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Capability Analysis

Electronic Warfare’s Place in Distributed Lethality: Congressional Testimony

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The following testimony published on Information Dissemination, and is shared with the author’s permission.

By Jon Solomon

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Prepared Statement of Jonathan F. Solomon

Senior Systems and Technology Analyst, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc.

December 9th, 2015

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

Thank you Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member Courtney and all the members of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee for granting me the honor of testifying today and to submit this written statement for the record.

I am a former U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO), and served two Division Officer tours in destroyers while on active duty from 2000-2004. My two billets were perhaps the most tactically-intensive ones available to a junior SWO: Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and AEGIS Fire Control Officer. As the young officer responsible for overseeing the maintenance and operation of my destroyers’ principal combat systems, I obtained an unparalleled foundational education in the tactics and technologies of modern naval warfare. In particular, I gained a fine appreciation for the difficulties of interpreting and then optimally acting upon the dynamic and often ambiguous “situational pictures” that were produced by the sensors I “owned.” I can attest to the fact that Clausewitz’s concepts of “fog” and “friction” remain alive and well in the 21st Century in spite of, and sometimes exacerbated by, our technological advancements.

My civilian job of the past eleven years at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. has been to provide programmatic and systems engineering support to various surface combat system acquisition programs within the portfolio of the Navy’s Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS). This work has provided me an opportunity to participate, however peripherally, in the development of some of the surface Navy’s future combat systems technologies. It has also enriched my understanding of the technical principles and considerations that affect combat systems performance; this is no small thing considering that I am not an engineer by education.

In recent years, and with the generous support and encouragement of Mr. Bryan McGrath, I’ve taken up a hobby of writing articles that connect my academic background in maritime strategy, naval history, naval technology, and deterrence theory with my professional experiences. One of my favorite topics concerns the challenges and opportunities surrounding the potential uses of electronic warfare in modern maritime operations. It’s a subject that I first encountered while on active duty, and later explored in great detail during my Masters thesis investigation of how advanced wide-area oceanic surveillance-reconnaissance-targeting systems were countered during the Cold War, and might be countered in the future.

Electronic warfare receives remarkably little attention in the ongoing debates over future operating concepts and the like. Granted, classification serves as a barrier with respect to specific capabilities and systems. But electronic warfare’s basic technical principles and effects are and have always been unclassified. I believe that much of the present unfamiliarity concerning electronic warfare stems from the fact that it’s been almost a quarter century since U.S. naval forces last had to be prepared to operate under conditions in which victory—not to mention survival—in battle hinged upon achieving temporary localized mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum over the adversary.

America’s chief strategic competitors intimately understand the importance of electronic warfare to fighting at sea. Soviet Cold War-era tactics for anti-ship attacks heavily leveraged what they termed “radio-electronic combat,” and there’s plenty of open source evidence available to suggest that this remains true in today’s Russian military as well.[i] The Chinese are no different with respect to how they conceive of fighting under “informatized conditions.”[ii] In a conflict against either of these two great powers, U.S. maritime forces’ sensors and communications pathways would assuredly be subjected to intense disruption, denial, and deception via jamming or other related tactics. Likewise, ill-disciplined electromagnetic transmissions by U.S. maritime forces in a combat zone might very well prove suicidal in that they could provide an adversary a bullseye for aiming its long-range weapons.

To their credit, the Navy’s seniormost leadership have gone to great lengths to stress the importance of electronic warfare in recent years, most notably in the new Maritime Strategy. They have even launched a new concept they call electromagnetic maneuver warfare, which appears geared towards exactly the kinds of capabilities I am about to outline. It is therefore quite likely that major elements of the U.S. Navy’s future surface warfare vision, Distributed Lethality, will take electronic warfare considerations into account. I would suggest that Distributed Lethality’s developers do so in three areas in particular: Command and Control (C2) doctrine, force-wide communications methods, and over-the-horizon targeting and counter-targeting measures.

First and foremost, Distributed Lethality’s C2 approach absolutely must be rooted in the doctrinal philosophy of “mission command.” Such doctrine entails a higher-echelon commander, whether he or she is the commander of a large maritime battleforce or the commander of a Surface Action Group (SAG) consisting of just a few warships, providing subordinate ship or group commanders with an outline of his or her intentions for how a mission is to be executed, then delegating extensive tactical decision-making authority to them to get the job done. This would be very different than the  Navy’s C2 culture of the past few decades in which higher-echelon commanders often strove to use a “common tactical picture” to exercise direct real-time control, sometimes from a considerable distance, over subordinate groups and ships. Such direct control will not be possible in contested areas in which communications using the electromagnetic spectrum are—unless concealed using some means—readily exploitable by an electronic warfare-savvy adversary. Perhaps the adversary might use noise or deceptive jamming, deceptive emissions, or decoy forces to confuse or manipulate the “common picture.” Or perhaps the adversary might attack the communications pathways directly with the aim of severing the voice and data connections between commanders and subordinates. An adept adversary might even use a unit or flagship’s insufficiently concealed radio frequency emissions to vector attacks. It should be clear, then, that the embrace of mission command doctrine by the Navy’s senior-most leadership on down to the deckplate level will be critical to U.S. Navy surface forces’ operational effectiveness if not survival in future high-end naval combat.

Let me now address the question of why a surface force must be able to retain some degree of voice and data communications even when operating deep within a contested zone. As I alluded earlier, I consider it highly counterproductive if not outright dangerous for a higher-echelon commander to attempt to exercise direct tactical control over subordinate assets in the field under opposed electromagnetic conditions. But that doesn’t mean that the subordinate assets should not share their sensor pictures with each other, or that those assets should not be able to spontaneously collaborate with each other as a battle unfolds, or that higher-echelon commanders should not be able to issue mission intentions and operational or tactical situation updates—or even exercise a veto over subordinates’ tactical decisions in extreme cases. A ship or an aircraft can, after all, only “see” on its own what is within the line of sight of its onboard sensors. If one ship or aircraft within some group detects a target of opportunity or an inbound threat, that information cannot be exploited to its fullest if the ship or aircraft in contact cannot pass what it knows to its partners in a timely manner with requisite details. In an age where large salvos of anti-ship missiles can cover hundreds—and in a few cases thousands—of miles in the tens of minutes, where actionable detections of “archers” and “arrows” can be extremely fleeting, and where only minutes may separate the moments in which each side first detects the other, the side that can best build and then act upon a tactical picture is, per legendary naval tactical theorist Wayne Hughes, the one most likely to fire first effectively and thus prevail.[iii]

This requires the use of varying forms of voice and data networking as tailored to specific tactical or operational C2purposes. A real-time tactical picture is often needed for coordinating defenses against an enemy attack. A very close to real-time tactical picture may be sufficient for coordinating attacks against adversary forces. Non-real time communications may be entirely adequate for a higher-echelon commander to convey mission guidance to subordinates.

But how to conceal these communications, or at least drastically lower the risk that they might be intercepted and exploited by an adversary? The most secure form of communications against electronic warfare is obviously human courier, and while this was used by the U.S. Navy on a number of occasions during the Cold War to promote security in the dissemination of multi-day operational and tactical plans, it is simply not practicable in the heat of an ongoing tactical engagement. Visible-band and infrared pathways present other options, as demonstrated by the varying forms of “flashing light” communications practiced over the centuries. For instance, a 21st Century flashing light that is based upon laser technologies would have the added advantage of being highly directional, as its power would be concentrated in a very narrow beam that an adversary would have to be very lucky to be in the right place at the right time to intercept. That said, visible-band and infrared systems’ effective ranges are fairly limited to begin with when used directly between ships, and even more so in inclement weather. This may be fine if a tactical situation allows for a SAG’s units to be operating in close proximity. However, if unit dispersal will often be the rule in contested zones in order to reduce the risk that an adversary’s discovery of one U.S. warship quickly results in detection of the rest of the SAG, then visible-band and infrared pathways can only offer partial solutions. A broader portfolio of communications options is consequently necessary.

