All posts by Guest Author

Capability Analysis

Forging the Apex Predator:­­­ Unmanned Systems and SSN(X)

4 Comments

By LCDR James Landreth, USN, and LT Andrew Pfau, USN

2041: USS Fluckey (SSN 812) Somewhere West of the Luzon Strait

Like wolves stalking in the night, the pack of autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) silently swam from USS Fluckey’s open torpedo tubes. In honor of its namesake, “The Galloping Ghost of the China Coast,” Fluckey silently hunted its prey. With the ability to command and control an integrated UUV swarm via underwater wireless communication systems, Fluckey could triangulate any contact in the 160-mile gap between Luzon and Taiwan while maintaining the mothership in a passive sonar posture. Its magazine of 50 weapon stows brimmed with MK-48 Mod 8 Torpedoes. 28 Maritime Strike Tomahawks glowed in the vertical launch system’s belly like dragon’s fire. With just one hull, the Galloping Ghost sealed the widest exit from the South China Sea. Any ship seeking passage would have to pass through the jaws of the Apex Predator of the undersea.

Introduction

The Navy has its eyes set on the future of submarine warfare with the Next Generation Attack Submarine (SSN(X)), the follow-on to the Virginia-class attack submarine. Though SSN(X) has yet to be named, the Navy began funding requirements, development, and design in 2020. Vice Admiral Houston, Commander of Naval Submarine Forces, described SSN(X) in July 2021 as, “[T]he ultimate Apex Predator for the maritime domain.”1 In order to become the “Apex Predator” of the 21st century, SSN(X) will need to be armed not only with advanced torpedoes, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, but also with an array of unmanned systems. While SSN(X) will carry both unmanned aircraft and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV), it is assumed that UUV optimization will lead the unmanned priority list. Acting as a mothership, SSN(X) will be able to deploy these UUVs to perform a variety of tasks, including gaining a greater awareness of the battlespace, targeting, active deception and other classified missions. To fulfill its destiny, UUV employment must be a consideration in every frame of SSN(X) and subjected to rigorous analysis.

SSN(X) must be capable of the deployment, recovery, and command and control of UUVs. To fulfill this mission, every aspect of contemporary submarine-launched UUV operations will need to scale dramatically. Submarine designers and undersea warriors need to understand the trade space available in order to gain an enhanced understanding of potential SSN(X) UUV employment. A detailed study of the trade space must include all relevant aspects of the deployment lifecycle including UUV acquisition, operation, sustainment and maintenance. The following analysis provides a first approximation of the undersea trade space where the Apex Predator’s ultimate form will take shape.

UUV Concept of Operations

Effective solution design of SSN(X) and UUVs can only come from a mature concept of operations (CONOPS). These CONOPS will center around the use cases for submarine launched UUVs. UUVs will provide SSN(X) the ability to monitor greater portions of the battlespace by going out beyond the range of the SSN(X)’s organic sensors to search or monitor for adversary assets. The ability to search the environment, both passively and actively, will be key to fulfilling the CONOPS. Additionally, active sonar scanning of the seabed, a current UUV mission, will continue to be a key UUV mission. These are by no means the only missions that UUVs could or will perform, rather they examples of relevant missions that enhance the combat power of SSN(X).

It is critical that CONOPS developers and acquisition planners consider the SSN(X) and its UUV as an integrated system. That integrated system includes the SSN(X) mothership as well as the UUV bodies, crew members required to support UUV operations and the materiel support strategy for deployed UUVs. Other categories are necessary for consideration, but each of these provides a measurable constraint on SSN(X) CONOPS development. While the acquisition of UUV and SSN(X) may ultimately fall under separate Program Executive Offices, the Navy must heed the lessons of Littoral Combat Ship’s (LCS) inconsistent funding of mission modules.2 One of LCS’s early woes related to the failure to develop mission modules concurrently with LCS construction. Absent the mission modules, early LCS units bore criticism for lacking combat capability. Instead, the Navy should draw on the success of iterative capability developments like the Virginia Payload Module (VPM).3 In the same way Virginia-class introduced incremental capability improvements across its Block III through Block V via VPM, the Navy must prioritize continuous UUV development just as urgently as it pursues its next submarine building initiative. Table 1 lists some priority considerations:

Category Elements for Consideration
UUV Size of the UUVs carried inboard
Quantity of embarked UUVs
Deployment methods of UUV
Communications between SSN(X) and UUV
UUV Crew UUV Support Crew Size
Training requirements for UUV Sailors
Materiel Support Strategy Charging and recharging UUVs inboard
Maintenance strategy for UUV
UUV load and unload facilities

Table 1. UUV Considerations

Designing SSN(X) for UUVs

Organic UUV operations are the desired end state, but several gaps exist between the Navy’s current UUV operational model and the Navy’s stated plans for SSN(X). At present, submarines deploy UUVs for specific exercises, test and evaluations, or carefully planned operations.4 Additionally, UUV missions require specially trained personnel or contractors to join the submarine’s crew to operate and employ the UUV system, limiting operational flexibility. To their credit, today’s SSNs can deploy UUV from a number of ocean interfaces according to the size of the UUV including: 3” launcher, the trash disposal unit, torpedo tubes, lock-in/lock-out chamber, missile tubes, large ocean interfaces or dry-deck shelters.5 However, the ability to perform UUV-enabled missions depends heavily on the legacy submarine’s mission configuration. Two decades ago, the Virginia-class was designed to dominate in the littorals and deploy Special Forces with a built-in lock-in, lock-out chamber. Just as every Virginia-class submarine is capable of deploying Special Forces and divers, every SSN(X) must be UUV ready.

