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Other Than War: HA/DR and Geopolitics

Naval HA/DR Topic Week

By Joshua Tallis

Military Operations Other Than War. Maritime Irregular Activities. Maritime Security Operations. The terminology with which we refer to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), among other non-traditional functions, draws a clear distinction: there is war, and then there is everything else. Under such categorization, HA/DR is often something to do until more important responsibilities come along. That is not to say that the men and women of the United States Navy are not committed to making the world a better place. It is to say, however, that too often HA/DR runs the risk of being divorced from a wider strategic narrative.

Take, for example, the reemergence of China. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is perhaps decades away from posing an equal challenge to the U.S. Navy outside of its near abroad, if it ever rises to that point. Yet, in the years until China develops the infrastructure, ships, and knowledge base to steam globally, it will not lie dormant. In that time, the strategic and political landscape will be shaped globally in part by a battle for soft power, building relationships, currying favor, and stabilizing troubled choke points.

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Critical maritime chokepoints. Source.

Under this guise, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are not ancillary to the broader strategic landscape, but pivotal in its construction. Already we can see elements of this mindset, not only in Chinese development projects throughout the world, but in the use of the PLAN for displays of soft power. The Chinese hospital ship Peace Ark, for example, after previous stops in Asia and Africa, deployed for the first time to the Caribbean Sea in the fall of 2011.[i] And while the U.S., according to a posture statement from SOUTHCOM in 2014, deploys about 700 medical professionals to the Basin annually, such contributions (in an already low-priority combatant command) may shrink even further. Cuba, by way of contrast, has used similar missions to sustain regional favor and influence in the face of longstanding ostracism from the U.S., sending 30,000 medical professionals into the Basin, many to Venezuela.[ii] And while more doctors for a poor region is always a good thing, goodwill may be, in important measure, a zero-sum contest when we take the geopolitical long view.

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Chinese hospital ship Peace Ark. Xinhua Photo.

HA/DR helps shape local political contexts, and it is within such contexts that future American diplomats and soldiers (and those of other nations) will operate. Though HA/DR is a moral imperative in its own right, without the expectation of a quid pro quo, it stands to reason that in an anarchic political landscape, nations will gravitate towards a country they have seen to have their best interests at heart.

What might that look like? Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations offer a wide swath of the developing world an opportunity to interface positively and intimately with the faceless American war machine. Such operations introduce a new generation to what the United States does and what global leadership means. Moreover, it signals that the United States is invested in maintaining presence and stability, something incredibly important at a time when many have called into question American commitments to allies from Europe, to the Middle East, to the Asia-Pacific. In such an era, increased goodwill, through genuine engagement with local communities, could provide the foundation for easing concerns over an American retrenchment, subtly but importantly shifting the prevailing narrative of an American withdrawal. That is, after all, a difficult narrative to sustain while American sailors are frequently seen distributing medical or food aid. Or, HA/DR could signal the opposite, that another country is more invested in the region’s success than the United States. The decision rests with Washington.

111023-N-WW409-696 UTAPAO, Thailand (Oct. 23, 2011) A child from the local community holds a sign thanking the U.S. Sailors from the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) and members from the Royal Thai Armed Forces during a community service event organized by the Princess Pa Foundation, Thai Red Cross Society. More than 40 Sailors from Mustin volunteered their time with the local community and members from the Royal Thai Armed Forces with assisting in preparing more than 5,000 packages. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jennifer A. Villalovos/Released)
UTAPAO, Thailand (Oct. 23, 2011) A child from the local community holds a sign thanking the U.S. Sailors from the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) and members from the Royal Thai Armed Forces during a community service event organized by the Princess Pa Foundation, Thai Red Cross Society. More than 40 Sailors from Mustin volunteered their time with the local community and members from the Royal Thai Armed Forces with assisting in preparing more than 5,000 packages. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jennifer A. Villalovos/Released)

