Tag Archives: Philippine military

Asia-Pacific, Strategic Outlook

China’s South China Sea Strategy: Simply Brilliant

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This article can be found in its original form at ASPI here, and was republished with permission.

In the past 12 months, China has provoked considerable attention with its reclamation activities in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratlys where it controls seven maritime features.

China’s history of salami-slicing presents a dilemma to regional countries as well as external powers with regional interests: do they escalate an incident each time China slices the salami and risk open conflict, or stand down and allow China to augment its territorial claims.

The million-dollar question remains: who or what will freeze China’s reclamation in the South China Sea? The answer: nothing, really.

It has been proposed, for example, that like-minded states carve out a ‘code of practice’ that would stress the rule of law and mirror the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Another option being considered by the Pentagon is to send US aircraft and ships within 12 nautical miles of the Chinese-built reefs in the Spratlys, to challenge its influence there.

While useful, such proposals won’t freeze or rollback China’s attempts to change the facts on the ground (or the high sea). China’s reclamation seeks to pre-empt any decision that would come from the Philippines’ challenge in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea over China’s nine-dash line claim to the South China Sea.

It’s noteworthy that China hasn’t only engaged in salami slicing; it has sought to use the attraction of its economy, trade and aid to offset its high-risk behaviour.

Following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident with the Philippines, China launched a charm offensive in 2013, wooing ASEAN with a treaty of friendship and cooperation, stressing that it intended to take China–ASEAN relations from a ‘golden decade’ to a ‘diamond decade’.

This year, when concerns about China’s reclamation have intensified, China has offered a carrot: US and other countries would be welcome to use civilian facilities it’s building in the South China Sea for search and rescue and weather forecasting, when ‘conditions are right’.

China has also used its economic weight to deftly tilt the balance (of influence, at least) in its favor. Its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is attracting long-standing American allies such as Great Britain, Australia and South Korea. China has stolen a march on the US in the battle to win friends and influence people.

And the economic offensive doesn’t end with the AIIB. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a free trade agreement that would involve ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea—is seen as a rival to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt is also another lure for peripheral countries keen on leveraging on China’s economic ascent.

Concerted and effective opposition to China’s fait accompli in the South China Sea requires an astute mix of diplomacy and deterrence. It might take the form of a regional effort to get China to clarify its nine-dashed line claims based on UNCLOS principles, an ASEAN ultimatum for China to at least freeze its reclamation activities, and joint ASEAN–US patrols near the reefs being reclaimed by China. This looks unlikely to emerge anytime soon.

ASEAN was damaged in 2012, when it failed—for the first time in its 45-year history—to issue a communiqué due to differing views over the South China Sea. ASEAN has recently upped its game by underscoring the dangers of China’s reclamation, but there’s little the group can do apart from pushing for a formal Code of Conduct. A successful conclusion of the code isn’t assured; China dangles the carrot of code negotiations to buy time even as its carries out reclamation.

For all its rhetoric about the need to uphold international law and the freedom of navigation, the US is conflicted when it comes to China. It all boils down to this: will the US risk its extensive relationship with China over a few rocks in the South China Sea? As Hillary Clinton once said: how does the US ‘deal toughly’ toward its banker?

To get a sense of the effect of China’s creeping invasion of the South China Sea, one only need look at Vietnam. Faced with China’s challenge to its claims to the Paracel Islands, Vietnam has purchased Kilo-class submarines, reportedly armed with sub-launched land-attack Klub missiles that could threaten Chinese coastal targets. But Vietnam didn’t fire a shot when China towed a US$1b oil rig into waters claimed by Vietnam last year. On a recent trip to Hanoi, Vietnamese scholars told me that Vietnamese military officers urged sterner action, such as firing on Chinese ships, but senior leaders vetoed them, instead deciding to sit back and let China incur ‘reputational damage’.

Not many people in Asia would agree with what China is doing in the South China Sea. But as it stands, China’s strategy—salami slicing, using offsets to soften risky behavior and accelerating its reclamation activities in the absence of significant opposition—can be summed up in two words: simply brilliant.

