A shorter version of this piece was originally published by the Surface Navy Association. This longer adaptation is published with permission.
By CDR Anthony LaVopa, USN
During my early days as a Department Head on USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), my Executive Officer advised me to reach out to Professor Jim FitzSimonds and the Halsey Alfa group at the Naval War College. He urged, “Pick their brains and absorb everything you can.” At that time, I had no idea how profoundly this exposure to the Halsey Program would refine my understanding of tactical, operational, and strategic topics. I did not anticipate the extent to which it would challenge my knowledge and assumptions about U.S. capabilities, tactics, and force employment, as well as those of our adversaries. My participation in the Halsey Alfa program, which has focused on war with China for more than 20 years, became one of the most significant and impactful learning experiences of my career. I believe this critical, analytical, and educational opportunity should be mandatory for every unrestricted line officer in the Navy.
With the addition of the Halsey Bravo Program, focused on conflict scenarios with Iran, the Halsey Program leverages subject matter experts and employs continuous free-play, iterative wargaming to educate students. Running three, ten-week wargames each year, the Halsey Program has completed more than one hundred wargames combined across both Alfa and Bravo since 2003. This large base of wargaming experience has created a wealth of valuable insight on operational warfighting, with OPNAV, flag officers, and senior leaders regularly consuming outputs from the Halsey program.
After commanding USS Hurricane (PC 3) and serving at OPNAV N96, I recognized that participating in the Halsey Advanced Research Program (ARP) at the Naval War College was essential before returning to sea and assuming command. I sought to challenge myself in every aspect as a naval officer and warfighter, aiming to sharpen my operational eye – and bring that mindset to my next command. The Halsey program is vital for cultivating the critical thinking and tactical skill required for pacing the rapid evolution of modern naval warfare. By effectively bridging theoretical knowledge with practical application through rigorous wargaming, it prepares naval and joint officers to navigate the complexities of high-end conflict against a peer competitor.
Why Wargame?
Replicating real-world conflict, especially at the high end, is inherently challenging. Wargaming stands out as one of the most time-tested and effective methods for doing so, offering a realistic way for naval officers to practice their craft. It fosters critical thought and discussions about capabilities, limitations, theater geography, the strengths and weaknesses of allies and partners, and the dynamics of fighting peer competitors, making it the premier method for simulating warfare. In contrast, exercises conducted at sea or with other branches of the Joint Force, allies, or partners typically capture only limited aspects of high-end conflict within a carefully controlled environment. Warfare is inherently complex, involving the integration of multiple domains and intricate kill chains. At its core, warfare requires a deep understanding of technology and the creative application of that knowledge to defeat adversaries. Wargaming serves as an effective framework for exploring these complexities. Successful war planning, operational execution, and future systems acquisition should hinge on relevant combat information, accumulated operational experience, and the conclusions reached in series of wargames.
Wargaming facilitates essential discussions on assessing risks to both force and mission. When introduced in a joint and partnered environment, it helps dispel myths and inaccurate assumptions – inherently dangerous beliefs and variables when discovered “in contact.” Analysis of exam data from new students in the Halsey Program reveals that many officers lack sufficient knowledge of domain integration and have even less familiarity with competitor systems and capabilities.
Wargaming is unlike any other game. There are no simple rules for either side and no pre-defined outcomes. There seem to be three major areas in wargaming that I have observed after almost two years in the Halsey Program: the operational environment (the game board) which is driven by the strategic context of politics and a desire to contain conflict, the friendly and opposing forces (the game pieces), specifically what forces exist and how they move, and the third area is the rules of force interaction (combat assessment factors). The brilliance of the Halsey experience is that politics, policy, bureaucracy, and other factors are also discussed, but at the end of the day, the game’s outcomes are driven by what is technologically possible. The results can help inform policymakers, acquisition professionals, and naval commanders on what the art of the possible could and should be.
