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The following article is published in English and Chinese.
By Tommy Jamison
The present dispute over the South China Sea doesn’t hinge on fishing rights, or oil fields, or even military bases. At its root the controversy stems from conflicting, profoundly held and historically consistent “core interests/核心利益.” On the one hand, the United States sees freedom of navigation as a fundamental pillar of the post-war order and integral to the past 70 years of relative peace and prosperity. On the other, China’s (re)assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea should be contextualized within its century long campaign to recover territory lost under (semi)-imperialism. The historical grounding of both these arguments seems lost on much of Washington as well as Beijing.
Left, “China: It Cannot Be Reduced by Even a Little.” Today a common image on social and state media (People’s Daily). Right, “A Map of the Current Situation” c. 1900. “It is obvious at a glance” that a host of imperial powers threatened Chinese sovereignty. (Wikipedia)
Territorial controversies are not new in China. From the Opium War (1839-42) to the present, resisting imperialism and recovering lost territory have constituted core objectives of Chinese foreign policy. As such, it is only through first exploring this historical context that we understand the modern conflict in the South China Sea. Because of “Western” (semi)-imperialism, territorial disputes in Chinese modern history are very common and have profound political ramifications. The question of Shandong’s sovereignty was the fuse for the May Fourth movement (1919); Japan’s aggression in Manchuria (1931) led to the collapse of the post-WWI internationalist system and incited the Second World War; before 1997 Hong Kong was one of the world’s last formal colonies; today Sino-Taiwanese relations remain a powder keg, and so on. From this historical perspective of course the South China Sea is a sensitive question. It is also in some ways a legacy of resistance to imperialism and, to a certain extent, a continuation of the 20th century movement to recover lost territories.
At the same time, from a macroscopic perspective, the U.S. post-war diplomatic strategy can be summarized in four principles: 1) defend democratic regimes; 2) encourage free trade; 3) protect freedom of navigation, because it is a fundamental requirement of free trade (alongside today freedom of information, the skies and even space); and 4) spread liberalization, an admittedly abstract principle. In short, the U.S. post war strategy has been an attempt to replace the pre-war anarchic international system with a liberal internationalist system. China’s activity in the South China Sea threatens these aims, particularly freedom of navigation, and thus threatens the post-war international system. Freedom of navigation is often criticized in mainstream Chinese media, as in, “At root, freedom of navigation is an excuse to implement the ‘pacific rebalance’ strategy and to contain the emergence of China,” but the present world was developed from these ideals. As such, freedom of navigation is in no way an empty slogan, but rather a core U.S. interest.
与此同时，在宏观层面上，美国二战后的外交战略可以归纳为四个原则：一是保护民主政府；二是推动自由贸易；三是捍卫航行自由，因为航行自由是贸易自由最基本的要求，现在这个原则扩展到飞行自由、信息自由，甚至天空自由等范围。第四个原则是最抽象的——普及自由化。简而言之，美国二战后的战略试图用自由国际秩序来代替二战前的无政府国际秩序(anarchic international system)。如今，中国在南海的行为威胁到了这些原则，特别是航行自由，因此也威胁到了二战后的国际秩序。中国主流媒体常常讽刺航行自由，比如“归根结底是借推行航行自由之名，行推进亚太再平衡战略、遏制中国崛起”等，但是目前的世界格局正在这理念之上发展而来。因此，航行自由绝非一个凭空的口号，而是一个核心利益。
The Dagu Fort Memorial, Tianjin China (大沽口炮台纪念馆, 天津). It was built and modernized in the late nineteenth century in an effort to resist foreign amphibious attacks on Beijing. A sign helpfully notes that the memorial, “makes clear to subsequent generations: those who lag behind will be bullied, it is only through strength and prosperity that peace can be achieved.” 昭示后人：落后就要挨打，强盛才有安宁. (Author Photo)
None of this is to say that today’s South China Sea controversy is a direct continuation of China’s resistance to imperialism—far from it—but only to suggest that the conflict’s acuteness cannot be divorced from a larger historical context. When writing his history of Sino-U.S. relations from 1989-2001, David Lampton appropriated a saying about spousal conflict to sum up his findings: Same Bed, Different Dreams (同床异梦). That’s about right for the South China Sea as well. Still, the more worrying phrase might be the oft heard, “one mountain cannot hold two tigers” (一山，不容，二虎), which not coincidently frames the last chapter of Sarah Paine’s excellent history The Wars for Asia (1911-1949). Given the significance of historical context in this dispute, the potential for the misuse of history is likewise apparent. Eric Hobsbawm once wrote, “Historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market.” That danger seems particularly applicable to South China Sea where the trends of nationalism, hegemony, ecological scarcity and globalization intersect.
Still, one thing is for sure, giving serious thought to the historical background informing behavior on both sides of the Pacific would go a long way toward dispelling the distortions of modern day nationalists and bureaucrats alike. It might even help prevent an especially unnecessary war.
Tommy Jamison is a PhD Candidate in International History at Harvard University. He served as an officer in the U.S. Navy between 2009-2014.
Featured Image: South China Sea Goddess of Mercy 南山海上观音圣像. (Percy)
As the South China Sea dispute continues to command headlines, such issues as China’s island building, U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), and the contested arbitration have received justified attention, but a concurrent trend in the activities of the PLA Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea also merits closer consideration. Within the past several months, the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet (南海舰队) has engaged in relatively sophisticated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) drills (反潜作战演练). Historically, China has remained relatively weak in ASW and continues “to lack either a robust coastal or deep-water anti-submarine warfare capability,” according to the Department of Defense.1 Despite such persistent shortcomings, the apparent advances in the realism and complexity of these recent drills suggest that the PLAN’s ASW capabilities could be progressing. Given the context, these drills, which were reported upon in detail in official PLA media,2 might also have been intended as a signaling mechanism at a time of heightened regional tension. Presumably, the PLAN is also motivated by concerns about U.S. submarines operating in the region and the submarines procured by multiple Southeast Asian nations, including rival claimant Vietnam.