This, consequently, gives rise to another example of the strategic importance of HA/DR: the threat posed by unstable choke points. The fallout from climate change, deforestation, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, pollution, sea level rise, coastal erosion, corrosion of estuaries, depleted fish stocks, mass migration, poverty, urbanization on the coasts—all suggest that intensely poor littoral communities around the world will fall under greater pressure in the coming decades (as expressed well by David Kilcullen, for example, in Out of the Mountains). Increasingly at-risk populations (which continue to grow), with fewer financial opportunities, and with fewer communal ties as a result of migration and urbanization, will face ever more common and ever more devastating extreme weather. Dislocation, poverty, and dissatisfaction are recipes for instability and could threaten critical junctures in the Gulf of Aden, the Caribbean, or the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, to name just a few.

Failure to secure such communities when they are at greatest peril will inevitably have reverberating implications for the maritime space. This has obvious overtones for the war on terror as well. Since September 11, we have understood that countering violent extremism requires, in part, a battle of ideas. That means wielding soft power and making positive impacts on the lives of those most in need and most at risk. HA/DR provides an opportunity to portray tangible benefits from a relationship with the West, to expose whole populations to the ‘other,’ and to let U.S. sailors continue to serve as ambassadors for the American idea.

Ultimately, the responsibility of the United States Navy will remain to prevent and, if need be, win high-end conventional wars. Seen in that lens, however, HA/DR is all too often relegated to the backbench in strategic conversations. In reality, missions on the softer end of the operational spectrum present an opportunity to prevent and win battles that may be fought by those who are barely in grade school now. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief shape the geostrategic landscape in subtle but consequential and potentially enduring ways. Until HA/DR is incorporated into that broader discussion, it will remain simply one of many operations other than war.

Joshua Tallis is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. He is a Research Specialist at CNA Corporation, a nonprofit research and analysis organization located in Arlington, VA. The views and opinions in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the position of the University or CNA.

[i] http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/09/pla-daily-offers-latest-details-on-peace-ark-hospital-ships-1st-medical-mission-to-caribbean/

[ii] SOUTHCOM Posture Statement from General Kelly, 2014.

Featured image: Sailor holding an aid recipient’s hand. Source.

Naval HA/DR Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC is running a topic week on Naval Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Our audience replied to the call for articles with strong contributions featuring varied and in-depth analyses. Their writings explore the complex and urgent nature of HA/DR missions, the importance of demonstrating goodwill to the international community, and provide recommendations to better perform this key mission. We thank our authors for their contributions. 

Below is a list of articles featuring during the topic week. It will be updated as the topic week rolls out and as prospective authors finalize additional publications.

Other Than War: HA/DR and Geopolitics by Joshua Tallis
Positioning Naval HA/DR in India’s Image Making by Vidya Sagar Reddy
How Lessons from HA/DR Can Prepare Naval Forces for Combat by Greg Smith
Applying Interagency Concepts from Domestic Disaster Response to Foreign HA/DR by Robert C. Rasmussen
Aligning HA/DR Mission Parameters with US Navy Maritime Strategy by CAPT John C. Devlin (ret.) and CDR John J. Devlin
A Proactive Approach to Deploying Naval Assets in Support of HA/DR Missions by Marjorie Greene
Enabling More Effective Naval Integration into Humanitarian Responses by David Polatty
The Challenges of Coming Together in a Crisis by David Broyles
Flattops Of Mercy by LCDR Josh Heivly
The Legacy of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami On U.S. Maritime Strategy by CDR Andrea H. Cameron

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact the CIMSEC editorial team at Nextwar@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: A U.S. Navy aircrew helps Pakistani soldiers load relief supplies aboard a U.S. Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter during humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, Aug. 21, 2010. The U.S. crew, assigned to Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15, is embarked aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Peleliu to support the Pakistan government in flooded regions of Pakistan. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Capt. Paul Duncan.