Many visitors to the Halsey spaces often ask whether the U.S. wins or loses. They are looking for a definite answer and a “recipe card” for success. Although winning or losing is complex based on which metrics and objectives each side is given, the true gold mine of insight in more than twenty years of Halsey wargaming is the set of identified factors that most strongly influence the prospects of red or blue victory in particular domains. These combat interactions between forces are the most complex because the net assessments between red and blue entities are often game-specific and dependent upon a personal point of view – realistic or optimistic. This is not to suggest that a wargame is wholly subjective, but rather it can be limited in effectiveness based on the limits of player knowledge and experience, as well as the control team’s ability to understand and adjudicate force interactions based on known and proven capabilities. A singular and biased viewpoint has the potential to impact the entire game, from the conduct of the game, to the adjudication of force interactions, and the outcomes reached.
The essence of a wargame lies in the assessment process itself. This process cannot occur in isolation or in small groups lacking transparency, especially when security classification limits collaboration. An inclusive discussion, conducted at the appropriate classification level, is essential for shaping game assumptions and determining outcomes. It is crucial to recognize that the fleet and joint force primarily operate at the Secret level. While some individuals may have access to higher classification programs and capabilities, a “black box mentality” should not dictate wargame results. This mentality can introduce significant uncertainty and unwarranted optimism, leaving players unable to assess the validity of the capabilities in question. In both wargames and real-world operations, players must prioritize managing uncertainty to enhance mission effectiveness while maintaining acceptable risk to force. Exquisite capabilities that are not integrated with more common tactics or are not adequately trained can be detrimental, providing a false sense of confidence that may ultimately cause more harm than good.
Often, military capabilities are viewed in a sterile, non-human way—as mere technologies tied to specific platforms delivering defined effects. This perspective fails to capture the reality of warfare, where human intuition and judgment, shaped by years of experience, drive tactical and operational decisions. Wargaming can illuminate the asymmetrical technological advantages of different sides, but it also offers crucial insight into the human element of decision-making, especially in complex, full-spectrum warfare. The experience should immerse players in mental, emotional, and psychological stress as they pursue their objectives and help them understand how this stress influences operational decision-making.
Many assume that peacetime rules and Command and Control (C2) structures will function effectively in future conflicts, yet skepticism persists, particularly regarding the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) model. Originally designed to defend carrier strike groups and their air wings, the CWC has marginally evolved but remains the default structure for operations—prioritizing capital ship defense to hopefully enable offensive power projection. However, if the carrier and air wing are removed from the equation, what C2 structure best supports a transition to an offensive campaign at sea? A key objective of wargaming is to explore the relationship between technology and human decision-making and test alternatives. This skillset cannot be developed in just a few days, it requires weeks or months of dedicated study of adversarial capabilities, employment methods, and C2 processes to understand how best to counter capabilities or change our own. In essence, effective wargaming not only challenges our assumptions about military operations, but also cultivates the critical thinking and adaptability needed to navigate the complexities of future conflict.
The Essence of the Halsey Program
The Halsey program’s core values are an absolute allegiance to reality and a deep skepticism of both technological and operational capabilities – by all sides – that have not yet been proven in peer combat. These values align well with the lessons of history and how unproven capabilities introduce major uncertainty and risk when high-end combat finally takes place. Another core value of the program is developing deep expertise in capabilities of rivals. It is challenging to distill nearly two years of experience into a few pages, but the opportunity to spend dedicated time every day reading and learning about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its components (Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force) has been professionally rewarding, and I believe beneficial as I turn my focus to returning to sea in command.
Unfortunately, I am in the three-percent club at the Naval War College. Less than three percent of the in-residence, non-international graduates each year can be involved with the Halsey programs, specifically the ability to wargame at the classified level. Unclassified wargames can achieve some of the critical thinking effects of a classified wargame, but are not sufficient to effectively assess real-world strategy and combat outcomes. It is perplexing that during a time of heightened tensions with the Chinese Communist Party, specifically regarding claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea, that almost 97 percent of my peers from the Naval War College can go through a year’s curriculum of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at the Navy’s premier strategic and operational center of excellence with only limited classified discussions, no requirement to conduct net assessments at the classified level, nor conduct any classified wargames.