While China’s ongoing investments in ASW platforms have indicated an increased prioritization of improving its ASW capabilities, the PLAN’s ability to advance in this regard will also be influenced by its level of training and experience.3 Certainly, the levels of stealth and sophistication of current and future U.S. submarines will continue to pose a considerable challenge. Although the PLAN’s ASW capabilities will likely remain limited in the short term, its attempts to realize advances in ASW reflect a new aspect of its efforts to become a maritime power and attempt to achieve “command of the sea” (制海权) within the first island chain.4
Recent PLAN ASW Drills in the South China Sea
Between May 25th and 26th, the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet engaged in ASW drills that involved a confrontation between Red and Blue Forces that continued “successively for twenty-four hours uninterrupted.”5 After entering the South China Sea through the Bashi Channel, within the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines, the far sea training formation involved initiated the drill “under actual combat conditions.”6 The Red Force involved four surface warships, two Type 052D guided-missile destroyers (Hefei and Guangzhou), a Type 052C destroyer (Lanzhou), and a Type 054A guided-missile frigate (Yulin), as well as three unspecified anti-submarine helicopters, against a Blue Force with an unknown number of submarines.
CNS Kunming (DDG-172) , the first of the Type 052D destroyers. (Photo: 海防先锋 via Wikipedia)
Since anti-submarine operations have reportedly become a “key emphasis” (重点) for the South Sea Fleet, this constituted an attempt to design a more advanced, realistic drill for ASW operations.7 It was characterized as “really rare” given the large size of the search area (1,000 square nautical miles); the multiple forms of anti-submarine forces included; the multiple ASW methods used, including five kinds of sonar; the employment of a greater number of anti-submarine attack weapons including anti-submarine rockets, depth charges, and torpedoes, and finally the length of the drill, which occurred for 24 hours continuously.8 That these aspects of the drill were considered so notable implies that prior drills were appreciably less sophisticated.
Although the drill seemed somewhat more advanced than previous such exercises, PLA media commentary also highlighted the existing shortcomings in the PLAN’s ASW capabilities that the drill was intended to mitigate. According to one PLAN officer who had participated, difficulties included the command and control over and coordination among the forces involved. He also highlighted that the two forces had not established a set program or plan prior to the drill – implying that past drills had been organized around more of a “script” (脚本).9 This lack of a script enabled the whole process to “break through into actual combat confrontation” and “explore anti-submarine methods and approaches.”10 In particular, this realistic training was intended to address certain “important difficulties,” including coordination between ships and aircraft, coordination of firepower, and information-sharing.11 For instance, a Blue Force submarine engaged in evasive measures, such that the Red Force had to cooperate closely and engage in real-time information sharing to locate it again and enable the launching of “precision strikes” against it.12
Although it is difficult to compare this ASW drill to previous iterations qualitatively or quantitatively – given the limitations of available information and uncertainties about the consistency of open-source reporting on such training – a review of prior accounts of the PLAN’s ASW exercises suggests that these drills have advanced considerably within the past several years. There seemingly has been a shift in the PLAN’s ASW training, starting from relatively routine exercises held only annually in the South China Sea, towards these more advanced exercises. In this regard, the South Sea Fleet’s engagement in this ASW drill at a time of heightened tension in the South China Sea not only might have been intended to serve as a signaling mechanism, but also may have reflected a longer-term trend toward advances in the PLAN’s ASW training. In the past several years, the PLAN’s ASW drills in the South China Sea have included the following:
September 2013: In accordance with the PLAN’s annual training plan, the East Sea Fleet held training exercises in the South China Sea that involved unspecified “new type” submarines, with collaboration between anti-submarine ships and anti-submarine helicopters, which reportedly “effectively increased ASW capability under informationized conditions.”13
September 2014: In accordance with the PLAN’s annual training plan, the East Sea Fleet held training exercises in the South China Sea in which there was an emphasis on “testing and exploring anti-submarine tactics.”14
May 2015: The Sino-Russian “Joint Sea” exercise incorporated an ASW component.15
November 2015: The North Sea, South Sea, and East Sea Fleets all engaged in live-fire “confrontation drills” in the South China Sea, involving Blue and Red Forces, which emphasized “information systems of systems ASW capability.”16, 17
January 2016: PLAN exercises with the Pakistan Navy incorporated ASW for the first time.18
May 2016: A sophisticated, realistic drill involving the South Sea Fleet occurred in the South China Sea, as described in detail above.19
July 2016: The PLAN’s extensive exercises in the South China Sea, which involved all three fleets, also included an ASW component.20, 21
While the list above is probably not comprehensive, this sequence seems to illustrate a potential shift in the pattern of the PLAN’s ASW training – or, at least, in official PLA media reporting on these drills. From late 2015 to the present, the reported drills have not occurred in accordance with the prior training schedule and have often involved the South Sea Fleet or multiple fleets. Perhaps this change indicates a shift in focus towards advancing the operational ASW capabilities of the South Sea Fleet in particular. As this timeframe has aligned with heightened regional tensions, the organization of such drills and the reporting on them could have indicated an increased degree of discomfort with the potential intensification of U.S. submarine activity in the South China Sea and also the ongoing procurement of Kilo-class submarines by rival claimant Vietnam, which received its fifth of six submarines in February 2016.22, 23 Eventually, this focus on realistic, unscripted ASW drills could enable the PLAN to progress in capitalizing upon the more advanced ASW platforms that have been concurrently introduced.