William Choong is a Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Capability Analysis, Global Analysis, South Pacific/Oceania

An ASEAN Maritime Alliance?

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The year 2014 brought new tensions to the South China Sea, particularly as Chinese authorities sought to establish a series of island-like structures in the midst of the disputed Spratly Islands. Such provocative actions, however, are unlikely to generate sufficient political will among the other countries of the region to establish a Political-Security Community under the auspices of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) by the 2015 deadline. But were this collection of ten countries to pool their resources into a security community or even a security alliance, it would be an impressive force and a potential deterrent to aggression in the South China Sea.

In particular, it is worthwhile noting the relative strength of ASEAN coastal defence forces. Some member states, such as Indonesia, possess respectable ‘blue water’ navies, that is to say, they have larger vessels capable of operating in deep waters and engaging in long-range standing battles. Other ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines, have considerable ‘brown water’ navies,  forces consisting of small patrol boats which can cruise inland waterways and the shallow waters that weave between tight-knit island chains. But the varied nature of the waters disputed in the South China Sea particularly requires the flexibility offered by corvettes.

Generally, corvettes fall between the Royal Canadian Navy’s Halifax-class frigates and Kingston-class coastal defence vessels in size. But there is much debate as to what constitutes a contemporary corvette. For example, the Royal Omani Navy calls its Khareef-class vessels ‘corvettes’ even though the displacement of each vessel in the class is approximately 2,660 tons. Recent advancements in shipbuilding have also allowed the US Navy to introduce new vessels with substantial displacement but with shallower drafts, meaning the new USS Liberty can approach closer to coastlines than the similarly sized but older Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates.

For the purposes of this analysis, only those vessels with a displacement greater than 100 tons but less than 1,700 tons will be considered corvettes. China’s maritime forces, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),  has a substantial number of vessels in this range deployed to Hong Kong and a network of naval bases off the South China Sea. 12 Jiangdao-class corvettes (1,440 tons) are the workhorses of this maritime presence in the region and China may possibly add 3 more vessels of this class by the end of 2015. Beyond the Jiangdao-class corvettes, PLAN’s southern presence includes six Houjian-class missile boats (520 tons) and approximately 80 other missile boats and gunboats of various classes and ranging in displacement from 200 to 480 tons each. This vastly exceeds the quantity and quality of vessels any individual Southeast Asian country could bring to bear in a conflict. But ASEAN’s combined maritime forces could meet the challenge presented by a limited PLAN offensive.

Brunei in particular has emerged as a promising new maritime actor in the region, even actively participating in the 2014 edition of the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). The Royal Brunei Navy acquired four specially built Darussalam-class offshore patrol ships (1,625 tonnes) from the German shipbuilder Luerssen-Werft, which replaced Brunei’s previous coastal defence workhorse, the Waspada-class fast attack craft (200 tonnes). The Waspada-class vessels have since been decommissioned and donated to Indonesia to be used for training purposes. The introduction of the Darussalam-class greatly upgrades Brunei’s defence capabilities and it will be of interest for Southeast Asian observers to see how Brunei further pursues the modernization of its forces.

The Republic of Singapore Navy has much in the way of heavier frigates and submarines to defend its unique position by the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s most significant shipping routes. Its corvette-like vessels are also impressive, six Victory-class corvettes (600 tonnes) and 12 Fearless-class offshore patrol ships (500 tonnes), but they are certainly not as new as some of the vessels boasted by Singapore’s neighbours. The Victory-class was acquired in 1990-1991 while the Fearless-class was introduced between 1996 and 1998. Therefore, it will also be of interest to see whether Singapore seeks to obtain any newer vessels which can serve as a bridge in capabilities between the Victory-class corvettes and the heavier Formidable-class frigates.