Call for Articles: Naval HA/DR Topic Week

By Dmitry Filipoff

Week Dates: Mar. 28 – Apr 3. 2016
Articles Due: Mar. 27 2016
Article Length: 800-1800 Words (with flexibility)
Submit to: Nextwar@cimsec.org

Natural disasters are often unpredictable and capable of inflicting mass devastation. The Asia-Pacific is especially prone, with over half a million lives lost and $500 billion in damages incurred within the last decade due to natural disasters. Time and time again, naval forces have performed admirably as first responders by performing Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions.

CIMSEC is launching a Naval HA/DR Topic Week to highlight importance of this mission and the role of naval forces in  its execution. Can HA/DR operations refine warfighting skills? What are the political challenges and benefits of deploying naval forces in support of humanitarian operations? How may climate change and rising sea levels affect the demand for naval HA/DR? Contributors can explore these lines of inquiry and many others, as well as analyze HA/DR in a greater context.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org

Distributed Lethality: China is Doing it Right

Distributed Lethality Topic Week

By Alan Cummings

Distributed lethality is about “increasing individual warship lethality and then combining surface warships in innovative ways.” We can add some 21st Century flair to the details, but the premise remains the essence of warships since time immemorial: go to sea and kill your enemy. Frankly, the U.S. Navy’s (USN’s) surface fleet is playing catch-up after the post-Cold War/ low-naval-threats era of the 1990s and 2000s. The fact that we needed to verify the value of capable warships with “a rigorous program of analytics” and numerous war games seems a poignant expression of the tactical and bureaucratic disconnect in the past decades. So for now, check out China and the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) if you want an example of Distributed Lethality in action.

The PLA(N) began building modern warships in the 1990s when they laid the keels for their first Luhu, Luhai, and Jiangwei-class vessels. Those vessels and every class of surface combatant since have counted anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) as their primary armament. Which is to say they were each deadly in the anti-surface warfare (ASuW) arena from day one. Ironically, as China was ramping up production of lethal surface combatants, the U.S. was ramping down. The last Arleigh Burke to incorporate the RGM-84 HARPOON (USS Porter, DDG 78) slid off the blocks in 1997 and every U.S. destroyer built since has been oriented around air defense. What little ASuW capability these later destroyers have is reliant on firing an SM-2 missile designed for air warfare in a secondary ASuW mode.

Fast forward to 2015, and you have two comparisons of the USN and PLA(N)- first by tonnage, then by strike-mile lethality.

Chart 1
USN vs PLA(N) Surface Combatants by Tonnage
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USN vs PLA(N) Surface Combatants by ASuW Strike-Mile

As you can see, the USN may have the edge in tonnage but the PLA(N) takes the prize for lethality. It turns out the PLA(N) also has more hulls- which means their tonnage and armament are more, wait for it, distributed.  Granted, a lot of that distribution resides in their Houbei PTGs. But if you’re focused on regional sea control, say like the South China Sea and Western Pacific, then those low-cost/high-lethality combatants are the perfect thing to disperse across contested locations, key transit areas, and chokepoints.

Today’s bottom line is that the PLA(N) can field more ASCMs and a wider variety of platforms than the USN. For most of the PLA(N), that lethality comes in the form of a warship with at least four YJ-83s, each delivering a 419-lbs warhead up to 100NM (some vessels have ASCMs with even longer ranges, like the YJ-18 and YJ-62). This means combatants with YJ-83s can hold a 200NM-diameter circle (or 31,400NM2) at risk of lethal effects. The Spratly Islands for example claim 120,000NM2; strategic distribution of a four-ship PLA(N) surface action group (SAG) gives ASCM coverage to 125,600NM2.  Raising the hull count or employing multiple SAGs makes the situation all the more frightening. Cue these vessels with rough targeting data (a.k.a. maritime domain awareness) from a Fiery Cross-based patrol aircraft and the PLA(N) has a full-blown system of distributed lethality.