It is commonly believed that the execution of strict Emissions Control (EMCON) in a combat zone in order to avoid detection (or pathway exploitation) by an adversary means that U.S. Navy warships would not be able to use any form of radiofrequency communications. This is not the case. Lower-frequency radios such as those that operate in the (awkwardly titled) High, Very High, and Ultra High Frequency (HF, VHF, and UHF) bands are very vulnerable because their transmission beams tend to be very wide. The wider a transmission beam, the greater the volume through which the beam will propagate, and in turn the greater the opportunity for an adversary’s signals intelligence collectors to be in the right place at the right time. In order to make lower-frequency radio communications highly-directional and thereby difficult for an adversary to intercept, a ship’s transmitting antennas would have to be far larger than is practical. At the Super High Frequency (SHF) band and above, though, transmission beamwidth using a practically-sized antenna becomes increasingly narrow and thus more difficult to intercept. This is why the Cold War-era U.S. Navy designed its Hawklink line-of-sight datalink connecting surface combatants and the SH-60B helicopter to use SHF; the latter could continually provide sonarbuoy, radar, or electronic support measures data to the former—and thereby serve as an anti-submarine “pouncer” or an anti-ship scout—with a relatively low risk of the signals being detected or exploited. In theory, the surface Navy might develop a portfolio of highly-directional line-of-sight communications systems that operate at SHF or Extremely High Frequency (EHF)/Millimeter-wave (MMW) bands in order to retain an all-weather voice and data communications capability even during strict EMCON. The Navy might also develop high-band communications packages that could be carried by manned or unmanned aircraft, and especially those that could be embarked aboard surface combatants, so that surface units could communicate securely over long-distances via these “middlemen.” Shipboard and airframe “real estate” for antennas is generally quite limited, though, so the tradeoff for establishing highly-directional communications may well be reduced overall communications “bandwidth” compared to what is possible when also using available communications systems that aren’t as directional. Nevertheless, this could be quite practicable in a doctrinal culture that embraces mission command and the spontaneous local tactical collaboration of ships and aircraft in a SAG.

High-directionality also means that a single antenna can only communicate with one other ship or aircraft at a time—and it must know where that partner is so that it can point its beam precisely. If a transmission is meant for receipt by other ships or aircraft, it must either be relayed via one or more “middleman” assets’ directional links to those units or it must be broadcast to them using less-directional pathways. Broadcast is perfectly acceptable as a one-way transmissions method if the broadcaster is either located in a relatively secure and defensible area or alternatively is relatively expendable.  An example of the former might be an airborne early warning aircraft protected by fighters or surface combatants broadcasting its radar picture to friendly forces (and performing as a local C2 post as well) using less-directional lower-frequency communications. An example of the latter might be Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) launchable by SAG ships to serve as communications broadcast nodes; a ship could uplink to the UAS using a highly-directional pathway and the UAS could then rebroadcast the data within a localized footprint. Higher-echelon commanders located in a battlespace’s rearward areas might also use broadcast to provide selected theater- and national-level sensor data, updated mission guidance, or other updated situational information to forward SAGs. By not responding to the broadcast, or by only responding to it via highly-directional pathways, receiving units in SAGs would gain important situational information while denying the adversary an easy means of locating them.

Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) radiofrequency communications techniques provide surface forces an additional tool that can be used at any frequency band, directional or not. By disguising waveforms to appear to be ambient radiofrequency noise or by using reduced transmission power levels and durations, an adversary’s signals intelligence apparatus might not be able to detect an LPI transmission even if it is positioned to do so. I would caution, though, that any given LPI “trick” might not have much operational longetivity. Signal processing technologies available on the global market may well reach a point, if they haven’t already, where a “trick” works only a handful of times—or maybe just once—and thereafter is recognized by an adversary. Many LPI techniques accordingly should be husbanded for use only when necessary in a crisis or wartime, and there should be a large enough “arsenal” of them to enable protracted campaigning.

Finally, I want to briefly discuss the importance of providing our surface force with an actionable over-the-horizon targeting picture while denying the same to adversaries. The U.S. Navy is clearly at a deficit relative to its competitors regarding anti-ship missile range. This is thankfully changing regardless of whether we’re talking about the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a Tomahawk-derived system, or other possible solutions.

It should be noted, though, that a weapon’s range on its own is not a sufficient measure of its utility. This is especially important when comparing our arsenal to those possessed by potential adversaries. A weapon cannot be evaluated outside the context of the surveillance and reconnaissance apparatus that supports its employment.

In one of my earlier published works, I set up the following example regarding effective first strike/salvo range at the opening of a conflict:

Optimal first-strike range is not necessarily the same as the maximum physical reach of the longest-ranged weapon system effective against a given target type (i.e., the combined range of the firing platform and the weapon it carries). Rather, it is defined by trade-offs in surveillance and reconnaissance effectiveness…This means that a potential adversary with a weapon system that can reach distance D from the homeland’s border but can achieve timely and high-confidence peacetime cueing or targeting only within a radius of 0.75D has an optimal first-strike range of 0.75D…This does not reduce the dangers faced by the defender at distance D but does offer more flexibility in using force-level doctrine, posture, plans, and capabilities to manage risks.[iv]

Effective striking range is reduced further once a war breaks out and the belligerents take off their gloves with respect to each others’ surveillance and reconnaissance systems. The qualities and quantities of a force’s sensors, and the architecture and counter-detectability of the data pathways the force uses to relay its sensors’ “pictures” to “consumers” matter just as much as the range of the force’s weapons.[v] Under intense electronic warfare opposition, they arguably matter even more.

For a “shooter” to optimally employ long-range anti-ship weaponry, it must know with an acceptable degree of confidence that it is shooting at a valid and desirable target. Advanced weapons inventories, after all, are finite. It can take considerable time for a warship to travel from a combat zone to a rearward area where it can rearm; this adds considerable complexities to a SAG maintaining a high combat operational tempo. Nor are many advanced weapons quickly producible, and in fact it is far from clear that the stockpiles of some of these weapons could be replenished within the timespan of anything other than a protracted war. This places a heavy premium on not wasting scarce weapons against low-value targets or empty waterspace. As a result, in most cases over-the-horizon targeting requires more than just the detection of some contact out at sea using long-range radar, sonar, or signals collection and direction-finding systems. It requires being able to classify the contact with some confidence: for example, whether it is a commercial tanker or an aircraft carrier, a fishing boat or a frigate, a destroyer or a decoy. An electronic warfare-savvy defender can do much to make an attacker’s job of contact classification extraordinarily difficult in the absence of visual-range confirmation of what the longer-range sensors are “seeing.”

A U.S. Navy SAG would therefore benefit greatly from being able to embark or otherwise access low observable unmanned systems that can serve as over-the-horizon scouts. These scouts could be used not only for reconnaissance, but also for contact confirmation. They could report their findings back to a SAG via the highly-directional pathways I discussed earlier, perhaps via “middlemen” if needed.