dsc_5220It is Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia that boast the largest complements of corvettes in the region, however. The Royal Thai Navy’s coastal defence is led by two Tapi-class corvettes (1,200 tons) and two Pattani-class offshore patrol ships (1,460 tons), which are joined by two Ratanakosin-class corvettes (960 tons), three Khamrosin-class corvettes (630 tons), three Hua Hin-class patrol boats (600 tons), six PSMM Mark 5-class patrol boats (300 tons), and 18 smaller patrol boats and fast attack boats of varying capabilities but all rather aged. The Philippines and Indonesia both have vast island chains within their respective territories, requiring corvettes and smaller patrol vessels just as much for counter-trafficking and counter-piracy operations as for countering conventional maritime forces. The Philippine Navy possesses one Pohang-class corvette (1,200 tons), two Rizal-class corvettes (1,250 tons), nine Miguel Malvar-class corvettes (900 tons), and three Emilio Jacinto-class corvettes (700 tons). Indonesia tops out ASEAN’s array of corvettes with three Fatahillah-class corvettes (1,450 tons), 16 Kapitan Patimura-class corvettes (950 tons), and 65 other missile boats and gunboats with a displacement of approximately 100-250 tons.

Yet it is unclear how much of their forces Indonesia or the Philippines would be able to deploy in the midst of a South China Sea conflict. As mentioned previously, many of these vessels have been used practically as inland patrol vessels. There are also some potential weak links in the chain should ASEAN establish some form of formalized maritime alliance. The Royal Malaysian Navy only offers four Laksamana-class corvettes (675 tons) and an array of 16 smaller missile boats and gun boats that could generally only be used to harass Chinese forces. Burma certainly has an impressive force in its own right – consisting of three domestically produced Anawratha-class corvettes (1,100 tons), six Houxin-class missile boats (500 tons), 10 5 Series-class missile boats (500 tons), and 15 Hainan-class gunboats (450 tons), but the military junta has already demonstrated that it will remain aloof from territorial disputes in the South China Sea and generally supports China’s policy toward Southeast Asia.

The Royal Cambodian Navy is in shambles, consisting solely of five outdated Turya-class torpedo boats (250 tons), five Stenka-class patrol boats (250 tons), and a lone Shershen-class fast attack boat (175 tons). But Cambodian authorities would be just as disinclined to engage in defence sharing as their Burmese counterparts. During Cambodia’s 2012 ASEAN chairmanship, Cambodian officials consistently interfered in efforts by other ASEAN member states to reach a common position on the South China Sea’s territorial disputes. Given the understanding on security issues shared between Cambodian and Chinese officials, as well as China’s status as Cambodia’s largest source of foreign investment and aid, it is apparent that Cambodia has relatively no need for the security guarantees ASEAN could provide as a regional counter-balance to China.

Vietnam is the unpredictable factor in the region. The Vietnam People’s Navy has a few corvettes of its own, including a Pauk-class corvette (580 tons), eight Tarantul-class corvettes (540 tons), and 23 patrol ships with displacements ranging from 200 to 375 tons. The Vietnamese government has also ordered two more TT-400TP gunboats (450 tons) from domestic shipbuilders with delivery expected in late 2015 or early 2016. This leaves Vietnam with a force perhaps not as sizable as that of Indonesia or the Philippines but with greater capacity to intervene should China seek to settle territorial disputes with Vietnam by force.

As Malaysia will hold the 2015 Chairmanship of ASEAN, the prospects for a maritime force in support of the bloc’s proposed Political-Security Community will depend to some degree on whether Malaysian officials will be willing to show leadership. If Malaysia looks to acquire new vessels and insists on placing maritime security on the agenda of upcoming ASEAN meetings, some arrangement could be struck by the end of the year. But this will require artful diplomacy, especially in the face of Burmese and Cambodian opposition. With Malaysian officials speaking predominantly about the need for a single market in the region and promoting a conclusion to negotiations regarding the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, such a drive for maritime security may not be forthcoming.

Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. His research interests are diverse and include maritime security, NATO affairs, and African regional integration.

This article can be found in its original form at the  
NATO Council of Canada and was republished by permission.

Capability Analysis

Philippine Navy Frigate Program: An OPV by Any Other Name?

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By Armando J. Heredia

The Philippine Navy has unveiled bidding specifications to purchase it’s first new major surface combatant in several decades. Titled “Frigate Acquisition Program,” this key milestone of the Capability Upgrade Program will reorient the nation’s military from decades of COIN operations and enable a credible defense against conventionally-armed opponents.

