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Against the Growing Anti-Ship Missile Threat, Are We Truly Semper Paratus?

By Michael Milburn

This is the first of a three-part series examining the effectiveness of current ship self-defense capabilities on U.S. Coast Guard cutters within the context of expanded roles in the maritime domain. The author proposes solutions to current gaps in capability and presents a high level cost-benefit analysis to the proposal.

Introduction

The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by skeptics or cynics whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can dream of things that never were.” President John F. Kennedy’s words challenge us to recall the limitations we once accepted and the adversity that forced change. Imagine the various catalysts that preceded major world events, technological milestones, social failures, and successes. Now imagine our nation – its safety, security, and vitality. Imagine those same feelings gutted and burning during the catastrophic impacts to the USS Stark and USS Cole. Because of these events, our Navy was forced out of the “obvious reality” and challenged to improve self-defense.

It is no secret that tensions between the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming progressively more inherently dangerous. Countries remain on high alert with fingers on triggers, awaiting the next move. As the U.S. Coast Guard sails off distant shores – the Arctic, the Middle East, and the South China Sea – it faces these same threats. The U.S. Coast Guard can be perceived as a soft target as it generally operates in a peacetime, non-aggressive, law enforcement capacity, unless transferred to the U.S. Navy by order of the President or act of Congress. But what happens when attacks are directed toward the Coast Guard? Bringing the service into 21st century warfighting has never been clearer than now with the need to examine a different Coast Guard that focuses on our statutory mission of Defense Readiness, in addition to homeland defense. One relatively quick and cost-effective method would be to upgrade USCG ships with modern close-in-weapons-systems (CIWS) to counter the proliferating anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) threat. This would enhance USCG survivability in forward areas while building off of the Navy’s progress in fielding such systems in order to realize savings. 

The Anti-Ship Missile Challenge

A C-802 anti-ship missile travels at Mach 0.9, 1 nautical mile (NM) every 5.9 seconds. Launched from 20NM, a C-802 will take approximately 120 seconds to impact its intended target. This missile was originally created by China and exported to Iran after the 1991 Gulf War. It is operated by numerous coastal batteries within the Strait of Hormuz and other areas. Akin to the AK-47 assault rifle, the C-802 continues to be a common weapon system worldwide. Ten nations field the weapon. Smaller nations such as Iran continue to upgrade its technology, payloads, and increase its range. Strategic placement along highly trafficked waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait continues to concern the U.S Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy, both of whom have military installations throughout the Middle East that are only accessible by way of such straits. 

Taking into account a ship’s reaction time, radar coverage, and the ever-decreasing engagement distance, there may be little to no indication of an inbound missile until it is less than 15NM away. This leaves less than 90 seconds to report, track, react with countermeasures, maneuver the ship, evaluate countermeasure effectiveness, and then re-engage. If it is not effective, CIWS is relied upon to take it out within its respective envelope. However, many modern anti-ship cruise missiles are even faster than the C-802. More and more missiles today fly at supersonic speeds of up to Mach 2-3. A missile traveling Mach 2.0 covers 1NM every 2.7 seconds; Mach 3.0 1NM every 1.8 seconds. That is 58 and 36 seconds of engagement time at a range of 20NM, respectively.

These highly sophisticated weapons are capable of being modified to fire from longer ranges and can also be installed on virtually any platform. They are no longer controlled by single or limited guidance systems. In recent decades, as early as the late 1980s, many countries including the U.S. looked to add multiple guidance systems on missiles to advance accuracy thereby increasing the probability of a hit. This was an adaptation to simplistic yet effective countermeasures of using chaff rounds, turning off a system the missile was looking for, or simply moving the ship out of the line of fire. Such simplistic countermeasures are no match for supersonic cruise missiles fitted with advanced seekers, capable of high-g turns, and that employ unpredictable maneuvers to maximize payload survivability and damage.

The recent and highly publicized events of the UAE Navy ship HSV-2 SWIFT, USS MASON, USS NITZE, AFSB PONCE and USS SAN ANTONIO have proven that post-Cold War missiles are still very much real and deadly. These attacks come as the first missile attacks against a U.S. or Coalition ship in over 25 years since Operation Desert Storm and just proved the necessity of installed self-defense weaponry. According to Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, “in the next few years, everywhere the Navy goes, if you’re not in a submarine, you better watch out because every crappy country will be able to launch high-speed missiles at you and the propagation of that is going to be amazing.” Why is the USCG ignoring the ASCM threat?

Close-In-Weapons-Sytems

Let us examine CIWS. According to NavWeps, a Phalanx “CIWS will prioritize the first six threats it sees at about 5 nautical miles (NM) and engage at 2NM.” That means confirmation of the threat occurs around 30 seconds from impact and the weapons system can effectively engage certain threats just 11.8 seconds before impact. There are 18 seconds of reaction time and 3 NM of dead space where certain counter-ASCM systems cannot engage effectively. CIWS is just that: a close-in weapons system designed as a last resort against the ASCM threat at extremely close range.

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SeaRAM pinpoints its target and fires Rolling Airframe Missiles — lightweight, supersonic, self-guided weapons designed to destroy close-range threats, including helicopters and cruise missiles. [Photo credit: Raytheon]
The SeaRam system using the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) provides the enhanced counter-ASCM capability the USCG needs to guard against modern threats in place of the currently equipped Phalanx system. RAM is a supersonic, lightweight, quick-reaction, fire-and-forget weapon designed to destroy anti-ship missiles. Its autonomous dual-mode passive radio frequency (RF) and infrared guidance provides the capability for engaging multiple threats simultaneously. It can engage threats at over five miles and double the range of the Phalanx system.

RAM is continually improved to stay ahead of the ever-evolving threat of anti-ship missiles, helicopters, aircraft and surface craft. SeaRam is the successful integration of key attributes of the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System and Rolling Airframe Missile, replacing the 20mm Phalanx gun system with an 11-missile launcher assembly. It combines RAM’s superior accuracy, extended range, and high maneuverability with the Phalanx Block 1B’s high-resolution search-and-track sensor systems and quick-response capability against close-in threats. 

Building Off Navy Progress

While the U.S. Navy continues to improve self-defense capabilities against the ASCM threat, the Coast Guard by comparison has yet to consider this a priority. In fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that National Security Cutters (NSC) have yet to achieve a hard or soft kill against a subsonic cruise missile as required by Congress. While the Phalanx CIWS onboard NSCs is fairly capable, the U.S. Navy has progressed to fleet-wide implementation of the more advanced RAM and SeaRAM systems – leaving even updated variants of systems from the early-80s for history.

The response came almost immediately amidst increasing threats from Russia and China in strategically key areas like the Eastern Mediterranean and the South China Sea. A handful of Navy destroyers in Spain were equipped to counter a Russian cruise missile threat that quickly emerged and littoral combat ships (LCS) are being tested with SeaRam, but the Navy is looking to expand these numbers to more ships across the fleet.

The Legend-class National Security Cutter USCGC WAESCHE (WMSL-751), Indonesian Navy landing platform dock ship KRI BANDA ACEH (BAC 593) and the amphibious dock landing ship USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) steam through the Java Sea in 2012. (U.S. Navy)
The Legend-class National Security Cutter USCGC WAESCHE (WMSL-751), Indonesian Navy landing platform dock ship KRI BANDA ACEH (BAC 593) and the amphibious dock landing ship USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) steam through the Java Sea in 2012. (U.S. Navy)

SeaRam and the MK 31 guided missile weapon system are not exactly “cheap” upgrades. On average the SeaRam and RAM systems cost the service around $998,900 per missile with 11 missiles for SeaRam and 21 for the MK31. As with any retrofitting there will be increased prices for outfitting the first few ships and lower production prices for long lead projects such as NSCs 8 through 10, all 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and the new icebreakers.

Where the Coast Guard has the upper hand is letting our more experienced, and bigger-budgeted (13 times our operating budget) sister service do the leg work. Once a decision is made on a system, the Coast Guard can simply buy-in at a lower rate, appending their order to the Navy’s purchase of a large-rate multi-year procurement. Subsequently, this agreement can become Navy-Type Navy-Owned equipment (NTNO) and the network for support greatly increases. This was and is the case for SPS-75 and 57mm Borfors (on NSC and LCS classes), and the SLQ-32 systems installed on NSCs, WMECs, and virtually all U.S. Navy surface ships. Congressional regulations require interoperability and cross-service utilization for systems executing DoD operations. The SLQ-32, 57mm Bofors, Data Link 11/16 systems, and other combat systems currently in use by the USCG all meet these requirements

These weapon systems bring the Coast Guard into modern ship self-defense. This would be a smart move for the Coast Guard as these systems are commonly used across not just the U.S. Navy, but eight other navies as well. This brings more experienced technical and mechanical support worldwide along with increased interoperability that the U.S. maritime services have preached and signed agreements on. Outfitting the USCG with this system allows for greater interoperability and provides needed protection during independent operations. This adequately meets Congressional acquisition requirements and reinforces the service as a military entity able to operate forward.

Conclusion

Years ago we ignored the electromagnetic spectrum, swarming boat threats, and quite possibly the ASCM threat as well. Our objectives were not aimed at those areas as they were predominantly Navy missions. Was this naive? The USCG motto, after all, is Semper Paratus, meaning “Always Ready,” but when it comes down to reality, are we really confident enough to place an NSC, or soon the OPC, into a high-threat area where modern missiles lie over the horizon? We cannot overlook that we are targets and we need to survive those unexpected attacks in order to be there when it counts.

In part two, we will examine the use of non-kinetic systems and measures for ship self-defense against anti-ship missiles. We will then discuss the integration of hard-kill and soft-kill tactics under the NSC program. We will cover costs associated, similar programs throughout history, issues with these systems, and the possible barriers the service may face along the way. There will be room to explore the Coast Guard’s continuing and expanded role in the maritime domain along with the associated international relationships and how these measures can enhance the service’s traditional roles.

Petty Officer Michael A. Milburn is a career Cutterman, with over 7 years of  experience aboard four different cutters, including commissioning two National Security Cutters. He is a current member of CIMSEC, USNI, Association of Old Crows, Surface Navy Association, and various other professional organizations. The views in this article are his alone and do not represent the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security or any other government organization.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (June 24, 2016) Legend-class cutter USCGC Stratton (WMSL 752) and littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) steam in formation while transiting to Rim of the Pacific 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Ryan Riley/Released)

Naval Applications of Solar, Kinetic, and Wind Energy Generation

Naval Applications of Tech

Written by Terence Bennett, Naval Applications of Tech discusses how emerging and disruptive technologies can be used to make the U.S. Navy more effective. It examines potential and evolving developments in the tech industry, communication platforms, computer software and hardware, mechanical systems, power generation, and other areas.

“The most damaging phrase in the language is ‘We’ve always done it this way!’” — Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper in an interview in Information Week, March 9, 1987, p. 52

By Terence Bennett

Introduction

Philippines President Duterte announced last month that he wanted all U.S. forces out of the Philippines in two years, leaving U.S. policy makers to find an alternative naval basing strategy for the region. The presence of U.S. naval forces in the Philippines can be traced directly back to Commodore Dewey’s command, “You may fire when you are ready, Gridley,” utterly shortly before a fleet of U.S. Battleships entered Manila Bay to liberate it from Spanish rule in 1898. At the time, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s work The Influence of Sea Power upon History had popularized the need for a strong U.S. merchant fleet, battle fleet, and network of naval bases. The taking of Manila Bay would give the United States its first taste of colonialism and the ability to operate U.S. ships from a homeport far away from the United States. With today’s political landscape changing in unstable ways, it is time to rethink any assumption about U.S. naval basing and power projection. Surface ships and naval basing platforms need to capitalize on unique forms of energy that surround them starting with solar, kinetic, and wind power.

Emerging clean technologies have presented many alternative forms of power generation, but none have been able to replace the energy dense and ubiquitous nature of diesel. Despite a strong commitment after World War II under Admiral Rickover towards a nuclear Navy, today’s over reliance on diesel is epitomized by the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer (DDG). This modern destroyer was commissioned in 1991 with seven gas turbine engines used for propulsion and power generation. Although having an extremely high power to weight ratio, gas turbine engines are fuel hogs and have left the U.S. surface fleet tethered to supply ships. In the two-and-half-decades since commissioning, the Arleigh-Burke-class has been improved with better combat systems, faster projectiles, and even hybrid-electric drives. But the Navy has not fundamentally readdressed Mahan’s assumptions on resupply and fuel-burning energy generation. The Navy needs to find solutions that unburden U.S. national security from a dependence on countries with strategically-located deep water ports. The issue of naval basing on foreign soil isn’t a political problem, but rather a technological one. 

Solar Energy

Solar power has been historically difficult to employ due to low efficiency, expensive equipment, and the need for a lot of space to gather sunlight. Successful application of solar has typically been to supply individual households with power. An Italian company has put a twist on this small-scale solar model by placing solar panels on floating platforms in residential lakes and ponds. This solution allows the arrays to rotate toward the sun, utilize otherwise unoccupied space, and cool equipment more efficiently. This year, researchers in Vienna have developed ocean wave dampening technology that will allow large floating platforms of solar arrays to be deployed with less risk of damage from waves at sea. Although floating solar arrays are not employed by the Navy today, this development may make sea-based solar arrays a project of interest in the future. When complete, the Heliofloat will be the size of a football field and generate solar energy for use on shore.

The solar panels use a giant platform that remains steady in rough seas (Credit: UT Wien)
The Heliofloat’s solar panels use a giant platform that remains steady in rough seas. (UT Wien)

The Heliofloat is getting attention from the solar energy community because it aims to leverage a large expanse of unutilized space. This same attitude can be applied to ships at sea. We overlook the paradox of sailing tightly cramped ships on the vast openness of the ocean. Naval architects and engineers work to fit as much as possible onto ships, but this mindset leaves out the potential for employing the open space around the ship for a useful purpose. Ohio-based startup Xunlight has developed large flexible roll-up solar arrays that could be used for solar energy generation outside the skin of a ship. Sailmakers have already started using this technology in the sails of commercially sold sailboats, demonstrating the material’s resilience and versatility. Like the solar sails of Jules Verne’s novels, Navy ships could employ large outriggers with quickly deployable solar arrays to collect the sun’s energy. Although impractical for many scenarios – in transit, in high seas, or winds – ships could make use of this solution during loiter operations. These solar sails could be designed to disguise ships from radar, or make them appear like an entirely different class of ship. A deployable roll-out solar array would be an easily prototyped green energy solution for ships today.

Kinetic Energy

The Navy is currently testing the Azura Wave device off the coast of Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii. This single device is capable of generating 20 kW from the motion of the ocean. To put that in perspective, the average Hawaiian consumes 17 kWh per day. This buoy, in optimal conditions, is offsetting the daily power consumption of one average Hawaiian resident in one hour. Although this may not seem like much of an impact, it proves that it can be done. Two more companies are planning to test similar devices capable of producing 500 kW. In the not so distance future, kinetic generators like this might be anchored in a grid and secured to Heliofloat-like platforms for combined kinetic-solar generation. Through the combination of different alternative energy projects, yields can be increased to levels competitive with fossil fuel systems.    

Ocean Power Technology’s (OPT) Powerbuoy wave generation system. (Credit: USMClife.com)
Ocean Power Technology’s (OPT) Powerbuoy wave generation system. ( USMClife.com)

Wind Energy

At the time of writing, winds in the central Arabian Gulf
are blowing at 23 knots. This is just fast enough to produce 5,000 kW with a 282 ft long Sheerwind wind tunnel, roughly the equivalent power production of two Allison generators aboard an Arleigh Burke-class DDG. Minnesota-based Sheerwind has developed a system to capture, concentrate, accelerate and harvest wind power in a funnel. The tunnels happen to be very big, but the installation of towers to collect wind could fit at the top of a ship’s stacks and ideally installed in line with existing diesel generation systems. This setup could allow the ship to use wind power when it was available and shift to diesel generation as necessary. This technology would have to be integrated into the design of a ship, but would be ideal for vessels required to operate for extended amounts of time in a single area.

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SheerWind’s INVELOX Wind Delivery system (Sheerwind.com)

Conclusion

When Mahan envisioned a battleship Navy, he was describing the prevailing example of concentrated seapower. When Mahan described the requirement for a nation to have a strong network of naval bases, it can be assumed that he was describing the need for sustained operations far from friendly coasts. Just as a Fleet in Being is useless unless it presents a legitimate danger of leaving port, a powerful Navy must be present to exert its will on the adversary. In maritime confrontation today, the challenge of finding and facing our adversary often becomes the key to success. For this reason, our current naval strategy of sea basing and sustained operations at sea will continue to be a central theme in the projection of U.S. military power. A glut of cheap oil may have slowed the progress of new Navy energy-related technology, but the emergence of a generation of cheap alternative energy sources and the clever employment of existing technologies can change this. The future of Navy operations is largely unknown, except that ships will always be required to spend long amounts of time at sea. High efficiency and ideally renewable sources like solar, kinetic, and wind energy should be an attractive addition to a ship’s power plant.

LT Bennett is a former Surface Warfare Officer and current Intelligence Officer. The views express herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Featured Image: YOKOSUKA, Japan (Aug. 22, 2012) Capt. David Owen, left, commanding officer of Fleet Activities Yokosuka, inspects recently installed solar panels at Sullivan Elementary School. The solar panels are a building integrated photovoltaic system, which is estimated to contribute $297,000 in projected annual energy savings at the installation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Matthew R. Cole/Released)

Russia’s Maneuvering of Conflicts for Enhancing Military Exports

The Red Queen’s Navy

Written by Vidya Sagar Reddy, The Red Queen’s Navy will discuss the The Red Queeninfluence of emerging naval platforms and technologies in the geostrategic contours of the Indo-Pacific region. It identifies relevant historical precedents, forming the basis for various maritime development and security related projects in the region.

“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.”– The Red Queen, Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll.

By Vidya Sagar Reddy

Introduction

Contrary to Western assessments that Russia’s military intervention in Syria would only deepen the economic crisis it is already facing, Vladimir Putin is tactfully turning this situation into an advantage. He is betting on the enormous Russian military-industrial complex with the logic that increasing the cash flow into this sector would create jobs and enhance military exports, reviving the economy. He is not alone in this thought. Foreign military sales is one of the principal sectors of the U.S. national economy creating millions of jobs, supporting local industries, and promoting innovation.

Russia provided ideological and military support to Communist forces in Asia, influencing the outcome of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts during the Cold War. The fallout of these conflicts continues to overshadow emerging security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. In this context, the Asia-Pacific region, which is grappling to respond to the rise of a regional hegemon, appears to be most promising for exporting Russian weapon systems.

Russian Arms Sales in the Asia-Pacific

It is hard to substantiate whether Russia is a direct stakeholder in the stability of the Asia-Pacific. Its principal support to China in the South China Sea dispute is more of a measure to obtain a reciprocal response from China in its own altercations in Europe and West Asia. The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria continue to interrupt Russia’s plans to establish a network of energy pipelines, which is a major source of revenue for the country. The deteriorated political relations with Ukraine also means a setback for Russia’s military exports since it is dependent on Ukraine-made engines and sensors.

Amid these tensions, Russia has swung to Asia-Pacific, concluding a string of strategic partnerships and securing export orders for its defense industry. China is set to buy 24 Russian Su-35 fighter jets and 36 S-400 air defense systems. India has also finalized a deal to buy the S-400 which only adds to the dominance of Russian military equipment in its arsenal. India and Russia are also discussing the exportation of jointly developed BrahMos cruise missiles to other countries such as Vietnam.

During the recent BRICS Summit in Goa, India finalized the $2 billion deal to lease a second nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) from Russia. India is currently operating an Akula II class SSN, rechristened the INS Chakra, on lease since 2012 for a period of ten years. India will also be buying four improved Talwar class frigates from Russia for $3 billion. Two of these ships will be built in Russia and the other two in India with the former’s assistance. These four add to the six commissioned warships of the same class, all built in Russia.

The decision to let the initial two warships be built in Russia has come as a surprise since India has already built the next generation Shivalik-class frigates domestically and has approved the construction of seven follow-on Project 17A stealth frigates by Indian shipbuilders. India will also need to buy the required power plants for these new frigates independently from Ukraine as the latter refuses to export military equipment to Russia due to the ongoing conflict. The fact is that Russia has already semi-built these frigates in its shipyard, but is struggling to obtain the engines from Ukraine. The Indian-Russian deal will arrange for these engines to be supplied to Russia through a third party (India) and the finished platforms will be commissioned for the Indian Navy.

The cruise missile salvo launched from the Caspian Sea flotilla against the targets in Syria is not only a show of force for Russia but also a live demonstration for elevating the export potential of its missiles. Several international customers including a few countries in Southeast Asia have expressed interest in the Russian Klub cruise missiles. As Russia’s official arms exporter Rosoboronexport puts it, this interest in cruise missiles leads to more orders for Russian warships and submarines because these cruise missiles require transportation and command and control platforms for deployment. Vietnam is keen to acquire land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles given the ever increasing threats from China to its territorial integrity. It has already purchased six Kilo class submarines from Russia, which will be armed with the Klub.

Russian Navy ships fire cruise missiles into Syria nearly 1000nm away from the Caspian Sea. (Russian Ministry of Defense)

Russia’s military equipment has a steady demand in the Asia-Pacific and other regions, partly due to the absence of issue linkages such as the human rights record the Western democracies would entangle their prospective buyers with. Russia is also generally insensitive to the security interests of its clients as evidenced by large deals with Vietnam, China, and India despite those nations’ concerns about one another.

Building on this demand and increasing its political leverage, Russia is even mulling reopening Soviet-era bases in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. For example, Russia is in discussions with Egypt, which is keen on allowing Russia to operate military bases in the country, thereby increasing the latter’s military footprint in the Mediterranean. There is speculation that Russia is also interested in renewing bases in Cuba and Vietnam. This will allow Russia to closely monitor both U.S. and Chinese naval activities, especially in the South China Sea.

Conclusion

Military might has always been a source of inspiration and pride for Russians, but military power does not automatically translate into economic well-being for the country. This is where Putin’s strategy comes into play, building on Russia’s vast military industrial apparatus for both international stature as well as the economic build up of the country. The Syrian conflict and the emerging security situation in the Asia-Pacific are being exploited for this purpose. The success of this economic strategy can only be awaited.

Vidya Sagar Reddy is a research assistant in the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative of the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Featured Image: Russian warships are seen during a naval parade rehearsal in the Crimean port of Sevastopol (Moscow Times) 

Reminder: Date Change to 01 Dec for Winter Lightning Rounds and HH

By Scott Cheney-Peters

A chill’s in the air with the season’s first storms. This means it’s time for CIMSEC’s Winter Lightning Rounds: 5 minute presentations by CIMSEC members on their current work in the maritime security world or maritime security challenges they’re grappling with. This summer’s events went so well we’re doing it again! Join us in the basement bar of St. Arnold’s Mussel Bar in Cleveland Park.

If you’re interested in participating as a presenter or would like to RSVP, please contact director@cimsec.org. All are welcome.

Time: Thursday, 01 Dec, 5:30-8:00pm; presentations will begin approximately 6:30.

Place: St. Arnold’s Mussel Bar (basement bar), 3433 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20008 (Cleveland Park Metro stop on the Red Line)

Save the Date! CIMSEC’s Holiday Party will be Dec 13th 6pm-8pm at the Front Page DC.

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Featured Image: (starnoldsmusselbar.com)