Tag Archives: Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

For America and Japan, Peace and Security Through Technology, Pt. 1

By Capt. Tuan N. Pham, USN

This is part one of a two-part series on the urgent need for a bilateral technology roadmap to field and sustain a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting technology-enabled Joint Force that can seamlessly conduct high-end maritime operations in the Indo-Pacific…a fitting legacy for former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his successor Yoshihide Suga, staunch champions of the enduring U.S.-Japan Alliance. 

In today’s strategic environment of Great Power Competition (GPC), global powers actively vie for preeminence. The growing competition is particularly acute in the technology domain, as evidenced by the ongoing technology race amongst the world powers. The global powers invest heavily in Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies to build national power, global influence, and international prestige and to prepare for uncertain economic and security futures. 

The United States and Japan are fully committed to national security technological innovation. The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 2020 Defense of Japan (DOJ) White Paper call for the harnessing, investing, and protecting of their respective technology bases for competitive advantages. Both nations share the strategic imperative and urgency to develop and sustain a technology-enabled Joint Force (otherwise known in Japan as the Multi-Domain Defense Force) that can conduct synchronized, distributed, and integrated operations across the interconnected and contested battlespaces in furtherance of the alliance’s shared national interests. The changing character of warfare has made warfighting a transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional activity. The U.S. Navy (USN) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) must, therefore, better leverage emerging maritime technologies and developing concomitant naval warfare concepts and doctrines to adapt to the new way of fighting. Otherwise, the allied navies risk ceding the technology domain and consequently maritime superiority in the Indo-Pacific to the competing navies of revisionist China and revanchist Russia – People’s Liberation Army Navy and Russian Federation Navy, respectively.

How China and Russia View Technological Competition

For General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping, technological advancement is not only a means to economic, political, and military power and influence for the CCP; it is also the “Long March” (or way) toward regional hegemony and ultimately global preeminence and an ideological end to itself: the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. The Chinese Dream offers hope for and validation of China as a great rising power after decades of political, economic, and social struggles. The commitment to advanced technologies reflects Beijing’s longing for past imperial glory (Middle Kingdom), its wishful guarantee against another century of humiliation (19th-century colonialism), and steadfast ambition to surpass the United States and Europe (21st century of Asia preeminence). To that end, China endeavors to become a global leader in every sector and domain and dominate emerging “game-changing” technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, and blockchain in accordance with its Made in China 2025 and Internet Plus policy initiatives. To Xi, technological innovation, by all means, is necessary to surpass the West, and technological dominance is the path to realize global preeminence by 2049 – the essence of the Chinese Dream.

Russian President Vladimir Putin likewise understands and appreciates the disruptive potential of technology as he tries to restore Russia to its former greatness. In 2017, he presciently declared that “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [explicitly AI and implicitly technology at large] will become the ruler of the world.” The bold statement summarizes well the purpose and intent behind the 2017 Strategy for the Development of an Information Society for 2017–2030, one of Putin’s key policy initiatives to rebuild Russia to its past Soviet glory. The technology strategy supplements and complements the greater 2015 National Security Strategy which reflects a Russia more confident in its ability to defend its sovereignty, resist Western pressure and influence, and realize its great power aspirations. 

Bilateral Technology Roadmap

The Department of Defense (DOD) technological advantage depends on a healthy and secure national security innovation base that includes both traditional and non-traditional partners. (2018 U.S. NDS)    

Japan will enhance priority defense capability areas as early as possible – strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations and core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base. (2020 DOJ White Paper)

The U.S. NDS and DOJ White Paper call for harnessing, investing, and protecting their respective national security innovation and technology bases to better respond to the growing challenges to the rules-based liberal international order (LIO) by illiberal powers like China and Russia. Washington and Tokyo both want to develop innovative technological approaches, make targeted and sustained technological investments, and execute disciplined fielding of critical warfighting capabilities to the Joint Force (Multi-Domain Defense Force ) – a force that can protect national and allied interests, advance the bilateral military-to-military relationship, strengthen the strategic alliance, promote the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and uphold the LIO. 