Likewise, a U.S. Navy SAG would need to be able to degrade or deceive an adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance efforts. There are plenty of non-technological options: speed and maneuver, clever use of weather for concealment, dispersal, and deceptive feints or demonstrations by other forces that distract from a “main effort” SAG’s thrust. Technological options employed by a SAG might include EMCON and deceptive emissions against the adversary’s signals intelligence collectors, and noise or deceptive jamming against the adversary’s active sensors. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy developed some very advanced (and anecdotally effective) shipboard deception systems to fulfill these tasks against Soviet sensors. Unmanned systems might be particularly attractive candidates for performing offboard deception tasks and for parrying an adversary’s own scouts as well.

If deception is to be successful, a SAG must possess a high-confidence understanding of—and be able to exercise agile control over—its emissions. It must also possess a comprehensive picture of the ambient electromagnetic environment in its area of operations, partly so that it can blend in as best as possible, and partly to uncover the adversary’s own transient LPI emissions. This will place a premium on being able to network and fuse inputs from widely-dispersed shipboard and offboard signals collection sensors. Some of these sensors will be “organic” to a SAG, and some may need to be “inorganically” provided by other Navy, Joint, or Allied forces. Some will be manned, and other will likely be unmanned. This will also place a premium on developing advanced signal processing and emissions correlation capabilities.

We can begin to see, then, the kinds of operational and tactical possibilities such capabilities and competencies might provide U.S. Navy SAGs. A SAG might employ various deception and concealment measures to penetrate into the outer or middle sections of a hotly contested zone, perform some operational task(s) of up to several days duration, and then retire. Other naval or Joint forces might be further used to conduct deception and concealment actions that distract the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance resources (and maybe decision-makers’ attentions) from the area in which the SAG is operating, or perhaps from the SAG’s actions themselves, during key periods. And still other naval, Joint, and Allied forces might conduct a wide-ranging campaign of physical and electromagnetic attacks to temporarily disrupt if not permanently roll back the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance apparatus. Such efforts hold the potential of enticing an adversary to waste difficult-to-replace advanced weapons against “phantoms,” or perhaps distracting or confusing him to such an extent that he attacks ineffectively or not at all.

The tools and tactics I’ve outlined most definitely will not serve as “silver bullets” that shield our forces from painful losses. And there will always be some degree of risk and uncertainty involved in the use of these measures; it will be up to our force commanders to decide when conditions seem right for their use in support of a particular thrust. These measures should consequently be viewed as force-multipliers that grant us much better odds of perforating an adversary’s oceanic surveillance and reconnaissance systems temporarily and locally if used smartly, and thus better odds of operational and strategic successes.

With that, I look forward to your questions and the discussion that will follow. Thank you.

Jon Solomon is a Senior Systems and Technology Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at jfsolo107@gmail.com. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

[i] For example, see the sources referenced in my post “Advanced Russian Electronic Warfare Capabilities.” Information Dissemination blog, 16 September 2015,http://www.informationdissemination.net/2015/09/advanced-russian-electronic-warfare.html

[ii] For examples, see 1. John Costello. “Chinese Views on the Information “Center of Gravity”: Space, Cyber and Electronic Warfare.” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 8, 16 April 2015,http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43796&cHash=c0f286b0d4f15adfcf9817a93ae46363#.Vl4aL00o7cs; 2. “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015.” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 07 April 2015), 33, 38.

[iii] CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr, USN (Ret). Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2000), 40-44.

[iv] Jonathan F. Solomon. “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks.” Naval War College Review 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2013): 113-114.

[v] See my posts 1. “21st Century Maritime Operations Under Cyber-Electromagnetic Opposition, Part II.” Information Dissemination blog, 22 October 2014, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/10/21st-century-maritime-operations-under_22.html; and 2. “21st Century Maritime Operations Under Cyber-Electromagnetic Opposition, Part III.” Information Dissemination blog, 23 October 2014,http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/10/21st-century-maritime-operations-under_23.html

Featured Image: Persian Gulf (Feb. 5, 2007) – Air Traffic Controller 1st Class Otto Delacruz identifies an air contact to Air Traffic Controller 1st Class Brent Watson standing watch in the ship’s helicopter direction center aboard USS Boxer (LHD 4). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joshua Valcarcel)

Capability Analysis, South America

The Rise Of The Latin American Shipyard

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The Southern Tide

Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

Introduction

In recent months various Latin American navies have either received or deployed new platforms. For example, Chile and Mexico have launched new Oceanic Patrol Vessels (OPVs) while Colombia has launched two amphibious landing vessels and two speedboats. In late July, Peru’s brand-new training vessel, the Union, left port for its first voyage.

While these acquisitions and deployments appear standard, there is one important detail that links them together: all these platforms were produced by Latin American shipyards.

The global shipbuilding industry is about to get more crowded as Latin America shipyards are making their presence felt. Their platforms are not solely produced for local navies, as exporting them is now an objective.

Current Projects

The most ambitious domestic naval project is found in Brazil. With assistance from the French company DCNS, the Brazilian Navy is constructing four Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarines, as well as a nuclear-powered submarine, a dream of the Brazilian Navy for decades. Just this past July, the fourth section of the Humaitá was delivered to Itaguaí Construções Navais (ICN).  According to the Brazilian news agency Defesa Aerea & Naval the first submarine, the Riachuelo, will be launched in 2018 and delivered in 2020 while the Humaitá will be launched in 2020 and delivered in 2021.

Apart from the submarines themselves, Brazil is also constructing a submarine-building facility in Itaguaí, near Rio de Janeiro. These projects constitute the massive program known as Programa de Desenvolvimiento de Submarinos or Program Development for Submarines (PROSUB).

A photo of the team that worked on the production of the submarine's stern of the Humaitá. Planobrazil.com
A photo of the team that worked on the production of the stern of the Brazilian submarine Humaitá. (Planobrazil.com)

Other countries are manufacturing naval platforms, though not submarines. Specifically, regional shipyards are constructing OPVs, multipurpose vessels, and even training vessels. Case in point, in late July, the Colombian shipyard Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval Marítima y Fluvial (COTECMAR) delivered two new amphibious landing vessels, the Golfo de Morrosquillo and Bahía Málaga to the Colombian Navy, as well as two river patrol boats. COTECMAR has already delivered two similar ships (the Golfo de Tribuga and the Golfo de Uraba) to the Colombian Navy and plans to build an additional two more for a total of six vessels. The company has also constructed OPVs like the 7 de Agosto, which participated in operations Atalanta and Ocean Shield off the Horn of Africa.

When it comes to other countries, in early August the Chilean shipyard Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (ASMAR) launched the OPV Cabo Odger from its facilities in Talcahuano. The company has already delivered three similar vessels: “Piloto Pardo, Comandante Toro and Marinero Fuentealba that were commissioned June 2008, August 2009, and November 2014, respectively.”

As for neighboring Peru, the state-run shipyard Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA) has, as previously mentioned, constructed the country’s new training vessel (the author has discussed Latin America’s training vessels in a 6 June commentary for CIMSEC). On 27 July, the BAP Union departed the port in Callao for its first multinational voyage, carrying aboard 93 Peruvian naval cadets. Moreover, two patrol vessels were launched earlier this year: the Rio Pativilca and the Rio Cañete; they were constructed in SIMA’s shipyard in Chimbote (northern Peru).

