Tag Archives: surface warfare

Distributed Lethality and Situational Awareness

By Richard Mosier

Introduction

The distributed lethality concept represents a distinct change in Surface Navy operations, one that emphasizes the offense, and one that requires the freedom of action only possible under mission orders. Both place heavy reliance on the Surface Action Group (SAG) having information superior to that of the enemy in order to be hard to find and thus avoid attack and achieve the offensive advantage of surprise. This is enabled in large measure by situational awareness: the warfare commanders’ perception of the tactical situation. It is achieved by the continuous collection, correlation, fusion, assimilation and interpretation of information from force organic systems, and nonorganic national, theater, and Navy systems. 

Deconflicting Doctrine

A core element of the distributed lethality concept is that SAG commanders operate under mission orders that allow them the freedom to make tactical decisions, a major change away from the long-standing convention of detailed direction from higher headquarters located ashore or on a CVN with its substantial tactical intelligence decision support capabilities. Consequently, the surface navy has had no driving requirement for the sophisticated Common Tactical Picture (CTP)1 or “plot” capabilities that are now required onboard surface combatants for the situational awareness required for the planning/re-planning, and tactical execution of distributed missions.

Current doctrine regarding the allocation of responsibilities for maintaining the Common Tactical Picture CTP or “plot” is fragmented. In accordance with NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine, the Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC), ASW Commander (ASWC), and Air Defense Commander (ADC) are responsible for using all available information to maintain a complete geographic plot for their respective warfare areas. NWP 3-56 also assigns to the Information Operations Warfare Commander (IWC2) responsibility for integrating real time Electronic Surveillance (ES) contact reports with indications,3 and warning4 information. NWP 3-13, Information Operations, assigns the IWC responsibility for achieving and maintaining information superiority; establishing and maintaining the CTP through spectrum awareness; and, for integrating real-time ES contact reports with indications and warning information. Further, NWP 3-56 assigns a Common Tactical Picture Manager (CTPM) responsibility for establishing, maintaining, assuring quality of, and disseminating the fused all-source GENSER CTP. NWP 2-01, Intelligence Support to Naval Operations, describes a concept in which the principal role of intelligence in support of warfare commanders is to characterize the threat and classify all threat targets that may enter the detection range of U.S. or coalition naval forces. It states: “Intelligence correlates and fuses all source data, including intentions, to determine the threat, threat direction, and operational characteristics of the threat platform before the threat platform is detected by own forces.” It further states: “Operational and tactical intelligence support is designed to detect, classify, target, and engage all hostile subsurface threats before they reach maximum effective weapons release range.”

When viewed together, NWP 3-56, NWP 3-13, and NWP 2-01 suggest that the Navy needs a concept and coherent allocation of responsibilities for developing and maintaining the CTP, especially as it applies to a SAG operating in EMCON while executing mission orders.

Impetus for Change 

Changes to current Navy doctrine to accommodate the concept of distributed lethality will be driven by at least two factors. First, to achieve the surprise that is essential for distributed lethality mission success, the SAG will have to operate in RF silence to deny the enemy the opportunity to detect the force with passive RF sensors, one of the primary methods for surveillance of large areas to gain initial location and classification of detected units. All communications to the SAG from supporting entities will have to be routed to and disseminated via narrow and wideband satellite broadcasts such as CIBS-M and GBS. In effect, the SAG gets all the shore support while remaining hard to find thereby minimizing risk of attack.

Second, the surface navy will have to develop and field intra-SAG communications that are sufficient to command and control the force and maintain the CTP but covert enough to minimize the probability of detection and location by the enemy.

PACIFIC OCEAN (June 5, 2008) Chief Engineer, Lt. Dave Ryan, evaluates a tactical image in the combat information center of the guided-missile frigate USS Kauffman (FFG 59) during an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise with the Chilean navy. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class J.T. Bolestridge)

Third, surface combatants have neither the space nor the systems to support the large intelligence presence such as that found on a CVN or other big deck. This suggests that when in EMCON, the SAG will be more heavily dependent on tactical intelligence provided from shore. Some sensor information such as combat information5 cannot be processed ashore into tactical intelligence in time to meet SAG requirements. Therefore, SAG combatants will require dramatically improved capabilities for automatically integrating tactical intelligence, combat information, and organic force sensor information. Given the criticality of time in tactical decision making, automated information correlation and fusion capabilities are essential. However, their output is never perfect or complete so the crew will have to have the skills, knowledge, and abilities to analyze and resolve ambiguities and conflicts.