Ongoing Investments to Overcome Traditional Weaknesses in ASW
Although the PLAN’s ASW capabilities have historically been lacking, the increased frequency and sophistication of ASW drills have corresponded with investments in and the commissioning of new ASW platforms within the past several years. The PLAN previously had only the Ka-28 and the Z-9C as ASW helicopters, but has introduced the more sophisticated Changhe Z-18F ASW variant.24 Notably, the Y-8FQ Gaoxin-6, an anti-submarine patrol aircraft reportedly analogous to the P-3C, which has a lengthy magnetic anomaly detector, was introduced into the PLAN in 2015.25 Although it was not reported to have participated in recent exercises, the Gaoxin-6 could critically contribute to China’s future ASW capabilities. In June 2016, the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet also commissioned the Type 056A corvette Qujing, the tenth such vessel assigned to it, which reportedly has “good stealth performance” and has been upgraded with a towed array sonar for ASW.26, 27 As of 2016, a total of twenty-six Type 056 corvettes are in service throughout the PLAN, and there might eventually be sixty or more, likely including quite a few of this ASW variant.27
Type 056 corvette. (樱井千一 via Wikipedia)
Beyond these existing platforms, the PLAN has been investing in multiple aspects of its ASW capability that could have significant long-term dividends. According to one assessment, the construction of a helicopter base on reclaimed land on Duncan Island in the Paracels could constitute a component of a future network of helicopter bases that would enable the PLA’s ASW helicopters to operate more effectively in those contested waters.29 The PLA’s existing and future aircraft carriers could launch multiple anti-submarine aircraft, and less-authoritative Chinese media sources have emphasized the expected efficacy of a future Chinese carrier strike group in ASW.30, 31 Concurrently, China has been establishing an underwater system of ocean floor acoustic arrays in the near seas, referred to as the “Underwater Great Wall Project” by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation responsible for its construction.32, 33 In addition, the PLAN clearly recognizes the relevance of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) in ASW. For instance, PLA academics from China’s National Defense University characterize “unmanned operations at sea” as among today’s “important development trends.”34 There are multiple Chinese USVs and UUVs under development,34 and PLA-affiliated individuals and institutes have evidently engaged in extensive research on the topic.36
Conclusion
Although the operational potential associated with such investments might require years to be actualized, China could eventually become a significant ASW force in the South China Sea and beyond. While the PLAN’s ability to engage effectively in ASW will likely remain limited by persistent shortcomings and its relative lack of experience for the short term, it is nonetheless notable that the PLAN has evidently decided to compete in an area of traditional U.S. advantage, which had previously seemed to be a lower priority for it. These apparent advances in its ASW drills and increased investment in a variety of ASW platforms could allow the PLAN to become an inconvenience and eventually an impediment to the ability of other regional players, and perhaps even U.S. submarines, to operate unchallenged in the South China Sea. Thus far, the PLAN appears to be focusing primarily on near seas ASW, especially with the “Underwater Great Wall,” and this concern regarding defense within the first island chain could reflect a reaction to the intensified U.S. focus on submarines as a tool to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities.37
This undersea dimension of strategic competition will likely continue to be a priority for the U.S. and China alike, and the South China Sea will remain of unique strategic importance. Notably, the majority of China’s submarines, including its SSBNs, is based on Hainan Island and would probably transit to the Pacific through the South China Sea.38 While the prevailing “undersea balance” seems unlikely to change significantly in the near future,39 the PLAN’s undersea warfare capabilities could advance more rapidly than anticipated across multiple dimensions. For instance, by one assessment, China’s new Type 093B SSN could be stealthier than expected.40 Looking forward, the traditional dynamics could also be appreciably altered by technological change. In particular, the U.S. and China’s parallel advances in unmanned systems, which will likely play a significant role in future undersea warfare, could accelerate competition in this domain. While visiting the USS John C. Stennis in the South China Sea, Secretary of Defense Carter alluded to the Pentagon’s investment in “new undersea drones in multiple sizes and diverse payloads that can, importantly, operate in shallow water, where manned submarines cannot,” which could become operational within the next several years.41 The PLAN’s USVs and UUVs might not be far behind. Although the PLAN may prove unable to overcome the U.S. Navy’s undersea dominance beyond the first island chain, the South China Sea itself could become a zone of “contested command” and frequent undersea friction in the years to come.42
Elsa Kania is a recent graduate of Harvard College and currently works as an analyst at Long Term Strategy Group.
Endnotes
1. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,” April 26, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016 China Military Power Report.pdf. For prior assessments of China’s relative weaknesses and gradual advances in anti-submarine warfare, see, for instance: Stratfor, “China: Closing the Gap in Anti-Submarine Warfare,” July 20, 2015.
2. See the PLA articles referenced later in the article, including: Li Youtao [黎友陶] and Dong Zhaohui [董兆辉], “The South Sea Fleet Organized Anti-Submarine Operations Drills [Which] Continued for 24 Hours Without Interruption” [南海舰队组织反潜作战演练连续24小时不间断].
3. For reflection on the importance of training and experience in ASW, see, for instance: Lt. Cmdr. Jeff W. Benson, USN, “A New Era in Anti-Submarine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 27, 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/08/27/opinion-new-era-anti-submarine-warfare.
4. The objective of becoming a “maritime power” was also articulated in China’s latest defense white paper. See: Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China[中华人民共和国国防部], “China’s Military Strategy” [中国的军事战略],” May 26, 2015.
5. Li Youtao [黎友陶] and Dong Zhaohui [董兆辉], “The South Sea Fleet Organized Anti-Submarine Operations Drills [Which] Continued for 24 Hours Without Interruption” [南海舰队组织反潜作战演练连续24小时不间断], China Military Online, May 26, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-05/26/content_7073486.htm.
6. Ibid.
7. “The Strongest Lineup! The South Sea Fleet’s Five Large Primary Warships Through Day and Night [Engaged in] Joint Anti-Submarine [Operations]” [最强阵容！南海舰队五大主力战舰跨昼夜联合反潜], PLA Daily, May 27, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-05/27/c_129019813.htm.
8. Li Youtao [黎友陶] and Dong Zhaohui [董兆辉], “The South Sea Fleet Organized Anti-Submarine Operations Drills [Which] Continued for 24 Hours Without Interruption” [南海舰队组织反潜作战演练连续24小时不间断], China Military Online, May 26, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-05/26/content_7073486.htm.
9. Ibid.
10. “The Strongest Lineup! The South Sea Fleet’s Five Large Primary Warships Through Day and Night [Engaged in] Joint Anti-Submarine [Operations]” [最强阵容！南海舰队五大主力战舰跨昼夜联合反潜], PLA Daily, May 27, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-05/27/c_129019813.htm.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. “The East Sea Fleet’s South [China] Sea Drills Life-Fire Multiple New-Type War Mines, Successfully Destroying the Targets” [东海舰队南海演练实射多枚新型战雷成功摧毁目标], PLA Daily, September 26, 2013, http://mil.cnr.cn/jstp/201309/t20130926_513692312.html.
