One of the U.S. Marine Corps’ greatest strengths has been a weakness of late. Its storied history and rich service culture make it an organization notoriously resistant to critical self-examination and change. If “man cannot remake himself without suffering, for he is both the marble and the sculptor,” then the Marine Corps is particularly fond of its own marble and sensitive to the chisel.1 Such a fondness explains thespateof articles from retired Marine Corps leaders criticizing the “hasty” execution of 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) and lamenting they sacrifice critical aspects of the Marine Corps combined arms heritage.
Taken sincerely, it represents well-intentioned men and women expressing concern for a service they care about. However, they should not be heeded if the Marine Corps is to realize its status as a modern and relevant force provider. Change is at the heart of maneuver warfare philosophy. This framework should guide the Marine Corps’ plans strategically as it does tactically, given the trajectory of global affairs. Applied, this process will see the Marine Corps carve its own marble to provide relevant and novel capabilities to combatant commanders, while shedding legacy capabilities that are ill-suited for the realities of the modern battlefield.
Well Meaning, But Wrong
It is useful to understand the critiques leveled at the Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Some of the critiques can be specifically refuted, such as General Zinni’s (USMC (ret.)), assertion that the proposed changes “do not meet … requirements and do not meet the needs of the combatant commander.”2 Meanwhile, General Todd Wolters, current Commander of U.S. European Command, told the House Armed Services Committee that the changes “dramatically enhance(s) our options … a brown-water force that can shoot, move and communicate and is very expeditionary is priceless for 21st century security.”3 Lieutenant General Van Riper’s chief complaint concerns the speed of change and overall lack of due diligence. This commentary fails to account for years of wargaming and study dating back to Commandant Neller’s tenure and for several years’ worth of oversight from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and Congress.4
Notably, nearly all of the capabilities slated for divestment (with the exception of tanks—shed for the incompatibility of tank units with expeditionary operations) have only been reduced in capacity to make way for novel and relevant capabilities. Despite changes to the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the domestic-based Marine Corp expeditionary forces remain largely unchanged, outside of reduced capacity in cannon artillery (to be replaced by precision long-range fires, such as rockets and missiles) and aircraft.
Change is the Answer
It must be accepted as fact that change is required. ThelastfourCommandants all agree, dating back to 2011, that the Marine Corps must evolve beyond the force that deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Inherent Resolve. Even those who oppose the CPG’s restructuring concede the point: Lt Gen. Van Riper (ret.) told Politico, “We recognize that the Marine Corps has to make changes,… what we want to see is these changes based on thorough study and analysis…”5 No serious commenter claims that the Marine Corps should not grow to take advantage of new capabilities and learn to operate in a more complex operating environment impacted by ubiquitous and emerging technologies. The disagreement, then, exists over the speed and extent of said changes.
Incremental change fails to achieve the objective of the change. The purpose of the Marine Corps’ evolution is to frustrate the adversary’s plans to mitigate Marine capabilities. Strategic competitors have observed the Department of Defense’s actions over the last two decades of operations and structured themselves accordingly.6 What they have not planned to directly counter and destroy, they have done their best to copy. A current Marine infantry battalion, equipped and enabled with legacy systems, represents a dangerous and noteworthy quantity, but a known one.
For example, the classical model of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU)—consisting of three ships, with a composite squadron on the big deck, and a Battalion Landing Team organized as company raid forces — have routinely deployed for decades, establishing patterns of employment and capability. These are not incapable systems and their roles as flexible deterrents below the threshold of conflict are useful, but they have existed long enough in their current forms that adversaries have developed counters to reduce their deterrent value.
Taken further, Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) proliferation limits the MEU’s Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) littoral access (and relevance) in conflict.7 However, adding piecemeal capabilities, such as unmanned systems to an infantry battalion or Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) to a MEU does not move the needle. An organization committed to maneuver warfare should recognize these adaptations by competitors and modify itself to maintain an advantage.
The Marine Corps’ Greatest Strength
Fortunately, the Marine Corps’ greatest asset has always been its people, particularly those that lead Marines in chaotic and unknowable environments. From the outset, Marine leaders are trained to act in the “intrinsically unpredictable” nature of war, because that is what enables success in combat.8 Do not take the Marine Corps’ word for it, either. In 2015, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Central Military Commission, chaired by President Xi Jinping released a document that came to be known as the “Five Incapables.” The document detailed shortcomings of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force, particularly the inability of enlisted and junior officers to judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, and deal with unexpected situations. This document has been referenced hundreds of times in the PLA Daily—the official newspaper of the PLA— between 2015 and 2019.9
The contrast is clear: where strategic competitors struggle to cope with ambiguous situations the Marine Corps thrives in them. The reasons for this trait in autocratic systems are manifold, from a reliance on higher-ranking decision makers to political oversight of commanding officers.10,11 The best way for the Marine Corps to be a relevant, capable resource to Combatant Commanders is to be a force that can create those ambiguous, chaotic situations and then use its advantage in them to win. That principle holds true regardless of the adversary from the Indo-Pacific to the polar regions and points in between.
A smaller, less expensive, but uncertain and survivable entity can be more disruptive to the enemy’s understanding of the situation than any current systems, making it a more effective use of resources. Developing new capabilities to modernize the Marine Corps’ ability to defeat an enemy’s plan is precisely what maneuver warfare doctrine calls for to “circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage.”12 With ubiquitous advances in long range fire — not just in the Indo-Pacific — highly nimble, survivable, and independent forces capable of operating inside a given weapons engagement zone will critical to a future fight.
Finally, what all critiques have failed to appreciate is that the most important change is not equipment or manpower, it is the creation and invigoration of a culture that seeks novel solutions to novel problems. By publishing the CPG, making important divestments, and following through, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has empowered an entire generation of Marines to think boldly about what comes next. The opportunity cost of maintaining antiquated structures and systems is not just fiscal, but one of growth. Necessity, embodied by a new environment, drives innovation and creates novel problems for competitors. The CPG has explicitly called out the new environment and situation; it is now the institution’s responsibility to adapt.