In order to fully define the requirements of the Apex Predator, requirements officers and engineers within the undersea enterprise must understand the trade space associated with UUV operations. SSN(X) must exceed the UUV capabilities of today’s SSNs and should use resources organic to the ship, such as torpedo tubes, to employ them. Also, given that Navy requirements need SSN(X) to transit at maximum speed, these UUVs will need to present low appendage drag or stay within the skin of the submarine until deployed.6 Similar to the internal bomb bay configuration of Fifth Generation F-35 Stealth Fighters, internally-housed UUVs, most likely with the form-factor of a torpedo, will likely yield the greatest capacity while preserving acoustic superiority at high transit speeds.

With so many variables in play and potential configurations, requirements officers need the benefit of iterative modeling and simulation to illuminate the possible. Optimization for UUV design is not merely a problem of multiplication or geometric fit. Rather, an informed UUV model reveals a series of constraining equations that govern the potential for each capability configuration. The following analysis examined over 300 potential UUV force packages by varying the number UUVs carried, the size of the UUV crew complement, and UUV re-charging characteristics in-hull, while holding the form-factor of the UUV constant. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of the first order analysis, focused on mission-effectiveness, seeking to maximize the distance that a UUV compliment could cover in a 24-hour period. Notably, the UUV sustainment resources inside the submarine matter just as much as the number of UUVs onboard. Such resources include maintenance areas, charging bays, weight handling equipment and spare parts inventory.

Given that SSN(X) and its unmanned systems will likely be fielded in a resource constrained environment, including both obvious fiscal constraints and physical resource constraints within the hull, a second order analysis scored each force package on maximum utilization. After all, rarely-utilized niche systems are often hard to justify. While more UUVs generally resulted in a potential for more miles of UUV operations per 24-hour period, smaller numbers of UUVs in less resource-intensive configurations (that is, requiring less space, less operational support, etc.) achieved up to 5x higher utilization scores. Given the multi-mission nature of SSN(X) and the foreseeable need to show high utilization in the future budgetary environment, requirements officers have a wide margin of trade space to navigate because many different types and configurations of UUVs could achieve high utilization rates as they performed various missions.

What should be Considered

SSN(X) will be enabled by advanced technologies, but its battle efficiency will rely just as much on qualified personnel and maintenance as on any number of advanced sensors or high endurance power systems. In order to identify the limiting factor in each capability configuration, the study varied the following parameters according to defined constraint equations to determine the maximum number of miles that could be scanned per 24-hours: number of UUVs, size of the UUV support crew, the UUV support crew operational tempo, the number of UUV charging bays, and the numbers or charges per day required per UUV. As a secondary measure, the UUV utilization rate for each capability configuration was determined as a means of assessing investment value. The constraint equations are provided in full detail in Appendix 1: Analysis Constraint Equations.

The Navy currently fields a variety of UUVs that vary in both size and mission. The opening vignette of this essay discusses UUVs that can be launched and recovered from submarine torpedo tubes while submerged, which the Navy’s lexicon classifies as medium UUVs (MUUV) and which this study uses as the basic unit of analysis. The current inventory of MUUVs include the Razorback and Mk-18 systems, but this analysis used the open-source specifications of the REMUS 600 UUV (the parent design of these platforms) to allow releasability. These specifications are listed in Table 2, and Table 3 assigns additional values to relevant parameters related to UUV maintainability based on informed estimates. While the first SSN(X) will not reach initial operating capability for more than a decade, the study assumed UUV propulsion system endurance would only experience incremental improvements from today’s fielded systems.7

Remus 600 Characteristics
Mission Speed 5 knots
Mission Endurance between Recharges 72 hours
Number of Sensors (active or passive) 3

Table 2. Remus 600 Characteristics

Informed Estimates on Maintainability
Maintenance Duty Cycle 0.02
Sensor Refit Duty Cycle 0.09
Duty Cycle Turnaround 0.23

Table 3. Informed Estimates on Maintainability

Model Results and Analysis

The Navy’s forecasted requirements for SSN(X) weapons payload capacity mirrors the largest torpedo rooms in the Fleet today found on Seawolf-class submarines. Seawolf boasts eight torpedo tubes and carries up to 50 weapons.8 Assuming SSN(X)’s torpedo room holds an equivalent number of weapons stows, some of these stows may be needed for UUVs and UUV support.

Trial values from the trade study for specific UUV, crew, and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) capability configurations are shown in Table 4:

Parameter Values
Number of UUVs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Number of UUV Crew Watch Teams 2, 3, 4
Crew OPTEMPO 0.33, 0.5
Number of UUV Charging Bays 2, 4, 6, 8
Daily Charges per UUV 0.33, 0.5

Table 4. Study Parameters

The number of crew watch teams could represent a multiple based on the ultimate number of personnel required to sustain UUV operations. Crew OPTEMPO represents the time that UUV operations and maintenance personnel are on duty during a 24-hour period. A value of 0.33 represents three 8-hour duty sections per day. 0.5 represents two 12-hour duty sections per day.

The results in Table 5 represent seven of the highest scoring capability configurations from among the 336 trials in the trade study.9 The most significant variable driving UUV miles scanned was the number of UUV Crew Watch Teams, and the second most significant variable was the UUV Crew OPTEMPO. UUV configurations with 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 UUVs all achieved the maximum score on scan rate of 240 miles scanned per 24 hours, though utilization rates were much higher for the configurations with fewer UUVs. The 3 UUV configuration was able to achieve 240 miles with the fewest number of UUVs and yielded the second highest utilization score. The 2 UUV configuration earned a slightly higher utilization score (+2%), but the scan rate was 42% less than the 3 UUV configuration. 