14. “The Navy’s East [China] Sea Fleet Organized Live-Fire Drills Under Complicated Acoustic Conditions” [海军东海舰队组织复杂水声环境下战雷实射演练], PLA Daily, September 26, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-09/27/c_127040400.htm.
16. “Chinese navy conducts anti-submarine confrontation drill in South China Sea,” CCTV, November 20, 2015, http://220.181.168.86/NewJsp/news.jsp?fileId=327578.
17. The Navy Held Submarine-Aircraft Confrontation Drills in a Certain Maritime Space in the South China Sea” [海军在南海某海域举行潜舰机实兵对抗演练], China Youth Daily, November 21, 2015, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2015-11-20/doc-ifxkwaxv2563788.shtml.
18. Koh Swee Lean Collin, “China and Pakistan Join Forces Under the Sea,” National Interest, January 7, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-pakistan-join-forces-under-the-sea-14829
19. Li Youtao [黎友陶] and Dong Zhaohui [董兆辉], “The South Sea Fleet Organized Anti-Submarine Operations Drills [Which] Continued for 24 Hours Without Interruption” [南海舰队组织反潜作战演练连续24小时不间断], China Military Online, May 26, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-05/26/content_7073486.htm.
20. “The Three Large Fleets’ Realistic Confrontation,” [三大舰队实兵对抗], China Navy Online, July 14, 2016, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7154202.htm.
21. Ibid.
22. “The Fifth Russian-Made Kilo Submarine [Has Been] Consigned to Vietnam” [第五艘俄制基洛级潜艇“托运”到越南], Xinhua, March 3, 2016, http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-03/03/content_6907855.htm.
23. Minnie Chan, “China and US in silent fight for supremacy beneath waves of South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, July 8, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1985071/china-and-us-silent-fight-supremacy-beneath-waves-south.
24.“The Z-18 Anti-Submarine Helicopter [Has Been] Fitted With a New Radar [That] Can Attack Air-Independent Propulsion Submarines” [直18反潜直升机配新雷达 可攻击AIP潜艇], Sina, April 30, 2014, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-04-30/1712776972.html.
25.“Expert: “Gaoxin-6” improves China’s anti-submarine capability greatly,” China Military Online, July 10, 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2015-07/10/content_4594293.htm.
26. “China commissions new missile frigate Qujing,” China Military Online, June 12, 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-06/12/content_7096962.htm.
27. “A New-Type Corvette Has Been Officially Delivered to the Navy” [新型护卫舰正式交付海军],Ministry of National Defense Website, February 26, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-02/26/content_2340335.htm.
28. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016,” April 26, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016 China Military Power Report.pdf.
29. Victor Robert Lee, “Satellite Images: China Manufactures Land at New Sites in the Paracel Islands,” The Diplomat, February 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/satellite-images-china-manufactures-land-at-new-sites-in-the-paracel-islands/.
30. “The PLA Is Building an Effective Weapon in the South [China] Sea’s Seabed Against the American Military’s Submarines” [解放军针对美军潜艇在南海海底打造利器], Sina, June 18, 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-06-18/doc-ifxtfrrc3844240.shtml.
31. “Our Aircraft Carrier Fitted with an Anti-Submarine Weapon [Will] Make American and Japanese Submarines Not Rashly Dare To Draw Near” [我航母配一反潜利器 使美日潜艇不敢轻易靠近], Sina, June 29, 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-06-29/doc-ifxtsatm0986174.shtml.
32. Richard D. Fisher, “China proposes ‘Underwater Great Wall’ that could erode US, Russian submarine advantages,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 17, 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/60388/china-proposes-underwater-great-wall-that-could-erode-us-russian-submarine-advantages.
33. See also: Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, “Wired for Sound in the ‘Near Seas,’” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2014, http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/media-ugc/items/2014-04-28-11-39-30-Goldstein&Knight%20-%20Wired%20for%20Sound%20in%20the%20Near%20Seas%20-%20Apr14.pdf.
34. Li Daguang [李大光] and Chan Jiang [姜灿], “Unmanned Surface Vehicles Have Become a Cutting-Edge Weapon for Future Maritime Warfare,” [无人艇成未来海上新锐武器], PLA Daily, February 12, 2014, http://military.china.com.cn/2014-02/12/content_31445672.htm.
35. Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “The Great Underwater Wall of Robots,” Eastern Arsenal, June 22, 2016, http://www.popsci.com/great-underwater-wall-robots-chinese-exhibit-shows-off-sea-drones.
36. For instance, Jiao Anlong [焦安龙],“An Exploration of Unmanned Anti-Submarine Warfare Platforms Under Informationized Conditions” [信息化条件下无人反潜作战平台探析], Science and Technology Horizons, (33), pp. 403-404, http://www.cqvip.com/qk/70356a/201333/48101887.html.
37. See, for instance: Megan Eckstein, “CNO Richardson: Navy Needs Distributed Force Of Networked Ships, Subs To Counter A2/AD Threat,” USNI News, March 11, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/03/11/cno-richardson-navy-needs-distributed-force-of-networked-ships-subs-to-counter-a2ad-threat.
38. For recent commentary on the topic, see, for instance: Minnie Chan, “South China Sea air strips’ main role is ‘to defend Hainan nuclear submarine base,’” South China Morning Post, July 23, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacydefence/article/1993754/southchinaseaairstripsmainroledefendhainan.
39. For a more detailed consideration of the undersea balance, see: Owen Cote, “Assessing the Undersea Balance Between the U.S. and China,” SSP Working Paper, February 2011.
40. Dave Majumdar, “Why the US Navy Should Fear China’s New 093B Nuclear Attack Submarine,” National Interest, June 27, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/whytheusnavyshouldfearchinasnew093bnuclearattack16741 .
41. Geoff Dyer, “U.S. to sail submarine drones in South China Sea,” Financial Times, April 18, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/18/us-to-sail-submarine-drones-in-south-china-sea.html.