The Commandant’s Planning Guidance appropriately and meaningfully empowers institutional change in recognition of a shifting environment and the capabilities of strategic competitors. The inherent challenges of the modern battlefield cannot be met by legacy structures and systems. The process—akin to maneuver warfare at the strategic level—will not be painless, as the Marine Corps carves from its own marble to provide relevant and novel capabilities to combatant commanders in any clime or place.
Captain Jesse Schmitt is the S-2a for the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit in Okinawa, Japan. He has a Master’s degree in International Relations and has written for CIMSEC, War on the Rocks, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and the Marine Corps Gazette.
Featured Image: Marines with 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, arrive at one of their launch positions with the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System at the Air Combat Element landing strip as a part of Integrated Training Exercise 3-18 aboard the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif., May 21, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal William Chockey)
The United States Marine Corps is in the process of transforming in ways that will have a profound impact on how the service helps ensure the security and prosperity of America in this decade and beyond. Documents such as the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, and others have staked out a plan for a dramatic change in force structure as well as a substantial transformation of operating concepts. The objective of these changes is to enable the Marine Corps to prevail against adversaries in an era of great power competition.
Looking to ongoing conflicts, while it will take months – or even years – to tease out all of the lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, one that will likely be examined in war colleges, think tanks, and other venues is the vital importance of logistics.
It should come as no surprise that logistics has emerged as a crucial factor in the wars of the third decade of the 21st Century. The importance of this discipline goes back as far as recorded warfare. Over 2,300 years ago, Alexander the Great put it this way: “My logisticians are a humorless lot…they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.” In the maritime domain, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan said: “Logistics are as vital to military success as daily food is to daily work.” During Operation Desert Storm, the 7th Corps Commander, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Fredrick Franks noted: “Forget logistics, you lose.”
That said, of all the military stakeholders that depend on logistical sustainment, the U.S. Marine Corps is one that will likely be mining these lessons learned in depth.
Marines in the fight use enormous quantities of fuel, food, ammunition, and other material in operations. Taking and holding islands in forward areas poses especially challenging logistical complexities. The mission will ultimately fail if the Marines are not able to have reliable and continuous sustainment in order to press the fight.
Marine Corps professionals have highlighted the importance of providing rapid and reliable sustainment as a critical factor in supporting Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), with one officer quoting the Commandant General David Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance noting:
“The Navy and Marine Corps will need improved logistics capabilities: We must reimagine our amphibious ship capabilities, prepositioning, and expeditionary logistics so they are more survivable, at less risk of catastrophic loss, and agile in their employment.”1
Traditional methods of resupplying Marines will not work, especially against a peer adversary like China which has substantial anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems that pose a serious risk for existing Navy and Marine Corps logistics platforms. Other writing has pointed out that EABO is vitally dependent on reliable logistics resupply, noting:
“The inherent risk in EABO is that traditional maritime logistics will be unable to support and sustain these groups in the contested environment. U.S. forces may not have access to stocks and supplies prepositioned in other nations. Unfortunately, EABO concepts only exacerbate this long-standing problem. Marine and Navy leaders and outside agencies have been calling attention to it for years.”2
Advanced base operations could involve Marines being cut off from sustainment, whether as forces that have been blockaded or forces that have been bypassed by opposing naval forces. Marines will require robust pre-positioned stocks to have enough self-sufficiency to continue the fight in the absence of sustainment, and sustainment assets must be more distributed and risk-worthy than legacy platforms. Unmanned systems can fill this gap.
The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Team Leverages New Technologies
Given the extensive A2/AD capabilities potential peer adversaries possess, vessels providing logistics sustainment will likely be subjected to withering enemy fire as they try to deliver vital supplies to Marines in advanced bases and operating within the adversary’s weapons engagement zone. Using manned naval craft for this sustainment mission puts operators at unnecessary risk of enemy fire, as well from near-shore obstacles. Using scarce manned craft to perform this mission also takes them away from more necessary roles. That is why this major Navy-Marine Corps amphibious exercise evaluated the ability of unmanned surface vehicles to conduct the sustainment mission.
Because of their long hiatus away from amphibious operations, the U.S. Marine Corps has recently been especially proactive in organizing a large number of amphibious exercises, experiments, and demonstrations to investigate emerging technologies (often commercial-off-the-shelf technologies–COTS) to enable expeditionary strike formations to prevail in the face of a determined adversary possessing robust A2/AD capabilities.
One U.S Navy-Marine Corps exercise, Joint Exercise Valiant Shield, focused specifically on the logistics function. Valiant Shield demonstrated the ability of commercial off-the-shelf technology – in this case, unmanned surface vehicles – to perform one of the more important functions needed by amphibious formations – that of logistics.
This is a solution teed up by the two U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings articles cited earlier. Indeed, as First Lieutenant Flynn suggested:
“Similar to the flexibility and the variety of logistics platforms that ground commanders have at their disposal, UUVs and USVs can increase flexibility for naval commanders. Such versatile platforms could be adapted to resupply warships at sea and Marine Corps forces on land.”3
Valiant Shield, overseen by Commander Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), looked to use emerging commercial off-the-shelf technology to support Marines on the beachhead during this critical juncture of an amphibious assault. To this end, a significant part of this exercise focused on logistics.
MARFORPAC used USVs during exercise Valiant Shield to resupply the landing force. The exercise coordinator used a catamaran hull, 12-foot MANTAS USV to provide rapid ship-to-shore logistics sustainment. While this small, autonomously operated USV carried only 120 pounds of cargo, the proof-of-concept worked and demonstrated that unmanned surface vehicles could effectively resupply troops ashore. That said, resupply in 120-pound increments is far less than is required to provide what is needed by Marines in expeditionary advanced bases. The Valiant Shield exercise provided the impetus and inspiration to continue to explore the use of USVs for force sustainment. Now the Navy and Marine Corps are looking to scale-up small USVs and continue to experiment with using larger USVs to provide larger sustainment quantities.