# UUV # Crew Crew OPTEMPO UUV Charging Bays Charges per Day Miles Scanned per 24 hrs Utilization Notes
8 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.25 Big footprint; High scan rate; Low utilization
7 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.29 Big footprint; High scan rate; Low utilization
6 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.33 Medium footprint; High scan rate; Low utilization
5 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.4 Medium footprint; High scan rate; Medium utilization
4 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.5 Medium footprint; High scan rate; High utilization
3 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.67 Small footprint; High scan rate; High utilization
2 3 0.5 2 0.33 165 0.69 Smallest footprint, Medium scan rate; Highest utilization

Table 5. Sample Analysis Results 

This study shows that in order to scan more miles, loading more UUVs is not likely to be the first or best option. Understanding of this calculus is critically important since each additional UUV would replace a weapon needed for combat or increase the overall length, displacement and cost of the submarine. Instead, crew configurations and watch rotations play a major factor in UUV operations.

Conclusion

The implications for an organic UUV capability on SSN(X) go far beyond simply loading a UUV instead of an extra torpedo. The designers of SSN(X) will have to consider personnel required to operate and maintain these systems. The spaces and equipment necessary to repair, recharge, and maintain UUVs will have to be designed from the keel up.

The Apex Predator must be more than just the number and capability of weapons carried. SSN(X)’s lethality will come from the ability of sailors to man and operate its systems and maintain the equipment needed to perform in combat. The provided trade study sheds light on the significant technical challenges that still remain in the areas of UUV communications, power supply and endurance, and sensor suites. By resourcing requirements officers, technical experts and acquisition professionals with a meaningful optimization study, early identifications of UUV requirements for SSN(X) can enable the funding allocations necessary to solve these difficult problems.

Lieutenant Commander James Landreth, P.E., is a submarine officer in the Navy Reserves and a civilian acquisition professional for the Department of the Navy. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.) and the University of South Carolina (M.Eng.). The views and opinions expressed here are his own.

Lieutenant Andrew Pfau, USN, is a submariner serving as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School and the U. S. Naval Academy. The views and opinions expressed here are his own.

Appendix 1: Analysis Constraint Equations

The following equations were used to develop a reusable parametric model. The model was developed in Cameo Systems Modeler version 19.0 Service Pack 3 with ParaMagic 18.0 using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML). The model was coupled with Matlab 2021a via the Symbolic Math Toolkit plug-in. This model is available to share with interested U.S. Government parties via any XMI compatible modeling environment.

Number of Miles Scanned per 24 hours=Number of Available Systems*Speed*24

Equation 1. Scanning Equation

Number of Available Systems= min⁡(Number of Available UUV,UUV Crew,Number of Available Charges)

Equation 2. System Availability Equation

Number of Available UUV=((Number of Available UUVs by Day+Number of Available UUVs by Night)*UUV Duty Cycle)/2

Equation 3. UUV Availability Equation

Number of Available UUV=((Number of Available UUVs by Day+Number of Available UUVs by Night)*UUV Duty Cycle)/2

Equation 4. UUV Duty Cycle Equation

Number of Available UUVs by Day=min⁡(number of day sensors,number of UUVs)

Equation 5. Day Sensor Availability Equation

Number of Available UUVs by Night=min⁡(number of night sensors,number of UUVs)

Equation 6. Night Sensor Availability Equation

Number of Available Crews=Number of Crews*Crew Time On Duty

Equation 7. Crew Availability Equation

Number of Available Charges=(Charges per Day)/(Daily Charges per UUV)

Equation 8. Charge Availability Equation

Utilization= (Number of Miles Scanned per 24 hours)/((Number of UUVs*Patrol Speed*24 hours))

Equation 9. Utilization Score 

Endnotes

1. Justin Katz, “SSN(X) Will Be ‘Ultimate Apex Predator,’” BreakingDefense, July 21, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/ssnx-will-be-ultimate-apex-predator/

2. Congressional Research Service, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Updated December 17, 2019, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

3. Virginia Payload Module, July 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf

4. Megan Eckstein, “PEO Subs: Navy’s Future Attack Sub Will Need Stealthy Advanced Propulsion, Controls for Multiple UUVs,” USNI News, March 9, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/03/09/peo-subs-navys-future-attack-sub-will-need-stealthy-electric-drive-controls-for-multiple-uuvs

5. Chief of Naval Operations Undersea Warfare Directorate, “Report to Congress: Autonomous Undersea Vehicle Requirement for 2025,” p. 5-6, February 2016, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=791491

6. Congressional Research Service, “Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” May 10, 2021, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20705392/navy-next-generation-attack-submarine-ssnx-may-10-2021.pdf

7. Robert Button, John Kamp, Thomas Curtin, James Dryden, “A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles,” RAND National Defense Research Institute, , 2009, p. 50, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG808.pdf

8. U.S. Navy Fact Files, “Attack Submarines – SSN,” Updated May 25, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169558/attack-submarines-ssn/

9. The results of all 336 capability configurations are available in .xlsx format upon request.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN – USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) joins Collins Class Submarines, HMAS Collins, HMAS Farncomb, HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean in formation while transiting through Cockburn Sound, Western Australia.

Force Development

Battlespace Awareness Tools Are Central to Fleet Readiness

Leave a comment

By Michael Tiefel and Andrew Orchard

In his book Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Capt.(ret) Wayne Hughes states: “At sea the essence of tactical success has been the first application of effective offensive force.”1 Capt. Hughes’ warfighting axiom – applying offensive force first – is the distinct advantage information warfare (IW) intends to deliver, and it is predicated on sound battlespace awareness (BSA). Given the advances in the speed, precision, and destructive power of modern naval weapons, finding and fixing the adversary remains indispensable.