Now is the opportune time to build a bilateral technology roadmap to field and sustain a lethal, resilient, and adaptable Joint Force, enabled by technology, that can seamlessly conduct high-end maritime operations in the Indo-Pacific – a predominantly maritime fight in a maritime domain. To do otherwise is a missed opportunity to strengthen the enduring U.S.-Japan alliance, increase the stabilizing regional security, and reinforce the weakening LIO that has provided global security and prosperity for over 70 years.

The technology roadmap should leverage extant USN and JMSDF technology strategies and plans to identify and prioritize joint projects for collaboration across the respective governments, private industries, and academia. By doing so, the allied stakeholders can identify current, proposed, and potential collaborative projects. Stakeholders must assess the cultural, institutional, organizational, and legal challenges of each country to determine how best to promote and incentivize bilateral collaboration. They must also expand the framework to all the joint services, and eventually extend the framework to other key allies and partners in the region and beyond.

Proposed Roadmap Framework

Purpose and Scope: In alignment with the defense strategies of the United States and Japan, the roadmap should examine the strategic environment in the innovative technology domain through the lens of GPC. This roadmap should:

  • Characterize the current state, development, and employment of disruptive technologies across the USN and JMSDF.
  • Envision the future integration of these emerging maritime technologies and developing concomitant naval concepts (doctrines) into the Joint Force.
  • Identify the barriers to realizing that joint future.
  • Outline the proposed actions to overcome those barriers.
  • Leverage the pervasive technological innovations happening in government, private industry, and academia within the United States and Japan.
  • Inform the actions of stakeholders who possess limited resources (human capital, money, and knowledge), incongruent cultures, and sometimes conflicting priorities to effectively and efficiently accelerate the development, fielding, and integration of joint warfighting capabilities in a fiscally constrained budgetary environment across the current U.S. Future Years Defense Program and Japan Mid-Term Defense Program.

Vision and Goals. The USN and JMSDF should contribute to the development and sustainment of a technology-enabled Joint Force. In the near term, both allied navies should develop a bilateral technology roadmap to deliver joint warfighting capabilities and increase joint warfighting capacities to the Multi-Domain Defense Force. In the long-term, each allied navy should modify its respective Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material Solutions, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policies (DOTMLPF-P) to provide the infrastructure and systems required to support the development, fielding, integration, and sustainment of these new joint warfighting capabilities and capacities. 

The broader U.S. DOD and Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) should also modernize their respective defense infrastructures (to include ecosystems of technical professionals, research facilities, and partnerships) to better support cutting-edge Science and Technology (S&T), realize the technology-enabled Joint Force, and maintain technological superiority over a rising China and resurging Russia, which are also making rapid technological advancements and incorporating them into their respective modernized forces. Long-term strategic success requires focused investment in four fundamental S&T areas – fundamental research, technical workforce, defense laboratories, and partnerships with the private sector and key allies and partners.

Objectives: The USN and JMSDF should consider broad and interlocked objectives to realize the aforesaid vision and goals. These include:

  • Define and prioritize emerging maritime technologies and developing concomitant naval concepts (doctrines) to maintain warfighting superiority.
  • Be technically and fiscally capable of fielding and sustaining maritime technologies at will.
  • Be interoperable and cyberspace-secure, and have adequate infrastructure and logistics support in both nations.
  • Be consistent with the programmatic principles of affordability, interoperability, agility, and resiliency.
  • Leverage emerging accelerated acquisition processes to enable the rapid development, demonstration, and fielding of maritime technologies.
  • Develop policies to allow the implementation of new bilateral warfighting capabilities and advance mutual naval interests.
  • Promote joint warfighter’s trust in these new maritime technologies.
  • Build on the Navy-to-Navy technology exchange and collaboration to extend to the other services and expand to other key allies and partners as and when appropriate.

This concludes part one of a two-part series that calls for a bilateral technology roadmap to field and sustain a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting technology-enabled Joint Force that can seamlessly conduct high-end maritime operations in the Indo-Pacific. Part two underscores the imperatives to do so and describes the ongoing technology competition within the region through the lens of GPC in the 21st century.    