While there are a range of larger USVs that can be evaluated by the Navy and Marine Corps, the basic specifications of the 38-foot Devil Ray “Expeditionary Class” (T38) will provide an indication of the ability of USVs to provide a steady, continuous stream of logistics support to Marines on the beach. The T38 can carry a payload of 4,500 pounds. The vessel travels at cruise speed of 25 knots and draws just 18 inches of draft. Additionally – and importantly for Marines in conflict – the T38 has a burst speed of 80 knots.
More robust logistics resupply can be provided by larger USVs of the same family of expeditionary unmanned surface vehicles as the MANTAS and Devil Ray. The T50 Devil Ray can carry a payload of 10,000 pounds. Like its sister T38, the T50 Devil Ray has a cruise speed of 25 knots and a burst speed of 80 knots. Given the speed and carrying capacity of the T38 and T50, it is readily apparent that they can support the rapid buildup of combat power in a contested space.
This logistics concept would also complicate an adversary’s attempts to interdict resupply operations. Rather than hunting down and killing single large, slow, vulnerable surface ships, a mothership could deploy multiple unmanned surface vehicles to complicate targeting efforts through a distributed operating concept. This would force the adversary to hunt and destroy each individual USV rather than simply tracking and destroying a surface ship moving between advanced bases or warships and resupplying them one at a time.4
A New Paradigm for Marine Corps Logistics Sustainment
While there are any number of scenarios that can be offered to demonstrate how unmanned surface vehicles can support Marines ashore, it is worth mentioning that while unmanned surface vehicles offer substantial promise to aid future expeditionary operations, USVs should not completely replace traditional means of supplying Navy and Marine Corps forces. Rather, they will supplement them by providing numerous, risk-worthy platforms to move supplies within the threat range of an adversary’s weapon systems, as will be required in EABO. These platforms could fulfill the requirements General Berger outlined in his Planning Guidance: they are more survivable, at less risk of catastrophic loss, and agile in their employment.5 These unmanned surface vehicles have the potential to be game changers for logistics in a contested environment.
Using a notional stand-off distance for an expeditionary strike group of 20 nautical miles, a formation equipped with four T38s traveling at their cruise speed of 25 knots could deliver 18,000 pounds of material from amphibious ships to the beach per hour, allowing the short time needed for loading and unloading the craft. Multiply that by 24 hours and it yields a buildup of well over 400,000 pounds of vital material per day, enough to support a substantial force of troops ashore. Using four T50s in a similar manner, the amount of vital material delivered approaches one million pounds a day.
Until recently, getting these medium-sized unmanned surface vehicles to the area of operations where they could provide logistics support to Marines on the beach was problematic. The amphibious warships comprising expeditionary strike groups are loaded with vehicles and supplies needed by their embarked Marines. What is needed is a mothership for USVs. These will soon enter the fleet. The Navy recently announced its intention to spend $2.7B researching and buying ten large unmanned surface ships over the next five years.6 The Navy envisions these LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons. These LUSVs could carry numbers of T38s and T50s combat loaded with needed supplies.
Under this CONOPS, presented in detail in a March 2022 article in Naval Engineers Journal, one or more LUSVs would be attached to an expeditionary strike group and carry these T38s and/or T50s. Supervisory control is coordinated by the expeditionary strike group commander or his designees.7 Under this CONOPS, the expeditionary strike group can leverage the extended cruising range of the T38 and T50 to stay well clear of adversary A2/AD capabilities, as the T38 has a cruise range of 1,000-1,500 nautical miles, and the T50 has a cruise range of 1,500-2,000 nautical miles.
Into the Future with Enhanced Logistics Sustainment and Enhanced Sensor Support
The Navy and Marine Corps are planning an ambitious schedule of exercises, experiments, and demonstrations in the years ahead, focused on the Commandant’s “Campaign of Learning.”8 It is time to once again demonstrate how unmanned surface vehicles can provide robust logistics sustainment to Marines. Based on the promising performance of small unmanned surface vessels in exercises designed to demonstrate how USVs can support expeditionary assault forces, the Navy and Marine Corps would be well-served to experiment further with larger USVs to perform this vital logistics sustainment mission.
While the available evidence suggests that the Marine Corps should leverage USVs for logistics support as a first priority effort, Marines will likely look for other ways to leverage these unmanned vehicles, such as to provide the organic sensor support Marine Littoral Regiments will need in the future fight.
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Director, Major General Benjamin Watson, put the need for organic sensors this way:
“A major investment for the service will include more sensors controlled by Marines instead of relying solely on joint tools for targeting awareness for the Marine Littoral Regiments. You’ve got to be able to sense the target before you can engage and a complete reliance on non-organic capabilities, like somebody else to do that sensing for us and find the target, confirm it, etcetera as part of the kill-chain is a position we prefer not to be in. We’d prefer not to have that as our only option.”9
Fortunately, this is an area where the Marine Corps is already experimenting with ways to use unmanned surface vehicles equipped with various sensors to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). During the Ship-to-Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation (S2ME2) Advanced Naval Technology Exercise (ANTX) the amphibious assault force employed an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) proactively to thwart enemy defenses. The MANTAS USV swam undetected into the “enemy” harbor (the Del Mar Boat Basin on the Southern California coast), and relayed information to the amphibious force command center. Subsequent to this ISR mission, the MANTAS USV was driven to the surf zone to provide IPB on water conditions, beach gradient, obstacle location, and other information crucial to planners prior to a manned assault.
In many ways, S2ME2 ANTX was a warm-up for, and precursor to, Bold Alligator, the annual Navy-Marine Corps exercise designed to enhance interoperability in the littorals and across the maritime domain. Bold Alligator took the concepts explored during S2ME2 ANTX to the next level, employing two different size MANTAS USVs in the ISR and IPB roles to provide long-range littoral reconnaissance of “enemy” beaches and waterways. These systems were employed during the Long Range Littoral Reconnaissance (LRLR) phase of the exercise. The beauty of using unmanned surface vehicles for the logistics – as well as the ISR/IPB missions – is that the same USVs can be employed by reconfiguring them for these missions, as well as others such as mine-countermeasures.