Conclusion

Distributed lethality depends on being hard to find and securing the element of surprise enabled by superior situational awareness. With the adoption of the distributed lethality concept, it is essential that the concept and doctrine for establishing and maintaining the CTP be reviewed and optimized to assure warfare commanders enjoy the tactical advantage of decision superiority over an adversary. The clear assignment to the shore intelligence structure of responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of tactical intelligence support to the SAG would result in renewed focus on tactical requirements and renewed appreciation of the critical importance of the clock at the tactical level. Moreover, it would drive a new hard- edged fleet focus on the ability of shore-based tactical intelligence support elements to provide this mission-essential support. The clarification of responsibilities onboard ship for maintaining the CTP would serve to focus attention on the ability of those responsible to maintain situation awareness that comports with the realities of the operating environment. As shortfalls and opportunities are identified, the fleet would refine its requirements for the manning, training, and equipping of surface combatants to achieve the information superiority that is the key to mission success. 

As stated by VADM Rowden in the January 2017 Proceedings: “The force we send forward to control the seas must be powerful, hard to find, hard to kill, and lethal. These are the bedrock tenets of distributed lethality…” The concept has gained wide support in the surface navy and is being adopted as a broader Navy operating concept. Rapid progress is being made by the surface navy under the leadership of the surface warfare Type Commands and OPNAV N96. Changes to doctrine to accommodate command control of operations on mission orders are being investigated. Surface forces are being up-gunned to be more lethal. Surface Warfare Officers are being trained and developed as warfare experts for air, surface, and ASW at the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center. This beehive of activity is resulting in rapid progress in all warfare areas except for Information Operations.  

Progress in this fourth foundational warfare area remains in limbo, owed in large measure to unaddressed OPNAV and Type Command organizational relationships and responsibilities for manning, training, readiness, equipping and modernization of the fleet for the planning and conduct of Information Operations. In the absence of progress in this warfare area the success of the distributed lethality is at risk against any near-peer nation with a sophisticated ISR capability.

Richard Mosier is a former naval aviator, intelligence analyst at ONI, OSD/DIA SES 4, and systems engineer specializing in Information Warfare. The views express herein are solely those of the author.

Endnotes

1. Common Tactical Picture — An accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network, ground network, intelligence network, and sensor networks.  Also called CTP. (JP 3-01)

2. IWC in NWP 3-56, NWP 3-13, and as used in this article is the Navy’s abbreviation for Information Operations Warfare Commander.   It shouldn’t be confused with the Navy’s use of the same abbreviation to denote the Navy’s Information Warfare Community.

3. Indications — In intelligence usage, information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bear on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 1-02)

4. Warning intelligence — Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile actions or intention against United States entities, partners, or interests (JP 1-02)

5. Combat Information — Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements. (JP 2-01)

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (June 27, 2012) Air-Traffic Controller 2nd Class Karina Reid operates the SPN-43 air search radar system while standing approach control aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Petty Officer 2nd Class Gretchen M. Albrecht/Released)

Which Player Are You? Warfare Specialization in Distributed Lethality

Distributed Lethality Topic Week

By Jon Hill

The cruisers and destroyers that comprise our Surface Action Groups (SAG) are like the tight end of the figurative maritime football team. The tight end is a great position. The tight end is a jack of all trades. Sadly, this also relegates him to being a master of none. The tight end will inherently never have the speed to outrun a corner nor the size to take on a double team. He will be decent at those things but never great. His job is to be the flexible organic mass compensating for the all-star positions making big plays. Although direly necessary in its limited function, a team cannot be comprised of generic compensating mass alone. Like a tight end’s well-rounded skill set, the generalized load-outs of our CRUDES ships provide a comforting buffer and mission flexibility but dampen our potential lethality. In the immortal words of John Paul Jones, “He who will not risk cannot win.”