As a final example,the Mexican Secretariat of the Navy has announced that the shipyard Astillero de la Marina (ASTIMAR) has launched two new vessels in the past couple of months. The shipyard No.6 at Guaymas (state of Sonora) launched the logistics support vessel ARM Isla María Madre in late May while shipyard No.1 shipyard launched coastal patrol vessel ARM Monte Albán in mid July. IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly explains that “Secretary of Navy Admiral Vidal Soberón Sanz noted during the launch ceremony that the ship was entirely built by Mexican workers with local materials.”

In an interview with the author, Mr. Mario Pedreros Leighton, president of the Georgetown Consulting Group, LLC., based in Washington DC, highlighted the multipurpose functions that these domestically-manufactured platforms accomplish. As inter-state war is highly unlikely in Latin America, platform acquisition is not solely judged on traditional defense from a foreign military, but what other missions platforms can carry out, particularly to support civil society. Mr. Pedreros Leighton explains how “there is no doubt that vessels today must fulfill a social role, like protecting natural resources and carrying out search and rescue operations. These uses make the vessels more attractive as their value is not based on traditional defense. In turn, governments find it easier to approve budgets and investments regarding these projects.” Hence, it is no surprise that the region has focused on constructing OPVs and multipurpose ships, as they are relatively inexpensive to operate and maintain, and can be utilized for patrol, support operations, as well as providing relief to coastal regions. 

Future Projects?

It is safe to say that Latin American shipyards will continue to produce vessels and submarines for local navies. As previously mentioned, Brazil is close to completing the construction of two Scorpene submarines, while it is expected that the two others will be delivered in 2022 and 2023. Even more, the highly anticipated nuclear submarine should be ready around 2023-2025.

Moreover, it appears that the Argentine shipbuilding industry is bouncing back after experiencing a difficult decade and a half of economic crisis and turbulent governance. The Rio Santiago shipyard in Buenos Aires province will now manufacture vessels that will be utilized to train naval cadets. Two are currently under construction, with a total of six expected to be ordered. According to the Argentine news agency Telam, the first will be delivered in 2018. Moreover, earlier this year Rio Santiago signed a deal with Daewoo to manufacture a Makassar-type landing dock platform vessel.

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Rio Santiago shipyard in Argentina. (Aandigital.com.ar)

It is important to highlight the assistance that other companies are providing to Latin American shipyards. Apart from DCNS in Brazil or Daewoo in Argentina, other examples include, Damen, which signed an agreement with Mexico so the country can construct in its own shipyards the aforementioned OPVs which are based on Damen’s Stan Patrol 4207. Similarly, while the Union was constructed in Peru, the Spanish company CYPSA Ingenieros Navales aided SIMA in the design of the vessel. As for future cooperation projects, representatives from Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems and Copower Ltda visited the facilities of Ecuador’s state-run shipyard Astilleros Navales Ecuatorianos (ASTINAVE) this past May.

The argument proposed here is that Latin American shipyards will continue to aim at domestically manufacturing platforms, which means that future deals with foreign shipyards will have to include some level of know-how and technical exchange.

The Ultimate Objective: Export

What is the ultimate goal for these shipyards? Manufacturing platforms for export, and not just to sell to local navies appears to be the answer. On this issue, Colombia’s COTECMAR reached a major milestone in April when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos carried out a diplomatic tour throughout Central America. During his stop in Honduras, President Santos signed a deal with the Honduran government where the latter will purchase a COTECMAR support vessel (the exact model and timeline for delivery are still unknown).

The significance of this deal cannot be underestimated as it is a Latin American shipyard exporting a platform to another regional state. (COTECMAR had previously supplied river boats to the Brazilian Army and Navy, however we are focusing on ocean-going platforms).

Colombia–Launch of the ARC Golfo de Uraba. (COTECMAR)

This deal also brings up the question of which countries are potential customers for Latin American shipyards. It makes sense that their primary targets would be countries with less developed naval industries, like for example Central America, Uruguay, and perhaps Caribbean states. If these hypothetical deals succeed, maybe some regional shipyard could attempt to export outside of the Western Hemisphere.

One plausible scenario is that, even if Latin American shipyards cannot sell brand-new platforms to the aforementioned nations, they could hypothetically still sell efficient, second-hand vessels from local navies at a much reduced cost. Mr. Pedreros Leighton explains how “Chile, for example, could attempt to sell the OPV Piloto Prado [constructed by ASMAR and utilized by the Chilean Navy] which is almost a decade old and was constructed utilizing a Fassmer 80 design.” Second-hand platforms are always an attractive option when there are insufficient funds for brand-new equipment.

Potential Problems

Due to space considerations, we will provide a broad overview of the likely woes thatregional shipyards could face regarding future projects. Financial and technical problemsare obvious concerns, which are best exemplified by the construction of the Brazilian submarines. In 2009, the Navy’s objective was to have the first submarine, the Riachuelo, launched in 2015, but construction has been delayed by three years. Meanwhile, the delivery date for the nuclear submarine varies by a margin of two years. These changing delivery dates certainly do not help the image of the ICN shipyard and its supporting companies.

Another issue is finding customers, locally and abroad. The global shipbuilding industry is cluttered as shipyards compete with one another as well as government-to-government deals (e.g. Peru has recently obtained a new corvette, the Ferre, which was donated by South Korea).  Moreover, while Latin American shipyards can construct vessels, potential customers may continue to prefer more expensive platforms from well-known companies.

ASTIMAR – OPV Chiapas. (imparcialoaxaca.mx)
OPV Chiapas in ASTIMAR shipyard in Mexico. (imparcialoaxaca.mx)

Another problem has to do with the volume of construction. Mr. Pedreros Leighton explains that “building one vessel is very expensive, but manufacturing two or more makes the project less costly.” Unsurprisingly, shipyards prefer to have large orders, however they may have to settle for single units (e.g. COTECMAR and Honduras) in order to establish their brands with foreign customers. While this situation may diminish sales revenue, the offset would be achieving a stronger name brand.

A final point has to do with marketing and name brands. Colombia’s COTECMAR has had an aggressive marketing program in order to gain customers abroad such as Brazil and Honduras. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss marketing strategies among shipyards, however it is necessary to stress that Latin American shipyards will only export platforms if they manage to make their names become well-known regionally.

Concluding Thoughts

Latin American shipyards are currently enjoying a boom, as many of them are constructing vessels from Brazilian submarines to OPVs in Chile and Mexico, to multipurpose vessels in Colombia, and a training vessel in Peru. This is a positive development for regional navies as they can rely on domestic shipyards to construct new platforms and have the expertise to repair vessels already in service. Moreover, the sale by Colombia’s COTECMAR to Honduras of a support ship is a significant development as this means regional shipyards are now exporting platforms.

It is true that Latin American navies cannot manufacture heavy surface combatants or carriers; meanwhile Brazil is having trouble keeping its ambitious PROSUB submarine project on schedule. Nevertheless, the tides are changing and Latin America is no longer solely an importer of sea platforms, it is also once again a producer and, albeit in a very restricted breadth, an exporter. 

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Featured Image: Construction of the Brazilian submarine Riachuelo in Itaguaí (RJ) (Planobrazil.com)

Asia-Pacific

China and Freedom of Navigation: The Context of the International Tribunal’s Verdict

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The following article was originally featured by the National Maritime Foundation and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.            

