session-2/c62s2ch287.pdf

[30] 1914 Annual Reports of the Navy Department, p. 219

[31] P. Novotny, The Press in American Politics, 1787-2012, 2014, p. 82

[32] P. Novotny, The Press in American Politics, 1787-2012, 2014, p. 83

[33] L.S. Howeth, Operations  and  Organization  of  United  States  Naval  Radio  Service  During  Neutrality  Period, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, 1963, pp. 227-235,  http://earlyradiohistory.us/1963hw19.htm

[34] P. Novotny, The Press in American Politics, 1787-2012, 2014, p. 79

[35] H.C. Gearing, The Electrical School, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Journal of Electricity, Power, and Gas, May 25, 1907, p. 395

[36] G. B. Todd, Early Radio Communications in the Twelfth Naval District, San Francisco, California, http://www.navy-radio.com/commsta/todd-sfo-01.pdf

[37] P.H. Boucheron, Guarding the Ether During the War, Radio Amateur News, September, 1919, pp. 104, 141, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1919spy.htm

[38] J. Keeley, 20,000 American “Watchdogs”, San Francisco Chronicle, January 30, 1916, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1916wat.htm

[39] P.H. Boucheron, Guarding the Ether During the War, Radio Amateur News, September, 1919, pp. 104, 141, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1919spy.htm

[40] L.S. Howeth, Operations  and  Organization  of  United  States  Naval  Radio  Service  During  Neutrality  Period, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, 1963, pp. 227-235,  http://earlyradiohistory.us/1963hw19.htm

[41] L.S. Howeth, Operations  and  Organization  of  United  States  Naval  Radio  Service  During  Neutrality  Period, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, 1963, pp. 227-235,  http://earlyradiohistory.us/1963hw19.htm

Featured Image: Soviet tracking ship Kosmonavt Yuri Gagarin.

Cyber War, Podcast

Sea Control 143 – Cyber Threats to Navies with Dr. Alison Russell

Leave a comment

By Matthew Merighi 

Join us for the latest episode of Sea Control for a conversation with Dr. Alison Russell of Merrimack College about navies and their relationship with cyber. It’s about the distinct layers of cybersecurity, how navies use them to enhance their capabilities, and the challenges in securing and maintaining that domain.

Download Sea Control 143 – Cyber Threats to Navies with Alison Russell 

This interview was conducted by the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. A transcript of the interview between Alison Russell (AR) and Roger Hilton (RH) is below. The transcript has been edited for clarity. Special thanks to Associate Producer Cris Lee for producing this episode.

RH: Hello and Moin Moin, Center for International Maritime Security listeners. I am Roger Hilton, a nonresident academic fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, welcoming you back for another edition of the Sea Control series podcast. Did any listeners read the news on twitter, message your friend on Facebook, or even do some mobile banking? Are you streaming this podcast for your enjoyment? If you did any of the above, like myself, you are dependent on the internet. So logically, based on this fact, it should come as no surprise that contemporary navies are as well. Naval technological capabilities and strategies have exponentially evolved from the nascent beginnings. Steam ships have been replaced by nuclear powered carriers while cannons have been substituted for intercontinental ballistic missiles. No doubt the power of modern navies is awesome, and as a result, their dependency and reliance on the cyber realm must not be overlooked.

Consequently, does this interconnectedness between hardware and software in fact leave 21st century navies more exposed to attacks from invisible torpedoes than actual physical ones? Here to help us navigate the minefield of the cyber threats facing both naval strategy and security is Dr. Allison Russell, she’s a professor of political science and international relations at Merrimack College in Massachusetts and a nonresident researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses. In addition, she’s the author of two books, Cyber Blockade and more recently, Strategic A2AD in Cyberspace. Dr. Russell, thanks for coming aboard today.

AR: It is great to be speaking with you Roger. Thank you for having me in your program today.

