African Maritime Forces Week

By Dr. Christian Bueger, University of Copenhagen

Maritime security is a global responsibility. All nations, including those without coastal waters, depend on the sea for trade, food, energy, and digital communication. Safeguarding shipping, protecting energy infrastructures, subsea data cables and the marine environment, fighting pollution, illicit fishing and other blue crimes are tasks that require nations worldwide to work together.

The global distribution of resources, capital and expertise, post-colonial legacies, but also the roles that states are given under the law of the sea, imply that states perform different functions in providing maritime security. States have regulatory roles as coastal, port or flag states, in providing search and rescue services, but also in terms of the maritime industries within their jurisdictions, whether that is shipping, fishing, or energy production.¹

Some states, such as the small island nations of Cabo Verde and Seychelles are responsible for managing and safeguarding enormous maritime zones, with very limited resources. Other states, such as Congo, Mozambique or Somalia, are witnessing violence, are recovering from armed conflict, or deal with severe economic problems, and struggle to prioritize effective governance of the sea. This implies significant gaps in capacity – whether in terms of institutions, staff, equipment, technology or expertise – leading to situations where states de facto cannot control, govern and protect activities in their maritime zones.

While all nations benefit from the sea in one way or another, the income gained from the oceans is heavily concentrated. Research has documented that 60 per cent of the wealth generated by the sea ends up in the hands of only 100 corporations.² The revenues from these corporations benefit only a few powerful states economically. This implies that these ocean economies have the responsibility to make strong contributions to safeguard the seas.

Also, maritime security and safety risks are unequally distributed. For example, large proportions of global ship traffic pass by the island states of Mauritius and Madagascar, implying severe risks of accidents and oil spills that can devastate the marine environment. Since ships enjoy freedom of navigation and do not stop in the island ports, these nations face high risks, but zero benefits.

Maritime spaces are interdependent, and so are blue crimes. As the Evergreen accident in the Suez Canal highlighted, a maritime incident in a strategic location can have large scale repercussions for world trade and global supply chains.³ Blue crimes, such as piracy, illicit fishing, the smuggling of narcotics or of people take place across states and regions and have trans-regional and often global effects.⁴ Moreover, in international waters all states that have signed, or comply with, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea have the “obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment” (Article 192).

While maritime security is a global responsibility, given the unequal distribution of territories, capabilities, risks and revenues burden sharing is required. In Africa many nations need support in providing maritime security, while not undermining their sovereignty and regional integration processes. This creates at least three major challenges: Problems linked to (1) how to deal with multi-level governance, (2) how to render capacity building effective, and (3) how to mitigate potential tensions of militarization.

Recalibrating the Maritime Security Multi-Level Governance System

Maritime security is an object of a quite complicated international regime complex. At which level maritime security is best provided is debatable. While the national level is obviously pivotal, most maritime security issues are transnational in character. On a global scale, more than twenty global international organizations deal with maritime security as a recent report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has documented.⁵ This includes the ‘big five’ of international maritime security agencies: the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), which each address maritime security from a different mandate.

Also, a wide range of regional cooperation mechanisms deal with maritime security. ‘Terrestrially’ organized regional organizations, such as the African Union or Africa’s regional economic communities have outlined maritime strategies and programmes. ‘Aquatic-oriented’ regional organizations addressing maritime security include those established under the Regional Seas Conventions supported by UNEP⁶ – the Abidjan, Nairobi, Jedda and Barcelona Conventions –, dedicated maritime security arrangements – such as the Djibouti and Yaoundé Code of Conduct facilitated by the IMO – or issue-specific regional organizations, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission supported by FAO. Mini- and bi-lateral cooperation, such as the jointly managed maritime zone between Mauritius and Seychelles, complement the picture.

Such governance arrangements can significantly overlap and create the risks of duplication or interface conflicts between organizations. Is a problem such as illicit fishing best addressed through a global mechanism (e.g., the Food and Agricultural Organization), through a terrestrial-oriented body, such as the African Union, a dedicated maritime body, such as the Indian Ocean Commission’s Maritime Security (MASE) architecture operative in the Western Indian Ocean, or by an issue-specific regional body, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission?