By Gurpreet S. Khurana

On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal constituted at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) issued its decision in the arbitration instituted by the Philippines against China. It relates to the various legal issues in the South China Sea (SCS) inter alia pertaining to China’s historic rights and ‘nine-dash line,’ and the status of features and lawfulness of Chinese actions.1

Within hours of the release of PCA Tribunal’s decision, India released a government press release, stating that

“India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS. India believes that States should resolve disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability…”2

However, Beijing has stated that China would not accept the Tribunal’s verdict.3 Furthermore, tensions have rekindled in the SCS with reports indicating that China intends “closing off a part of SCS for military exercises.”4 The issue of Freedom of Navigation (FON) is of immense relevance not merely for the SCS littorals, but for all countries that have a stake in peace and tranquillity in the SCS; and yet bears a significant potential to flare-up into a maritime conflict.

This issue brief aims to examine China’s approach to FON in context of international law, including the verdict of the PCA Tribunal. In this writing, the term ‘FON’ refers to the broader concept of ‘navigational freedoms,’ including the freedom of over-flight. Furthermore, this brief attempts to identify the de jure ramifications – even if not de facto, considering China’s rejection of the verdict – of the PCA Tribunal’s decision on China with regard to FON in the area.  

FON is a fundamental tenet of customary international law that was propounded in 1609 by the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius, who called it Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas). The legal tenet is codified in the UNCLOS, a process that involved over two decades of intense labor of international maritime lawmakers at three brainstorming Conferences. The Third Conference itself (UNCLOS III) spanned nine years, which led to the signing of Convention in 1982 and its subsequent entry into force in 1994. The Peoples’ Republic of China was among the first signatories to the Convention on 10 December 1982 (along with India), and ratified it on 07 June 1996. The key question is whether China – despite the foregoing – is impeding freedom of navigation in the SCS? For a comprehensive answer, the issue would need to be examined separately for the three legal regimes/ areas wherein international law applies differently: China’s Territorial Sea, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the other areas within the ‘nine-dash line.’ 

Territorial Seas

In a State’s 12-nautical mile (NM) Territorial Sea, the right of ‘Innocent Passage’ provided for in UNCLOS Article 17 applies to both commercial and military vessels. As regards commercial shipping, there is no evidence whatsoever of China denying this right to such ships flying the flag of any nationality. Notably, China is a manufacturing-based and export-led economy, which imports nearly 80 percent of its oil and natural gas via the sea. Therefore, China has tremendous stakes in unimpeded maritime commerce, and does not stand to gain by deliberately impeding the FON of merchant ships.

For foreign warships, however, the ‘yardstick’ of ‘Innocent Passage’ differs. During the UNCLOS negotiations, most developing countries wanted restrictions on foreign warships crossing their Territorial Seas. Many of these States proposed that foreign warships must obtain ‘authorization’ for this from the coastal State. Eventually, however, the proposed amendment was not incorporated in UNCLOS; nonetheless, the States were permitted to take measures to safeguard their security interests. Consequently, and in accordance with UNCLOS Article 3105, like many other States, China made a declaration in June 1996 while ratifying UNCLOS, seeking ‘prior permission’ for all foreign warships intending to exercise the right of Innocent Passage across its Territorial Seas.6 The declaration was based upon Article 6 of China’s national law of 1992.7 It is pertinent to state that about 40 other States – including many developed countries in Europe – made similar declarations seeking ‘prior permission’ for Innocent Passage. (Notably, India seeks only ‘prior notification’. However, the United States does not recognize the right of either ‘prior permission’ or ‘prior notification’).8

It may be recalled that during the Cold War, in 1983, the Soviet Union promulgated rules for warship navigation in its Territorial Seas, which permitted Innocent Passage only in limited areas of Soviet Territorial Seas in the Baltic Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Sea of Japan. This led to a vigorous protest from the United States. Later in 1986 and 1988, the United States Navy conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the Soviet Territorial Sea in the Black Sea.9 In contrast, therefore, China’s stand on navigation of foreign warships through Territorial Seas of ‘undisputed’ Chinese territory is clearly legitimate.

However, the passage of foreign warships within 12-NM of the disputed SCS islands/features – which are occupied and claimed by China – has been highly contentious. Since the United States seeks to prevent any norm-building in favor of China’s territorial claims, it has been undertaking FON operations (FONOPS) in the 12-NM zone of these islands. Notably, since the launch of the U..S “Freedom of Navigation Program” in 1979, the United States has conducted such operations on numerous occasions all around the globe; sometimes even against its closest allies.

From the perspective of China – that is in de facto control of the islands/features – its objection to the U.S. warships cruising within 12-NM of these islands/ features without ‘prior permission’ is as much valid as the U.S. FONOPS to uphold its right of military mobility across the global commons. Hence, until such time that the issue of sovereignty over these islands is settled, the legitimacy of China’s stand on FON in these waters cannot be questioned. 

Exclusive Economic Zone

Alike in its Territorial Sea, China has never impeded FON of commercial vessels in its EEZ. However, like many other States, China has been objecting to foreign military activities in its EEZ. It may be recalled that in April 2001, China scrambled J-8 fighters against the U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft operating about 60 NM off China’s Hainan Island, leading to a mid-air collision.10

Unfortunately, the UNCLOS does not contain any specific provision, either permitting or prohibiting such activities. According to Articles 58(1) and 87 of UNCLOS, the EEZ is part of ‘International Waters’ wherein all foreign warships may exercise High Seas FON, with certain exceptions that relate to economic/ resource-related uses of the EEZ, such as Marine Scientific Research, which may be conducted only if permitted by the coastal State. Therefore, if a foreign military conducts hydrographic surveys in China’s EEZ, it may be justified as being among the High Seas Freedoms since it may be necessary for safe navigation of warships. However, if a foreign military conducts intelligence collection in the EEZ – as China interprets the objective of U.S. military activities in its EEZ – it may be objectionable, at least in terms of the spirit of UNCLOS, whose Article 88 says that “The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.” Of course, some may consider ‘intelligence collection’ as a normal peacetime activity of a State to bolster its military preparedness to maintain peace. But this only serves to reinforce the prevailing void in UNCLOS, rather than legally deny China the right of ensuring its own security.

Other Areas within ‘Nine-Dash Line’

China has never explicitly articulated its stand on the legal status of the sea areas within the ‘nine-dash line’, which lie beyond its 12-NM Territorial Sea and the 200-NM EEZ. However, by laying ‘historic’ claim to all SCS features (islands, rocks or reefs), and referring to all these as islands entitled to EEZ and Legal Continental Shelf (LCS), it has implicitly claimed sovereign jurisdiction over the entire sea area enclosed within the nine-dash line. Based on such assumed sovereign rights – though disputed by other claimant States – China has been curtailing FON in these areas, particularly for warships. For example, in the days leading to the International Tribunal’s verdict on the China-Philippines Arbitration, Beijing declared a ‘no sail zone’ in the SCS during a major naval exercise in the area from 4 to 11 July 2016 (see Fig. 1 below).

SCS
Figure 1 – China’s ‘No Sail Zone’ in South China Sea, promulgated: 04 July 2016. (DefenseOne.com)

As the map indicates, the ‘prohibited zone’ was a sizable 38,000 sq mile area lying between Vietnam and the Philippines. It encompasses the Paracel Islands, but not the arterial International Shipping Lane (ISL) of the SCS.11 During such exercises in the past, China has imposed such restrictions on navigation in the SCS. While some analysts have referred to such restrictions on FON as violation of maritime law,12 given the susceptibility of prevailing international law to divergent interpretations, China cannot be denied the right to interpret law in a manner that best suits its security interests.