Conclusion
Force Design 2030 calls for a U.S. Marine Corps that “Can execute the complex missions defined by our emerging concepts in any potential theater.”10 Complex missions demand innovative solutions and leveraging the good work that has gone into evaluating unmanned surface vehicles to support a number of expeditionary missions is one of the surest ways to ensure the U.S. Marine Corps prevails in a future high-end fight.
Captain George Galdorisi (U.S. Navy, retired) is the Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Futures for the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific. Prior to joining NIWC Pacific, he completed a 30-year career as a naval aviator, culminating in 14 years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff. During his final tour of duty he led the U.S. delegation for military-to-military talks with the Chinese Navy. In his spare time he enjoys writing, especially speculative fiction about the future of warfare. He is the author of fifteen books, including four consecutive New York Times bestsellers. He is co-editor of the U.S. Naval Institute book, AI At War: How Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Are Changing Naval Warfare. His most recent novel, Fire and Ice, is eerily prescient of today’s events, as it foresaw Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
References
[1] Karl Flynn, “Unmanned Vessels for EABO,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2021.
[2] Walker Mills and Erik Limpaecher, “Sustainment Will Be Contested,” U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings, November 2020.
[3] “Unmanned Vessels for EABO.”
[4] Megan Eckstein, “Navy, Marines Moving Ahead with Unmanned Vessel Programs,” USNI News, October 31, 2019.
[5] General David Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, July 2019).
[6] Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress – CRS Report 45757 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2022).
[7] George Galdorisi and Jack Rowley, “Engineering Unmanned Surface Vehicles Into an Integrated Unmanned Solution,” Naval Engineers Journal, March 2022.
[8] James Hammond, “U.S. Marine Corps in Review,” U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings, March 2022.
[9] Sam LaGrone, Mallory Shelbourne and Heather Mongilio, “Fewer Marines, More Sensors Part of Berger’s Latest Force Design Revision,” USNI News, May 9, 2022.
[10] Force Design 2030 (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps, May 2022).
Featured Image: SAN DIEGO (April 17, 2021) Chris Valdez conducts pre-underway systems checks aboard the MANTAS T38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vehicle during an operations demonstration April 17. (U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mike Jones)
The ongoing transformation of the U.S. Marine Corps has raised some controversy and prompted wide-ranging discussions on the future of the Corps. Opponents of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, or EABO, are concerned that proven combat power like tanks and tube artillery, are being sacrificed to create a new force that is less flexible, and would provide a single tool fit for only one operational problem. EABO and the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) are supposed to be an answer to the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). EABO is best understood as a virtual network of scout snipers extending the eyes and fires of the fleet. Marines, operating as Stand-in Forces, will hide in the littoral spaces inside an enemy’s Weapons Engagement Zone or “WEZ,” where they can support a friendly fleet that has to remain outside the WEZ. These forces will also rely on use deception and signature management, displacing every 48 to 72 hours using high-speed, low signature craft and use decoys that an enemy will struggle to target. Critics have also argued that TMEABO abandons the Marines Corps’ fundamental doctrine as described in MCDP-1 Warfighting. But this ignores the warnings of General Alfred M. Gray, 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, in the preface to MCDP-1: “Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated.” EABO is firmly based in the tenants of maneuver warfare where speed, surprise, deception, and ambiguity are essential. Preliminary doctrine for this force has been laid out in the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, or TMEABO, a publication that pays homage to the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations—and a previous effort to remake the Marine Corps for amphibious warfare during the interwar years.
Despite the breadth of conversation surrounding EABO, operational law has been largely ignored in the discussions, by both critics and proponents of the new concept. As the U.S. Marine Corps develops and transforms its doctrine for EABO, it must consider what impacts international law will have on future operations. Key factors to consider include targeting, degraded logistics, deception plans, and territorial access.
Targeting
EABO will see the Marine Corps embrace a new form of targeting, particularly when integrated with the Navy. In the past, Marines were concerned with targeting military objectives on land, while limiting collateral and incidental damage to civilians and civilian objects. EABO will see Marines engaging naval platforms, like enemy submarines and warships, where the make-up of the vessel’s crew is irrelevant in the targeting process.
The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations provides a concise reference for the law concerning targeting such platforms. During conflict, enemy warships, naval auxiliaries, and military aircraft may be attacked or captured anywhere outside neutral territory without warning. Attacks on surface ships must cease when they have indicated an intention to surrender such as striking their colors, stopping, or surfacing if a submarine. A submerged submarine or disabled aircraft are subject to attack until destruction due to the uncertainty of surrender.
Enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft are subject to capture outside neutral territory. They may be attacked if they are engaged in belligerent acts or conduct war-sustaining/war-supporting activity. If they actively resist visit and search or capture, persistently refuse to heave to after being ordered to do so, convoy with enemy warships, or are armed with weapons greater than needed for self-defense from pirates or terrorists, they may be attacked. In such case, enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft are not innocently employed and they risk destruction.
Some enemy vessels may not be attacked or captured. Enemy hospital ships and medical aircraft may not be attacked, but they must be appropriately marked and registered. Other vessels are also immune based on their use. This status could include ships involved in prisoner exchange, or religious, scientific, or philanthropic use. Finally, small coastal vessels engaged in local fishing are immune from attack.
Contested Logistics
Marine Stand-In Forces will not be able to rely on a global supply chain and may be forced to subsist off the civilian infrastructure of a host nation or what may be seized from the enemy. As the Marine Corps develops new doctrine for EABO, it will need to consider how to requisition property in a host nation or in occupied enemy territory.
The initial question is where the property to be acquired is located, in host nation or enemy territory? In host nations, the Marine Corps will use local contractors and vendersthrough contracting officers and purchase agents. If local property is seized or damaged, a Foreign Claims Agent will step in to pay compensation.