090906-N-0120R-068A closer look at the program’s bid specifications along with missions that are likely to be met by the platform, reflects the balancing act between cost and capability that all naval forces must perform when seeking mid-to-low assets. Is it really a frigate that they’re looking for? Or is it more of a corvette? Or even an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)?

It’s worth noting that at a functional view, the distinctions today between frigates, corvettes and OPVs are subtle; and in most cases, the label used is more about political expediency than clear-cut delineations about capabilities. For purposes of this article, an OPV leans towards enforcement or constabulary duties as opposed to being a dedicated combatant vessel, with a minimal weapons fit necessary to fulfill it’s function.

A Philippine Navy Desired Force Mix paper published in 2012 identified gaps in several operational specialties including Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW); roles traditionally filled by frigates and corvettes. The bid specifications at a high level paint a picture of a multi-role combatant with embarked helicopter that meets both those capabilities, plus a moderate surface warfare punch.

However, a closer look at the requirements calls into question if the program is really seeking a frigate:

  • Perform Economic Zone Protection Roles
  • Operate up to Sea State 6
  • Operational Range of 4,500 nautical miles @ 15 knots
  • 30 Days Endurance
  • Minimum upper speed of 25 knots

Starting at the top, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) specification combined with high endurance and rough sea-state handling gives signals that we’re looking more at a patrol vessel for primary use. The contemporary history of spats with China over the resource-rich Shoals and the Spratlys is a stark reminder that asserting claims in the maritime space is one of the Philippine’s political drivers for modernization. Currently, the Navy has only two vessels capable of sustained operations to the edges of the EEZ; namely the newly acquired High-Endurance Cutters (WHEC) from the U.S. Coast Guard. It’s logical that follow-on ships would enhance those same patrol and presence operations.

The lower speed range (most combatants top out at 30+ knots), large operating radius, modest cruise rate and long endurance time reinforce the idea of patrol rather than dedicated offensive operations. While a specific propulsion type is not mentioned, one of the reasons the Philippines did not leverage wide availability of gas-turbine ships in the used defense market is a concern for their high fuel consumption rates. That may be explained in some part by the doubling of the Navy’s Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants (POL) expenditure; seeming to coincide with the initial operating year of the gas-powered Hamilton WHECs. While the cutters by themselves cannot be the sole cause, it’s a reminder that with new acquisitions comes a increased overhead – there are no free lunches. Gas-turbine plants are also a novelty, having been introduced to the Fleet only on the WHECs – and an older model to boot. Given all that, it’s likely that the winning bid will be diesel-based. This is also a characteristic of patrol vessels, prioritizing fuel efficiency and a greater operating range while trading off reduced speeds for sprints, evasive maneuvers and transits.

Other aspects to consider:

  • Embarked helicopter and rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) facilities, including full hangar space for the aviation asset
  • Accommodations for special warfare or other occupants
  • Selection of a 2D air search radar and Electro-Optical (EO) sensors
  • A quadruple Surface-to-Air (SAM) launcher with infrared or semi-active homing missiles (5km minimum range)
  • Two dual-box Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Launchers (total of four missiles, 50 km minimum range)
  • 76mm main gun
  • One (1) secondary stabilized gun

Again, some subtle differences delineate this vessel’s requirements from a pure combat craft. Helos and RHIBs are common to both ship types – force multipliers that enable presence, intelligence-gathering and and if needed, kinetic reach well beyond the ship’s limits. Conversely, they can also be used for search-and-rescue (SAR) and law enforcement. A possible supporting indicator is whether the winning bid uses ramps versus davits. The latter method is more versatile and enables SAR operations in rougher seas that would swamp a ramp-equipped ship. The additional accommodations, while noted for special warfare detachments, can also double as holding areas for refugees, survivors or detainees.