RH: Well, let’s get right into it. There’s no doubt that cyberspace and threats associated with it are hot topics today. While much of the news coverage on cyber threats is focused on hackers spreading disinformation, or even potentially gaining access to critical infrastructure, can you provide an initial overview of the role cyber plays in the contemporary maritime environment and as well as some of the menaces targeting the Navy?

AR: I would be glad to. As you pointed out, much of the attention on cyber threats focuses on hackers, data thefts, cyber espionage, and information or influence campaigns. And those are important. But these really are not the biggest threats in the maritime environment. The threats naval forces face in a maritime environment vary depending upon the part of cyberspace we’re talking about.

See, there are four levels in cyberspace: the physical, the logic, the information, and the user layers. The physical layer is the physical infrastructure, the hardware that underpins the global grid that is the basis of cyberspace. Although we tend to think of the internet and cyberspace as wireless or in the cloud, it is very much reliant upon physical infrastructure at its most basic level. Fiber optic cables including undersea cables, and satellites comprise some of the more prominent features of the physical layers of cyberspace.

The second layer is the logic layer. This is the central nervous system of cyberspace. This is where the decision-making and routing occurs to send and receive messages to retrieve files, really to do anything in cyberspace. The request must be processed through the logic layer. The key element of the logic layer are things such as DNS, the Domain Name Servers, and internet protocols.

The third level is the information level. This is what we see when we go on the internet: Websites, chats, emails, photos, documents, apps. All of that is the information posted at this level. But it is reliant on the previous two levels in order to function.

Lastly, the fourth level is the user level: the humans who are using the devices and are interacting with cyberspace. They matter because cyberspace is a man-made entity and its topography can be changed by people. Cyberspace is critical to modern naval strategy and security because it underpins the essential communications networks and capabilities of naval forces. And adversaries will seek to destroy or degrade those capabilities in the event of a conflict. Cyberspace enables robust command and control, battlespace awareness, intelligence gathering, and precision targeting, which are at the core of mission success. These days navies must defend and maintain their freedom to operate within cyberspace in order to be effective forces at sea.

RH: Thanks for the brief outline. As I mentioned earlier the identity of the navy has changed greatly since its original inception into conflict theaters. Accordingly, the advent of cyberspace has added an entirely different dynamic to the field. And you mention some of them as well. Consequently, what are some of the new responsibilities that have arrived with the integration of cyber to navies? And in general, what is the role the navy plays within a larger national security architecture?

AR: The cyber capabilities are really integrated at all levels at the naval mission. So, the core capabilities navies seek to provide are the blue-water capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, control, sea control, and power projection, as well as maritime security and humanitarian assistance or disaster response. All of these core capabilities are supported and enhanced by cyber capabilities. Thus, the full spectrum of naval operations and the corresponding naval strategy involve cyber capabilities today.

For more technologically advanced navies, these cyber capabilities are so integrated into weapon systems and platforms, that they’ve become essential to full spectrum warfighting operations. For the less technologically advanced navies, cyber capabilities can still play an important role in augmenting other capabilities by providing command and control and acting as a force multiplier in certain situations. In addition to their blue water role, naval forces are responsible for providing cyber capabilities to support combatant commanders’ objectives in defense of national information networks and for fleet deployment. They are force providers to joint and interagency operations. They are supporters of the national mission and blue-water warriors all at the same time. As a result, they must have a holistic, full spectrum understanding of the role cyberspace plays from tactics to operations to grand strategy.

RH: That was a great encompassing of it. As you can see it comes full circle when you compare conflict theatres to human assistance missions which is great you mentioned. At the same time Dr. Russell, you cite out naval strategies are in a period of transition at the moment. Could you elaborate on these implications with regard to how cyberspace is impacting the current formation of national naval strategies?