We need greater specialization in our Surface Action Groups. We don’t need more tight ends. We need wide receivers who can block and tackles who can catch a pass. These specialists with overlapping mission capabilities will create a more potent offensive force whilst maintaining an appropriate defense. The primary unit tasked with maintaining air superiority will not have to waste precious magazine space beyond minimal anti-surface capabilities because the ship entrusted with that mission area will have the equal and opposite armament to compliment his counterpart. The SAG must be modular and scalable to support the mission objectives laid before them. As easily as a coach can substitute a player, the Navy, too must be ready and flexible. With each ship’s warfare focus clearly defined, commanders will have the ability to add or subtract specific vessels in support of various mission sets and theaters of operation. Assets can be scaled up or down and allocated according to the tactical needs the mission warrants.

The Specialized SAG

Every warship will be commanded by a Weapons Tactics Instructor (WTI). Much like a marine and his rifle, these next generation warriors will be intimately familiar with the weapons they command. The WTI program, although still in its infancy, is guiding the Navy back to its tactical roots. It will create leaders tactically proficient in air, surface, and subsurface warfare areas that will be force multipliers for a SAG. These individuals must be identified and directed towards commands that will capitalize upon their knowledge and skillful utilization of the warship’s capabilities. The Integrated Air and Missile WTI will command ships tasked with air supremacy, the Surface Warfare WTI will command the seas, and so forth with the other WTIs and their respective mission areas. With the increased potency of our offensive capabilities, specialized individuals must be assigned and prioritized to relevant commands to ensure maximum effect with regards to possible kinetic solutions. There must be no wasted Sailors, ships, or munitions in the war to come. We require individuals in our SAGs who can utilize their weapons to the fullest potential.

DAHLGREN, Va. (May 27, 2016) Graduates of the rigorous 19 week Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course pose for a picture with Rear Adm. James W. Kilby, Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (NSMWDC) (left), and Rear Adm. Ronald A. Boxall, Commander, Carrier Strike Group Three (right) at NSMWDC Detachment Dahlgren. Course graduates serve in a production tour as trainers and instructors at critical training and evaluation commands throughout the Navy and then return to operational Fleet command billets following their normal career progression model. (U.S. Navy photo by Information Management Specialist Laurie Buchanan)
DAHLGREN, Va. (May 27, 2016) Graduates of the rigorous 19 week Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course pose for a picture with Rear Adm. James W. Kilby, Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (NSMWDC) (left), and Rear Adm. Ronald A. Boxall, Commander, Carrier Strike Group Three (right) at NSMWDC Detachment Dahlgren. (U.S. Navy photo by Information Management Specialist Laurie Buchanan)

The cruiser will be the de facto SAG leader and primary air coordinator. With its combat suite optimized for an additional command detachment and enhanced command and control capability, the cruiser is a natural choice. Its additional Vertical Launch System cells and fourth Fire Control illuminator make it ideal for ensuring air supremacy for the rest of the SAG. No fewer than two destroyers will accompany the cruiser to bolster air superiority, and to ensure surface or subsurface dominance. They will be specifically configured based upon their warfare specialty and the requirements dictated by the mission and surrounding elements. We need appropriate magazines for these warriors to employ. The primary unit tasked with Air supremacy cannot afford to waste VLS cells on land attack missiles just as the primary Surface commander cannot sacrifice their anti-ship missiles for air beyond the minimum needed for self defense. While a Swiss Army knife is useful in its function, one would never build a house with it.  There is a reason the hammer has been invented.  It is the right tool for the right job not just a tool for a job. 

With the continued proliferation of unmanned vehicles, it will be necessary for an amphibious ship be attached to the SAG as both a staging platform and an invaluable battle force multiplier. The amphibious ship can host the unmanned complement to each specialty commander’s tasking. Instead of Marines and their supporting vehicles, the well decks will be filled with unmanned sub and mine hunters, as well as anti-surface vehicles for use by the SAG’s surface and subsurface commanders. The flight deck will be filled with drones controlled by the air commander. In a war of attrition, these assets will enhance survivability of blue units while increasing lethality to red. Lives need not be unnecessarily risked when we have machines to employ in their stead. The SAG will be given dangerous and pivotal missions in which their tactical ability will need to be without question in an environment where they will take casualties both to personnel and equipment. The amphibious ship will carry reserves of both to ensure the SAG can remain on station. The abundance of drones will supplement the numerically small yet heavily-armed ships comprising the SAG.