The ongoing analysis and education in the Halsey program, facilitated by continuous wargames, have revealed several key trends. The trends are applicable at the operational level of war – meaning, the potential success of a tactical-level engagement is overshadowed by the effect at the operational level of a campaign. The reason these trends are significant is that unlike many other wargames, Halsey only games two years into the future. This prevents a series of “perfectly executed acquisition cycles” from impacting the game. The students go to war with the military we already have.
Two of the largest trends I have observed include the decreasing relevance of the aircraft carrier and tactical aircraft based within 2,000nm of the fight, as well as hardkill cruise and ballistic missile defenses. There was an inflection point that occurred somewhere around the mid-2010s that triggered the decreasing relevance of these U.S. capabilities and tactics based on advances in PLA missile technology.
However, the two largest trends I have observed for increasing relevance are penetrating ordnance rather than penetrating platforms, and passive missile defenses. In his July 2012 Proceedings article “Payloads Over Platforms: Charting A New Course,” then-CNO Admiral Greenert clearly articulated the necessity to shift our focus to payloads, specifically decoupling platform development from payload development.1 That shift has yet to occur, and while our peer competitor continues to turn out one anti-ship weapon after another, we are still struggling to bring meaningful, offensive, anti-ship payloads into the fleet on a relevant timeline.
Wargaming Must Lead to a War Mindset
The primary expectation of a wargame is to produce quantifiable evidence of whether the employed technology effectively achieved desired outcomes. However, the most critical aspect is ensuring these results reach the appropriate levels to influence the fleet more broadly. Rarely if ever are the findings from the Global series of wargames communicated at the tactical level within the fleet, even as we strive for a “warfighting first” mentality.
As part of the Halsey program, we brief every Prospective Executive Officer (PXO), Commanding Officer (PCO), and Major Commander (MCO) course at the Surface Warfare Schools Command (SWSC) in Newport, Rhode Island. The consistent feedback from these classes is, “I wish someone in the fleet was sharing this information. Why aren’t we using it?” Despite challenging students to critique our analyses, not one has been able to find fault in over twenty-five briefings, supported by more than twenty years of continuous gaming and learning.
Merely encouraging a war-focused mindset with words alone is insufficient. For the average sailor or officer, “war” often translates to routine maintenance, administrative tasks, or unit-level certifications. We need to create opportunities for sailors to think critically about war and wargaming, fostering discussions that lead to meaningful training and education. While deploying units participate in the culminating month-long event known as COMPUTEX (Composite Unit Training Exercise), this is arguably the sole instance during a 36-month Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) where they experience a challenging tactical environment at the high-end, combined arms level. Aside from that fraction of sailors who are about to deploy, many other shoreside sailors have little access to tools for practicing their high-end warfighting skills at the operational level of war.
If the Naval War College is truly the Navy’s premier center for strategic and operational excellence, its wargaming results must permeate all levels of fleet education. The fleet-wide curriculum across all training commands should be adaptable to incorporate continuous updates on tactics and technology from both U.S. forces and peer adversaries. Without this integration of knowledge and a mindset focused on preparing for war, the outputs of the Halsey program and the Naval War College risk becoming merely PowerPoint presentations of good ideas, wargaming outcomes, and recommendations to commanders. In a 1912 Proceedings article, “The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” Captain W. McCarty Little writes, “In the game of war, the stake is life itself, nay, infinitely greater, it may be the life of the nation, certainly its honor. We are its champions: what sort of a figure shall we cut when, at the tournament, the trumpets sound the charge, and it is found that we have neglected to practice in the joust.”2
For me, returning to the fleet means applying my Halsey experience from day one, just as I did during my previous command tour. I view everything through a warfighting lens. On Hurricane, I encouraged my sailors to understand the significance of their daily actions from this perspective. When we faced degraded equipment, the focus was not just on repairs but on understanding the implications for warfighting capability. This empowered my crew to prioritize effectively and raise issues that did not align with our warfighting culture, enabling me to address concerns that might otherwise be seen as mere resource drains. Returning to sea, I will expect the wardroom and CPO mess to share this mindset as we prepare our ship and crew, highlighting the essential distinction between leadership and management – leading people versus managing equipment and process. This warfighting focus at the unit level is as crucial now as it was on December 7, 1941.