AR: Yes, naval strategies are in a period of transition with regards to cyberspace. Most navies acknowledge the importance of cyberspace as a critical enabler, but there’s emerging recognition that cyberspace is also much more than that. Ultimately, cyberspace is a game changer for naval forces and security forces in general. All phases of conflict now have a cyber dimension. From phase zero planning to phase five stabilization and reconstruction, cyberspace affects all levels of war, from strategic to the operational to the tactical. All types of conflict are affected by cyberspace including conflicts in the other four domains. For naval forces in particular, cyberspace enables new kinds of fires: Cyber-fires. It improves situational awareness and enhances command and control.

It has also opened the door to new threats. Anti-access and area denial operations, improved targeting capabilities by adversaries, and presenting more targets for attack in the form of cyber-attacks. As naval forces adopt next technologies to leverage the unique capabilities of cyberspace, reliable access to cyberspace is a necessity. Assuring access to cyberspace and confident C2 for deployed forces regardless of the threat environment is a top priority for the U.S. Navy as well as for many others.

RH: There’s no doubt based on your texts and some of the other content out there that reliable access seems to be driving naval strategy and security, especially among the technically advanced navies. So thank you for mentioning that to the listeners.

We spoke about technologically advanced navies and less technologically advanced navies. To demonstrate some of the diversity in strategy, can you provide a quick comparison about how some of the national strategies have integrated cyberspace in their doctrine?

AR: Yes, I think a comparison of the U.S. and Russia helps to illustrates this.

RH: You couldn’t have picked two better countries to compare at the moment, so thank you for that selection, Dr. Russell.

AR: (Laughs) Well, there’s a lot of interesting things happening there. The current U.S. maritime strategy, the 2015 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, has incorporated cyberspace and cyber power into that strategy in a very robust way. The strategy talks exclusively about all domain access and cross-domain synergy. By which it means, synchronizing battlespace awareness with all the layers and sensors and intelligence within that, and synchronizing that with the short access to networks. Offensive and defensive cyber operations, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and integrated kinetic and non-kinetic fires. All of this is apparent in U.S. maritime strategy as essential elements in supporting the naval mission. And it’s all spelled out.

In contrast, there is very little information that is publicly available about how cyberspace effects the Russian maritime strategy. At last check, Russian maritime strategy does not directly address cyberspace and cyber security as a maritime or naval responsibility. But it does recognize the importance of what it calls information support of maritime activities for the maintenance and development of global information systems, including systems for navigation, hydrographic, and other forms of security. Most of the publicly available Russian cyber strategy in general focuses on information operations and disinformation campaigns. Despite having advanced cyber-capabilities, there’s not much information available on how that is being integrated into the Russian naval strategy.

RH: You know, it’s very unfortunate that there was no release of any new information recently in St. Petersburg, they celebrated national Navy day with President Putin visiting. But I guess we’ll have to stay on the lookout for any new information.

Before we even go up into the highly integrated platforms of navies in cyber, you reference very acutely the Kremlin’s use of synchronized fires. Can you briefly elaborate on what this concept is and if we can expect to see a similar pattern in future conflict theaters?

AR: Yes, without a doubt I think we can expect to see a similar pattern in the future. For those who don’t know, during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, Russian forces assaulted Georgia on land, in the air, and from the sea, while at the same time Georgia was subjected to destructive distributed denial of service or DDOS attacks on the websites of Georgian government offices, financial services, and in news agencies. So, this was a synchronized attack in multiple domains on Georgia from Russia simultaneously.

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, similarly Ukraine suffered multiple cyber attacks in conjunction with that conflict, including cyber attacks targeting infrastructure. I think that these synchronized integrated fires will likely continue and eventually become the norm in conventional conflict unless some action is taken, diplomatically or otherwise, to limit the use of cyber fires or restrict the number of quote unquote “legitimate” cyber targets.

RH: Again, that’s Russia picking on countries that are less developed, but it would be interesting to see moving forward against another more developed or modern adversary if it would be as effective a concept. When assessing operational level warfare, as well as tactical level warfare, how does cyberspace enhance their application?

AR: Starting with the operational level, cyberspace operations can be categorized in three ways: Offensive action, defensive action, and network operations.