However, the above scenario prevailed prior to 12 July 2016. The verdict of the PCA Tribunal has changed all that. The Tribunal has dismissed China’s claim to ‘historic rights’ within the ‘nine-dash line’, indicating that such claims were incompatible with UNCLOS, and asserted that no feature claimed by it in the SCS is capable of generating an EEZ. At least from the standpoint of international law, therefore, Beijing’s claim to sovereign jurisdiction over these areas is decisively annulled. Henceforth, China will need to concede to unimpeded FON in the SCS, both for commercial shipping and warships. For example, if it needs to conduct a naval exercise in the area, declaring a ‘no sail/ prohibited zone’ would no longer be legally tenable. Instead, China could, at best, merely promulgate a mere ‘advisory’ for the safety of ships and civil aircraft intending to transit through the exercise area.

China could possibly react to the adverse verdict of the International Tribunal by declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the SCS. A resort to this would not be constructive since it would further heighten anxieties in the area. Nonetheless, China’s declaration of an ADIZ would be tenable from the legal standpoint. The promulgation of such Security zones is not prohibited by international law. However, for interpreting it as ‘not prohibited, and hence permitted,’ promulgating such a zone must adhere to the spirit of law in terms of its need for maintaining peace or for self-defense, and that it is not obverse to the overarching principle of freedom of navigation and over-flight.  

Concluding Remarks

It is amply clear from the foregoing that the contentions over freedom of navigation and over-flight in the SCS are more a result of the geopolitical ‘mistrust’ between China and the other states, aggravated by the voids and ambiguities of international law, rather than any objective failing on part of China and the other states involved to observe the prevailing tenets of international law.

The geopolitical relationships constitute an aspect that China and the other countries involved need to resolve amongst themselves, and the rest of the international community can do little about it. Further, there is hardly a case for convening a fourth UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to renegotiate the UNCLOS, which already is a result of painstaking efforts of the international community during a period that was geopolitically less complex than it is today.

Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the lingering maritime-disputes in the Asia-Pacific are being arbitrated upon by international tribunals. Over the years, the decisions of international tribunals on cases such as the India-Bangladesh (July 2014)13 and the more recent one between China and Philippines on the SCS would be valuable to fill the legal voids, and would firm up over time to add to the prevailing tenets of international law.

China’s adherence to PCA Tribunal’s decision would not only contribute to peace and prosperity in the region, but would also best serve its own national interest, at least in the longer term. However, it remains to be seen how long Beijing will take to assimilate the ‘new normal’ into its policymaking.

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com.

Notes and References

1. ‘The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines V. The People’s Republic of China)’, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, Press Release, 12 July 2016, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf

2. ‘Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS’, Ministry of External Affairs (Govt of India) Press release, 12 July 2016, at http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement_on_Award_of_Arbitral_Tribunal_on_South_China_Sea_Under_Annexure_VII_of_UNCLOS

3. ‘Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, 12 July 2016, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml

4. ‘China ups the ante, to close part of South China Sea for military exercise,’ Times of India, 18 July 2016, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-ups-the-ante-to-close-part-of-South-China-Sea-for-military-exercise/articleshow/53263905.cms

5. Article 310 of UNCLOS allows States to make declarations or statements regarding its application at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention.

6. Office of the Legal Affairs of the United Nations, Treaty Section website (Date of most recent addition: 29 October 2013), at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm

7. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, No.55, 25 February 1992, at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocottsatcz739/

8.  Limits in the Seas, US Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, US Department of State (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), No 112, 09 March 1992, p.52

9. Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in the Territorial and Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR; ratified by the Council of Ministers Decree No. 384 of 25 Apr 1983, cited in Limits in the Seas, US Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, US Department of State (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), No 112, 09 March 1992, pp.56-57

10. Patrick Martin , ‘Spy plane standoff heightens US-China tensions,’ World Socialist Web Site, 3 April 2001, at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/04/spy-a03.html

11. Echo Huang Yinyin , ‘China Declares a No-Sail-Zone in Disputed Waters During Wargame,’ Defense One, 5 July 2016, at http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/07/china-declares-no-sail-zone-disputed-waters-during-wargame/129607/?oref=d-river

12. Sam LaGrone, ‘Chinese Military South China Sea ‘No Sail’ Zone Not a New Move’, USNI News, 7 July 2016, at https://news.usni.org/2016/07/07/chinese-military-south-china-sea-no-sail-zone-nothing-new

13, Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh V. India) Award, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, 07 July 7, 2014, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1376

Featured Image: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (Sept. 6, 2006) – Chinese Sailors man the rails aboard the destroyer Qingdao (DDG 113) as they arrive in Pearl Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Joe Kane)

Capability Analysis

Full Spectrum Anti-Theater Missile Warfare

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The following article is part of our cross-posting partnership with Information Dissemination’s Jon Solomon. It is republished here with the author’s permission. You can read it in its original form here.

By Jon Solomon

My recent post on how to counter Chinese anti-shipping capabilities between the First and Second Island Chains was heavily influenced by CAPT William Toti’s seminal article in last June’s Naval Institute Proceedings on the need to tackle anti-submarine warfare from a theater-wide, threat-tailored, combined arms campaign construct. If you haven’t read his article (which is outside the paywall), do so. It is a foundational work.

Toti observes that the dramatic sensor advantages that allowed the U.S. Navy to thoroughly dominate Soviet submarines throughout much of the Cold War no longer hold. Our ability to detect and attack an approaching adversary submarine before it can shoot first is uncertain at best. Yet, as Toti points out, “real ASW is not about detecting the submarine, it’s not about killing the submarine, it’s about defeating the submarine.”[i] The ability to win a close-in “knife fight” against a submarine, while important, represents just one of many opportunities to prevent the submarine from executing an effective attack. The submarine in wartime must, after all, have a safe haven in port for resupply, must break out of port, must transit through marginal seas or the open ocean to its patrol station, must be cued into patrol stations or intercept positions from which it would have the greatest opportunity for encountering prey, must detect and correctly classify a target (or receive targeting-quality cues from external surveillance and reconnaissance assets), must approach the target to weapons release range, and must land a blow with its weapon salvo. Most conceivable adversaries of the U.S. have the added geographical challenge of pushing their submarines through chokepoints such as straits in order to access the open ocean or return to port from patrol. Toti observes that there are exploitable vulnerabilities in each of these steps that can deny the submarine a chance to attack effectively and perhaps even lead to the submarine’s own destruction. Toti also notes that if a potential adversary’s leaders became convinced that the U.S. would be able to defang any submarine offensive, they might opt not to employ their submarines—or go to war—in the first place.

In rereading Toti’s article the other week, it occurred to me that there are remarkable parallels between what he suggests could be done to wage a wartime theater anti-submarine campaign and what could be done to wage a campaign to defeat an adversary’s wartime use of theater-range conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. His recounting of the Navy’s “full-spectrum ASW” doctrine provides an excellent model for tying together a combined arms “full-spectrum anti-theater missile campaign” concept along the lines of what Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work dubbed “raid breaker” earlier this year.[ii]

Just as ASW doesn’t depend entirely on destroying the submarine, theater missile defense doesn’t depend entirely on destroying the inbound theater missile. With this in mind, we see that each of Toti’s “ten threads of full-spectrum ASW” has an anti-theater missile analogue:

Full Spectrum ASW Full Spectrum Anti-Theater Missile Warfare
Defeat submarines in port Suppress missile-armed mobile platforms’ basing and logistical support infrastructure
Defeat the submarines’ shore-based command and control capability Defeat the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to attack effectively
Defeat submarines near port, in denied areas Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards their firing positions
Defeat submarines in choke points Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points
Defeat submarines in open ocean Defeat missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas
Draw enemy submarines into ASW “kill boxes,” to a time and place of our choosing Induce missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose themselves to attack
Mask our forces from submarine detection or classification Mask our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts
Defeat the submarine in close battle Defeat missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle
Defeat the incoming torpedo Defeat the inbound missile
Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ submarines Create conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles

Let’s go through the anti-theater missile “threads” in turn. As we proceed, note that I implicitly discard the option of engaging in war-opening preemptive attacks against an adversary’s theater missile forces. With the exception of certain types of electronic or cyber operations, I work under the assumption that most of the below types of attacks would only be authorized by a U.S. President after a war has already started. 