42. This term is taken from: Bernard Brodie, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.: 1942.
Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 13, 2016) A sailor from the Chinese navy submarine rescue ship Changdao (867) sits in an LR-7 submersible undersea rescue vehicle off the coast of Hawaii following a successful mating evolution between the LR-7 and a U.S. faux-NATO rescue seat laid by USNS Safeguard (T-ARS-50), during Rim of the Pacific 2016. The evolution was the final event and practical portion of a multinational submarine rescue exercise between seven countries. (Chinese navy photo by Kaiqiang Li)
As a part of CIMSEC’s South China Sea topic week and our regular Sea Control Podcast, we bring you a discussion on the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on territorial disputes in the South China Sea with one of the China-watching community’s best known, most respected, and outspoken voices, retired U.S. Navy Captain James Fanell. Captain Fanell and host Sally DeBoer discuss the implications of the ruling, thoughts on Chinese, American, and international reactions to the court’s findings, and possible directions for the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-Pacific going forward. A transcript of the discussion can be found below, as well as a download link of the audio recording. This interview has been edited for clarity.
SD: On July 12th, the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration ruledon territorial disputes between the PRC and the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS). The court ruled largely on the side of the Philippines, denying the legitimacy of China’s claims and upholding international law as outlined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, recognizing territorial seas, but not exclusive economic zones, of several disputed features, including the Spratly Islands. Further, the court found that China violated the Philippines’ sovereignty when they interfered with fishing and petroleum exploration activities in the Philippines exclusive economic zone. The court also upheld the right of both China and the Philippines to conduct fishing in and around Scarborough Shoal. China, who has denied and continues to deny the legitimacy of the court’s ruling, publicly stated its intention to both ignore the court’s findings and continue construction of artificial islands. Immediate responses from Chinese media stated that the ruling was an “American-backed farce,” while statements from Chinese officials echo this sentiment and reinforce their commitment to exercising control over their “nine dash line” claims. Clearly there is a great deal to unpack and discuss on this ruling and its implications going forward. Fortunately for us, our guest today is an expert on the matter. Joining us today is retired U.S. Navy Captain James Fanell, former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet, and founder of Red Star Rising. In the tradition of our Sea Control podcast, we will give Captain Fanell a chance to introduce himself before we get started.
JF: Good Afternoon, Sally, thanks for inviting me to participate in Sea Control and CIMSEC’s valuable efforts to bring information to the general public and raise our consciousness on what’s going on in the maritime domain. I’m pleased to talk about this subject and there’s a lot to cover and I will just say that I am happy to be talking to you from Eastern Switzerland where I’m currently a fellow at the Geneva Center for Security Policy.
SD: I want to begin by characterizing the ruling. Sir, what was your general impression of the courts’ finding? Is the finding more or less sweeping than you had expected – are there any facets of the ruling that surprised you?
Itu Aba, also known as Taiping island. (Wikipedia)
JF: The ruling itself is a resounding repudiation of China’s actions, statements, and posture over the last five years in the Asia-Pacific region. The court went much farther than I think anyone predicted in the academic or intelligence communities that I’m associated with. I think the court surprised many people by pointing out the things you described in your opening, which is to say they ruled on whether or not a feature is entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or a territorial sea. [The ruling] raised the bar on what constitutes an island with respect to Itu Aba. Previously, many had thought that the requirements, based on a general reading of UNCLOS, would suggest that if [a party] could provide habitability from a land feature to include it’s own water sources, that would somehow guarantee an EEZ. The Court raised that bar and said, no, it has to be more than just water to be life sustaining, it has to demonstrate habitability and the ability to sustain life – in that case the court looked back and said there was nothing on Itu Aba that would suggest that. That’s caused a bit of a development between Taiwan and China.
But besides that one point, I think the larger issue is that there was nothing here for China. They had nothing to hang their hat on, there’s nothing for them to go forward with and from that standpoint, it is going to be very difficult for them in terms of saving face. But from an international law perspective and what most of the world accepts – China’s actions in the SCS were unilateral, aggressive, and threatening to their neighbors. This ruling states that this behavior is not correct and that this is not an accepted way to act in the international community.
SD: So definitely a precedent setting ruling then. You talk about China’s ability to save face. Let’s talk about the Chinese response to the issue. It is an understatement to say they have not taken the ruling well. Before we talk about their international response, I would like to briefly discuss China’s internal reaction to the ruling. In 2017, the PRC’s 19th party congresswill occur and there is significant potential for change in the Politburo. How much of Xi Jinping’s response to the ruling is for domestic consumption and to maintain credibility and consistency with his domestic audience?
JF: I think that based on the research from Red Star Rising and open-source scouring of Chinese media and press reporting in English and Chinese, what we’re seeing is that China has presented a unified response across the domestic and world audience that says they refuse to accept this. You mentioned that they used the term ‘farce,’ just about every Chinese response to this ruling has used the word farce. The main Chinese press organs all have special web pages devoted to this SCS arbitration…“the farce should end.”
There’s no question that the party has set a pretty strict line on responding to this. The senior leaders of China, [up to and] including President Xi Jinpingand Admiral Wu Shengli have said they’re not going to accept this and that China won’t abide by this ruling. What’s more worrisome is that they’ve said that they’re going to – if pushed, if challenged – respond in kind. So I think that’s the great concern for the international community – just how far will China go to disregard this ruling and will they use physical force, physical violence, to maintain their, if you will, physical possession of these disputed areas? They say they won’t do that, they say they are peace loving and they won’t inhibit anyone’s freedom of navigation, but in the same speeches they tell us that they’re going to not accept outside influence from non-parties of the region and that they’re not going to accept having their sovereignty violated. So that’s the concern that people have now.
SD: In your opinion, is this response to serve a larger Chinese narrative that the region is peaceful and that the U.S. is interjecting in affairs where it doesn’t belong?