Moreover, is African maritime security provision best organized in continental terms – through pan-African mechanisms – or better approached through the lenses of ‘African seas’ with dedicated arrangements for the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean? And what happens if regional actors or international donors prefer one arrangement over the other, or, even worse, sideline and ignore one another?

These questions escape easy answers. Transparency and information sharing between organizations, and considerations of the principle of subsidiarity can be key to addressing them. Informal formats such as the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) for the Western Indian Ocean, or the G7++ coordination mechanism in the Gulf of Guinea can play very important roles in facilitating the needed transparency, information sharing, and strategic dialogues.

Informal maritime security governance arrangements that do not draw on formal legal treaties or have standing secretariats are often beneficial, since they allow for flexibility and experimentation, and avoid lengthy negotiations.

However, informality comes at a price. It often implies a lack of accountability – participants cannot be held accountable for their (in)actions. Moreover, the absence of formal rules for membership implies that important stakeholders might be excluded, and the lack of permanent administration can limit efficiency and the buildup of specialized expertise over time.

While this calls for efforts at formalizing cooperation, cases such as the failure to ratify the 2016 ‘African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa’ (known as the Lomé Charter) illustrate that formalization and treaty making is not an easy process, either. Hence, careful and realistic calibration between formal and informal cooperation across different regional constructions is necessary.

Learning to Learn: Capacity Building Traps

The global responsibility to protect the sea under the condition of unequal distribution of revenues and risks implies that states benefiting from the ocean economy have a duty to assist through capacity building and technical assistance. Capacity building aims at enabling states and regions in performing crucial maritime security functions and developing their potential to govern the sea. Yet, research has shown that successful delivery of capacity building is full of intricacies.⁷

Project cycles of two to three years and emphasis on ‘low hanging fruits’ – short-term workshops, exercises or provision of equipment – can imply that there is limited focus on sustainability and long-term maintenance of capabilities. Donors bring with them their own priorities, idealized ways and institutional preferences of how maritime security challenges should be handled. They might prefer one agency over another, leading in the worst cases to organizational rivalry or political disruption. Capacity building is always a political intervention and hence implies effects on national and regional power constellations or might be perceived as threatening national sovereignty and hence evoke resistance. Some donors might, moreover, directly pursue commercial or political interests in providing capacity building, such as market development, arms trades, or countering the political influence of another state.

Such challenges are not easily overcome and hence place severe restrictions on what can be achieved through capacity building. Yet, success stories such as the building of the MASE structures by the Indian Ocean Commission supported by the European Union, or country cases, such as Seychelles, that have successfully disrupted piracy,⁸ illustrate the significant benefits that capacity building can bring, nonetheless.

The Militarization Dilemma: Avoiding Geopolitical Tensions 

Not all gaps can be addressed through capacity building. Sustainable capacity building takes time. Human resources can be constrained. Maritime security threats can escalate to a scale that they become impossible to handle operationally by one state alone, as was the case with piracy off the coast of Somalia, or the increase in narcotics trade in the South Atlantic or Western Indian Ocean. High sea crimes demand international action.

To live up to their obligations, global ocean powers and other states need to directly contribute to maritime security through operations at sea. Since most coast guards and maritime police forces lack the capabilities to operate far from their home shore or stay out for prolonged periods at sea, operations usually require the employment of naval forces.

The use of high-end military forces leads to a dilemma.⁹ More military forces enhance maritime security on the one side. Their presence strengthens law enforcement and surveillance at sea and provides more robust deterrence of maritime crime. Indeed, military operations, including by the European Union’s Operation Atalanta and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, have been vital in curbing piracy off the coast of Somalia or in fighting the maritime narcotics trade.