In the past, invading armies have foraged for their supplies. This allowed for the seizure of food and livestock to support an invading army. During the American Civil War, for example, the Lieber Code made a distinction between private and public property. Public property could be seized and used by the invading army. Private property was protectedand could be seized only when military necessity required it. Even in such case, the property owner was entitled to fair compensation.
GC III also makes a distinction between requisition of private and public property. Article 18 of GC IIInotes that POWs have the right to retain personal property including clothing, feeding utensils, and protective equipment. This was felt necessary because during the Second World War, many POWs were stripped of personal property and their issued equipment. This was an incorrect interpretation of a belligerent’s right to seize an enemy’s public property.
GC IV (Civilians) placed certain obligations on an occupying power toward the civilian population. Article 55 discusses the obligation to provide food and medical supplies to civilians. Requisition may only be used to support the occupying force, not the war effort. If requisition does occur, compensation must be paid, and requisitions must consider the needs of the civilian population. The 1958 Commentary to Article 55 and Article 147label excessive requisitioning a grave breach of the convention subject to prosecution as a war crime.
The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfareprovides a summary of the U.S. policy on protecting public and private property. It prohibits pillaging and the destruction of property“unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” It notes that requisition may occur, but only in occupied areas and with the use of receipts and compensation.
Deception and Distinction to Protect Civilians
EABO relies on deception to ensure the survivability of Marines. The Stand-in Forces guidance suggests the use of civilian infrastructure to achieve this by using civilian vessels, vehicles, and civilian communication infrastructure. This deception plan must be balanced against the requirement to protect civilians and civilian objects. This principle is known as distinction where the law recognizes the protected status of civilians and civilian property from that of combatants and military objectives.
Any deception plan must be balanced with these requirements. Marines operating in and among the civilian population must ensure that they are distinct from noncombatants and do not place noncombatants at risk. Article 58(b) of AP I requires the parties to the conflict to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas. Moreover, the use of human shields is expressly prohibited by U.S. Policy and Article 51(7) of AP I.
The plan must also avoid perfidy. Marines may not employ a deception plan that leads the enemy to believe the Marines have a protected status. Perfidy is defined in Article 37 of AP I, the DOD Law of War Manual, and Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. Examples include the use of symbols of protected organizations, such as the International Red Cross; pretending to be a non-combatants, feigning surrender the use of flags of a neutral country. At sea, however, false flag operations are permitted until such time as naval combat is undertaken. For example, if Marines employ the Light Amphibious Warship, the law of naval warfare wouldallow the use of a false flag until hostilities commence.
Territorial Access
The Stand-in Forces guidance envisions the Marines defending the territory of an allied nation. EABO does not exclude seizing hostile territory, but it is more likely that the EABO A2/AD strategy will be used on a host nation’s territory in collective self-defense. The issue of access to this territory is key, and the stakes in international law are quite high. States exercise and enjoy sovereignty over their national territory and the territorial sea and the airspace above the land and the territorial sea.
Security ambiguity is at the heart of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is authorized to provide Taiwan with weapons sufficient for Taiwan’s self-defense. The Act makes no commitment to defend Taiwan only stating an expectation that the One China policy must be peacefully resolved. Nonetheless, the United States would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.
If the People’s Republic of China invaded or were preparing to invade Taiwan, both Japan and the United States may be drawn into the conflict. Japan exercises sovereignty and control of the Senkaku Islands adjacent to Taiwan. This claim is disputed by both the PRC and Taiwan. The United States acknowledges that its defense commitment extends to the Senkaku Islands under the administration of Japan. If an invasion crisis emerges in the region, the Marines may establish EABs on the Senkaku Islands to defend or deter aggression against the Ryukyu Islands or Japan proper. The inherent threat to U.S. forces in Japan would likely draw the Japanese Self Defense Forces into taking measures in concert with U.S. forces for collective self-defense.
South China Sea
The most likely country to allow the Marines ashore in the South China Sea is the Philippines. U.S.-Philippines relations have been turbulent dating back to the Philippine-American War when the United States invaded, and colonized the Philippines. Cold War pressures led to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines which provided for mutual support if there was an attack on the territory of either of the parties, island territories under their jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, or their armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific. The end of the Cold War and growing anti-American sentiment led the Philippine government to reject renewing a basing agreement and all U.S. forces were removed from the Philippines in the early 1990s. The subsequent Global War on Terror and continued bi-lateral training missions have seen U.S. forces return. U.S. service members are governed by the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which has been a football in Philippine national politics. It was renounced by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on February 11, 2020 only to be reinstated July 30, 2021. Nonetheless, under the VFA, U.S. personnel may only be temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine government.
The ability of Marine forces to access key maritime terrain in the Pacific will ultimately be determined by diplomacy and legal agreements. Every country will weigh its own diplomatic, economic, and defense requirements before granting access to US forces. As events unfold in the struggle of competition, to crisis, to conflict, new partners may emerge and old ones may fall away.
Conclusion
The future codification and operationalization of EABO will be constrained by international law. Marines will have to adapt their targeting to a new missions which target platforms and not individuals. Degraded and contested logistics will increase the demands on purchasing and contract agents. Deception plans will be forced to consider the obligation to protect civilians. EABO will be conducted in cooperation with host nation forces granting access in collective self-defense. Ultimately, EABO is a transformational warfighting concept that requires careful input by legal advisers and USMC judge advocates to ensure it unfolds consistent with international law and U.S. policy.
LtCol Brent Stricker, U.S. Marine Corps, serves as the Director for Expeditionary Operations and as a military professor of international law at the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College.
The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, the Naval War College, or the Department of Defense.
Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Stephen Mathews, a Liberty, Indiana native, and rifleman with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines conducts a combat patrol during Bougainville III at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Patrick King)
The past few months have seen renewed interest and controversy surrounding the 38th Commandant’s Force Design 2030 efforts to modernize the Marine Corps and meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy. Though initial feedback to Force Design 2030 was largely positive, an increasingly vocal subset of retired general officers and senior civilians have publicly sounded the alarm that the divestments and doctrinal changes espoused by General Berger, such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and stand-in forces, go too far and risk irreparably harming the Marine Corps.1 Nearly three years after the publication of the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the Marines find themselves at an uncomfortable crossroads: retired senior leaders decrying what they see as destructive changes, and active duty leaders defending the methodology undergirding the Marine Corps’ transformation.2
The purpose of this article is to shift the debate from litigating the merits of EABO, Force Design 2030, and its accompanying Stand-in Forces (SIFs) concept, to improving their efficacy by addressing known shortfalls. Modifying these concepts is a better approach than rejecting them wholesale for two reasons: first, they were implemented with the understanding that incremental updates would be necessary and two, many of the recent arguments against Force Design 2030 are weak and do not hold up under scrutiny. LtGen (ret) Van Riper’s critiques about the divestiture of tanks never explains how a future USMC could employ these logistically intensive armor systems to deter China in a future conflict.3 Gen (ret) Terry Dake writes an entire article bemoaning cuts to the Marine’s Air Combat Element (ACE), while not once mentioning the significant (and necessary) increases to the Corps’ unmanned aviation capabilities.4 It is impossible to ignore the criticisms of these retired senior leaders, but it is equally important to not let their concerns derail the necessary organizational changes implemented under General Berger. This article therefore rejects the notion that the USMC should stop or reverse Force Design 2030, and instead focuses on providing the critical feedback and ideas necessary to make it a success.5
A key challenge facing the current and future Marine Corps is gaining and maintaining access. After framing the central role that access challenges will play in implementing Force Design 2030 and its associated warfighting concepts, recommendations are then proposed for how the USMC can best employ its cadre of international affairs (IA) Marines to address this access challenge. The desired endstate is thus to improve these concepts to ensure that their implementation is successful in deterring and, if necessary, defeating America’s enemies. Force Design 2030 is the future of the Marine Corps – IA Marines are ready to make it a reality.
Framing the Problem – Access
The biggest potential flaw in the USMC’s Force Design 2030 is the access challenges U.S. military forces will face in the event of direct conventional conflict with Russia or China. For brevity, this article focuses on the most pressing scenario of conflict with China. Simply put, any USMC effort to deter and defeat China within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility requires Marines to have access to the air, land, and territorial seas of a foreign partner, but the Marine Corps currently lacks an international affairs operating concept to ensure that this access is granted.6
Focusing on access is critical because, by definition, EABO and its associated Stand-in Forces concept cannot exist without the support of partners and allies. Expeditionary advanced bases and forward terrain of interest within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone will mostly be on the territories of allies and partners. The May 2022 Force Design 2030 update notes that, “access and placement matter” for our warfighting concepts and capabilities. As envisioned in A Concept for Stand-in Forces, stand-in forces are the means and ways to “set conditions for the introduction of naval and joint forces.”7 Stand-in forces critically require an understanding of allies, partners, and their operating environments to succeed as a joint access enabler. It is much more preferable to gain access to allied and partner territories in peacetime through constructive engagement than to have to secure access through warfighting in the midst of conflict.
To operationalize the Stand-in Forces concept, the Marine Corps must look beyond just the systems and technologies which these forces may field. Political and diplomatic access is a critical enabler for these forces to be positioned on territory of interest. While the USMC is pushing hard to develop new technologies, these capabilities may be for naught if Marines do not have the basing and access required to not only get to the fight, but to be on the fight’s frontlines as stand-in forces in the critical first days and weeks of a crisis. There are convincing arguments as to why the USMC needs more unmanned aviation over traditional manned platforms, more long-range rocket artillery over traditional gun systems, but the lack of detail in how USMC forces will be able to achieve physical and diplomatic access prior to conflict is problematic.8
The origins of this gap are understandable: USMC planners had to move quickly and make some assumptions in the earliest days of Force Design 2030 in order to validate warfighting concepts and make informed decisions about changes to force structure. Nearly three years on, however, and in a world where China’s global naval ambitions are becoming increasingly assertive, the USMC cannot afford to assume or underinvest in building strong relations with partners and allies to ensure access.9
International Affairs Marines – Key Enablers to Support USMC Access
IA Marines come from various backgrounds and are comprised primarily of foreign area officers (FAOs), regional area officers (RAOs), and foreign area staff non-commissioned officers (FASs).10 The International Affairs Program of Headquarters Marine Corps describes FAOs as such: “FAOs develop professional language regional expertise and cultural (LREC) capabilities and insights to help MAGTF, Joint, and Coalition commanders understand the complex human environment where Marines deploy.” FAOs bring to the MAGTF their unique capabilities in regionally-focused graduate education, foreign language proficiency, and personal experience through regional travel and immersion. Similarly, RAOs “develop specialized regional expertise through graduate education or significant time abroad” and inform commanders on the operational environment. FASs “apply LREC to the Marine Corps Planning Process, Security Cooperation and combined exercise planning, and serve as LREC trainers for operational force units, members of Forward Command Elements, and inter-organizational liaisons.” Together, these IA Marines form a multi-functional cadre of foreign area experts who fulfill an array of billets in the interagency, joint, and Fleet Marine Force.
IA Marines are critical enablers for the Marine Corps capabilities envisioned in Force Design 2030 and concepts for EABO and SIFs. Across the levels of war and through the spectrum of competition to conflict, IA Marines develop an understanding of the operational environment, develop capabilities in allied and partnered forces, gain and maintain access to key terrain, and enable the introduction and employment of U.S. forces. International Affairs Marines are arguably the Marine Corps’ first stand-in force – and set conditions so that, in the run-up from competition to conflict, Marines can have the access, basing, and overflight to execute the Marine Corps’ warfighting concepts.
