All posts by Tiago Mauricio

Tiago MAURICIO (PRT) holds a MA in War Studies from King's College London. He is currently a graduate student at Waseda University focusing on the strategic implications of military exercises in Northeast Asia. His career began as an academic researcher in the Portugal's Navy Staff focusing on Portuguese maritime security and strategy in NATO and the South Atlantic. He also worked as a political and military analyst for Portugal's embassy in Brasilia, Brazil. Before moving to Tokyo, Tiago was a researcher at Kyoto University for two years, working on Northeast Asian geopolitics and military affairs. He is an assistant researcher at the Portuguese Orient Institute in Lisbon and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat. His research interests include: Strategy, seapower, military exercises, US-Japan alliance, and Northeast Asia security.

Call for Articles: Forgotten Naval Strategists Week

CIMSEC will soon run a series dedicated to expanding the naval canon entitled “Forgotten Naval Strategists”. From September 30 until October 5 (or when we run out of articles), we want to discover and explore the ideas and works of naval strategists whose names remain largely unknown. Articles are due to “Nextwar(at)cimsec.org” by 26 September.

In an article published in July I argued that a founding manuscript of the naval studies lore is absent in the historiography. Oliveira’s 1555 “The Art of War at Sea” remains unknown to many navalists, including some in his own country: Portugal. The larger and unwritten argument in that piece was that many other works remain unmentioned in the debate. Simply put, these are the works that never make it to the syllabi of naval war colleges.

This series aims to raise awareness to these lesser known strategists and their contributions to the theory of maritime power. If we are to grasp the growing complexity of human activities at sea, from the sea, and through the sea, we have a professional as well as moral duty to look beyond the horizon and expand our intellectual toolkit to devise new solutions to deal with maritime problems.

This upcoming quest to expand our knowledge of forgotten naval strategists echoes two previous calls made elsewhere in the blogosphere. First, the good folks at Kings of War had an article a few years ago asking which country had produced the greatest strategists. In the comments section, many people jumped into the discussion and took some liberties to mention unsung heroes. Second, James Holmes’ The Naval Diplomat had a series of controversial articles asking whether America still had any naval strategists. These  two articles give us some hints about the way in which a debate about expanding the naval canon should be conducted and we urge you to read them too.

To conclude, submissions must focus on one strategist whose work, for whatever reason, goes unappreciated in current naval debates. As an example, contributions by strategists from Italy, India, China, Brazil, Japan, among other countries, are most welcomed. The challenge is to identify a theoretical contribution, either a specific concept or a broad formulation, that helps us understand maritime strategy. To put it bluntly, we don’t want yet another piece explaining why everyone should read Mahan or Corbett; we know that already. We also don’t want an eulogy for an admiral’s feats in battle. Remember, it’s all about their intellectual contributions to the study of maritime strategy!

Series title: “Forgotten Naval Strategists”
Due Date: September 26
Due to: Nextwar(at)cimsec.org
Running: September 30 – October 5
Format: 500-2000 words

Epic writer Luís Camões salvages his masterpiece "Os Lusíadas" from a shipwreck. Watercolour by Francisco de Resende (1867)
Epic writer Luís de Camões salvages his masterpiece “Os Lusíadas” from a shipwreck. Watercolour by Francisco de Resende (1867)

Expanding the Naval Canon: Fernando de Oliveira and the 1st Treatise on Maritime Strategy

Every community has a canon that best encapsulates the genealogy of personalities, ideas, and events that shape the way the community sees itself and is perceived by others. The naval community is no exception. This article suggests that an important monograph has been overlooked in that canon: Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” published in 1555. It is the oldest treatise on maritime strategy.

The naval lore and the mainstream canon
Maritime strategy and war at sea have long occupied the minds of sailors and statesmen. The scholarly study of maritime strategy, however, is a relatively recent endeavour. Its roots in the modern western tradition are found in the United Kingdom during the latter half of the 1800s.

Authors such as the Colomb brothers, Sir John Laughton, and, more famously, Sir Julian Corbett were among the first to muster a robust understanding of strategy in discussions of naval problems. The United States soon followed suit as Alfred Mahan, William Sims, and Willis Abbot, among others, penned numerous other works to an increasingly sophisticated naval lore.

Not surprisingly, the standard account of the disciplinary evolution of maritime strategy and naval affairs reflects this Anglo-Saxon outlook. This account is taught in naval academies and some civilian universities around the world, further reinforcing the existing canon. Other influences surely contribute to the debate, including Jomini and Beaufre, and even ancient Greeks, such as Thucydides and Themistocles, but by and large the naval lore is founded on works dealing with the British and American experiences at sea.

Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (1555)

In its rise to become the first global maritime empire, Portugal had to develop an understanding of maritime strategy that enabled the achievement of its political aims. Like Britain’s Corbett and America’s Mahan, Portugal’s greatest maritime strategist was Fernando de Oliveira. Writing at the peak of Portuguese power, Oliveira put in writing the foundations of that global empire.

Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (Arte da Guerra do Mar), published in Coimbra in 1555, stands as the oldest treatise on maritime strategy. Oliveira himself acknowledges that very little had been written on the subject; he only refers to Vegetius (4th century AD) for his important but sparse insights into naval warfare. In historical context, Oliveira wrote this treatise three centuries before Corbett, Mahan, and others acquired the habit of thinking strategically about naval warfare. So what can we find in Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea”?

Frontispiece of the original "Arte da Guerra do Mar" (1555), by Fernando de Oliveira.
Frontispiece of the original “Arte da Guerra do Mar” (1555), by Fernando de Oliveira.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the principles of war at sea whereas the second explores its conduct. Each part has fifteen chapters. The genius of Oliveira’s work is found not merely in his (dated) analysis of Portugal’s 16th century navy, but, more importantly, in his comprehensive grasp of the (perennial) foundations of maritime power. The chapters focus on topics such as just war theory, strategic theory, leadership, shipbuilding, logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and military readiness. And this is just in the first half. The second part goes on to tackle force structure, situational awareness, oceanography, and intelligence, among other topics.

These are obviously modern terms to describe very old phenomena. However, the challenges of 16th century naval power are not dissimilar to those of today’s navies whose countries depend on the sea for wealth and prestige. Oliveira, like Corbett and Mahan, was aware of this and expressed it in the opening pages of the treatise. Discussing naval matters, the author argues, “is a useful and necessary matter, particularly for the people of this land [Portugal] who now fare more at sea than others, whereby they gain many profits and honour, and also run the risk of losing it all, if they do not preserve it […].” This verdict ought to resonate contemporary strategists from nations such as the United States, Britain, and Japan, but also those strategists whose countries have maritime ambitions, such as China and India.

Fernando de Oliveira (or Fernão de Oliveira) was an interesting man living in interesting times. A true polymath educated in a Catholic seminary, it soon became evident that God had other plans for him. Oliveira dwelled in the maritime community of Lisbon, then as now a capital with an umbilical connection to the sea, learning key skills that made him a valuable asset for any navy. These skills included: navigation (he became a pilot aboard a French warship in expeditions against British commerce); shipbuilding (two English kings coveted his counsel whilst a prisoner of war in London); negotiation (he led a prisoner exchange when a Portuguese military expedition to north Africa failed; and possibly espionage (some sources mention his spying for the Portuguese Crown in negotiations with the Vatican).

In between his adventures, Oliveira wrote invaluable works that rival “The Art of War at Sea” in scope and insight. These include the world’s first encyclopaedic treatise on navigation and shipbuilding entitled Ars Nautica (ca. 1570), which he later expanded into the first treatise on naval architecture, Livro da Fabrica das Naos (ca. 1580), the first book on Portuguese grammar, Grammatica da Lingoagem Portuguesa (1536), and one of the first books on Portuguese history, Historea de Portugal (ca. 1581). These works attest to Oliveira’s genius. Unlike Corbett, who entertained a career as a novelist at first, Oliveira made a lasting literary contribution to fields beyond maritime strategy.

Conclusions
There is every reason for Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” to become compulsory reading for sailors, mariners, strategists, historians, and laymen with an interest in the complexity of conflict at sea. I will highlight only four of them.
First, the book is a distant yet direct ancestor to the current mainstream canon of maritime strategy. Incorporating this source into the canon and submitting it to academic scrutiny will help illuminate the origins of Western maritime strategic thought.
Second, there is an inherent value in studying Oliveira’s work in the context of naval warfare in the age of sail, particularly Portugal’s path toward a global maritime empire.
Third, the book retains great relevance for current debates on maritime strategy. Oliveira’s thoughts on the building, maintenance, and deployment of navies in the pursuit of policy can inform decision-makers, analysts, and the larger policy community on the often misunderstood nature and character of naval warfare.
Fourth, “The Art of War at Sea” can foster a debate on broader issues of strategy and power in light of existing scholarship on just war theory, military leadership, defence economics, and so forth.

In conclusion, it is high time for the naval community to retrieve Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” from the dustbin of history. My current efforts to translate the treatise to English will hopefully set this process in motion.

 

Tiago Mauricio is a WSD-Handa non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London and is continuing his studies at Waseda University, after spending two years as a researcher at Kyoto University, Japan. He is currently translating Fernando de Oliveira’s Arte da Guerra do Mar (1555) to English.