CAPT Pham is a maritime strategist, strategic planner, naval researcher, and China Hand with 20 years of experience in the Indo-Pacific. He completed a research paper with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) at the U.S. Naval War College (USNWC) in 2020. The articles are derived from the aforesaid paper. The views expressed here are personal and do not reflect the positions of the U.S. Government, USN, ONR or USNWC.

Featured photo: RADM Winter and RADM Saito discuss Science and Technology partnerships between the U.S. and Japan, aboard Japanese JS Izumo (DDH-183). Photo credit: Office of Naval Research, released. https://twitter.com/usnavyresearch/status/743474786643251201

China’s South China Sea Strategy: Simply Brilliant

This article can be found in its original form at ASPI here, and was republished with permission.

In the past 12 months, China has provoked considerable attention with its reclamation activities in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratlys where it controls seven maritime features.

China’s history of salami-slicing presents a dilemma to regional countries as well as external powers with regional interests: do they escalate an incident each time China slices the salami and risk open conflict, or stand down and allow China to augment its territorial claims.

The million-dollar question remains: who or what will freeze China’s reclamation in the South China Sea? The answer: nothing, really.

It has been proposed, for example, that like-minded states carve out a ‘code of practice’ that would stress the rule of law and mirror the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Another option being considered by the Pentagon is to send US aircraft and ships within 12 nautical miles of the Chinese-built reefs in the Spratlys, to challenge its influence there.

While useful, such proposals won’t freeze or rollback China’s attempts to change the facts on the ground (or the high sea). China’s reclamation seeks to pre-empt any decision that would come from the Philippines’ challenge in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea over China’s nine-dash line claim to the South China Sea.

It’s noteworthy that China hasn’t only engaged in salami slicing; it has sought to use the attraction of its economy, trade and aid to offset its high-risk behaviour.

Following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident with the Philippines, China launched a charm offensive in 2013, wooing ASEAN with a treaty of friendship and cooperation, stressing that it intended to take China–ASEAN relations from a ‘golden decade’ to a ‘diamond decade’.

This year, when concerns about China’s reclamation have intensified, China has offered a carrot: US and other countries would be welcome to use civilian facilities it’s building in the South China Sea for search and rescue and weather forecasting, when ‘conditions are right’.

China has also used its economic weight to deftly tilt the balance (of influence, at least) in its favor. Its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is attracting long-standing American allies such as Great Britain, Australia and South Korea. China has stolen a march on the US in the battle to win friends and influence people.

And the economic offensive doesn’t end with the AIIB. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a free trade agreement that would involve ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea—is seen as a rival to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt is also another lure for peripheral countries keen on leveraging on China’s economic ascent.

Concerted and effective opposition to China’s fait accompli in the South China Sea requires an astute mix of diplomacy and deterrence. It might take the form of a regional effort to get China to clarify its nine-dashed line claims based on UNCLOS principles, an ASEAN ultimatum for China to at least freeze its reclamation activities, and joint ASEAN–US patrols near the reefs being reclaimed by China. This looks unlikely to emerge anytime soon.

ASEAN was damaged in 2012, when it failed—for the first time in its 45-year history—to issue a communiqué due to differing views over the South China Sea. ASEAN has recently upped its game by underscoring the dangers of China’s reclamation, but there’s little the group can do apart from pushing for a formal Code of Conduct. A successful conclusion of the code isn’t assured; China dangles the carrot of code negotiations to buy time even as its carries out reclamation.

For all its rhetoric about the need to uphold international law and the freedom of navigation, the US is conflicted when it comes to China. It all boils down to this: will the US risk its extensive relationship with China over a few rocks in the South China Sea? As Hillary Clinton once said: how does the US ‘deal toughly’ toward its banker?

To get a sense of the effect of China’s creeping invasion of the South China Sea, one only need look at Vietnam. Faced with China’s challenge to its claims to the Paracel Islands, Vietnam has purchased Kilo-class submarines, reportedly armed with sub-launched land-attack Klub missiles that could threaten Chinese coastal targets. But Vietnam didn’t fire a shot when China towed a US$1b oil rig into waters claimed by Vietnam last year. On a recent trip to Hanoi, Vietnamese scholars told me that Vietnamese military officers urged sterner action, such as firing on Chinese ships, but senior leaders vetoed them, instead deciding to sit back and let China incur ‘reputational damage’.