Yet, on the other side, the employment of naval forces is also a form of power projection and geopolitical signaling. Growing numbers of military vessels in regional seas, while beneficial for fighting maritime crimes, can lead to growing tensions or even escalatory dynamics. They also might undermine national sovereignty and lead to unintended dependencies or claims to permanent bases if countries are too reliant on outside military forces. Effective mechanisms of confidence building and deconfliction are vital to mitigate this challenge.

Navigating the Challenges: A Maritime Security Clearing House?

Translating the global responsibility to protect the sea into action requires innovative approaches to these complex challenges. Raising awareness among African nations and their international partners is fundamental. High-level attention must focus on recalibrating governance structures, ensuring the sustainability of capacity building, and mitigating tensions arising from militarization. Information sharing that enhances transparency and builds confidence is essential. This necessitates effective clearing house mechanisms that not only facilitate these processes but simultaneously promote ocean literacy and maritime domain awareness.

Formats such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings or the Indian Ocean Commission’s Regional Operational Coordination Center are important instances of a growing number of operational mechanisms and maritime domain awareness centers aim at facilitating this flow of information. Yet, equal efforts are needed at strategic, diplomatic, and political levels. The revitalization of the Sea Power for Africa Symposium in 2024 and ambitions to initiate a pan-African coastguard functions forum are important steps in this direction. The question of whether maritime security is best addressed at a terrestrial continental pan-African level or through regional seas cooperation in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea, however, needs serious consideration.

Acknowledgments: Research for this article has benefitted from support by the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group funded by the Velux Foundation.

Dr. Christian Bueger is a professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen, where he leads the ocean infrastructure research group, and a research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). He is the author of Understanding Maritime Security (Oxford University Press, 2024, with Timothy Edmunds). He has explored questions of international security and the sea in over 200 publications. In his current research he is investigating global maritime security governance and the challenges of critical maritime infrastructure protection. Further information is available on his personal website at www.bueger.info.

Endnotes 

1. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Understanding Maritime Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024).

2. J. Virdin, T. Vegh, J.-B. Jouffray, R. Blasiak, S. Mason, H. Österblom, D. Vermeer, J. Wachtmeister, and N. Werner, “The Ocean 100: Transnational Corporations in the Ocean Economy,” Science Advances 7, eabc8041 (2021). DOI:10.1126/sciadv.abc8041

3. Nguyen Khoi Tran, Hercules Haralambides, Theo Notteboom, and Kevin Cullinane, “The Costs of Maritime Supply Chain Disruptions: The Case of the Suez Canal Blockage by the ‘Ever Given’ Megaship,” International Journal of Production Economics 279 (2025), 109464, doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109464.

4. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised Crime at Sea,” Marine Policy 119 (2020),104067. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067.

5. Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds, and Jan Stockbruegger, “Securing the Seas: A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf

6. Elizabeth Mendenhall, “The Limits of Marine Regionalism in Global Ocean Governance: the UNEP Regional Seas Program,” in The Politics of Global Ocean Regions, ed. Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Rebecca Strating (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

7. Christian Bueger, “Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit,” Seychelles Research Journal 1, no.2 (2019): 149–56; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Understanding Maritime Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), 180-187.

8. Christian Bueger, Ryan Adeline, and Brendon J. Cannon, “Anti-piracy Lessons from the Seychelles,” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/anti-piracy-lessons-from-the-seychelles/

9. Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma,” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

References

Bueger, Christian and Jan Stockbruegger. “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma.” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. “Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised Crime at Sea.” Marine Policy 119 (2020): 1040670, doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067.

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. Understanding Maritime Security. Oxford University Press, 2024.

Bueger, Christian, Ryan Adeline, and Brendon J. Cannon. “Anti-piracy Lessons from the Seychelles.” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/anti-piracy-lessons-from-the-seychelles/

Bueger, Christian, Timothy Edmunds, and Jan Stockbruegger. “Securing the Seas. A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024. https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf

Bueger, Christian. “Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit.” Seychelles Research Journal 1, no. 2 (2019): 149–56.

Mendenhall, Elizabeth. “The Limits of Marine Regionalism in Global Ocean Governance: the UNEP Regional Seas Program.” in The Politics of Global Ocean Regions, ed. Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Rebecca Strating. Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming.