JF: That’s exactly what they’ve said. They’ve characterized the U.S. as being the offending party. In fact, just today there was an article in one of the press organs that stated that just the presence of the United States is offensive and causes problems. Not just that [the U.S.] does FONOPS, but just [their] very presence has been a destabilizing factor. So the narrative over the last five years from China has changed [from having] said we’re not trying to displace the U.S., to this argument that the US’ very presence is causing the turmoil…they need to get out of here, it’s not China that is the problem. Which is in complete contradiction of what this impartial, unbiased tribunal out of the Hague handed down two weeks ago. As you can imagine, the Chinese press has gone after the Hague’s ruling, first to discredit them by saying they are not part of the UN, and now they’re going after one of the senior members of the tribunal, saying that he is a biased Japanese national and therefore was only implementing the desires of [Japanese] Prime Minister Abe. So their attack on this ruling is across the board and across all facets of conversation and ideological perspectives. They are 100 percent going after this thing, and I think that’s an indicator of what they’re actually going to do in the physical domain in the lead up to the party congress that you mentioned.
SD: This week, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Richardson visited China and had a discussion with the PLAN’s leader, Admiral Wu Shengli, where he was roundly assured that Chinese construction in the Spratly Islands would “never stop.” What do you make of this directness, and what can the United States do to reinforce the courts’ rulings?
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson (L) and PLAN Adm. Wu Shengli (R)
JF: Admiral Richardson’s visit has caused some level of controversy in the U.S. regarding the timing of this visit. He accompanied NSA (national security adviser) Rice to China – and the issue was – what kind of message was he taking and what kind of message did he receive? As you mentioned, the message he received was very clear and unambiguous from Admiral Wu. [He said] we reject the findings of this court, it has no legitimacy, it has no authority, and these are our sovereign territories…it’s been that way since ancient times, and it will be at our place and choosing to declare an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), it will be in our time and choosing when to place military equipment on these islands, and we will do that in response to the challenges that we get from the Philippines, Japan, or the U.S. So, Admiral Richardson, in many respects, was given a lecture by Admiral Wu.
We can talk about that at another time, but the simplistic answer is that it appears the Chinese were able to spin this visit, which was surely prearranged while knowing the date the ruling would be released, and use that to their advantage to portray to the people of China that the U.S. kowtowing to the leaders of Beijing saying ‘hey, we’re in charge despite any piece of paper…possession is nine tenths of the law and we own and physically control it all.’
What will be interesting to see is what will come out of the dialogue between the CNO and Admiral Wu regarding the specific issue of Scarborough Reef. Admiral Richardson made some statements back in March that China was preparing to build up Scarborough Reef just like it had done in the southern Spratly Islands. The question is whether or not China will use this ruling as justification for going ahead and reclaiming land around Scarborough and building another base, another naval installation…not sure it will be a Naval Air Station as Hainan Island is fairly close. If they do they’ll have control of the northern approaches to the SCS just like they have physical control and possession of the southern approaches to the SCS. This is the concern, and I don’t speak for the CNO, but I feel disappointed and ashamed that he had to take that kind of public treatment when we knew that the Chinese were going to reject the ruling in the first place.
SD: So they’re sending an unambiguous message in terms of their statement, but they’re also sending a physical message. Earlier this week there was the H-6K over flight of Scarborough Shoal. What do you make of that, and what do you make of the exercises around Hainan Island that were likely planned before this ruling, where China announced they would be “closing off” a part of the SCS which is not in line with any legal precedent.
JF: Some Chinese experts commented in the press that this is the first time that we’ve publicly provided these pictures [of the bomber overflight]. Some were implying that this was the first time an H-6K had directly overflown Scarborough Reef, some made the point that the plane was vectored and pointing toward Manila, implying that it could be used to do more damage than maybe some would consider. In that same vein, some mentioned Chinese planes can now reach everywhere in the SCS and that China can control an ADIZ. This is an allusion to the fact that they declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea and haven’t been able to effectively control that given the amount of commercial air traffic there and the international community’s ire [should the Chinese] try to implement something that restrictive. It may be different in the South, and they may be practicing ‘salami slicing’ where they may just be slicing the slices very thinly to get to the point where they can implement the ADIZ. We should expect more flights of this nature, including flights down to the three new naval air stations.
Regarding the SCS exercise closure areas, I don’t know if those were timed ahead of time. One can imagine they were planned ahead of time knowing the ruling was going to come out sometime this summer, and that the PLAN had been prepared to conduct an exercise and were waiting for the timing to be right. I don’t know that for a fact, but I am just going off your assumption that it may have been already planned. The fact of the matter is they used the exercise to heighten and emphasize their displeasure at this ruling. I think that’s the real key, which is to say that it’s not just words and rhetoric, but it is actual physical movement of naval forces and other forces into the region or around the region in a show of force to the United States and the rest of the world.
The intention is to say, “not only are we (China) saying we don’t agree, but we will physically not agree with this ruling.” I think that’s the real question about how the United States should respond. I would submit that we need to sustain our commitment to the presence that we have demonstrated this year such as the dual carrier ops, the continued Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), the continued presence that we’ve displayed over 7 decades needs to sustain itself, and we need not fear that there will be conflict started because we’re down in the same water space. I don’t believe that the PRC, at this time, are ready to start a shooting war. They’re pretty upset, they may get very close, but they recognize they have too much to gamble, too much to lose, both internally and externally, for their dream of restoration and rejuvenation. I think you saw that even recently with some of the press reporting that the Chinese press is clamping down on internal protesters [sending the message that] patriotism is good, we understand why you’re upset because this ruling is abhorrent to us, but you don’t have to demonstrate your patriotism by protesting in front of a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet.
SD: That was an interesting choice! Going on that same theme, you’ve talked about how the U.S. can counter this escalation or perceived escalation. Are continued FONOPS something you’d like to see there as well?
JF: I think we need to do that, I think there’s been a lot written about that in the last week or so. Bonnie Glaser has written about that. I actually agree with her position that we should do [FONOPS] but not announce them or provide advanced warning. I disagree with her when she said [the U.S.] shouldn’t tell people what we’ve done. I think there is a process to report these out post-facto, post-event, to say “here’s what we’ve done this year and here’s the legal reasons why.” I think that’s important, but to advertise them ahead of time, to put our sailors in harms way, I think is not very smart.
I think we should not just [conduct] the FONOPS, which typically are a single ship or aircraft, but [consider] doing more naval exercises in the region unilaterally, but also bilaterally and multilaterally. I think the more we demonstrate that these are waters that anyone can work in and that China is going to have a tough time covering exercises down in the SCS and ECS.