Offensive cyberspace operations are designed to project power through the application of force in or through cyberspace. They’re cyber attacks. Defensive cyberspace operations are intended to defend national or allied cyberspace systems or infrastructure. Network operations design, build, configure, secure, operate, and maintain information networks and the communications systems themselves to ensure the availability of data, the integrity of the system, and confidentiality. So those all work together on operational level.

So, to give an example, we already talked about how cyberspace enables assured command and control, integrated fires, battlespace awareness, intelligence, as well as protection and sustainment. It also enables naval maneuvers, with positioning, navigation, and timing support. For sea-based power projection, in a landscape that is very often devoid of signposts and landmarks, the ability to have precise navigational information and over-the-horizon situational awareness is particularly critical. Cyber and satellite-based global positioning and navigational systems provide this capability. Beyond the navy itself, commercial and academic institutions that provide support to the fleet or the military in the form of design, manufacturing, research, and other products and services, are also part of the broader environment for naval security.

So, naval security and warfighting advantage depends in part upon thwarting attacks on military or government sites, as well as securing sensitive information from cyber theft or cyber espionage. Sensitive information in the wrong hands can of course undermine the operational effectiveness of the fleet by improving targeting of naval forces by adversaries and increasing the adversary’s knowledge of how forces man, train, and equip for warfighting.

Moving to the tactical level, naval commanders must incorporate the use of cyber technologies into their battlefield tactics. In practical terms, this means that defensive and offensive cyber capabilities will be integrated alongside kinetic action. This is the integrated fires. Cyberspace can increase the effectiveness of traditional kinetic fires through improved intelligence and targeting. But it also presents new challenges for defensive operations to protect these systems from cyberattack as well as kinetic fires.

Cyberspace and cyber capabilities play a particularly important role in supporting network-centric weapon systems, such as the tactical Tomahawk missile, which the U.S. launched into Syria in April. Tactical Tomahawks receive in-flight targeting data from operational command centers. Similarly, carrier aviation maintenance programs rely on cyberspace to enable them to provide mission ready aircraft.

There are alternatives and workarounds to overcome system failures, but the point is that reliable access to cyberspace is critical to the successful employment of these systems. Naval security also depends upon the protection of access and critical information whether it is classified or not. For naval forces, this process of protecting critical information means educating and training sailors in good cyber hygiene habits and having cyber security integrated into the life cycles of systems.

 

RH: Moving on, we’ve discussed how naval strategies revolve around the four key layers. It is clear that the structure of cyberspace begins with the physical layer. Sometimes users forget how hardware like fiber optic cables and satellites are hidden from view in our daily use of cyberspace. It looks to be a frightening future as you provided a few examples that confirm how vulnerable these physical elements are to tampering.

An appropriate contextualization for the listeners of this threat was on display in a 2015 New York Times article that describes increased Russian submarine activity and how the construction of unmanned, undersea drones related to fiber optic cables is rattling the Pentagon. According to Rear Admiral Fredrick Roegge, commander of the Navy Submarine fleet Pacific (COMSUBPAC) he was quoted as saying, “I’m worried everyday about what the Russians could be doing.” What is your take on the threat to the physical layer and is this threat explicitly exaggerated? Or is it a feature that national security policy makers should be more concerned with?

AR: That’s a great question, I don’t believe that it’s exaggerated. The cables carrying global business for more than $10 trillion per day and 95 percent of daily communications. They are very important to our global economic and political structure.

Back in the 70s before there was a system as robust and widespread as it is today, the U.S. was willing to take great risks to tap into the cables in Soviet waters to gain intelligence. Now these cables carry much more information and have much more value in the present context. The Russians are seeking to identify and potentially exploit infrastructure weaknesses of the US and the West. So, I think it is absolutely worth being concerned about.

RH: Can you comment a little bit on what would happen in the event of tampering and what the process of repair might look like moving forward?