Contesting the EM Spectrum

In a world defined by the electromagnetic spectrum, it is no longer enough to attack the equipment. A SAG commander must be continually aware of and decide how to tactically manipulate their profile in a communications-denied and emission-controlled environment. We must instead aim for the operator interpreting the equipment’s reports. Technology will reach a limit where we can no longer overcome it with other technology. It will then be a matter of influencing the perception of the individual making decisions based on the information they receive. When the enemy is searching for a small contact they may pay not attention to the large ones. A single destroyer with the radar cross section of a tanker traveling along shipping lanes warrants no second thought compared to the apparent squad of rowboats making a trans-Pacific journey.  The enemy is looking for strike groups spread over hundreds of miles communicating on every frequency at their disposal and radiating each radar to its full capacity. 

We must use this knowledge to our advantage. In this regard, an Information Warfare commander will take on  greater responsibility for not only individual warships but the SAG as a whole. In concert with Air, Surface, and Subsurface commanders, the IW commander will coordinate the electromagnetic activities of the SAG while monitoring the perception of enemy operators. This warfare area is important for attacking left of the kill chain as the WTI are for attacking right of it. Because of this importance a greater weight must be placed upon IW and experts should be at the forefront in training  other warfare commanders on how to fight effectively in the dark.

While doing this, we must continue to operate as our opposition expects as long as peace allows while training for the eventuality of never being afforded this luxury again. The enemy has been lulled into a safe pattern of recognition due to our over-dependency on our once superior technology. While propagating this impression, it is essential that we develop our ships into perceptual landmines. A single mine found can guard an entire field or waterway and is the quintessential Occam’s Razor of Anti-Access/Area Denial. A warship, completely invisible to the electromagnetic spectrum, capable of unleashing devastation before disappearing once more, will shut down entire sectors of the ocean and control the seas through even the rumors of its presence. There will come a point where modern technology will fail us in our mission. The SAG that trains for this and draws upon antiquated techniques of navigation and war fighting will dominate the seas. 

Conclusion

It is important now to project our power and run up the score to ensure this team cannot hang with us until the fourth quarter. There is nothing wrong with the traditional SAG or the tight end, but he needs a specialized, supporting cast to win decisively. The Navy requires a wide receiver who can catch the long ball when the defense stacks the box and a fullback who can drive it down their throats when the defense shifts to compensate. While the tight end is a key player, rarely has a defense needed to plan their game around one. We too must divest ourselves from this safe yet unimaginative playstyle while not abolishing it completely. We require specialty players who can keep the enemy off balance and force them to adjust their defense. No longer can there be a generic force presented for the opposition to send generic units in response. That’s too easy and too safe. We project the exact power we want them to counter and dictate the pace of play accordingly. Our high impact players will keep the opposition reliant upon us for operational cues until we have ripened the battle space for the traditional tight end to deliver the killing blow. Their continued failure will promote uncertainty and further reinforce our sea power dominance moving forward.

LT Jon Hill is the Fire Control Officer onboard USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of his ship, the Navy, or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Will Gaskill

LCS Versus the Danish Strawman

nils juel 2Many critics have assailed the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) program for its high cost in comparison with foreign, supposedly better armed and equipped equivalents. The Danish Iver Huitfeldt and Absalon class frigates are often cited as examples of cheaper, more capable small combatants in comparison with LCS. These claims are not well researched and are based on isolated points of data rather than any systemic analysis. Other nations may be able to build relatively cheap warships, but hidden factors not discussed by critics, rather than U.S. shipbuilding and general acquisition deficiencies make this possible. The Danish Navy, in conjunction with corporate giant A.P. Moeller have produced an outstanding series of warships, but a direct comparison between them with the LCS is one of apples verses oranges. It’s time to stop using this inaccurate strawman argument against LCS.

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The direct comparison of the Danish frigates to LCS is highly misleading due to significant differences in Danish shipbuilding practice and financial accounting. The Danish “StanFlex” system of “plug and play” weapons, sensors and equipment (including cranes!) officially separates these components from the advertised cost of the ship. A 2006 RAND report on the rise in warship costs specifically identified such systems as the principal drivers of warship cost inflation. The Danish concept of separating these more costly systems from their hull gives the appearance of a much less expensive warship. The ships were often accepted by the Danish Navy in an incomplete condition. The Danish Nils Juel, for example, was delivered in 2014 with 76mm guns scavenged from decommissioned ships. Danish figures suggest that the Iver Huitfeldt program used $209 million in reused equipment from scrapped vessels. Reuse, however, could not meet all system requirements. The planned 127mm (5 inch) gun system was deemed too expensive at $50 million a copy. The ship’s close-in weapon system mount was actually a dummy, wooden weapon due to a lack of certification. While equipped with a MK 41 vertical launch missile system (VLS), the ship deployed to the fall 2014 U.S. Bold Alligator exercise without the system certified for use or weapons purchased for eventual outfitting. That same reporting indicated that the ship was delivered with its damage control system incomplete and lacking a secondary steering control center. Much of the ship is built to merchant ship standards which are not as robust as those traditionally provided to warships. In addition, the Danish ship was forced to take on nearly 20 extra crew members when the lean 100 person complement was found insufficient for operational needs.

