Tag Archives: Somalia

Mothership Tours and Skiff Rides at Somali Piracy Week

International Maritime Satire Week Warning: The following is a piece of fiction intended to elicit insight through the use of satire and written by those who do not make a living being funny – so it’s not serious and very well might not be funny.

If you go: Be sure to arrive early for a tour of a real pirate mothership at the scenic port of Hobyo, Mudug province, Somalia.

October 1st-7th will bring a special treat to the Mudug town of Hobyo in central Somalia. To mark the start of the 2012-2013 “pirate season” and revive support for a flagging business, local pirates have organized “Somali Piracy Week,” modeled on the success of the U.S. Navy’s series of Fleet Weeks throughout the United States.

“It’s going to be quite the event!” said Ayub Yusuf, a spokesman for the pirates and commander in a pirate fleet.  “Bring your whole family if you can, there will be something for everyone – skiff rides, a grappling-hook toss, and tours of a mothership.  This week will show young men what exciting opportunities and careers the field of piracy holds:  Join the pirates – see the Horn of Africa, and possibly Norfolk!”

While the pirates will spend a good deal of time sizing up potential recruits against the rigorous standards of whether they can hold an AK-47 assault rifle and not fall off the back of a fishing dhow, the week is not solely about potential recruits.  Responding to hostility towards the piracy trade from fellow Somalis, the group organizing the event under pirate financier Aden Abdirahman Ismail of the Reer-Aden subclan has sought to win over the support of locals who earlier in the year attacked another group of pirates.

“We hope to change some of the misperceptions that local citizens and clans harbor about our service,” said Yusuf.  “For example, did you know piracy was the fastest-growing job-sector in the last decade, or that our patronage helped keep unemployment below 40% in many pirate towns?  But some of the locals think we’re no more than criminals with guns,” Yusuf said as he polished his AK-47.

Local support may prove critical as 2012 is shaping up to be one of the worst on record for the pirates.  International military efforts, shore-based counter-piracy, and defensive actions taken by the ships themselves – such as convoy programs, armed guards, and ships’ physical countermeasures have all taken their toll, with only 5 successful Somali pirate attacks to date this year.

Freighter or Foreign Warship? – You be the judge! Just one of many events at Somali Piracy Week in Hobyo, Somalia from Oct 1st-7th.

Hoping to see a return to piracy’s heyday and the money it brings, some private businesses have helped sponsor the event.  Mahad Nahar’s Hobyo House of Whores, the Weli Lexus Dealership of Galmudug, and RPGs ‘R Us are among the key backers of Somali Piracy Week.  “It’s a real opportunity to show our support for our brave boys in scarves and t-shirts and remind them that if they don’t continue to make payments on their SUVs I do have the means to repossess them,” said Abdi Weli.

Local fisherman Mohamed said he wanted no part in the events, and that the presence of pirates only brought violence and vice to Hobyo.  His young son Aadan, however, said he hoped his father would relent. “I really want to try my luck in the ‘Freighter, or Foreign Warship?’ visual identification challenge.”

As part of the events the pirate mothership MV Iceberg 1 has been moved to an anchorage in the city’s port to accommodate tours.  The Panamanian-flagged MV Iceberg 1 was captured in March 2010 outside Aden, Yemen; its crew enduring over 2 grueling years of captivity.  The ship’s second engineer Francis Kasoom said, “It’s been like living a fresh hell every day without knowing whether we’ll see our loved ones again.  But I hear premiums are down on shipping insurance, so I guess piracy is beaten.”

Asked his future plans for boosting piracy’s support if Somali Piracy Week turn out a success, Yusuf said he’d like to release a movie.  “Battleship has been a real inspiration for me,” said Yusuf.  “It showed the American public in an entertaining and realistic manner how crucial it is to maintain a strong Navy in the event of a strictly maritime-based alien attack.”

Somali Piracy Week runs from Oct 1st-7th, 10am-5pm, at the Port of Hobyo, Somalia. 

Who Defeated the Somali Pirates?

Ships from CTF-150, one of the mult-national naval force conducting maritime security operations off the Horn of Africa

The New York Times published a piece last week describing the “sharp” decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia  It cited data provided by the US Navy demonstrating that attacks had significantly fallen off in 2012 compared to 2011 and 2010.  The decline was attributed to industry having implemented better security measures, the large-scale participation by forces from many world navies in counter-piracy operations in the region, and raids conducted to rescue hostages.

Conspicuously absent, however, is any mention of how events ashore may have impacted piracy.  The only mention in the piece as to how actions on land are related to piracy was that “renewed political turmoil” or “further economic collapse” could cause more Somalis to pursue piracy as a livelihood.