Strategically and globally, IA Marines gain and maintain access, influence, and develop capabilities for larger stand-in forces. IA Marines are the critical touchpoints with both the U.S. Department of State and foreign militaries, ensuring mutual understanding of USMC capabilities and advocating for access. IA Marines are therefore critically positioned to advocate for Force Design 2030 and stand-in forces to allied and partner governments. As members of embassy country teams, IA Marines are highly capable, low-signature enablers of U.S. access. In 34 countries around the world, including Taiwan, Ukraine, and Iraq, IA Marines serve as attachés, advising U.S. ambassadors and advancing U.S. national and foreign security policies, including the specified interests of the Navy and Marine Corps.11 Additionally, through security cooperation and security assistance, IA Marines facilitate the development of critical capabilities with allies and partners, such as the Harpoon Coastal Defense System. IA Marines in embassies around the world inform MAGTF commanders of the operational environment and set the conditions for the introduction of larger forces.
At the operational level, IA Marines translate strategic objectives into tangible ways and means through security cooperation, security assistance, and campaigning with allies and partners. IA Marines leverage their operational experience and focused understanding of the operational environment to align resources and inform commanders. While ultimate approval of formal bilateral agreements lies at higher level of State and OSD policymaking, FAOs and RAOs are the immediate connective tissue linking U.S. military forces with their counterparts abroad. Thus, anytime one reads an impactful bilateral security document—such as the historic defense cooperation roadmap signed between the U.S. and Morocco in 2020—FAOs at the country-team level were heavily involved in the process.12 Aligning USMC FAOs and RAOs toward the USINDOPACOM access problem set is therefore essential to ensure the political and military viability of stand-in forces.
Philippine Marines with Marine Battalion Landing Team 10 and U.S Marines with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division conduct a bilateral beach defense exercise during Balikatan 22, at Aparri Beach, Cagayan, Philippines, March 31, 2022. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Joshua Brittenham)
At the tactical level, IA Marines enable the introduction and inform the employment of USMC capabilities alongside allies and partners during competition, crisis, and conflict. Not only can the Marines help impart wisdom about amphibious operations, but our regional partners and allies can teach us skills and share technologies too. Indeed, Colonel Yusuke Kawachi, a Japanese military attaché to the United States, noted that Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces have been using land-based anti-ship missiles analogous to the USMC’s nascent ROGUE fires system since the Cold War.13 Similarly, not only are the U.S. Navy and USMC pursuing LAW development, but the Australian Army is also investing hundreds of millions of dollars in improving their own littoral vessel capabilities.14 Recognizing and taking advantage of this aspect of the operating environment offers great opportunities, especially “when each ally and partner makes the best use of their respective comparative advantages.”15
International Affairs Marines – Challenges and Way Ahead
The requirement for highly trained, multi-functional international affairs experts has never been greater. Additionally, forces with light footprints increase their chance of survival in contested spaces. As A Concept for Stand-in Forces emphasizes, “reducing the number of Marines needed to operate effectively means each Marine must have the ability to perform an expanded set of tasks when compared to current practice.” IA Marines are the low-signature, persistently postured intermediaries with our allies and partners that enable USMC warfighting concepts.
Force Design 2030-related budgetary decisions are jeopardizing the high-demand, low density International Affairs Program, however. Although the deactivation of the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group created the potential to reinvest existing structure in the Fleet Marine Force, those billets were instead recapitalized for other purposes. The recently created information maneuver military occupation specialty (MOS) is a positive example of Force Design 2030-related structure reinvestments, but these new influence-related specialties lack the education and experience working alongside our allies and partners to be effective in their operating environment.
Additionally, the remaining structure for International Affairs Marines is not optimized to achieve the objectives of Force Design 2030, the Stand in Forces concept, or EABO. IA Marines are not deliberately organized into the Fleet Marine Force, and successive duty assignments often squander the accumulated knowledge and capabilities of IA Marines. Indeed, of the 14 Marines who were selected to be FAOs in the 2016 Commandant’s Career Level Education Board (CCLEB), and thus forecasted for a summer utilization tour slating, only four were able to be utilized.16 The requirement for Marine Corps FAOs to conduct a tour in their primary MOS immediately after completion of their training pipeline (to remain competitive for promotion in their original community) is the proximate cause for this talent management disconnect.
Generating an international affairs operating concept would be one way that the USMC could prioritize and execute the necessary changes to align IA Marines to the access challenges inherent within Force Design 2030. A critical first step toward realizing this operating concept would be to stop the misallocation of study-track FAOs, as seen with the ongoing challenges to slate utilization tours for CCLEB Marines. The Marine Corps can and should move quickly to generate a primary MOS for IA Marines, just as the organization addressed comparable talent management issues in the past by creating the 8059/61 acquisitions community and the recent 1700 information maneuver community. This is not a new idea, and a low-density, lateral-transfer community for IA Marines would allow the organization to grow and operationalize its resident IA experts, especially as concerns USINDOPACOM.17 Moreover, optimizing the organization, promotion, and retention of IA Marines would fall squarely within the guidance of the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act, and the best practices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which all have PMOSs for FAOs.18
With these immediate manpower challenges addressed, an international affairs operating concept would enable Fleet Marine forces by aligning IA Marines to impactful assignments where they can advocate for the Marine Corps, from access issues to building and sustaining relationships with partners and allies. Under this new concept, IA Marines could also potentially retain their original MOS as a secondary MOS to employ their expertise in designated Fleet Marine Force billets that require a fusion of these two skills. For example, a Mandarin-speaking FAO with a secondary specialty of intelligence would be qualified to serve as the III Marine Expeditionary Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The underlying theme of a proposed international affairs concept is that IA Marines must be deliberately leveraged for their critical capabilities.
Conclusion
The service must recognize that new concepts and capabilities critically require the political, diplomatic, cultural, and historic understanding of the operating environment that IA Marines uniquely contribute. It is one thing to have a bilateral exercise, such as a KMEP with our Korean allies on the peninsula, but when that exercise is paired with a Korean-speaking FAO or LNO who can help bridge the gap between tactical-level staffs and speak to emerging USMC doctrine in Korean, the value added is immense. We would not expect another service or agency to advocate to Capitol Hill on our behalf; so too must we not outsource Marine Corps access and influence on key forward terrain. The capabilities delivered by IA Marines are critical to our continued effectiveness as a fighting force.