 AR: Well, it’s a little hard to speculate on exactly what would happen, but somethings that could happen is, cables could be severed, they could be cut, which would cause a slowdown in the system, and it would be difficult to repair them, particularly because these cables lie along the ocean bed, the floor of the ocean. And so, there are a certain number of ships in the world that can go to these places and fix the cables and that can be a process that is expensive and is time consuming. That’s just one scenario where the cables are cut.

Another scenario is that they can be potentially tapped into somehow. That is, of course, what the U.S. did to the Soviet Union in Operation Ivy Bells in the 1970s, and that was used for espionage purposes. So, something along those lines could be done with these cables with information being stolen or simply recorded and copied, but then passed along so that nobody knows that someone else was listening in. So, there are a variety of different things and they would require different responses, but some of them would be difficult to detect and to identify that there was a problem, while others like a cut in the cable would be immediately apparent.

RH: In terms of the logic layer, do you think it’s conceivable that a Stuxnet-like attack could seriously damage naval operations? It is worth noting to our audience that even in the case of air-gapped networks, which is what Iran was using, infections from viruses are still possible.

AR: I think it is entirely possible that a cyber-attack could manipulate the logic layer of cyberspace in a number of ways which could cause it to malfunction or shut down completely in order to inhibit the flow of data, which could directly affect naval operations. You make a very good point that even air-gap networks are still at risk. The Stuxnet attack happened 10 years ago, but it successfully targeted highly sensitive protected air-gap systems. And the technology and cyberweapons have advanced quite a lot in the decade since then.

RH: It seems like a bit of an antiquated question, but in the event, that a Stuxnet attack hit a naval operation, what would the response of the Navy be? I mean, do they still know how to use compasses and work like they did back in the day?

AR: (Laughs) This is a good question. But there are workarounds. There are capabilities that are redundant that have resiliency built in. Things would not function perfectly, but most things would still continue to function, so they would still be able to get to where they were going, but they wouldn’t be as effective as they’re intended to be. And so, it would be problematic. Absolutely.

RH: Just as an example for listeners though, but again theoretically, if there was a Stuxnet attack on an operation, it could kill the ability of network-centric weapons to function, correct?

 

AR: It has that potential, or could cause them to malfunction. So, an object could appear to go on course  go off course, or not be able to function entirely or, if it’s ordnance, explode too early, something along those lines.

It can cause a variety of effects, depending on exactly what type of attack it is and what it’s designed to do. Because these attacks – we say attacks in cyberspace happen very quickly because they do in cyberspace – but they also typically take a very long time to develop.

So, that’s another thing where we can develop the cyberweapons and keep them until you’re ready to use them, they do take a while to actually develop. But once you deploy them they happen almost immediately.

RH: A lot of those symptoms you just mentioned earlier about, sort of, missiles veering off course or exploding too early, that’s also a good way to look at the early stages of the North Korean missile program, which unfortunately has evolved to a dangerous point right now. But that’s also maybe a good example if you would agree about the various difficulties that come with a Stuxnet like attack on any sort of cyber infrastructure.

AR: I think that’s an excellent sample.

RH: Drives people crazy in Pyongyang. We have an established the crucial role of cyber for naval strategies, and touched on the composition and structure. Against this backdrop, what are the main opportunities for naval forces and policy makers moving forward with cyber?

AR: Well, there are many potential opportunities but there are three that I think are the most important and exciting.

The first is improved battlespace awareness. Cyber capabilities allow naval forces to have a better understanding of the environment in which they are operating and that is very very good for them.

The second is that cyberspace presents new opportunities for modelling and simulation to help naval forces prepare and train for warfighting.

And then third, as a new domain, cyberspace presents opportunities for cooperation with partner nations for developing, maintaining, and protecting a domain to ensure things like reliable access for allies and partners. And limiting the adversary’s maneuverability within the domain.

So, the domain is essentially a blank slate for cooperation within the international community. That provides some really exciting and interesting opportunities.

RH: Despite these improvements in the maritime domain, it is safe to say that you still remain skeptical of the numerous challenges that threaten naval security. Can you identify and describe some of the major threats? To either advanced technological navies or less advanced navies.