When selecting a sensor suite for a frigate, there are no advantages to having a 2D radar versus a more capable 3D radar that facilitates, among other things, effective anti-air warfare. Coupled with the minimal SAM armament that is purely defensive in capability, this cannot be one of the ships meeting the AAW role. The under specification of the SSMs (eight missiles are nominally found on most warships) is another indicator of the balance between versatility and weapons fit, potentially indicating that deckspace is either at a premium or needs to be freed for other purposes. The 76mm main gun leverages operational and maintenance commonality, as the Oto-Melara is present on other ships in the fleet. It is also just about the largest caliber that can be found on patrol vessels. No explicit Close-In Weapons System, a staple in modern warfare against missile-equipped opponents, is another tell. Very rarely are OPVs armed with last-ditch defense systems, and their secondary gun is usually a slower-firing weapon in the 20-35mm range rather than high-speed multi-barrelled Phalanxes or GoalKeepers.

Of the eleven prospective bidders, what are some of the offerings that might fit? The tight budget requirement really drives baselines to be a small hull, likely accompanied by a custom sensor/weapons fit that may not tick all the boxes.

Navatia’s Avante 1800 is an excellent candidate, ticking and in most cases, exceeding the requirement checkboxes. South Korea could be sitting pretty, as the pending sale of FA-50 fighters could put them at the top of the list to leverage same-source efficiencies. But it will take a lot of corner-cutting to get Hyundai’s Incheon-class frigate down-specified to fit the bill. While not in the prospective bidders list, other close alternatives are BAE’s Amazonas-class OPV, and ST Marine’s Fearless baseline platform. Other alternatives may be immediately disqualified on the basis that they must be “proven vessels,” – i.e., previous successful sales of the platform in the past ten years.

Given the short period that has passed since publication of the technical specifications, it’s not surprising that the bidding deadline moved to the end of November, granting interested parties more time to build competitive proposals. Of all the hurdles they face, the one that may be most daunting is the projected total budget of roughly USD400 Million for both units plus integrated logistics support. The situation is further complicated by the notorious 2-Stage Bid Process that has derailed previous acquisition programs.

A term that will likely puzzle and frustrate the bid analysis is “Fitted for but not with” – meaning, “yes, we’d like to have Feature X, but if your bid doesn’t have it, it might still be okay and we might actually have the money for it but we can’t tell you right now.” It’s a very big symptom of the program’s tone of uncertainty. If no changes are issued to the technical specifications, then only pre-bid Q&A will enable prospective companies to tailor their offerings.

The program could quickly run out of steam if winning bids don’t emerge. If that happens, the bid process resets with accompanying waiting periods. Several factors are lining up that would make such delays to a successful signed contract fatal. For starters, the monies allocated will need to eventually be reset if not spent, requiring passage again through an already lengthy and onerous legislative process. President Benigno Aquino III’s term will end in 2016, and there is no guarantee that the following administration will be as supportive of military modernization. Finally, there is growing call for a rejection of purchases that are not addressing immediate security needs such as the Sabah and Zamboanga crises. Assuming a bid makes it past, they will still have to reckon with Stage 2, where potentially something as small as a documentation omission or error could force a reset back to the beginning as well.

To succeed, the Frigate Acquisition Program needs to move away from a minimums-only approach on technical specifications. A Request-for-Proposal that states minimums exclusively will beget minimums – driving the bidders to a cost-sensitive solution. By emphasizing what this platform really should excel at (i.e., surface warfare or AAW), this gives maneuvering room for the suppliers to build in additional selling points under the bottom line. This gives the Philippine Navy a solution that should satisfy cost limitations and deliver the most value.

Armando J. Heredia is a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Events, Uncategorized

Typhoon Haiyan – 48 Hours After

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PAF C-130s and a Sokol helicopter (background) at the battered Tacloban City Airport. Image Credit: Reuters
PAF C-130s and a Sokol helicopter (background) at the battered Tacloban City Airport. Image Credit: Reuters

Super Typhoon Haiyan tore through the Central Visayas area of the Philippines, not only leveling Tacloban City where she made first landfall, but ripped through the islands of Samar and Leyte, Northern Cebu and the Panay provinces and swiped Busuanga Island, on her way out to the Western Philippine Sea. One apt description of Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) was “easily a Category 4 Hurricane, but combined with a tornado having a hundred-mile wide damage path .”