A powerful suite of BSA tools exists now, and they hold the key to making sense of an increasingly complex environment for Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) IW Teams. Incorporating BSA tool familiarization and training in IW schoolhouses while exercising their use in the Fleet Response Training Program (FRTP) cycle is an opportunity the IW community must seize to maintain an edge over potential adversaries.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) integration will drive future conflicts. In 2018, the Department of Defense (DoD) published its Artificial Intelligence Strategy and established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in recognition of this fact.2 The AI Strategy directs the military to accelerate research, development, and adoption of AI/ML into a range of defense activities. The JAIC, meanwhile, manages the DoD investment in the application of AI/ML in activities ranging from logistics management to BSA. It serves as the executive agent for the military’s adoption of AI Strategy and seeks opportunities to move the military from traditional “Handcrafted Knowledge Systems” towards the development and incorporation of AI/ML.3 JAIC’s efforts portend exciting changes and will fundamentally transform how the Navy approaches the BSA mission.

However, none of these AI/ML efforts have resulted in tools the force can use now. Fortunately, there are BSA tools available to make Information Warfare teams effective in today’s maritime fight and that of the near future until AI/ML capabilities mature. Potential adversaries also recognize the criticality of winning the BSA battle and the possibilities of AI/ML in the long term. To remain ahead of these challengers and prevent them from gaining “the potential for decision by technological surprise,” the US Navy must expand its advantages in understanding the operational environment, and that starts with the effective use of currently available BSA tools.4

The Future Is Now: A Powerful Suite of Tools Exists

There is a pervasive belief both within and outside the Information Warfare community that BSA watch standers cannot successfully compete in a data- saturated world without AI/ML to help them understand the tactical picture. Action officers have spent many hours writing urgent operational needs statements to argue for rapid development and fielding of analytical tools to do the work usually placed on junior officers and Sailors. This panacea AI solution probably will not materialize in the near term, even though the JAIC continues to work to this end. The tools currently available may be the ones with which the next maritime conflict will be fought, and the fact is they work! Information Warfare officers must make an earnest effort to train their Sailors to complement traditional analysis tools with multi-intelligence fusion applications. CSG and ESG Staff Intelligence Officers play a significant role in cultivating a culture within their watch and analysis teams to push the envelope of available BSA capabilities in order to build the most accurate maritime picture from which commanders make tactical decisions even under stressful conditions.

 Afloat intelligence teams are now prioritizing training in Intelligence Community-wide tools as a standard operating practice for BSA watches.5 Not only does this train personnel on “buttonology,” but it also ensures watch teams understand the data sources from which they derive information, identify alternative sources if available, and appreciate data that is not available and what that means to their analysis. Officers and Sailors must understand the fundamentals of BSA tools and the sources that feed them; they must know other search mechanisms when missing information and explain their analytical process to other ship watches, aviators performing pre-flight walkthroughs, or even the strike group commander.

Afloat intelligence teams are also employing these BSA tools for analysis across all work centers from the air wing to shipboard cryptology. It is our experience that core BSA tools including the Fusion Analytic Development Effort (FADE) tool suite, Thresher data fusion tool, and Defense Intelligence Agency’s Think, Analyze, Connect (TAC) are integral to understanding the threat and operational situation in today’s dynamic maritime environment.6 Watch standers and analysts more quickly and accurately cross-reference information, build greater confidence in their use of traditional program of record systems, such as generic area limitation environment (GALE), and make higher confidence intelligence assessments through their continued utilization of these and other BSA tools.

How to Make the Connection: Cross-functional Training

Cross-functional training is the natural complement to BSA tools implementation; Sailors require a functional understanding of how each discipline provides value to the organization to use these tools most effectively. This is not a novel concept. Many papers have been written on the need for cross-pollination within  intelligence and cryptologic communities to better operationalize information warfare.7 However, there is no better environment to push the boundaries of integration than in SUPPLOT or EXPLOT. 

A common understanding of the various intelligence and cryptology specializations enables efficiency both on the watch floor and in the other intelligence work centers. An Intelligence Specialist (IS) with an ELINT background can leverage a Cryptologic Technician Technical’s (CTT) skill to find uncooperative contacts while he or she resourcefully locates cooperative contacts. Similarly, a CTT able to correlate imagery with ELINT can identify a vessel of interest without assistance and allow for more economical use of time for those high demand positions such as the Red Database Manager or the Force Intelligence Watch Assistant. 

This cross-functional approach does not demand in-depth expertise, but instead requires a basic, working understanding of the IS and CT disciplines. Watch standers benefit from cross-functional working knowledge that breaks down knowledge silos and enables collaboration using a common language and BSA tool set.  A shared background fosters the free flow of analytical ideas by unifying the team. Ultimately, a unified and self-aware team will remain one step ahead, thereby creating a distinctive capability.8 At the Strike Group level, our distinctive capability begins with training personnel on Intelligence fields, data sources, BSA tools, and fleet operations.9 The goal is to familiarize, which precedes, or at least tightly accompanies, analytic skills development.

Watch standing qualification now requires a combination of fundamental and practical lessons to create a cross-functional foundation. The fundamentals portion provides a basic understanding of the “how” behind each facet. Much like Surface Warfare Officers must understand how a warship’s systems acquire and track targets; information warfare professionals need to understand the sources and methods behind the data. Such lessons also concentrate on improving technology literacy and operational knowledge. Both are critical to effectively using advanced analytics and associated technologies during the practical training. The practical segment seeks to build the technical skills an intelligence professional requires to turn data and information into intelligence. The best way to become an intelligence professional is to work through as many practical examples as possible. Initial practical training emphasizes the development of personnel skills, patterns of life, and technology familiarization. Once mastered, practical applications focus on cross-functional communication and team building to meet strike group intelligence demands.