Not many people in Asia would agree with what China is doing in the South China Sea. But as it stands, China’s strategy—salami slicing, using offsets to soften risky behavior and accelerating its reclamation activities in the absence of significant opposition—can be summed up in two words: simply brilliant.

William Choong is a Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Japan’s Izumo Helicopter Carrier Commissioned

Post by Chris Biggers

This past week, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commissioned the lead vessel of its new class of helicopter carrier at a ceremony at the Yokusuka naval base less than 10 miles south of Yokohama, Japan’s second largest city.

The Izumo (DDH-183) is the island nation’s largest vessel superseding the Hyūga class, Japan’s first helicopter carrier post World War II. To get a clear sense of size, satellite imagery from March 2014 shows both vessels at the IHI Marine United shipyard. At the time, the 248 meter-long Izumo was still in the fitting out process while the 197 meter-long Hyūga (DDH-181) was located in a nearby dry-dock undergoing routine maintenance.

At 24,000 tons, the fully loaded Izumo is noticeably larger than its 19,000 ton predecessor and more capable.[1] Manned by approximately 470 sailors, the vessel can support up to 14 helicopters — broken up into seven Mitsubishi-built SH-60k ASW helicopters and seven Agusta Westland MCM-101 mine countermeasure helicopters.

According to Jane’s, the carrier is equipped with an OQQ-22 bow-mounted sonar for submarine detection, two Raytheon RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile SeaRAM launchers and two Phalanx close-in weapon systems for air defense.

“This [vessel] heightens our ability to deal with Chinese submarines that have become more difficult to detect,” an JMSDF officer told the Asahi Shimbum in late March.[2] Downplaying grander ambitions, JMSDF officials have often focused media attention on the ship’s role in undertaking border surveillance and humanitarian assistance missions.

Izumo

Beyond the ship’s standard load, the vessel can also support the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and some have even suggested the vertical landing Lockheed Martin F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter. Although the latter has caused much controversy, putting F-35s on the Izumo seems unlikely given that the advanced fighter was acquired by Japan’s Air Force and not its sea services (to say nothing of the additional retrofit costs that would require of the vessel).

But that hasn’t stopped Chinese assertions and general concerns throughout East Asia of Japanese intent. “The Izumo proves that Japan has the technical capabilities and demand to develop aircraft carriers. It’s also possible that Japan may explore the possibility during the Izumo’s service,” Li Jie, a Beijing-based military commentator, told the Chinese Global Times newspaper. Beyond China, South Korea has also voiced concern.

While no one’s exactly sure how Japan will use the new carrier, its potential for power projection is undeniable. As geopolitical tensions increase, especially with disputed island territories and areas like the South China Sea, it’s not surprising to see Japan push to bolster her navy. With the election of officials like Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, defense spending has gone up and bans on arms exports have been lifted—suggesting Japan is preparing to reinterpret her role on the world stage. What this will ultimately mean for the service is still too early to say.[3]

In the meantime, the USD 1.2 billion Izumo will join JMSDF’s Escort Flotilla 1, based at the Yokosuka naval base, also home of the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet.[4] The vessel was initially laid down on 27 January 2012 and launched on 06 August 2013. It will later be joined in 2017 by the second vessel in the series, the DDH-184, currently under construction at IHI Marine United Shipyard.

This post can be found in its original form at offiziere.ch 

Notes
[1] Both measurements refer to the vessels at full load.
[2] In 2013, Japan said it detected Chinese submarines navigating near territorial waters of Okinawa and Kagoshima prefectures.
[3] Japan has in recent years participated in amphibious warfare training utilizing the Hyuga class helicopter carrier in concert the US. For Example Dawn Blitz 2013.
[4] Japan has 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix of 7-8 warships each. Bases are located at Yokosuka, Kure,Sasebo, Maizuru, and Moinato. SSKs are organized into 2 Flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka. Remaining Units assigned to 5 regional districts.

More Than Meets the Eye in Asian Naval Race

(NoteThis article appeared at RealClearDefense and is cross-posted by permission.)