One example is ANNUALEX with the JMSDF. We should be [conducting] ANNUALEX west of Okinawa to send this message to the Chinese: if you really want to prevent people from exercising their militaries all over the first island chain, then you’re going to be stretched very thin. Some would say, maybe the Chinese can match us ship for ship, and maybe they can against the U.S. 7th fleet today. But they cannot [do so] against the allied naval forces of the region and that’s the real strong position there. If we take that, we will demonstrate to China that they need to change their behaviors.
SD: Going back to your point about FONOPS and pre-announcing them, I think the point has been made that the announcement itself implies some sort of wrongdoing. If we truly believe that its freedom of navigation and that these are international waters then there should be no need to announce. Is that what you are saying?
JF: Yeah, I think it’s daily business, just going about daily operations. If [warships] happen to sail through some place that is disputed, then they do that or they don’t do that, but they don’t have to make a big deal out of it. And I would say that there’s a nuance here. You don’t have to make a big deal out of it not because you’re concerned that China is going to get upset, and granted I don’t think we should go out of our way to antagonize China, but we should not limit our actions because we’re always concerned about that, which seems to be what we normally do. I think we don’t advertise for the security and safety of the sailors who are now going to be put in a position where someone knows they’re coming and may set up an ambush or a set of circumstances that could cause someone to lose their life. That’s really why I don’t think we should pre-announce the FONOPS.
SD: Its not hard to imagine a scenario where, intentional or not, something could happen. Accidents happen at sea, especially when ships are getting close, so that could be escalatory. Your point is very well taken.
JF: I think that the position here is nuanced, because there’s many inside the “China-watching” community that are suggesting we don’t want to embarrass or upset or provoke China. That seems to be our constant concern before acting in our national security interest. The U.S. seems to be more concerned about not upsetting [China] because there’s this belief that if we do, then our national security will be worse off.
I don’t think the evidence supports that logic over the last decade, but that still seems to be the predominant mindset, which is “provoking China makes things worse.” Instead of saying that China is the [party providing the provocation] and changing the status quo, not following their own declared and signed declarations like the ASEAN code of conduct from 2002, or even their signature on UNCLOS. The court of arbitration was very clear in its message, ‘you signed into this, China, you agreed to follow these rules and now you don’t want to.’ I think that’s the issue, and not so much that the U.S. is somehow parachuted into the SCS in the last two years and caused everyone to get upset. We’ve been there a long time, and we’ve given everybody a great opportunity to raise their standard of living across Asia, including China. We need to reject this notion that we’re the problem, and we need to start identifying that China is the problem. If we cant do that, they’re going to continue to take advantage of this [narrative].
SD: It was reported that China approached the Philippines for bilateral talks with the condition that both parties agreed to disregard the UN Court’s ruling. The Chinese did not even want to broach the subject at said talks and the Philippines declined to talk with these conditions. Is this an attempt by China to save face and does this indicate to you that there’s a politically acceptable way for an agreement on the outside of this ruling?
JF: It was informative to see the Philippines’ response under the new Duterte administration. There was some concern in certain circles in China and outside about [what] Duterte’s approach to China [would be]. Now on this first overture by the PRC, it is clear that the Philippines are not going to accept this kind of [off the table negotiation.] They won’t set aside the ruling and say that’s not valid.
This represents a classic Chinese approach. I live up here in the Alps and I see a lot of these granite rocks, and sometimes the rocks crumble off the face and crash down. They do that because every winter, water comes in and finds the smallest crevice, freezes, and expands. It does that over time and then finally the rock cracks and gives way. The Chinese approach to diplomacy is like this, find the smallest little crack, the smallest little diplomatic nuance or change in language, and try to break someone off from their core interest, and if you accept that you’ll be separated from your strategic national objective.
In this case, they suggested they could work with the Philippines, as long as they said the ruling was invalid and they’re not going to accept it. Maybe the Philippines will, and maybe they wont, but right now they’ve said no. I think it should be informative to people to watch how the Chinese approach these things. That’s the soft sell. There’s the hard sell, which is the bomber overflight, the declaration of SCS exercise areas, there’s the speech that Admiral Wu gave to Admiral Richardson, and then there’ll be this behind-closed-doors deal making.
SD: How much of the Philippines’ calculus on rejecting these talks has to do with the fact that they tried that angle with China over Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and were betrayed? China did not uphold their side of the deal.
JF: I think that’s an excellent point, and now some would say “how much does the new administration know about what happened in 2012?” I think most people in the Philippines do know that they were hoodwinked by the Chinese in that agreement. Their fingers are still numb from being burned before. So they’re less likely to buy into something like this. But, China is very persuasive in their soft power attempts and so things like business opportunities for Philippines in China and visa versa. These will all be brought up in closed door sessions, away from the media, and there’ll be extreme pressure exerted on this administration to dismiss this ruling and “go from there.” But you can go back to 2002 and say the same thing, China told everyone they agreed that no one should change the status quo in the SCS, and then they did over the next 14 years. China has a track record of saying one thing and doing something else. I think the more people are exposed to this through bad experiences ,the less inclined they are to buy into it again.
SD: So, if that “soft sell” is rejected, how do you see the Chinese responding? How will they amend their strategy, this two-pronged approach of soft and hard sell, if nobody’s buying anymore? What’s next for China?
BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57), grounded at Second Thomas Shoal. (Jay Directo/Agence France Presse — Getty Images)
JF: As I mentioned earlier, possession is nine tenths of the law. They’re betting that no one is going to launch a major naval operation or invasion of these islands to kick them out based on the PCA’s ruling. I don’t think anyone on the planet is planning to do that or would want to do that. I think China knows that. So the reality is, what do we do from here? Where do we go from here? Is there a way to stop China’s expansionism? Well, Scarborough Shoal will be that test. They’ve built up most of the islands that they want in the Spratlys, Second Thomas Shoal is another one, there’s the grounded LST Sierra Madre they could try to physically take, so the Philippines and our allies need to watch for that.