Battlespace Awareness Tool Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Build BSA tools and cross-functional training into routine watch practices. Two years ago, Carrier Strike Group Five (CSG-5) introduced substantive changes to the SUPPLOT training syllabus. We recognized the need for cross-functional training on the various BSA tools currently available. All watch standers, whether they are direct support personnel assigned from a Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC), the USS Ronald Reagan, or Carrier Air Wing 5 complete both common and specialized job qualification requirements (JQR) that includes proficiency in a BSA toolkit (i.e., Thresher, MIST, TAC). At sea, our ability to train personnel relies upon knowledge gained through informal online training, on-the-job training and through active interest by the various IS, CT, and officer users. Additionally, CSG-5 frequently coordinates with CACI, NRO, ONI and the USAF to schedule training opportunities for watch standers as these courses are available.10 We recommend all deploying CSGs/ESGs build BSA tool competency and a cross-functional approach into their watch standing JQRs.

Recommendation 2: Ensure Information Warfare students receive BSA tool training early. The Center for Information Training (CIWT) must integrate modern Battlespace Awareness tools into its curricula across the basic Intelligence Officer, basic Cryptologic Officer, Cryptologic Resources Coordinator (CRC), and various IS, CTT and CTR “A” school training curricula. This aligns with Admiral Gilday’s charge in his NAVPLAN 2021 that the Navy reforms its education programs to win in day-to-day operations and in combat.11 We are confident our Information Warfare schools can find space within the margins of Training Requirements Reviews to incorporate initial training on FADE MIST, A2, Thresher, and TAC. This change will also address a training deficiency in the OPINTEL toolkit identified by LT William Murray in 2019.12 However, training in BSA tools cannot end at the accession level training commands.

Recommendation 3: Reinforce early training with sustained training events during the FRTP. Fleet training commands must begin to integrate follow-on training and OPINTEL tool utilization during all phases of the CSG/ESG work up cycle. For example, some Information Warfare Training Commands must invest in a second iteration of BSA tool training as part of the Supplementary Plot (SUPPLOT) and Expeditionary Plot (EXPLOT) Team Trainer (SETT) events. Fleet training commands, such as our Naval Information Warfare Training Groups, should then put the SETT classroom instruction into practice as part of the Fusion Analysis Team Trainer (FATT) and Afloat Information Warfare Team Trainer (AIWTT). Deploying CSGs and ESGs should have the confidence to explore these tools during Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) and Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) graded events. There remains an important role for NRO, CACI, ONI or USAF training opportunities beyond the introduction to these tools at the basic schools and into the FRTP process. We envision these organizations moving beyond teaching the basic application of these tools to more sophisticated training events that allow for mastery of these capabilities. Furthermore, repetitive training opportunities allow these organizations to refine their curriculums to address basic and advanced training requirements as well as update their tools through fleet feedback.

Recommendation 4: Engage IW WTIs to be our BSA tool experts. Finally, we must ensure our WTIs are well versed in the variety of BSA tools currently at our disposal and able to implement rigorous training programs for our junior officers and Sailors. Several WTI candidates communicated with CSG-5 during our 2020 deployment to discuss thesis topics and request reviews of their final projects. Looking back, we should have pressed them to write projects on the training and application of current BSA tools for deploying naval forces. Naval Information Warfare Development Center (NIWDC) must include robust training in BSA tools as part of their standing WTI curriculum to make our future training officers successful in the fleet. The fleet deserves NIWDC-trained instructors well versed in existing tools and energized to help nurture their use from the tactical level up through the operational level at Maritime Intelligence Operations Centers .

Battlespace Awareness Tools Allow the Navy to Act Decisively First

Potential adversaries will continue to develop the requisite technology and weaponry to amass an effective offensive force. In response, the Navy is introducing new hardware, more demanding pre-deployment training and exploring AI/ML to address these challenges. Information warfare will enable the success of these efforts by maintaining the Navy’s advantage in BSA using existing analytical tools, building commonalities across the IS and CT force to encourage collaboration and communication, and modifying officer and enlisted training syllabi to allow for early and continuous integration of BSA resources. Moreover, broad use of current BSA tools across both  intelligence and cryptologic communities and supported by our WTIs engenders feedback from multiple perspectives. This feedback continues to be critical to tool developers as they refine many of these analytical tools even as we move away from handcrafted knowledge systems towards contextual adaptation and beyond. 

To achieve battlespace awareness to the satisfaction of any commander is the intelligence community’s highest objective. Intelligence personnel must be best prepared to provide confident analytical assessments of the tactical situation so that commanders and naval forces can make informed tactical decisions with greater confidence and speed than their adversaries. As CAPT Hughes wrote, “winners have out-scouted [battlespace awareness] the enemy in detection, in tracking, and in targeting.”13 A growing appreciation for BSA tools accompanied by a robust training program tailored toward fast recognition and quick integration of all available data ensures information warfare professionals remain at the leading edge of this mission critical requirement to out-scout the adversary, even in the information realm. This will allow the Fleet to be the one “who would attack decisively first.”14 

Michael Tiefel is a U.S. Navy intelligence officer and currently serves as the Executive Officer at the Center for Information Warfare Training, Pensacola, FL.

Andrew Orchard is a U.S. Navy intelligence officer and currently the officer in charge of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center New Orleans.

The authors thank Capt. James Pendergast, USN, commanding officer of the Hopper Information Services Center at the Office of Naval Intelligence, for his review and inputs into the final version of this paper.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Endnotes

1 Hughes, Wayne P. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. Naval Institute Press., 2018, 206.

2 Department of Defense. “SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity.” https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF, 5.