In previous writing about the ongoing East Asian naval race shortly after the launching of the Japanese helicopter destroyer Izumo (DDH-183), I noted that the feverish naval race may be rooted in historical grievances, fierce competition for scarce resources, and the recent sequestration cuts within the Department of Defense, which may make it more difficult for theUnited States to “manage its alliances and strategic partnerships in the region.”

Izumo

As some of my readers have pointed out, I may have appeared somewhat biased against Japan because I did not fully account for other dynamics of the regional naval competition. However, it is not my intention in any way to accuse Japan or its neighbors of espousing expansionist tendencies.  I should, therefore, point out that the factors behind the ongoing naval race may be more complex than they appear at first.

First, it should be noted that Japan’s 4.68 trillion yen  budget ($46.4 billion) pales incomparison to China’s raw defense budget of $166 billion. Though Japan’s recent 40 billion yen ($410 million) increase in its defense budget has been construed by some in neighboring states as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s hawkish agenda, Japan’s defense budget is relatively modestwhen compared to that of China’s,  and  hence, insufficient to tip the regional security balance in their favor.

That said, the launching of Japan’s newest ship has provoked controversy over what kind of ship the Izumo really is. Whether the Izumo is a STOBAR (Short-Take-Off But Arrested Recovery), VSTOL (Vertical Short Take-Off and Landing), or CATOBAR (Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) type “aircraft carrier” hardly matters. The reason why some of Japan’s neighbors are upset about the Izumo is the fear that Japan may eventually field an F-35B squadron on the ship. In short, it is not Japan’s current capabilities that are provoking uneasiness, but its future naval might.

Indeed, Beijing and Seoul have accused Abe of attempting to repeal the war-renunciation clause within the existing constitution in favor of the “establishment of an army, navy and air force in name.” But both China and South Korea (the Republic of Korea or ROK) share blame for upping the ante for the ongoing naval race.

As Robert Farley, an assistant professor of the Patterson School, noted a few days ago, the Izumo was “hardly the only naval aviation news to emerge over the past week [since]photographic evidence seems to indicate that China is well on its way to a second, indigenous carrier, this one sporting full catapults.”

Not to be left out, the ROK Navy has become a great regional naval power in itself. Like the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, the ROKN also fields an amphibious assault ship, the Dokdo, with a 653 feet-long (199 meters) flight deck. It should be noted that the ship, whichcan supposedly deploy a Marine infantry battalion for any contingencies as they arise, is named after disputed islands claimed by both the ROK and Japan. Moreover, the ROKN hassteadily increased its submarine fleet in response to the growing asymmetric threats emanating from North Korea and Japan’s alleged expansionist tendencies.

ROKS Kim Jwa-jin

While it may be easy to suppose the three East Asian naval powers may be harboring expansionist tendencies, it may also be the case that each is looking to defend its own interests. Indeed, if we trace the origins of this naval race, we can discern that defense budget increases—or  for that matter, acquisition of improved capabilities—by the three East Asian countries were reactions to perceived threats posed by their rivals’ attempts to rearm themselves. Thus, the three states can and should adopt “trust building” diplomatic measures to avert a disastrous regional war.

But the bases for mutual trust remain flimsy at best. Contrary to Trefor Moss’s assertion that neither Japan nor China will go to war because of economic interdependence, economic interdependence does not necessarily translate to trust and cooperation. Furthermore, as Taylor Washburn argues, “major powers have often clashed without escalation.”

Considering the obvious distrust that pervades among the three East Asian naval powers, it is not difficult to understand why I have previously argued that taming the East Asian naval race may require America’s continued diplomatic presence as a disinterested mediator. The United States can no longer afford to appear inflexible in the face of fluid geostrategic dynamics and unrelenting sequestration cuts. Nor can it afford to alienate China by implementing “pivot to Asia” strategy. Not only that, but “leading from behind” to tame the ongoing East Asian naval race just may be the most cost effective way in which to exercise influence in the region.

But most importantly, through this newfound role as peacemaker, the United States can set an example as a peace-loving democratic nation committed to promoting good will within East Asia and to the rest of the world.