AR: Yes, and there are many challenges, but again I’ll pick the top three that I consider to be the most dangerous or the most important:

First, anti-access and area denial operations in cyberspace are the most significant challenge to the basic goals of naval forces: To retain freedom of maneuvering in cyberspace and deny freedom of action to the adversaries. Cyberspace is essential to naval operations so therefore; the protection of cyberspace is also essential. It doesn’t matter how new or fancy your ships are, if they don’t have the capabilities you need because you can’t access cyberspace. So, I think the most important challenge is, maintaining access to the domain.

The second is significant challenge for naval forces is that offense has the advantage. Threats in cyberspace develop faster than forces can protect against in many cases. The domain is constantly evolving, and innovation is happening so quickly that creating new systems, platforms, and tools occurs at a rapid pace. With the creation of new applications comes the opportunity for new vulnerabilities within the systems. Adversaries are constantly seeking new ways of attack or penetration of networks.

While defensive cyber operations have to work very hard to keep up with the constant onslaught of attacks, there are things like advanced persistent threats, APTs, that are these stealthy persistent attacks on a targeted computer system in order to continuously monitor and extract data. These are particularly problematic because they are so difficult to detect and could render significant damage. We just saw recently that a very prominent cyber security firm was actually targeted with the use APTs, which is very worrying given that they are a prominent cyber security firm. And in addition, the speed at which some cyber attacks can take place, the relatively low barriers on entry to cyberspace, and the potentially big impact of an attack provides a lot of incentive for attackers to keep trying. So, it’s difficult for defensive operations to keep up with them and innovate to protect against future attacks.

RH: I have to be honest Dr. Russell, based on our discussion and the litany of challenges, I’m more inclined to believe that navies will remain exposed to invisible torpedoes more so than physical ones. But hopefully the offensive actions and the various layers will become more resilient in defending and fighting them off. Undoubtedly, it has been an eye-opening podcast that has served to expand our collective assessment on the role of cyberspace and the implications for both naval strategy and security. As we sail off on another sea control series podcast Dr. Russell, do you have any operational takeaways for the listeners or the issues they should pay special attention to?

AR: Well, the rise of cyber capabilities of allies and adversaries such as precision targeting and long-range attacks on systems mean that navies will be simultaneously more connected and more vulnerable at sea than ever before. The modern Navy has so many capabilities that rely on cyberspace that it must not take access to cyberspace for granted. As our ships grow smarter and we invest more and more in the high-end capabilities that allow this unprecedented array of actions, let us not forget to simultaneously ensure that the cyber-connected systems are protected so that our new technology can be used effectively when it’s called upon.

Sun Tzu observed that it is best to win a war without fighting. If modern navies did not have access to cyberspace, it would be very difficult for them to fight. The goal of the navies in the future will be to retain freedom of maneuver and deny freedom of action to adversaries at sea. As well as in cyberspace.

RH: Dr. Russell, thank you again for taking the time to enlighten us on such a relevant and complicated issue.

If our listeners want to follow up in more detail on cyberspace and maritime strategy, or gain a better outlook on the general maritime domain, The Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security, edited by Sebastian Bruns and Joachim Krause, published in 2016 is an indispensable resource to have. Please check www.kielseapowerseries.com for more info on the book and other podcasts derived from the book.

With no shortage of maritime issues within the greater geopolitical landscape, I promise I will be back to keep CIMSEC listeners well-informed. From the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University and its adjunct, the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, I’m Roger Hilton saying farewell and auf wiedersehen.

Dr. Alison Russell is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Merrimack College.  The author of Cyber Blockades (Georgetown University Press, 2014), she worked for six years as a security analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses where she specialized in naval strategic planning. She holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, an M.A. in International Relations from American University in Washington, D.C., and a B.A. in Political Science and French Literature from Boston College.

Roger Hilton is a nonresident academic fellow for the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel.

Matthew Merighi is the Senior Producer for Sea Control.