Virdin, J. T. Vegh, J.-B. Jouffray, R. Blasiak, S. Mason, H. Österblom, D. Vermeer, J. Wachtmeister, and N. Werner. “The Ocean 100: Transnational Corporations in the Ocean Economy.” Science Advances 7 (2021). DOI:10.1126/sciadv.abc8041

Featured Image: A boarding team undertakes an operation as part of the simulated exercise in Seychelles. (Photo via UNODC/Global Maritime Crime Programme)

African Maritime Forces Week

By Vice Admiral Ignacio Villanueva Serrano, Operation Commander, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA

The waters surrounding the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean are a vital confluence of global and local interests, serving as essential conduits for international trade, energy security, and the livelihoods of coastal communities.

These maritime spaces, encompassing strategic choke points like the Bab el-Mandeb strait, are both a lifeline and a point of vulnerability, confronted by threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, and transnational organized crime. In an era of increasing international competition and emerging security challenges, non-African states are indispensable in supporting African regional maritime security, working alongside local actors to safeguard these critical domains.

As the Operation Commander of EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, I offer insights into how external and regional stakeholders collaborate to pursue shared maritime security objectives, drawing on our operational experience and acquired expertise.

The Global and Local Significance of African Waters

The Western Indian Ocean is a global commons, linking continents and enabling the flow of goods, energy, and people. Its strategic importance is amplified by chokepoints like the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which are critical to fuel and food security for global shipping and regional stability. These waters are pivotal to international supply chains and the economic well-being of African littoral states, yet they remain under threat. In the Horn of Africa, piracy persists as a latent risk, with Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) still active in Somalia despite significant reductions since its peak over a decade ago. Recent incidents highlight a resurgence, underscoring the need for continued vigilance. Meanwhile, attacks on sea lines of communication in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea by groups employing sophisticated weaponry, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), further complicate the security landscape, impacting freedom of navigation and global trade. Beyond piracy, transnational organized crimes, such as narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, and illegal fishing, pose additional challenges, compounded by arms smuggling networks that supply advanced weapons, often transported via maritime routes from distant origins.

The interconnected nature of these threats demands a robust, collaborative response where non-African states, particularly through the European Union, provide essential support to regional efforts. Recent assessments indicate a low piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden and parts of the Somali Basin, though a realistic possibility of attacks persists. Conflict-related threats in the Red Sea remain severe for vessels linked to specific nations, reflecting the dynamic risk environment we navigate.

The Contribution of Non-African States

Non-African states have engaged decisively in this complex environment, motivated by strategic, economic, and humanitarian imperatives. EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, launched in 2008, is a testament to this commitment. Initially established to counter Somali-based piracy, our operation has evolved into a broader contributor to maritime security, with a mandate extended until February 2027. This updated mandate encompasses protecting merchant shipping and World Food Program (WFP) vessels, countering weapons and narcotics smuggling, and monitoring illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, reflecting the EU’s enduring commitment to stability in the region. Our achievements—reducing piracy through naval patrols, maritime surveillance, and legal prosecutions—demonstrate the tangible impact of external involvement.

Throughout our mission, we have handed over 177 suspected pirates for trial across jurisdictions including Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius, and EU member states, with 145 successfully convicted. In a particularly active year, we transferred dozens of pirates captured during multiple incidents, reflecting a robust deterrent effect. The knowledge that apprehension leads to prosecution and lengthy sentences in regional or international jurisdictions discourages pirate activity, contributing to a decline in attacks over time. Our success rests on robust cooperation with military partners, a strong military-industry partnership, advanced maritime security architecture, and effective defense diplomacy.

EUNAVFOR Operations and associated contributors deploy naval assets, such as frigates, patrol vessels, and maritime patrol aircraft, alongside helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to patrol key areas like the South Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea. Recent operations have seen vessels under our operational control conduct joint activities with allied task forces, share intelligence on smuggling routes, and enhance local maritime capabilities through engagements with regional navies like Kenya’s. Maritime patrol aircraft, flying sorties along the Somali coast and the Red Sea, bolster our surveillance. At the same time, port visits to strategic locations like Mombasa, Victoria, Salalah, and Djibouti facilitate maintenance, replenishment, and coordination.