3 Allen, Greg. Understanding AI Technology: A concise, practical, and readable overview of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning technology designed for non-technical managers, officers, and executives. Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), April 2020, 3.

4 Hughes, 229.

5 Although we reference SUPPLOT throughout this article; our methodology and tools have equal practical application in Expeditionary Plot (EXPLOT) as well.

6 The National Reconnaissance Office maintains a suite of tools under their FADE program that contribute to the BSA toolkit used afloat.

7 Schwille, Michael, et al. “Improving Intelligence Support for Operations in the Information Environment.” RAND Corporation, 2020, doi:10.7249/rb10134.

8 Barney, Jay, and William Hesterly. “Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage.” Competitive Strategy, 2011, doi:10.7551/mitpress/8956.003.000, 149-153.

9 We recognize an appreciation for blue force capabilities is important. In fact, the CSG-5 Battlespace Awareness team works with surface, air, MISR (which resides within the N2 Department) and Information Warfare WTIs on a daily basis to ensure an understanding of blue force tasks and capabilities, allowing the SUPPLOT team to focus on N2’s Intelligence priorities. See Nelson, Christopher, and Eric Peterson. “Naval Intelligence Must Relearn Its Own Navy.” Proceedings, 13 Feb. 2020, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/february/naval-intelligence-must-relearn-its-own-navy.

10 Individuals with SIPRNET accounts are welcome to review the SUPPLOT JQR on the CTF-70 Collaboration at Sea (CAS) webpage.

11 Gilday, Michael ADM. “CNO NAVPLAN 2021,” https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002562551/-1/-1/1/CNO%20NAVPLAN%202021%20-%20FINAL.PDF, 6.

12 Murray, William N. “Reimagine Intelligence Officer Training.” Proceedings, 21 Feb. 2019, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/january/reimagine-intelligence-officer-training. 

13 Hughes, 212.

14 Hughes, 212.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 17, 2020) Lt. Louis Petro, from Weeki Wachee, Fla., stands watch as the tactical action officer in the combat information center aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

Fiction Contest Week

Security by Obsolescence

2 Comments

Fiction Contest Week

1st Place Finisher

By Captain James Schmitt, U.S. Air Force

Captain Hal “Sleazy” Slotsma watched the sea pass underneath his aircraft. The day was calm and the water’s surface mostly unmarred, though the occasional wakes passing through his field of vision led him to fishing vessels and other small craft. Looking at the brilliant blue water illuminated by a sun just starting to set, he could feel a familiar emotion building inside. “I am so damn bored,” he announced, startling the other person in the cockpit.

“We still have four hours until the break crew gets in,” said Corporal Sam “Curbs” London, settling back into her seat and glancing at the shift schedule on a screen to her right. “Is it your Friday or something?”

“Thursday,” said Sleazy glumly. He had two days left in his rotating workweek.

“Well, you’re in for a long night,” said Curbs, catching the edge of a wake and following it with the aircraft’s camera. “You never know, though. Maybe this wake leads to a sub and we get the XO’s bottle of scotch.”

“Some sub to leave a wake this big,” said Sleazy, as the camera finally caught the other edge of the wake, the disruptions making a “V” pointing to a ship still off-screen. “Maybe a tanker got lost.”

“Maybe not,” said Curbs, who had caught up with the ship and begun to zoom in.

Instead of the high-walled stern of a tanker, the ship’s aft was flat and sleek. As the camera slewed, it became clear that the ship was military, not commercial; it had a well-marked helipad, tapered bridge, and two uncovered mounted machine guns.

“Well, they’re not supposed to be here,” said Sleazy. “White hull?”

“White hull,” confirmed Curbs, identifying the ship as Coast Guard instead of a gray-hulled regular Navy vessel. The white hull also provided enough contrast to clearly see the bright red Chinese flag flying from the mast. “Not a monster ship, though.”

Curbs was right. The ship didn’t have the familiar bulk of the CCG-3901, a massive China Coast Guard ship that had terrorized Japanese fishing boats for the past four months. The outdated ship had surprisingly free rein of the area after decisively winning a game of chicken against a Japan Coast Guard cutter. A determined rescue effort saved the Japanese ship from sinking, but political leaders had still backed away from any further confrontations.

This mystery vessel’s course was as unusual as its type. Curbs was used to seeing Chinese ships patrolling a regular path through the waters off the Senkaku islands, part of normalizing their “domestic police actions.” This ship, however, was steaming in the general direction of the disputed islands, but it wasn’t on the normal course.

“I’m going to see where they’re headed,” said Sleazy, pulling up a moving map on a screen to his left. “Let’s look around to see if there’s anyone else.”

“Copy,” Curbs acknowledged, beginning an expanding search with practiced precision as Sleazy projected the ship’s course on his map. As far as he could tell, it would pass within two miles of Uotsuri Island, the westernmost of the disputed Senkaku islands. It wouldn’t be the closest approach that he had ever seen—hell, a maritime militia fleet had briefly landed on the islands a couple months ago—but it was odd. Odd enough for him to take a closer look.

“Coming left,” he said to Curbs, banking gently and activating the aircraft’s air-to-sea radar to sweep the area off the islands. There was plenty to find—just under two miles northwest of Uotsuri there was a cluster of a dozen returns, perhaps more. Sleazy waited for the radar to make a second pass, but the screen froze. Looking to another screen, Sleazy could see that the feed from the camera had frozen there as well.

“Lost link,” said Curbs, somewhat obviously. The link between their ground control station and the MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft had failed. Sleazy and Curbs were now sitting in a moderately expensive shipping container in Hawaii, not in the cockpit of an aircraft flying over the East China Sea. Sleazy picked up the phone.

“Savage 26 lost link,” he told the communications technician on the other end. “Let’s get countermeasures going.”