Suppress Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms’ Basing and Logistical Support Infrastructure

Theater missile-firing platforms include aircraft, submarines, naval surface combatants, and Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL). All of these platforms require logistical support including rearmament, refueling (with the exception of SSNs, of course), replenishment of stores, corrective maintenance, and damage repair. In war, the bases in which they normally reside, receive servicing, and operate from can be attacked (assuming authorization from political leadership, which I’ll discuss in more detail below).

Nevertheless, not all of these platforms need to always return to a permanently-fixed base for all forms of servicing. For example, many missile-firing platforms can operate from and be serviced to some extent in austere locations such as seaports, airports, “satellite” airbases or ad hoc airstrips, or relocatable logistical depots. Some missile-firing platforms can have fuel, stores, repair parts, and even certain types of munitions brought to them in the field: replenishment ships can resupply surface combatants and sometimes submarines at sea, trucks or transport aircraft can resupply strike aircraft at austere airbases/airstrips, and trucks can resupply TEL units. All of these means for logistical support in the “field” can be directly attacked given sufficient intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance to know when and where to strike. Moreover, the depots and other fixed infrastructure that logistics forces inevitably pull from can also be identified and attacked. There’s an important caveat, though: the heavy wartime demands on U.S. strike-capable platforms and the finite size of their guided munitions inventories suggests that (politically authorized) targeting lists would have to be prioritized based on a particular logistical asset’s or site’s importance in the adversary’s combat logistics chain, plus the operational and tactical difficulties/risks in attacking that target. 

This leads to a key point: an intelligent adversary could employ many forms of deception and concealment to heavily complicate U.S. and allied targeting efforts against a logistical asset/site or the missile-armed platforms it was servicing. Nevertheless, many forms of concealment would require that the adversary reduce its missile forces’ operational tempos somewhat in order to reduce the risk of detection, classification, and attack. This might relieve some pressure on friendly air and missile defenses by suppressing the frequency and sizes of missile raids on the margins; this can have a significant effect on a given defense’s probability of annihilating a raid. In turn, this suppression might provide friendly forces increased temporary localized margins of operational freedom in a theater—not to mention possibly alleviate some margin of pressure on allied populations and their governments (and by extension on U.S political leaders).

Attacking an adversary’s theater missile forces’ bases along with much of their supporting logistical infrastructure would require strikes against the adversary’s home soil. U.S. political leaders would undoubtedly weigh the escalatory risks of such strikes against the consequences of allowing the adversary to enjoy operational sanctuary for its missile forces. Some critics suggest these escalatory risks would—and should—bar the U.S. from ever attacking a nuclear-armed adversary’s soil. Such critiques however do not recognize the high probability that if the adversary valued certain political objectives highly enough to opt for major war, those objectives would force him to commit the escalatory precedent of conventionally striking a treaty ally’s territory—and perhaps also sovereign U.S. territories—first. This is of immense strategic significance. For one thing, an adversary’s conventional first strike against U.S. or allied territories would almost certainly ignite the popular passions of the victims’ citizens.  The pressure on a U.S. President to retaliate in scope if not in kind would be intense. For another, the adversary’s first strike would allow the U.S. and its ally to invoke unassailable legal as well as moral justification for retaliation. These factors would not offset the nuclear risks of non-nuclear retaliation, but it should be noted that there is an enormous difference between selectively striking conventional forces that might carry theater nuclear weapons and striking distinct nuclear forces. In many cases, the bases and logistical infrastructure supporting conventional forces are distinct from those used by nuclear forces. For example, China’s theater nuclear forces (in the form of its DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile force) are distinct (and often geographically segregated) from its conventionally-armed short-range ballistic missile and long-range cruise missile forces.

None of this is meant to minimize questions of escalation risk facing a U.S. President, but they most certainly do not present a “checkmating” barrier that prevents operations to deny the adversary’s theater missile forces sanctuary. It bears observing that potential adversaries wouldn’t be investing heavily in integrated territorial air defenses, base hardening, and deception and concealment technologies to protect their conventional theater missile forces if they didn’t accept the reality that those forces might be attacked in war.[iii]

Defeat the Systems-of-Systems that Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms Rely Upon to Attack Effectively

I’ve previously written about these kinds of operations at length. Suffice to say, an adversary must be able to either provide correct targeting-quality tactical pictures to its firing units or be able to cue those “shooters” into positions from which they can use their own sensors to build local targeting pictures. The U.S. and its allies can use deception and concealment to prevent the adversary from being able to effectively attack protected mobile forces. This can also be done to some extent for fixed bases and military or civil infrastructure, as deception and concealment can be used to make unimportant sites look important and vice versa. Deception and concealment might additionally be used to induce the adversary to waste precious weapons (and expose firing platforms) in attacks against false or low-value targets. The U.S. might additionally attack the adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance assets, precision navigation and time systems that allow the construction of an accurate situational picture, command and control sites where firing decisions are made, and data relay pathways that form the “backbone” of the entire apparatus. These attacks can be physical, but in many cases it might be more effective as well as carry less escalation risk to use electronic or (as technically plausible) cyber attacks. Nor do these attacks need to have permanent effects (though that would certainly be the ideal), as friendly forces could greatly capitalize on even temporary localized degradation of the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-targeting infrastructure.

This “thread” would not prevent an adversary from using its conventionally-armed theater missiles in terror bombardment campaign against an American ally’s cities. Even so, history suggests such a campaign would be far more likely to further ignite the ally’s popular passions and deepen its resolve to prevail—and retaliate—than it would to coerce the ally into submission. In other words, it would be a strategically self-defeating move by the adversary.

Defeat Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms as They Break out of Bases/Garrisons Towards Their Firing Positions

As Toti observes, this “thread” would largely occur within “denied” areas such as the adversary’s own soil, any friendly or neutral territories occupied by the adversary’s forces, the airspace above or adjacent to these territories, or the waterspace adjoining these territories. This would accordingly complicate offensive anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface combatant, and anti-TEL operations. Nevertheless, friendly submarines could lurk offshore to intercept the adversary’s submarines and surface combatants. Offensive sweeps by theater-range fighters might be used when and where feasible to attack the adversary’s outbound aircraft. Standoff strike aircraft cued by penetrating scouts might be used to attack the adversary’s surface combatants. If adequate air superiority is present, maritime patrol aircraft might be used to search for and attack adversary submarines. Special forces might be used to cue attacks using penetrating aircraft or long-range guided munitions against TELs (though if the First Gulf War is any indication, probably without a great deal of success). Destroying missile-firing platforms would of course be ideal, but the real goal of this “thread” would be to make breakout more time-consuming and resource-intensive than it might otherwise be for the adversary. This might result in further suppression of his operational tempo. It might also prevent him from seizing or maintaining the operational initiative.

Defeat Missile-Armed Air and Naval Platforms in Choke Points

I covered this with respect to aircraft and submarines last week; the threats facing an adversary’s surface combatants would be even steeper. This forms part of the argument for deploying land-based anti-ship missiles alongside straits. Land-based surveillance assets bordering a strait can also cue anti-ship strikes by friendly aircraft operating from more distant bases. Similarly, these surveillance assets can provide other friendly forces with tactically-actionable indications and warning of a strike aircraft raid transiting through a choke point towards its targets or back to its airbases. Lastly, defensive minefields could be laid as geographically practical to complicate transits by the adversary’s surface combatants or submarines.

Defeat Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms in Their Patrol or Firing Areas

I also covered this with respect to aircraft and submarines last week. In the absence of persistent tactical air cover, an adversary’s surface combatants would not be able to hold out for long against U.S or allied anti-ship onslaughts.

TELs present the hardest target to engage in the adversary’s firing areas, bar none. They not only can hide within the broad expanse (and defense-in-depth) of the adversary’s territory, but can also blend into their surroundings on par with the quietest submarines at sea. They can shift quickly and frequently between prepared firing positions, or can hunker down heavily camouflaged for protracted periods. There is no existing or technically-plausible weapon system that could offer a high kill probability against TEL units that were smartly employing deception and concealment. Nor is there an existing or technically-plausible strike aircraft that could persistently perform TEL hunts deep within a capable adversary’s airspace unless the adversary’s territorial air defenses had been comprehensively rolled back. This does not mean that TEL hunting, if the tactical environment allows it, would be fruitless. The situation-dependent use of U.S. aircraft to hunt TELs using cheap weapons with low kill probabilities would still put TEL units on the defensive, which in turn might contribute to suppressing TEL firing rates and salvo sizes.

The most effective means of defeating ground-launched missile forces is to physically occupy the territory they are operating within. This is a principle that has been proven time and time again, from the allies’ Second World War efforts to defeat the German V-1 and V-2 bombardment campaign, to the Israelis’ efforts to break up Hezbollah and Hamas rocket bombardment campaigns over the past decade. It’s also the most costly in treasure and blood, as it requires the use of sizable ground forces. This is plausible and probably necessary if the adversary is operating TELs on the overrun soil of a U.S. ally; liberation of the ally’s territory would normally be a U.S. war objective in any case. It may also be plausible, albeit possibly far more costly, if a relatively small adversary country is operating TELs on its own soil. It is not plausible at all, whether militarily or politically, against TELs operated on the soil of a regional or great power. However, if a regional or great power is operating TELs relatively close to its border or coastal areas, and especially if those areas are somewhat geographically isolated, it might be plausible to dispatch special forces on brief raids aimed at destroying them directly, flushing them for attack by other friendly forces, or temporarily suppressing them by inducing them to go into hiding. Expeditionary forces might also be used to raid a regional power’s TELs in these kinds of areas; this would not be possible politically or militarily against a great power.

Induce Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms to Fire at False Targets and Perhaps Expose Themselves to Attack

I’ve written about this one extensively in the past as well. Every theater missile wasted is one less in the adversary’s finite inventory, with concomitant impacts on his campaign plans. This is especially true if a wasted missile cannot be readily replaced off the production line during wartime.

Similarly, an adversary platform or grouping that is seduced into attacking false targets will be incapable of attacking valid targets elsewhere at the same time. U.S. and allied forces can obviously exploit this operationally. At maximum, a submarine, surface combatant, or aircraft that shoots a theater missile gives away its general presence and sometimes even its approximate position. False targets might thus be used to set up reactive intercepts against the attackers, or perhaps even to lure them into prepared ambushes. It isn’t a stretch to imagine the kinds of enduring (and exploitable) psychological effects that might be imposed upon previously-overconfident adversary crews that wasted ordnance against decoys—or managed to survive an ambush.

Mask our Forces From the Adversary’s Local Reconnaissance and Targeting Efforts

This is another “thread” I’ve covered previously elsewhere. It is just as crucial to the use of false target tactics in the previous “thread” as it is to defending actual U.S. and allied forces from attack. The adversary must not be allowed to properly classify, let alone detect if at all practical, actual U.S. and allied forces until it is too late to matter. Toti hits the nail on the head in his piece when he notes “…it is about increasing the fog of war by making the real targets look like anything but a real target” and that it “must be a continuous process.”[iv]

Defeat Missile-Armed Air and Naval Platforms in Close Battle

This is self-explanatory: destroy them or induce them to retreat before they can shoot at friendly forces. This demands either long-range weaponry that can be fired from the “inner zone” against the adversary’s inbound missile-armed platforms or the placement of persistent outer layer defenses in the adversary’s path. The latter is almost always preferable as the adversary can easily field strike missiles that outrange any weapon the defender might fire from the inner zone.

As its title makes clear, this “thread” is not applicable to TELs.

Defeat the Inbound Missile

This is also self-explanatory. Missile defense sensors, kinetic weapons, and electronic warfare systems all factor here. So does damage recoverability (e.g. use of redundant systems, rapid repair of damaged runways, hardening of a base’s critical infrastructure, shipboard damage control, etc). No single measure offers a panacea: some combination of active and passive measures is necessary to maximize defensive effectiveness.

A subtle variation of this “thread” involves the dispersal of forces not just to enhance their survivability, but also to force the adversary into an inventory management dilemma. The adversary could concentrate strikes over a specific period of time against a small number of force dispersal sites in order to overwhelm the missile defense systems protecting those sites, but that would leave the U.S. and allied forces positioned in other dispersal sites free to operate. The adversary could alternatively strike the maximum number of dispersal sites possible within a specific time period, but that would result in relatively few missiles attacking any single site—and thereby greatly simplify the jobs of each site’s missile defense systems. Also recall that theater missiles are not easily produced, especially in war. This means every missile fired would reduce the number available to the adversary for the duration of the conflict. As such, the adversary would probably have some threshold limit to the number of missiles he’d be willing to use in a concentrated or “spread” attack. U.S. and allied forces could adapt to capitalize on whichever attack type the adversary selected, and by doing so defeat the adversary’s theater missiles at the operational level of war. 

Create Conditions Where an Adversary Chooses not to Employ Theater Missiles

Full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare signifies denying the adversary conventional escalation dominance in a crisis or war. The cumulative effect of convincing an opportunistic potential adversary that each of its “threads” are combat-credible—and that U.S. political leaders would be willing to deny the potential adversary’s forces operational sanctuary on their own soil if the adversary struck first—will generally be successful conventional deterrence.

The ideal state of deterrence would obviously be prevention of war outright, and Cold War-era theories regarding how this can be achieved between two competing nuclear-armed powers remain applicable. But even if a conventional war did erupt, the credibility of full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare might help induce an adversary with modest political objectives to keep the conflict limited to a brief localized clash along a land border or at sea involving only the shortest-range missiles in both sides’ inventories. While tragic and hardly desirable, it would still be vastly preferable to a ruinous general war.

Jon Solomon is a Senior Systems and Technology Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at jfsolo107@gmail.com. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

Endnotes

[i] CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.” Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014, 39.

[ii] I define “theater missile” to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea.

[iii] This point is made abundantly clear in Elbridge Colby. “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle.” The National Interest online, 13 July 2013, accessed 5/24/15, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show

[iv] Toti, 43.

Featured Image: ARABIAN GULF (March 20, 2011) Mineman Seaman Charles Bryan watches for contacts on the SPA 256 radar while on watch in the Combat Directive Center aboard the mine countermeasures ship USS Ardent (MCM 12).  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Lewis Hunsaker/Released)