The Absalon class is more akin to a heavily armed, limited load amphibious ship rather than a surface combatant. It combines a number of warfare and expeditionary capabilities on a single hull, but excels at none of them. It is also significantly slower (at 24 knots maximum speed) than most other surface combatants. Both Absalon and her sister Esbern Snare were also delivered without their full installation of weapons and sensors. In the case of Absalon, this process took over three years. The Danish Navy has been open in regards to these conditions. U.S. advocates of adopting the Absalon or Iver Huitfeldt classes almost always overlook them.

The LCS, by contrast is delivered with significant systems such as its 57mm gun and point defense missile system incorporated into the overall cost. Scavenging of weapons from previous U.S. ships is extremely difficult due to a constant process of upgrades over time. Weapon systems, like ships also have service lives and U.S. ships being decommissioned often have equally aged weapons and supporting electrical, hydraulic and mechanical systems that make a re-installation not cost effective. Unlike the Absalon class which is not equipped to master any one warfare area in any of its configurations, the LCS can be exclusively equipped to master one such discipline. It is purposely designed to operate in tailored flotillas designed to mitigate the risks incurred by one ship like Absalon. Critics often fail to note that both Iver Huitfeldt and Absalon are nearly twice the size of LCS.  Neither has the speed requirements that drove initial LCS design considerations. The size difference alone may explain the Danish ships’ much longer endurance. These differences in Danish and U.S. practices make comparisons difficult at best.

Finally, the Danish Navy contracted the building of both the Iver Huitfeldt and Absalon classes to a single firm, the A.P. Moeller Corporation. This multinational giant derives the vast bulk of its earnings from the more stable commercial market and its warship business is not dependent on government orders, which causes instability and cost overruns in its production process. By contrast, U.S. LCS shipbuilders Lockheed Martin and Austal serve government interests much more than private ones and are more dependent on government contracts to maintain stability in their operations. The 2006 RAND report also identified this process of divided warship construction as another factor in the increased cost of surface combatants.

The LCS program has been beset with a number of technological and systemic problems since its inception that have slowed the program’s progress and likely contributed to some cost overruns. On the surface, the Iver Huitfeldt and Absalon class frigates would appear to be cost effective alternatives to the LCS. Deeper investigation, however, reveals how the Danes achieved these substantially lower figures by separating higher cost equipment from that of the platform, scavenging weapons from decommissioned ships, accepting incomplete warships for service, and purchasing these vessels from a single, robust commercial shipbuilder not dependent on or affected by unstable government ship acquisition processes. In summary, these classes meet Denmark’s needs, but are an unsuitable substitute for U.S. Navy small combatants. LCS critics, however, should not use the Danish ships as strawman LCS substitutes. It is a most unequal comparison.

Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer and a PhD student in military history at Ohio University. His focus areas are modern U.S. naval and military reorganization efforts and British naval strategy and policy from 1889-1941. 

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Re-Post: Surface Warfare: Taking the Offensive

Guest article by VADM Thomas S. Rowden, USN from June, 2014. Re-Posted during the SNA National Symposium this week.

I am indebted to the leadership of CIMSEC for providing a platform for me and senior members of my team at OPNAV N96 to lay out for readers key parts of our vision for the future direction of Surface Warfare. Captain Jim Kilby started it off with “Surface Warfare: Lynchpin of Naval Integrated Air/Missile Defense”, and Captain Charlie Williams followed up with “Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) – The Heart of Surface Warfare” and “Increasing Lethality in Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)”.   Both of these officers were recently selected for flag rank, and the Surface Force could not be more fortunate. Their years of fleet experience in these mission areas uniquely qualify them to lead our force in the future. Together with our continuing mastery of land attack and maritime security operations, the three operational thrusts they describe a Surface Force that is moving from a primarily defensive posture to one on the offense. This is an exciting development, and I want to spend a few paragraphs reinforcing their messages.