Holding short of a war at sea, PLA(N) combatants are the muscle behind China’s maritime presence and influence operations. PLA General Zhang Zhaozhong implied this in early 2013, calling it a “cabbage strategy” to surround contested maritime claims (like Second Thomas Shoal) with layers of civilian, government, and military vessels. Then in 2014, PLA(N) vessels helped escort the Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling rig in 2014 despite Chinese statements to the contrary. Talk about “combining surface warships in innovative ways,” China is using them as part of a layered politico-military offense to advance their maritime claims, one that easily transitions to combat operations if things deteriorate.

Implementing distributed lethality requires sound doctrine and a practiced C2 structure. That’s where the USN carries the advantage (for now) while we implement expedients like the modified TLAM and SM-6. However, much of our doctrine is either available via open source research or may have been compromised by cyber warfare. For example, the majority of our own textbook on “Surface Tactics 101” is available via a quick Google search for MTP-1D (the Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book). Paired with the equally available NWP 3-56 Composite Warfare Doctrine, and five minutes of Google research has provided the fundamentals of distributed tactics.

Whether the PLA(N) has incorporated U.S. C2 doctrine or developed a native system is likely hidden in classified reporting. However, we can look at broader open source examples to evaluate how practiced they are at operating warships together. For instance, rehearsals of combat resupply demonstrate coordination amongst combatants and the entire logistics train. Recent exercises with Russia, Australia, and the U.S.  illustrate that the PLA(N) has become a capable partner for live fire exercises, amphibious landings, and maneuvering drills amongst other evolutions. I was once told that the key to combat at sea is showing up to the right location, on time, with weapons and radios that work (which may have been borrowed from someone else). I believe that is a valid definition, particularly in the context of distributed lethality, and one that the PLA(N) appears to be meeting.

If one is inclined to dismiss exercises and drills as liable to heavy scripting, then the PLA(N)’s blue water deployments show their C2 abilities are no fluke. These complicated operations (and the C2 required for them) are one snapshot in an evolution of PLA(N) doctrine that runs concurrent with their progress in warship technology. Even the larger Chinese defense organization is adapting to facilitate coordinated operations. Two of the five newly inaugurated theater commands will likely be tasked with maritime-centric missions in the East and South China Seas. More important than today’s snapshot, these trends indicate where China wants to take their C2 ability tomorrow. So what do these strategic moves mean for distributed tactics? If China has the C2 infrastructure, logistics support, and trust in its commanders to operate independently around the world then it stands to reason they can operate together in China’s near abroad.

Which brings up my last point on distributed lethality in the PLA(N): they win by implementing it locally. Warships from China’s East Sea Fleet at Ningbo need to cover 400NM to be in the disputed Senkaku Islands, while South Sea Fleet ships from Zhanjiang are 700NM from the Spratly Islands. PLA(N) vessels can cycle through combat patrols, maintenance periods, training evolutions, and resupply hops in 1/3 the distance a U.S. destroyer covers transiting from San Diego to Hawaii. Meanwhile, the USN still needs the missiles, variety of hulls (small, medium, and large combatants), and regional partners to make distributed lethality work in the Asia Pacific. China need only cast off lines.

Tactics come down to your ability to shoot, move, and communicate. Most of the USN surface fleet can move and communicate around the world, but can’t authoritatively prosecute a surface engagement. The PLA(N) is working on the skills to communicate in a coordinated attack, but they can move with ease in their near seas and they designed their surface combatants as shooters from the beginning. Both sides have identified where they are and where they want to go as far as tactical capability (which, for good or ill, seems to be similar places). So which challenge is easier- learning C2, or refitting and retraining a fleet? I guess the race is on.

Alan Cummings commissioned from Jacksonville University in 2007 and served as a Surface Warfare Officer in the USN until 2013. The opinions here are his own and do not represent the position of the U.S. government. Some material used here is drawn from research being considered for publication elsewhere. Original data is available via valid requests submitted to nextwar@cimsec.org.