It wasn’t long after the Marines started flying MQ-9s in the Pacific that the Chinese had begun interfering with their command-and-control links. The interference had turned into a back-and-forth competition, with increasingly ingenious and complex jamming and counter-jamming. The latest solution let MQ-9 aircrew defend their link to the aircraft . . . usually.

“Sorry, sir, but we can’t,” the tech answered immediately. Sleazy was sure he could hear other phones ringing in the background of the call—not a good sign. When comm techs were busy, it was often a bad day for everyone. “There’s jamming across the whole scope. I’m surprised the damn phones are working.”

“It’s not just us?” asked Sleazy, surprised. Harassing one MQ-9, especially one near the Senkakus, was pretty par for the course. But the Chinese normally avoided escalation.

“It’s everyone,” confirmed the tech. “Not just SatCom, either. Over-the-air comms are out, and the internet is so slow that even the backup chat is down.”

“How are we talking, then?” asked Sleazy. While he was talking on what seemed like a phone, it was technically a Voice over IP device routing the call through a secure network.

The tech laughed.

“Security by obsolescence,” he said. “There’s a backup mode on these things that routes through an old satellite constellation in the X band that no one uses. It’s so out of date that the Chinese probably decommissioned their jammers for it.”

Sleazy laughed too. “Hey, no mocking old tech. This whole MQ-9 program basically exists because the Air Force had leftovers. In fact, we used to be on X-band.” “Too bad you’re not there anymore,” said the tech. “Anyway, sir, you need anything else? It’s getting pretty hectic here.”

Sleazy stayed silent, staring at the frozen image on the screen. “Hang on a second,” he said. “Curbs, do you remember the brief we got with the last software update?” Curbs looked up from documenting the jamming.

“Yes?” she answered hesitantly.

“Not a test,” said Sleazy, grinning. “Do you remember the new procedure for emergency divert? One of the steps was to manually disable the link recovery automatic checklist.”

“Yeah,” said Curbs, “because the genius engineers still had it set to the backup.”

“The X-band backup!” Sleazy turned back to the phone. “Still there?”

“Yeah, and I heard you,” said the tech, starting to get excited. “We’re not really supposed to use that constellation without coordinating first, but what the hell. How do

you feel about limited bandwidth?”

“A hell of a lot better than no bandwidth,” said Sleazy. “Give me the numbers.”

They went back and forth for a couple minutes, getting the technical details for the new link pathway. Finally, the video stuttered. It dropped noticeably in quality and then restarted, displaying blue water dulled by low fidelity. Triumphantly, Sleazy and Curbs retook control of the aircraft and camera.

“Nice thinking,” said the comms tech. “You might be the only people with a connection back home.”

“We’ll see what we can do with it. Thanks for getting us going again,” said Sleazy. As he hung up the phone, Curbs was already looking for their target. The China Coast Guard ship, moving at an unhurried 10 knots, was easy to reacquire.

“Tally,” announced Curbs. “Same course, same speed.”

“Headed right toward those other contacts. Let’s see if we can find his friends.”

“You think maritime militia?” asked Curbs as she worked.

“Probably,” said Sleazy. “They love to cause trouble.”

The camera, zoomed out to move quickly, picked up some specks. The images enlarged, then sharpened as Curbs worked her controls.

“We should have put money on it,” she said. The ships were civilian, but they weren’t the fishing ships of the maritime militia. They were massive and had just begun a slow crawl toward the Senkakus. A brief check on the Coast Guard ships showed they had changed course to join as a small flotilla a mile or so off Uotsuri.

“RO/ROs,” said Sleazy, referring to roll-on/roll-off ships used to transport cars. “That’s new.”

“And they’re moving,” pointed out Curbs. “Right toward the islands.”

Sleazy considered briefly, then pointed the aircraft at the Senkakus. RO/ROs might be an easy way for patriotic Chinese citizens to transport some supplies to Uotsuri as a publicity stunt. Or they might be a great way to transport military equipment. Sleazy figured that in the worst-case scenario, it couldn’t hurt to be in a position to intercept.

“Let’s try to figure out what we’ve got,” he said. He pulled up yet another screen and scrolled to the location of the Chinese fleet, finding a cluster of returns from the hodgepodge of sensors on the aircraft. It looked largely like any other civilian group of ships with their associated emissions. Radios, navigation radar, AIS signals—the mess of identifiers required to operate safely in international waters. Most were represented as dots, but twoway communications were represented by faint lines. They branched out to navigation stations, other vessels, and . . . an area near the city of Fuzhou?

“Hey, Curbs,” said Sleazy, pointing at the lines. “You see this HF connection? Every ship has one to Fuzhou.”

Curbs sat up straight. “Isn’t the Eastern Army headquarters in Fuzhou?”

She was right—the PLA command responsible for the invasion of Taiwan and the Senkakus was communicating with this fleet. If Sleazy had any doubts about what was in the RO/ROs before, he didn’t now.

“It’s an occupation,” he said. “They’re going to land enough equipment to make it a fait accompli. Probably a whole A2AD kit.”

“What can we do about it?” asked Curbs. “Even if we could confirm it, and even if someone wanted us to shoot, we can’t talk to anyone with this jamming. Look, the damn phone even cut out.”

She pointed at the phone next to her, which now featured a prominent spinning wheel.

“We’re not going to start World War III anyway,” said Sleazy. “We need a nonkinetic option.”

“Get some 35s in here for a show of force,” suggested Curbs. “That would scare them right off.” “Probably, but it’ll take too long,” said Sleazy. “They’re not going to pack up after they land, it would look too bad. We have to get them to turn around.”

“So, we need to spook them with all of one MQ-9,” said Curbs. “Hey, we could try a show of force.”