In June Matt Hipple made his case in this blog that international naval operations had little or nothing to do with the current decline in piracy.  He argued that the Kenyan invasion of Somalia and continued operations by the multi-national forces of AMISOM, as well as armed private security forces onboard commercial vessels were the decisive factors behind the recent drop in pirate attacks.  Another June piece by the website Somalia Report attributed the decline to internal Somali factors, primarily declining financial support by Somali investors in the pirate gangs, and increased operations of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF).

A basic principle within the social sciences and statistics is that “correlation is not causation.”  Just because the U.S. and other world navies applied military force at sea to combat Somali pirates does not mean that maritime operations caused the piracy decline, particularly when there are so many other independent variables have contributed to piracy, especially those ashore driven by Somalis themselves.  Until this year the only group with real success at stopping piracy over the last decade was the Islamic Courts Union (forerunner to al-Shabab), who stopped it when they controlled southern Somalia for most of 2006.  Piracy came back when the Ethiopians invaded and forced the Islamic Courts Union out of Mogadishu and the pirate strongholds at the end of that year.

It is possible that a debate over who defeated the Somali pirates could mirror the similar debate over the effectiveness of “the Surge” in Iraq.  U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile has been one of the most outspoken advocates of questioning the conventional wisdom assuming that the 2007 U.S. troop increase in Iraq and the adoption of the Counter-Insurgency doctrine were what caused violence to fall.  He instead argues that Iraqi-driven variables such as Sunni insurgent groups accepting U.S. money to switch sides and Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr’s decision to stop attacks were what made the difference.

Both the deployment of ships and other assets by the world’s navies, as well as changed behavior by the maritime industry, have played some role in the drop in pirate attacks.  To assume that those were the decisive factor, however, with no consideration given to what has actually happened in Somalia over the past few years, is shortsighted and ignores the larger reasons for why the phenomenon of Somali piracy started in the first place.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence Officer and currently serves on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2). The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

James Bridger at CSIS

The Puntland Marine Police Force: munificent benefactors apply within.

I had the pleasure of last week meeting one of our newest members, James Bridger, who spear-headed our partnership with the Atlantic Council of Canada. He was in town for a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel discussion on piracy, and the video is now available. If you’re interested in shore-based approaches to the problem and the influence of international politics and organizations on the reports, funding, and arms flow into the region, then it makes for an intriguing view. James is wearing his patented CIMSEC skinny tie:

Shore-based Counter-Piracy in Peril

Who will keep the lights on?

Just as independent analysts and pirates themselves attest to the impact the Puntland Marine Police Force is having on piracy in northern Somalia, pushing bosses from their bases and offering a shore-based solution nearly everyone says is needed, Robert Young Pelton of Somalia Report details the program’s backers, the UAE, has suddenly halted funding (h/t James Bridger):

Around one hundred mostly African and South African expats and their approximately 800 Somali Marines of the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) were left stranded with no cash for food, fuel or salaries.

Back at the PMPF base, just west of Bosaso airport, there now sits millions of dollars in heavy construction equipment, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, ocean-going ships, RHIBs, heavy transport trucks and 4X4 vehicles that suddenly became idle.

This calls into question the plateau in pirate attacks in the first half of the year from the north of the country, as gains on the ground might be reversed with a let up in pressure. According to Somalia Report‘s article, the decision may have come as a result of pressure from the UN which has been critical of the program. Read the full article for speculation on the program’s future.

 

The announcement also comes on the heels of a report on the human cost of piracy by Oceans Beyond Piracy with a telling rundown of numbers. The following analysis is from gCaptain:

The report found that a total of 3,863 seafarers were fired upon by Somali pirates, down 8% from 2010.  Of those, 968 came in close contact with armed pirates who were able to board their vessels and a total of 413 of them were rescued from citadels by naval forces.

 

A standout number in the report was that the number of seafarers taken hostage in 2011 dropped by 50% with a total of 555, most likely driven by increased security measures taken by crews including the use of  armed.  In 2010 a total of 1,090 had been taken hostage.

 

The report adds that a total of at least 1,206 hostages were held captive by Somali pirates in 2011, including the 555 seafarers who fell victim during 2011, 645 who were captured in 2010 and remained captive in 2011, and 6 tourists and aid workers kidnapped on land.  The report estimates that the average length of captivity was over 8 months, up 50% over 2010.

 

Tragically, 35 hostages died during 2011 including; 8 who were killed by pirates during an initial attack or after being taken captive; 8 died from disease or malnutrition while being held; and 19 died in crossfire while being used as human shields and during hostage rescue attempts.  Another 3 hostages died after release as a result of abuse they had suffered while in captivity.

 

In contrast, it is estimated that 111 pirates were killed in 2011 with 78 killed as a result of encounters with naval forces, 30 killed by fellow pirates, and 3 by Puntland police.

 

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security and holds a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.
 
The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.