Our cooperation with INTERPOL further reinforces information exchange. In matters relating to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) within Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, coordination is maintained directly through INTERPOL’s National Central Bureau in Somalia. This intelligence link enhances our ability to detect and respond to transnational maritime crimes with international reach, amplifying our operational impact.

The transformation of our Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO) into a modernized platform, completed with upgrades set for 2025, features four integrated applications—Registration, Alert, Analysis, and Blog—bolstering situational awareness. The MERCURY platform is central to this evolution, our primary tool for secure, real-time information sharing with other naval partners and maritime law enforcement agencies in the Western Indian Ocean.

An agreement with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) provides access to Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) data from over 80 Flag States, significantly strengthening our tracking capabilities. As of early April 2025, over 1,000 cargo and tanker vessels are registered within our voluntary reporting area, with nearly 50% of daily entrants actively participating, underscoring industry trust in our framework. Advanced data collection and analysis, leveraging automatic identification system (AIS), LRIT, and satellite imagery, remain pivotal in tracking vessels and monitoring threats, from piracy to conflict-related risks in the Red Sea.

Partnership Between External and Local Actors

Effective maritime security hinges on collaboration between non-African and African stakeholders, harmonizing external expertise with regional ownership. Our partnership with the shipping industry exemplifies this synergy, with over 4,200 cargo and tanker vessels operating within our voluntary reporting area as of early April 2025. Our maritime security center fosters trust through vessel registration and incident reporting, supported by a modernized system with intuitive interfaces and offline capabilities. A standardized reporting framework enhances communication and interaction with the shipping industry, making the registration and incident reporting processes more streamlined and efficient.

The Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing (IORIS) platform, a non-binding yet widely adopted information-sharing mechanism governed by a Steering Committee, is a key enabler of multinational maritime cooperation.

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has played a leading role in shaping IORIS by participating in thematic and geographic Community Areas (CAs), including search and rescue, pollution response, and maritime interdiction. Through initiatives like the ALDABRA II exercise and training programs in Seychelles, IORIS has demonstrated its potential as a unifying platform. Initial lack of coordination with other maritime coordination entities like the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has been resolved through persistent engagement, achieving unprecedented cooperation that benefits the naval community.

The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Forum has evolved into a groundbreaking platform that brings together naval forces from across the globe alongside industry stakeholders. Far beyond a series of routine meetings, SHADE represents a genuine operational partnership where commercial shipping actors actively participate and hold an equal voice in shaping maritime security decisions.

We have also formalized cooperation with regional maritime centers such as MSC Oman, establishing protocols for real-time information exchange, expertise sharing, and coordinated responses. These bilateral agreements underscore our commitment to empowering regional actors and reinforcing the collaborative fabric of maritime governance in the Western Indian Ocean.

Private maritime security companies (PMSCs) serve as force multipliers, providing deterrence and real-time intelligence. Their tactical presence on vessels, tested by PAGs, remains effective, though adaptations to counter sophisticated threats like drones and missiles through enhanced crew training and citadel procedures strengthen our collective response.

Joint operations with allied task forces like the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) further amplify our reach. Regional frameworks amplify this collaboration, with African navies committing to joint efforts to protect maritime territories. ATALANTA actively supports the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), adopted in 2009 under IMO facilitation and expanded via the Jeddah Amendment in 2017 to address broader threats like trafficking and IUU fishing. Our participation in DCoC high-level meetings and training workshops enhances regional capacity and coordination in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Exercises with regional partners, such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Seychelles, bolster interoperability and local capacity through maritime interdiction training and key leader engagements, reinforcing stability.

Finally, I just recently finished a trip to India to improve the operational coordination in the area, to provide adequate points of contact (POCs) for both ATALANTA and Indian Navy Maritime Security Centers, and to set the scenario for an international maritime exercise that helps to recreate possible engagements at sea and ease future cooperation.