Ultimately, investing in the USMC IA community is about investing in the success of EABO and the larger FD 2030 effort to focus on strategic competition against peer competitors, like China. It means acknowledging that campaigns will not occur on amorphous blobs devoid of people; they will occur on key terrain with diverse populations and differing predilections. Fortunately, we know where this key terrain is and, in most cases, the populations and governments are friends. In a combined campaign, our allies and partners will be the primary stand-in force. In this dynamic, IA Marines are key enablers for combined stand-in forces.
History tells us that navigating concerns of national pride and sovereignty are complex, and that even a perceived common enemy is no guarantee of harmony amongst allies. During the WWII Pacific campaign, for example, the U.S. Navy’s official history wryly noted that both French and British civilians hoped U.S. forces would serve as a check against the other.19 Given the recent diplomatic row between the U.S., UK, Australia, and France over an Anglophone military and technology pact dubbed AUKUS, military planners must always be cognizant of the potential for friction with allies and work continuously to ensure smooth communication.20 As Winston Churchill stated, “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them!”21 IA Marines can help the USMC navigate the sensitivities of allies that have critical operational implications.
The current tech-centric debates about the merits of Force Design 2030 miss the mark because they do not address the most important subject: people. Deterring and defeating China is not simply a matter of developing new technology, it is about the United States maintaining access and strong relationships with partners and allies. Alliances and partnerships are America’s greatest strategic asset, and a robust cadre of IA Marines is therefore essential to the successful implementation of Force Design 2030 and the continued relevance of the Marine Corps.22
Zach Ota is a Marine infantry officer and Southeast Asia regional area officer. He deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Unit Deployment Program. He currently serves in the International Affairs Branch, Plans Division, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. He can be found on Twitter at @zach_ota.
Eric Hovey is a Marine foreign area officer and member of the Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) Board of Governors. He is currently based in Washington, DC and can be found on Twitter at @Eric_Hovey.
The views expressed in this article are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Marine Corps or other U.S. government institutions.
References
[1] Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson, “How Two Dozen Retired Generals Are Trying to Stop an Overhaul of the Marines,” Politico, 1 April 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/01/corps-detat-how-two-dozen-retired-generals-are-trying-to-stop-an-overhaul-of-the-marines-00022446.
[2] “A Critical Discussion on Force Design 2030 with LtGen Paul Van Riper and Gen Anthony Zinni,” The Warfighting Society, April 14, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fL-yFiveCag
[3] P. K. Van Riper, “The Marine Corps’ Plan to Redesign the Force Will Only End Up Breaking It,” Task and Purpose, 20 April, 2022, https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/marine-corps-force-design-infantry/.
[4] Terry Dake, “The Marine Corps’ Reorganization Plan Will Cripple Its Aviation Capabilities,” Task and Purpose, 22 April 2022, https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/force-design-2030-cripple-marine-aviation/.
[5] Dake, “The Marine Corps’ Reorganization Plan Will Cripple Its Aviation Capabilities,” pg. 23.
[6] George J. David, “Making it Work,” vol. 104, no. 10, Marine Corps Gazette (October 2020): 46.
[7] “A Concept for Stand-in Forces,” Headquarters Marine Corps, December 2021, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Users/183/35/4535/211201_A%20Concept%20for%20Stand-In%20Forces.pdf?ver=MFOzu2hs_IWHZlsOAkfZsQ%3D%3D.
[8] The Warfighting Society, “A Critical Discussion on Force Design 2030 with LtGen Paul Van Riper and Gen Anthony Zinni.”
[9] Damien Cave, “Why a Chinese Security Deal in the Pacific Could Ripple Through the World,” The New York Times, April 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/world/australia/china-solomon-islands-security-pact.html; David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/.
[10] This definition of IA Marines implicitly includes other programs such as Marine Attachés and international Personnel Exchange Program (PEP), since these Marines can subsequently apply for FAO/RAO accreditation after their tours, if they were not already accredited to begin with.
[11] “Marine Corps Support to the Defense Attaché Service (DAS),” Headquarters Marine Corps, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Intel-OPS-PERS/Defense-Attache-Program/.
[12]Jim Garamone, “U.S., Morocco Chart Defense Cooperation Through 2030,” Department of Defense, October 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2369742/us-morocco-chart-defense-cooperation-through-2030/.
[13] Yusuke Kawachi, “Opportunities and Challenges,” vol. 106, no. 5, Marine Corps Gazette (May 2022): 39.
[14] “Austal Australia to Bid for New Littoral Manoeuvre Capability for the Australian Army,” Austal Limited, May 31, 2022, https://www.austal.com/news/austal-australia-bid-new-littoral-manoeuvre-capability-australian-army.
[15] Headquarters Marine Corps, “A Concept for Stand-in Forces.”
[16] “International Affairs Program Newsletter,” Headquarters Marine Corps, Second Quarter 2022, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Users/039/23/3623/2022-Q2_IAP_Newsletter_4-25-2022_FINAL.pdf?ver=hu5priT0udURXM66BpUM3Q%3d%3d.
[17] William B. Easter, “FAOs and RAOs: We Need to Better Manage These Skills More Effectively,” vol. 104, no. 1 Marine Corps Gazette (January 2020): 77-78.
[18] U. S. House of Representatives, “Rules Committee Print 117-21 Text of House Amendment to S. 1605,” December 7, 2021, https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117S1605-RCP117-21.pdf#page=1186.
[19] James D. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal, (United States: Bantam; 2012), page 38.
[20] Heather A. Conley and Michael J. Green, “Don’t Underestimate the AUKUS Rift With France,” Foreign Policy, September 22, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/22/aukus-france-biden-europe-allies/.
[21] Kenneth Harris, “Wartime Lies,” The New York Times, last modified April 27, 1997, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/04/27/reviews/970427.27harrist.html?scp=80&sq=cross%2520word&st=cse.
[22] Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 10, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
Featured Image: Marines with the Maritime Raid Force, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, conduct military free-fall training over Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Oahu, Hawaii, as part of the 11th MEU’s Western Pacific 16-2 deployment, Oct. 18, 2016. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Devan K. Gowans)