Sleazy laughed. The Reaper was many things, but it wasn’t intimidating. A low pass over the ships wasn’t going to scare off the China Coast Guard. If the MQ-9 was going to scare the Chinese, it wasn’t going to be with its speed.

“I think I have an idea,” he said, “but it’s going to mean a major security violation.”

“Good thing the security team is on leave.”

“Alright, grow a track,” said Sleazy, “and grab my cell phone from the front. We’re going to become some opensource intel.”

In a surprisingly short time, everything was set up. Sleazy’s cell phone was propped up haphazardly on a stand, livestreaming to Twitch. The viewership was surprisingly high—a counter in the corner read 482—and surprisingly localized to Japan. Marine liaisons, informed by a cell phone call, had reached out to the Japan Coast Guard, which had in turn distributed the stream to local fishing boats. An overlay even included a helpful map showing the location of the video feed. 

Smaller and nimbler than the Chinese RO/ROs, Japanese fishing ships started moving toward the Senkakus. Even the poorest fishers carried a small Starlink terminal, and word spread at the speed of low-earth orbit internet. After the Chinese rammed their Coast Guard ship, Japanese citizens were determined to prevent another embarrassing maritime incident. It was hard to feel anything other than admiration as a cluster of small boats gathered around the islands. And the group of boats kept growing.

Sleazy also felt increasing concern for the fishers. The China Coast Guard ships were paramilitary vessels. They were larger than any of the fishing ships, and they were armed. If they wanted to clear a path through the impromptu fishing blockade, they could do it. But if they did, it would be a bloody, aggressive act. Maybe too aggressive—maybe so aggressive that it would set the Chinese back more in international opinion than the gains from occupying the Senkakus.

“They have to know that we’re here,” said Sleazy.

“Show of force?” asked Curbs hopefully.

“Sort of,” said Sleazy. One of the few radio channels not filled by the static of jammers was 156.8 MHz, a channel reserved for vessels in distress. Feeling a strange sense of relief when the static stopped and he heard radio silence for the first time in hours, Sleazy switched to the distress frequency and keyed the mic.

“Unknown Chinese vessels at position 25 48 north, 123 20 east, this is the United States military,” he said, keeping his voice level through the adrenaline of unauthorized international diplomacy. “You are unlawfully transiting a designated protected area within the sovereign Japanese waters. Reverse course, acknowledge this transmission, and exit Japanese waters immediately.”

“I don’t think that’s the script from the SPINS,” said Curbs wryly, referencing the theater Special Instructions that spelled out authorized radio transmissions in exacting detail. The instructions were so precise that there was a persistent rumor of pilots who had lost their theater qualification for getting a single word wrong. And Sleazy had just gone completely off-script.

“Not quite,” agreed Sleazy, letting out a breath. “Don’t worry, I’m pretty sure you won’t have to do the requalification training with me.”

Any further contemplation was cut off by a return radio call, delivered in English so pristine and mellifluous that it might have been from a professional actor.

“American aircraft,” said the voice. “This is the Chinese Coast Guard patrol cutter Haijing 1126. You and the paramilitary fleet of boats off the Diaoyu Islands are in Chinese territory and are in an area of live-fire operations.

Please exit the area to the east, or there may be unintentional damage to your vessels or aircraft.”

Time to call their bluff, thought Sleazy, hoping desperately that it was true.

“Haijing 1126,” he responded, ensuring that he kept using his cool radio voice, “this is an MQ-9 aircraft with a full-motion, high-definition, video feed of your actions. Any attempted ‘accident’ will be broadcast live to the world and recorded for history. If you do not believe me, I invite you to tune in to the broadcast yourself.”

He slowly read out the website for the live stream, to no immediate response from the Chinese. But a couple minutes later, the viewer count began climbing rapidly. Most of the new viewers were smart enough to route through a VPN, but apparently some of his new Chinese audience was in too much of a rush to bother. Satisfied that his message had gotten across, he returned to the radio.

“Haijing 1126, this is the United States military. I assume you have now seen our live feed. Any hostile act against this aircraft or Japanese ships in the area will be a public act of violence and aggression.”

He bit back the instinct to add “and get the hell out.” The Chinese ships needed a way to leave without losing face, and they couldn’t do that if it looked like they were following American imperialist direction. He bounced his leg nervously as he waited for a response, shaking the cockpit until Curbs looked over, annoyed. He stopped and focused on flying a precise figure eight in the sky over the Senkakus while they waited.

“American aircraft,” said the Chinese voice, abruptly. “Your presence is illegal, as is the presence of unauthorized fishing ships. We have noted the hull numbers of all ships involved and will be issuing citations for unauthorized fishing operations. We will also file a complaint and issue a fine for the unsafe operation of an aircraft inside an Air Defense Identification Zone. Haijing 1126 out.”

“They’re changing course,” said Curbs, amazed. “I can’t believe that worked.”

Sure enough, Sleazy could see the small fleet breaking up. The RO/ROs turned ponderously back onto a course toward the mainland, as the Coast Guard ships split off to pick up a standard patrol route. Over the next few minutes, the video quality snapped back to high-definition normality as the jamming between cockpit and aircraft disappeared. At the same time, the persistent static on the tactical frequencies cleared, and aircraft began checking back in. The East China Sea was returning to its normal uneasiness.

“Well,” said Sleazy. “I’m not paying that fine.”

Captain James Schmitt is an MQ-9 pilot with more than 2,500 combat and combat-support hours. He currently serves on the Air Staff and is a graduate student in strategic studies at Norwich University. He is a graduate of American University’s School of International Service and the U.S. Air Force Weapons School.

Featured Image: “MQ-9 Reaper” by Neakster via Artstation.