China’s already been vociferous over the last 5-6 years; since 1999 they’re been very upset about this. Now, with the ruling out, they may use this as one of those areas to seize in the middle of the night. [China could] come in with a bunch of warships in the cover of darkness against a poor indications and warnings network. We need to watch Second Thomas Shoal, we need to watch Reed Bank, [there are places] that China could just move in and begin dredging. Scarborough, clearly, is a place where the Chinese already have a toe hold, they have a section of it, so it would be easy for them to try to do something. The U.S., Philippines, and other allies in the region have to ask themselves what they’re going to do to physically prevent China from doing this. Taking back Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, Subi Reef, or Caurteron Reef is going to be hard and nobody really wants to do that. Those may be gone forever.
The other areas I just mentioned are areas where [the U.S. and its allies] can go on a routine basis and show continuous presence, which is going to require more than the 60/40 split from the U.S. Navy. It is going to require more assets, it may require our Coast Guard, it may require other nations’ Coast Guards to be physically present and prevent China from [taking ownership of these features]. That would be the strongest signal we could send, and it would require not just ships, but subs and also aircraft, and reconnaissance flights with fighter escorts. This would get across to China that they really crossed a line without publicizing red lines, and without getting into that geopolitical mess, just a physical presence. I think what we’ve seen with the[USS] Stennis Strike Group’s operations are a nod to that, but now it’s got to be more than just high profile exercises and dual carrier ops. It has to be a commitment to a daily presence. Otherwise, China knows they will be there daily, having increased their presence in the SCS by my own estimates at last tenfold. They have a lot of platforms from the Coast Guard and Navy that are in and around those waters 24/7/365. If we really want to stop them from expanding, we’re going to have to be there and match them hull for hull in some sense.
SD: Understood. I want to wrap up with this question on how the disparity between the Chinese response to this ruling and the American public’s response could not be more disparate. Having a presence there will cost money and will take increased investment and a larger navy. How can we as navalists, or China watchers, communicate to the larger American public the importance of this issue?
JF: You’re exactly right. It will take a larger navy. I think that’s a topic of discussion [for] one of the parties in this upcoming election cycle. What’s the size of our navy and is it big enough to do the kinds of things we need it to do? There’s arguments on both sides that there’s not enough money to procure this, and even if we had the money, it would take years to get. That’s a difficult issue. But we need to address [the need for a larger Navy] in a dialogue with the American people. As I mentioned before, it’s the responsibility of senior naval leadership to articulate this message to our senior policymakers, and to make it something that gets articulated to the American people. When I talked to a naval officer a week ago, after the ruling had come out, the response I got was ‘hey, these are just a bunch of rocks, and they have no bearing on U.S. National Security.’ That really troubles me.
In the 1980s, when Secretary of the Navy Lehman helped create the maritime strategy, there was no question about our national objective of making sure that the spread of communism didn’t go worldwide. There was no question that the U.S. Navy was a key part of that national objective. We need to have naval leaders explain to the American public and policy makers from both parties that the reason we need this large Navy is because if China can control the SCS and can control who can come in and out, (even though they’ve denied that they will do that, we do have knowledge that they may have plans to do that), this will adversely affect our national interests, the interests of all the countries in the region, and the global economy. We need to have leaders that are going to be more forceful in articulating this requirement. The pivot, the re-balance, is one step. The 60/40 split that [the U.S.] announced for our Navy is good, some of the new capabilities that we’re bringing out there like the P-8, Virginia-class submarines, and Zumwalt-class destroyers, are all good uses of our bully pulpit with the resources that we have.
But I’m concerned when I see things like our State Department giving an anemic response the day after the PCA ruling. [The statement] basically equivocated and said that China and the Philippines are co-equals in the ruling and they both need to pay attention to it. We had a chance, in that small window, to come out and endorse international law, this ruling, and [state] that we will back it up with not only our own physical forces but those of our allies. This would build on cooperation of nations to suppress China’s unilateral aggressive behavior; we missed that opportunity. I’m still waiting from the State Department’s detailed analysis of the ruling. It’s now been well over a week and a half, and we still don’t have that, yet, very smart people like Jerome Cohen have already come out with a detailed analysis of the court’s 500 plus page ruling and given it an endorsement. I think this is the kind of comprehensive national power that China applies to a problem that we seem to be lacking. I think we need to come together on this. Otherwise we risk our ability to say that Freedom of Navigation is around the world.
SD: There’s a fundamental misunderstanding, coming back to your “bunch of rocks” quote, where the U.S. Navy has been the arbiter of the freedom of the global commons for a long time now, and it has fostered a system that has allowed people to raise their standard of living and a successful global system that is unprecedented. Perhaps people don’t appreciate the U.S. Navy’s role in that.
JF: If you believe that, and not everyone does, but if the people within the [U.S. Navy and U.S. policy making bodies], can’t get unified on that belief, then we’re going to fail in articulating that to the American public. Especially in times when we’re in crisis in other areas of maritime endeavors, like Russia and what’s going on in the Mediterranean, Syria, Iran, and the threats that they’re making to naval forces in the Persian Gulf. These [issues] are not just isolated to the East Asian arena. This is a global issue. We’ve been a global navy. People say we can’t be the world’s cop, okay got it, maybe not in different land areas, but we have been committed to being the ‘world’s cop’ in the maritime domain.
If we’re not going to do that, let’s have a discussion about that as a nation and let’s save billions of dollars and cut back, bring the 7th fleet back to Hawaii or San Diego, quit building Ford-class nuclear aircraft carriers, SSBN(X), etc. There are a lot of things that are implied in this idea of standing down from being a global navy. We are being challenged right now in East Asia. It is not just in the SCS, but the ECS as well, and Japan will be one of the next points of attack for the Chinese based on how they do in this SCS scenario.
SD: It has been an honor to speak with you today, Sir. I’m sure that there will be a lot more to discuss on this topic in the future, and I hope you will join us again. If our readers want to subscribe to Red Star Rising, and I recommend they do, how can they do so?
JF: Interested readers can subscribe to Red Star Rising by contacting me at kimo.fanell@gmail.com.
Captain James Fanell, USN (Ret.) is currently serving as a fellow at the Geneva Center for Security Policy. He previously served as Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet.
Sally DeBoer is the President of CIMSEC, and also serves as CIMSEC’s Book Review Coordinator. Contact her at President@cimsec.org.