The impacted area is about the size of West Virginia, but with the added complication of being scattered islands and archipelagos, relying on key transit points including airports, seaports and vital roads and bridges that are mostly inoperable. Thanks to a storm surge of up to 24 feet, much of the infrastructure may remain closed or damaged for months. Reports of casualties vary, but victim narratives backed by initial media coverage and official government tallies seem to confirm that at least over one hundred people lost their lives in the storm. That number is likely to rise as contact is re-established with the harder-hit outlying areas. As of the time of this article’s publication, the storm made landfalls over 5 islands, displacing over 600,000 people, destroying or damaging at least 20,000 homes and structures.

The Philippine Government had sufficient warning and heeding past incidents, pre-positioned relief supplies and began mandatory evacuations of residents into emergency shelters such as stadiums and other sturdy structures. No one was prepared however, for the immense damage wrought by winds close to 190 miles per hour with gusts exceeding that figure, along with flash flooding and storm surges that easily came to rooftop levels in most locations. Possibly the only saving grace is the speed of the storm that wrought those winds also made a quick transit of the Visayas region.

With Haiyan now well off-shore and threatening the Vietnamese coast, damage assessment efforts have begun. A generous outpouring of international aid both near and far, and deployment of US Navy units out of Japan will bolster current government operations to bring immediate relief. The challenge is that the entire area is dark, literally. A complete power and communications blackout has hampered efforts to reach both major population centers and the the more isolated townships and villages. Tacloban City airport was devastated, but some reports indicate that the runway is mostly intact. Initial sorties by the Philippine Air Force were focused on delivering electrical generators and sufficient communications gear to replace what was lost on the ground and re-establish links to unaffected areas of the country. Based on media photos, a few PAF C-130s and Sokol utility helicopters were seen on the battered and congested ramp, but the lack of electrical power, damage to the control tower and fueling areas will severely limit the number of flights the airport can handle in the coming days. Sealift support by the Philippine Navy includes up to 20 vessels, most notably the hard-working Bacolod City-class Logistical Landing Craft, a familiar sight from recent crises such as the Bohol earthquake and the Zamboanga City uprising. Overall, the government committed a goodly portion of it’s military and civilian assets and personnel prior to Haiyan’s arrival, to quickly deal with the aftermath. This comprehensive effort is being managed through the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), the equivalent to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Perhaps the only benefit of this natural disaster was the temporary cessation of the standoff at Ayungin Shoals – the Philippine Marines aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre safely rode out the storms, as did many other of the small, isolated detachments in the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or as the contested Spratleys are known. The Chinese Maritime Surveillance ships quickly moved out ahead of the oncoming tempest for safer harbor.

As with any major Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Recovery (HA/DR) operation, the bulk of relief supplies will have to be sent via ship or ground. Most roads remain blocked by fallen trees and other debris, with the critical San Juanico bridge linking Leyte, where Tacloban City is located, with it’s Northern neighbor Samar, currently under safety evaluation. This vital road link between the two islands is the only way road-bound supplies can reach the impact zone. Tacloban Seaport is blocked, mostly by debris and ships wrecked and washed ashore by the typhoon’s powerful waves. The San Juanico strait is barely navigable, and the bottom which is littered with World War II shipwrecks are now further cluttered by new victims. Assuming the port can be cleared, this will force relief vessels to either pass north through the San Bernardino Straits and swing around Samar or south through the Surigao Straits into Leyte Gulf, adding miles to an already long voyage.

In a scene eerily reminiscent of the days following Hurricane Katrina, lawlessness and looting have broken out in the major population centers, with President Benigno Aquino III resisting calls to impose martial law, despite some local governments ceding effective control and operations back to Manila due to manpower shortages. Government forces are starting to arrive to deliver both aid and establish law and order. The coming weeks will be the critical time, as efforts to rebuild, restore power, establish potable water sources and housing will be racing the clock against starvation, disease and exposure to the elements.

How to help:

NBC Summary Page of Relief Operations
CNN Summary Page of Relief Operations

Juramentado is the pseudonym for Armando J. Heredia, a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.