Adapting to Regional Realities

Our experience underscores that uniform solutions are impractical. Somalia’s fragile governance and absent navy necessitate direct intervention authorized by international resolutions. We adapt by focusing on trust-building, regionally led cooperation, and a robust legal finish. Advanced alert and analysis tools tailor responses to local threats, while efforts to enhance judicial capacity in regional states ensure effective prosecution.

Somalia’s onshore instability, marked by militant activities targeting supply lines and military operations in regions like Lower Shabelle and Bari, indirectly influences maritime security. However, direct threats to our assets remain highly unlikely. Yemen’s conflict, with resumed Houthi activities following airstrikes, heightens risks in the Red Sea, though merchant shipping has seen no recent attacks as of early April 2025.

The resurgence of piracy, distinct from Red Sea threats, requires tailored legal and operational frameworks. Economic motives, illegal fishing, and political instability fuel this resurgence, with a moderate threat persisting in parts of the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. Recent cases in territorial waters, often involving fishing vessels, pose unique challenges due to legal and jurisdictional complexities, yet our agile response, deploying assets within 48 hours, mitigates risks.

Looking ahead, I anticipate one or two piracy incidents in the near term, a manageable level given our current capabilities, though uncertainties around local licensing and corruption complicate our understanding.

Tackling Root Causes and Future Challenges

Non-African states address maritime insecurity’s root causes, though challenges persist. In Somalia, piracy’s decline reflects naval deterrence and best management practices, yet poverty, instability, and organized crime endure. Capacity-building initiatives strengthen law enforcement, constrained by onshore conflicts and competing priorities. Our narcotics seizures, totaling nearly 16,000 kilograms, including over 3,000 kilograms of hard drugs like heroin, disrupt trafficking networks. However, many suspects are released due to jurisdictional limits, highlighting the need for broader legal frameworks.

Our operation has shifted from focusing solely on counter-piracy to a broader maritime security role, contributing to the Western Indian Ocean’s stability. Resource constraints limit full implementation, but focused operations targeting illegal fishing yield actionable insights. Future enhancements to our maritime security platform, including AI integration and expanded vessel tracking, will improve threat detection and address adaptive risks from smuggling networks and conflict spillovers. Sustained funding and mandate adjustments remain essential to counter emerging challenges.

Conclusion

Non-African states are vital partners in African regional maritime security, providing resources, expertise, and coordination that complement local efforts. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA’s engagement, enhanced by modernized tools, industry partnerships, and capacity-building, secures critical sea lanes. Our success depends on trust, shared awareness, and tailored approaches. Naval coordination, PMSCs, legal innovation, and platforms like MERCURY and IORIS bridge the gap between external and local actors. As threats evolve, from piracy’s resurgence to sophisticated attacks, sustaining these partnerships, leveraging advanced capabilities, and addressing onshore drivers remain imperative to ensure that this connected ocean fosters stability rather than insecurity. Our strategic achievements position EUNAVFOR ATALANTA embedded in the regional maritime security architecture with high international recognition and represent a tangible tool for the EU’s objectives and interests in the West India Ocean.

VADM Ignacio Villanueva Serrano has been the Operation Commander of Operation Atalanta, EU NAVFOR since November 2023. A graduate of the Spanish Naval Academy, he began his career as a Naval Aviator, later commanding several naval platforms before becoming a staff officer in the International Relations Department at the Spanish Navy headquarters. He has extensive NATO experience in both operational and staff officer defense planning, NATO expeditionary operations and the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander for NATO Flag Officers. VADM Villanueva earned a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and has been a Professor at the High Defense Studies Center in Madrid, Spain.

Featured Image: EUNAVFOR Atalanta Joint Sea Activity, supporting UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) and Somali Fisheries Enforcement officers, as part of UNODC organised training activity Ex Sea Spirit in support of UNSCR 2662/2022. (EUNAVFOR photo)