The single most important warfighting advantage that the U.S. Navy brings to the joint force is the ability to project significant amounts of combat power from the sea, thousands of miles from our own shores on relatively short notice and with few geo-political restraints. No one else can do this, and for the better part of two decades, our ability to do so was unchallenged. Without this challenge, our mastery of the fundamentals of sea control—searching for and killing submarines, over the horizon engagement of enemy fleets, and long range air and missile defense—diminished, even as the world figured out that the best way to neutralize this power projection advantage was to deny us the very seas in which we operate.

Surface Warfare must “go on the offensive” in order to enable future power projection operations. I call this “offensive sea control” and it takes into consideration that in future conflict, we may have to fight to get forward, fight through our own lines, and then fight to stay forward. Pieces of ocean will come to be seen as strategic, like islands and ports, and we will offensively “seize” these maritime operating areas to enable further offensive operations. Put another way, no one viewed the amphibious landings in the Pacific in WWII as “defensive”; there was broad understanding that their seizure was offensive and tied to further offensive objectives. It is now so with the manner in which we will exercise sea control.

What does this mean to fleet Sailors? It means that we have to hit the books, dust off old TACMEMOS and begin to think deeply again what it means to own the inner screen against submarines, to hunt down and destroy adversary surface vessels over the horizon, and to tightly control the outer air battle. We need to study the threats and devise new tactics designed to counter them. We need to master the technology that is coming to the fleet—Navy Integrated Fire Control (Counter Air), or NIFC-CA; the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR); the SQQ-89 A(V)15 ASW Combat System; the LCS ASW Mission Module; the introduction of the Griffin missile in the PC class; new classes of Standard Missiles; Rail Gun; Directed Energy. We will need to use these systems and then do what Sailors always do—figure out ways to employ them that the designers never considered.

Going on the offensive is a mind-set, a way of thinking about naval warfare. It means thinking a good bit more about how to destroy that than how to defend this. Don’t get me wrong—we will still need to be able to defend high value units, amphibious forces, convoys, and logistics—but we will increasingly defend them by reaching out and destroying threats before those threats are able to target what we are defending.

We are moving to a concept of dispersed lethality in the Surface Force, one that presents an adversary with a considerably more complex operational problem. It will not be sufficient to simply try to neutralize our power projection forces. While these will be vigorously defended, other elements of the surface force will act as hunter/killer groups taking the fight to the enemy through the networked power of surface forces exercising high levels of Operational Security (OPSEC) and wielding both lethal over-the-horizon weapons to destroy adversary capabilities and sophisticated electronic warfare suites to confound adversary targeting. Especially in the Pacific, vast expanses of ocean will separate the carrier air wing from dispersed surface operations, so the paradigm of the past few decades that suggested the carrier would provide strike assets to supplement the Surface Force is no longer valid. We will leverage air wing capability, but we will not be dependent upon it.

Working in tandem with shore-based maritime patrol aircraft and our organic helicopters, we will seek out and destroy adversary submarines before they threaten high value units or fielded forces. Bringing together the networked power of surface IAMD forces and the mighty E-2D, we will dominate the outer air battle, eliminating threats to the force at range. The Surface Force will seize strategic “maritime terrain” to enable synchronized follow-on operations.

Those who may ask how the current fiscal environment impacts this vision, my answer is that it does so substantially. We will be forced to favor capability over capacity. We will favor forward deployed readiness over surge readiness. We will continue to invest in forward-looking capabilities through a strong science and technology/research and development budget, while ensuring we accelerate those promising technologies closest to fielding and most effective in advancing our offensive agenda.

We will posture more of the force forward, and more of it in the Pacific. While the total size of the fleet will likely decline if current conditions continue, more of it will be where it needs to be, it will be more effectively networked over a larger more dispersed area, and it will be equipped with the weapons and sensors necessary to enable this offensive shift.

I am bullish on Surface Warfare, and you ought to be too. I look forward to continuing this dialogue on the Renaissance in Surface Warfare, and I am proud to be part of the greatest Surface Force in the greatest Navy the world has ever known!

 

Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden’s current assignment is Commander, Naval Surface Forces. A native of Washington, D.C., and a 1982 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, VADM Rowden has served in a diverse range of sea and shore assignments.