The Right Players on the Field
During the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, the Naval War College used a Halsey program-like approach to educate its line officers through continuous wargaming. This academic effort was coupled with fleet exercises to trigger changes to tactics and produce realistic war plans. Due to this structure and effort, nearly all the Navy’s flag officers graduated from the wargaming programs during the interwar period. It was essentially a requirement for flag rank. These programs provided a critical forum for testing and socializing warfighting concepts into naval officers over weeks or months, rather than the handful of days typical of current large-scale games.
Ultimately, the model used in the interwar years was successful because the players involved in the game respected reality and were willing to make significant changes in the face of changing technology and operational concepts. These wargames brought Navy leadership together around common frameworks for understanding fleet battles and theater campaigns, frameworks that proved integral to the Navy’s success in WWII. One of Admiral Nimitz’s most famous postwar quotes argued that the rigorous and repeated Naval War College wargaming had ensured “nothing that happened during the war was a surprise…except the kamikaze tactics.”3
Unfortunately, this model has long been abandoned by the Naval War College and the fleet, with classified wargaming now relegated to the fringes of naval education. In his January 2013 Proceedings article, Naval War College Professor Milan Vego wrote that, “The Navy’s readiness and ability to fight and win at sea depends on the quality and skills of its top commanders and their staffs—yet it does not send many promising officers to attend the resident program at Newport, Rhode Island’s, Naval War College. Today’s Navy officer corps’ knowledge and understanding of naval theory and military history is far from adequate.”4 The Halsey program is helping to turn the tide, but at a small and inadequate rate.
The ability to further scale the Halsey program is limited by the number and quality of the war college faculty and the ability to accurately assess complex game moves. The rudder needs to be put hard over as we prepare for high-end conflict against a peer competitor, potentially within this decade. The rapid advances in warfare represent a double-edged sword to be leveraged or victimized by. The knowledge and experience I have gained as a student in Halsey has been invaluable – and has set a course of continual learning that will endure when I depart Newport. Daily discussions with officers, faculty, and guest flag and general officers have enhanced my experience at the Naval War College beyond expectation. It is this experience that continues to drive my thirst for knowledge, understanding, and research. It drives me to share what I know with wardrooms, ready rooms, and everyone with whom I interact. In the spirit of CNO Admiral Franchetti’s “more players on the field,” the Navy also needs the right players on the field. The Halsey program prepares naval and joint officers to be the right players on the field for when it matters most.
Commander Anthony LaVopa graduated from the U.S. Naval War College in March 2024 as a Halsey Alfa Fellow. He commanded USS Hurricane (PC 3) and is the Prospective Executive Officer (P-XO) for USS Bulkeley (DDG 84).
The opinions expressed are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of the U.S. Navy or any other entity of the U.S. government.
References
1. Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, “Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,” Proceedings 138 (July 2012), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/july/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course.
2. W. McCarty Little, “The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” Proceedings 38 (December 1912),
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1912/december-0/strategic-naval-war-game-or-chart-maneuver
3. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz speech to U.S. Naval War College, 10 October 1960, Folder 26, Box 31, RG15 Guest Lectures, 1894–1992, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport RI; quoted in John M. Lillard, Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for WWII, PhD dissertation, George Mason University, 2013, 1.
4. Milan Vego, “Study War Much More,” Proceedings 139 (January 2013), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/january/study-war-much-more.
Featured Image: PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Wuxi attached to a unit under the PLA Northern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou)