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Current Operations, Europe

An Adequate NATO Maritime Posture: The Missing Element For Deterring Russia

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European Maritime Security Topic Week

By Ian Sundstrom

Introduction

Since the Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) was published in 2011, the strategic context facing NATO has shifted. The drafters envisaged a world where the Alliance would continue to be an expeditionary one, employing its forces in counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and humanitarian roles in many locations around the world. Under the aegis of this strategy, Alliance maritime forces did precisely that. Operations Ocean Shield and Active Endeavor were conducted in these contexts. The former was a counterpiracy operation off the Horn of Africa and the latter a counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean. Both ended in 2016, but Active Endeavor was replaced by Operation Sea Guardian, designed in much the same spirit. Its objectives are very similar: maritime situational awareness, protection of freedom of navigation, maritime interdiction against weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, and protection of critical infrastructure. This lone maritime operation does not, however, match the strategic realities that NATO faces.

Over the last six years, NATO’s strategic environment has changed significantly. The Arab Spring, beginning in 2011, led to instability on the Alliance’s southern flank, exacerbated perhaps by NATO’s own actions in Libya. One result has been massive cross-Mediterranean migrant flows that European states have been unable to halt. The civil war in Syria has slowly deteriorated to the point that the United States, its allies, and Russia have become involved in the air and on the ground. Naval activity in the Eastern Mediterranean is at levels not seen since the Cold War. Russian, American, and NATO warships continuously ply these seas and the Russian Navy’s only aircraft carrier recently completed its maiden combat deployment from the Eastern Mediterranean.

There and elsewhere, Russian forces regularly intercept NATO aircraft and ships in international airspace and waters, generating tension between East and West and demonstrating a renewed level of aggression epitomized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2014 Russia invaded its neighbor and annexed the Crimean Peninsula and the strategic naval base at Sevastopol in the process. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have destabilized Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region and caused concern amongst NATO and non-NATO states that Russia’s next moves may come in the Baltic. NATO was founded to deter and defend against Soviet aggression in Europe, and Russia’s recent actions have shown its enduring necessity after more than two decades of strategic drift. All told, the strategic environment predicted by the drafters of the AMS has evaporated.

Insufficient Measures

NATO has responded to its changing strategic environment almost exclusively through operations and initiatives ashore. To counter Russian aggression and reassure eastern Allies, NATO established two major programs. The first, Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), installs NATO soldiers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on a permanent rotational basis. It will be fully established in 2018 and includes troop contributions from 19 member states. The second is Tailored Forward Presence in Romania. This consists of an expanded series of rotational exercises, with the result of near continual NATO presence on Romanian territory. The United States’ own European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), distinct from, but complementary to, NATO actions, is similarly land-focused. Over its three years of existence, from 2015 to today, the annual budget for the U.S. Navy’s participation in ERI has been three percent, four percent, and two and a half percent respectively. The response to Russian aggression has been clearly focused ashore.

The existing initiatives are a step in the right direction, but the lack of a coherent maritime response undermines those efforts and presents opportunities for Russia to exploit. NATO’s sole maritime operation, Operation Sea Guardian, does not support existing efforts to counter Russian aggression. And it is not designed to, as it is specifically not an Article 5 operation. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires that treaty signatories come to the defense of one another in case of attack and is considered the bedrock of the Alliance. NATO is right to state that Operation Sea Guardian is not in response to an attack on any member, but by explicitly highlighting that the operation is non-Article 5 in focus, it sends a signal that day-to-day operations are not aimed at deterring NATO’s potential opponents. Operation Sea Guardian is also explicitly focused on Task Four of the AMS, consisting of maritime security operations. These are conceptually distinguished from the deterrence and defense roles of the Alliance delineated in Task One. This further demonstrates to Russia that NATO’s maritime focus is separate from its ground efforts. Even if aimed at deterring Russia, it is insufficiently resourced. One recent “Focused Security Patrol” under the mantra of Operation Sea Guardian comprised three aged frigates (Turkish, Greek, and Italian) conducting 600 combined hours of patrols, or 8 and 1/3 days each, in the Eastern Mediterranean. This level of effort, in both duration and capability, is inadequate in the face of the forces the Russian Navy has maintained in that theater.

Bolstering NATO Seapower

To their credit, Alliance leadership may have begun to recognize the insufficiency of NATO’s maritime posture. As part of Tailored Forward Presence, Alliance defense ministers agreed in February 2017 to increase NATO presence in the Black Sea to improve situational awareness and increase training and exercises. This may improve the situation in the Black Sea, but the problem of deterrence is broader. This ad hoc approach to maritime deterrence will not stop Russia’s pattern of aggressive actions in the seas around Europe.

NATO’s poor showing at sea has led some to argue that the AMS itself needs a total overhaul. Critics are correct in noting that the strategy’s discussion of the maritime security environment is out of date. They also rightly criticize the lack of any resource – i.e. force structure and development – discussion. The strategy is also insufficiently focused on the core collective defense and deterrence mission and therefore not aligned with NATO’s 2015 Political Guidance which reemphasized these core Alliance tasks. The AMS does require a refresh, and policymakers should begin discussions on this now, but without delaying maritime action by the Alliance.

The AMS itself provides the logical basis for conducting peacetime Article 5 operations. The first task the strategy assigns to maritime forces is deterrence and collective defense. By grouping these two concepts together, the AMS links collective defense and deterrence in a continuum of action between peace and war. It highlights that collective defense is the necessary action in response to failed deterrence. Article 5 requires that member states aid one another only in the event of armed attack, but given the defensive nature of the alliance, the terrible consequences of war between NATO and Russia, and the conceptual link between deterrence and collective defense, it is logical to draw explicit connections between peacetime NATO deterrent operations and Article 5 collective defense actions.

Such an explicit connection would improve the deterrent effect of the operation. The AMS notes that deterrence relies upon “proven capability, demonstrations of readiness, and effective strategic communications.” This is firmly based in existing theories of deterrence. An actor, be it a state or group of states, must possess not merely adequate defensive capabilities to either stop enemy aggression or inflict sufficient pain to make the aggression too costly. The actor must also be credibly committed to using this force in the event that deterrence fails. Communicating these two preceding facts to the potential enemy in such a way that their leaders perceive a sufficient threat is the final component. Establishing a new maritime operation would neither change NATO’s capabilities nor fully address the credibility problem inherent in the alliance, but by tying this new operation to Article 5 the alliance would better communicate the seriousness of its commitment to preventing further Russian aggression.

As written, the AMS is flexible enough to serve as the basis for a more coherent maritime response to Russia. As it declares, “the relative weight given to the Alliance’s engagement in each of these roles will depend on circumstances and the resources available.” NATO should rebalance its maritime efforts to increase the relative weight devoted to the deterrence and collective defense mission. This can be accomplished through a combination of three actions: launching a new maritime operation with collective defense and deterrence as its main objective, increasing the frequency and complexity of NATO maritime exercises, and better resourcing the existing Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups (SNMCMG).

First, NATO should establish a new operation focused on deterring Russian aggression at sea and, if necessary, exercising collective defense. This operation should explicitly state that it rests upon the foundation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. To date, the article has been activated only once, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Operation Active Endeavor was established as the maritime component of the NATO response to this armed attack on a member state. While Russia has not attacked any members, this recent experience provides some precedent for establishing a maritime operation founded upon Article 5.

To achieve the desired effect, this operation should be wide in its geographic scope and mission to best demonstrate existing capability and readiness. It should be active in the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean, and Norwegian Seas to counter Russian efforts in each of these areas. Russia has increased its maritime presence in each sea to levels last seen during the Cold War and NATO must demonstrate the capability to respond simultaneously in each theater. The operation should also focus on the full-range of maritime missions. It should develop situational awareness of Russian actions, hold Russian maritime forces at risk any time they deploy, and enhance NATO interoperability and build expertise in combined operations at the unit and higher echelon command levels. These actions will better prepare NATO forces to defend against Russian attacks in the event of war and will demonstrate to Russian leaders that NATO stands ready to do so.

Invigorating Alliance Exercises

In addition to a new deterrent operation, NATO should significantly expand the number and scale of its maritime exercises. These exercises should focus on high-end warfighting skills against peer opponents to demonstrate effective combat capability and readiness. Existing maritime exercises are a step in the right direction. The Dynamic-series, consisting of Dynamic Guard, Dynamic Move, Dynamic Mantra, and Dynamic Mongoose in 2017, are focused on air defense and electronic warfare, MCM, and antisubmarine warfare respectively.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is welcomed by the Captain of the frigate Aquitaine, Emmanuel Sagorin. (NATO)

The current exercise schedule is focused on the appropriate warfare areas but it must be significantly expanded to develop the level of competence and interoperability that would be necessary in the event of war. Antisubmarine warfare exercises in particular require expansion and should be the highest priority. The Russian Navy sees submarines as its primary capital ships, unlike western navies which prioritize aircraft carriers. Russia has invested heavily in its submarine force, with new classes under development, old classes undergoing modernization, and new Kilo-class submarines destined for its Black Sea Fleet under construction. By focusing efforts on detecting and defeating submarines, NATO can demonstrate to Russia that, in the event of war, its primary naval forces will be defeated.

Air defense and electronic warfare should also be emphasized. Russia has invested heavily in new antiship missiles. NATO navies must demonstrate their ability to defeat these weapons to show Russia that it cannot count on keeping Allied maritime forces outside striking range of its shore. This will warn Russia’s leaders that they cannot initiate conflicts far from Russian shores and rest assured that the Russian mainland will be safe.

Finally, mine countermeasures remains a key enabler for Allied maritime missions and must be strengthened. In particular, the United States should participate in exercises with its own MCM ships to improve its capabilities and highlight the importance of the mission area. Increasing the frequency and complexity of exercises in these three areas would significantly increase alliance capabilities to counter Russian aggression.

Strengthening Standing Maritime Groups

The final component of an improved NATO maritime posture is better resourcing of the SNMGs and SNMCMGs by member states. Discussions of resourcing in the NATO context are often focused on the two percent policy, wherein member states pledge to contribute two percent of GDP towards defense. Total alliance resources are important, as each state’s total military capabilities are the source of NATO-assigned forces; however, they do not translate directly into forces available for Alliance use. Without increasing their defense budgets, each state could improve NATO’s deterrent posture by assigning more existing forces to NATO missions. A brief review of the maritime forces currently assigned to the Alliance will demonstrate the availability for growth.

As currently constituted, NATO’s standing maritime forces consist of two SNMGs and two SNMCMGs. These consist of the three warships and one tanker of SNMG1, ten warships (five of which are small patrol craft) and one oiler of SNMG2, four mine countermeasures (MCM) ships of SNMCMG1, and five further MCM ships of SNMCMG2, for a total of 23 vessels of all types. Looking deeper, one finds no U.S. ships, no French vessels, only one British minesweeper, and only three German ships, one of which is a tanker. The heaviest contributors are the Spanish, Greek, and Turkish navies, who together contribute almost half the ships. Ships rotate through these standing task groups, but the absence of the two largest NATO fleets and the poor showing from the Royal Navy and Bundesmarine indicate a lack of commitment to the Alliance’s maritime posture.

If each member state contributed an additional vessel, NATO’s maritime forces would more than double, sending a clear signal to Russia that the Alliance was ready to defend its maritime flanks. Barring that, if the United States, France, and the United Kingdom each contributed several ships it would vastly improve the capability of these forces. These navies are not only the largest, but their ships are the most capable against the threats posed by Russian forces.

Conclusion

NATO was founded as a means of defending Western Europe against Soviet aggression, but with the fall of the Soviet Union its raison d’être disappeared and the Alliance lost focus. It grew to incorporate many former foes in Eastern Europe and began participating in peacekeeping and expeditionary operations and envisaged a future where it would emphasize missions other than deterrence and collective defense. Recent Russian actions have reminded Alliance members of its original purpose. Through its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, its intervention in Syria, and its continued bellicosity at sea and in the air, Russia has proven itself to be a threat to European security once again. NATO has taken actions to deter aggression against its members, but its efforts at sea have been inadequate. Implementing the initiatives above would go a long way toward integrating alliance maritime posture with existing plans ashore, improving the overall deterrent effect. The Alliance has all the necessary tools, its members need only act.

Ian Sundstrom is a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of the United States Department of Defense.

Featured Image: NATO Standing Maritime Groups operating in the Mediterranean (NATO)

Asia-Pacific, Europe

The Asia Pacific and Europe’s Maritime Security Strategy

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European Maritime Security Topic Week

By Dave Andre

In the aftermath of the July 2016 ruling by the United Nation’s Permanent Court of Arbitration that broadly found China’s demarcation claims in the South China Sea to be without legal merit, it became apparent that legal decisions alone would do little to influence the status quo. Considering The Hague’s ruling against the strategic backdrop of power politics in the Asia Pacific, the need for a global maritime presence became clear. This presence connotes a significant maritime challenge for the European Union (EU), which remains a peripheral actor in the maritime security of the Asia-Pacific as several major powers oversee the geopolitical reordering of this critical region. The importance of the region for European trade and business, global economic stability, and international maritime security necessitates that the EU maintain more than just an economic and diplomatic presence in the region. Adding a dedicated maritime presence to the region will involve a balancing act between the competing interests of individual EU members while advancing a comprehensive and unified stance—this goes beyond simple matters of naval capability and capacity. As such, it is important that the international maritime community not treat this presence as a fait accompli, merely awaiting an executable maritime framework.

As the European Council on Foreign Relations summed up in 2013 in reference to Asia, the EU “does not have an automatic seat at the table and therefore must work all the harder to secure its own self-interests.”1 Since then little has changed, as China has increasingly expanded its territorial footprint, the EU has executed an uneven approach to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. This ineffectual response leaves Europe open to maritime security threats from afar.

The European Union’s Maritime Domain: A Unique Challenge

Given Europe’s long maritime history it is no surprise that the legal principle for freedom of the seas originated with a European—a Dutch lawyer to be specific—by the name of Hugo Grotius, who in the early seventeenth century wrote, ”Navigation was free to all and no one country could lay claim to the seas on the basis that their navigators were the first to sail on it.”2 Today, that principle exists within the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which details provisions for navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, EEZs, territorial waters, and settlement of disputes. Today, the European Union faces a dynamic maritime environment with challenges ranging from border security to renewable resources and combating piracy. Of the EUs 28 member states, 22 have a combined coastline that extends 65,993 km encompassing the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean.3 The length and breadth of this dynamic maritime environment, when coupled with the competing priorities of member states and coordination with non-member states, makes the EU’s maritime security strategy a unique challenge amongst maritime powers.

The EU addresses this complexity in the European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), which recognizes the importance of protecting maritime interests worldwide while simultaneously recognizing that success depends on the ability to collaborate across regional and national levels.4 However, since the 2014 adoption of EUMSS, the EU has struggled to balance the myriad regional maritime issues with international maritime issues, showing that a unified maritime strategy for the global maritime domain is still far off. The unfolding situation in the South China Sea is perhaps the best example of the fissures and shortfalls inherent with the EU’s maritime strategy. The EU has so far remained outside the fray, issuing a tepid statement after the UN tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines in July 2016.5 While many see this strategy as a case of prioritizing domestic issues over international issues, the issue is far more complex. The ever-evolving transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe, the economic influence of China on Europe via initiatives like the One-Belt-One Road framework, and the declining naval power of European navies, all factor into Europe’s support of the maritime order in the Asia-Pacific.

Europe and Asia: A Complex Relationship

As a region, the Asia-Pacific is as dynamic as they come. Militarily, disputed islands, paramilitary forces, and militarization characterize the operating environment. Politically, Chinese realpolitik clashes with liberalism, pitting international governance against the rise of a regional hegemon. Meanwhile, from an economic standpoint the region is home to three of the world’s biggest economies, while over $5 trillion in global trade passes through the seas each year. This geo-political environment, coupled with the complex maritime geography of straits, archipelagic waters, and overlapping maritime claims means that international law is critical to maintaining an orderly system.6 Within this complex milieu lays the maritime challenge—protecting the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) critical to global economic prosperity.

This region holds significant interest for the European Union, but exactly what those interests are differs from member to member. These differences present difficulties for the EU’s development of a unified and actionable strategy in the South China Sea and the Southeast Asia region. China is the EU’s second largest trading partner, as a region ASEAN is the EU’s third largest trading partner, and South Korea, Japan, and India all place within the top ten. Collectively, this trade amounts to almost a trillion euros annually. Furthermore, there are more than 10,000 European companies operating within the Southeast Asia region.

The economic considerations are not solely defined by Europe looking east of the Suez; they are also largely influenced by China’s Eurasian ambitions. China’s One-Belt-One-Road initiative promises significant investment in Europe, especially the struggling economies of the South and East. Likewise, investments by companies such as the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), which is upgrading the port in Piraeus, Greece, illustrate that this economic influence extends past mere business ventures.7 While the One-Belt-One-Road initiative is unlikely to radically alter the geography of trade routes and investment in port upgrades will not alter Greece’s naval posture, these activities do have the potential of altering and influencing the economic interdependence of EU member states. This creates scenarios where Europe needs to tread lightly as they balance economic and diplomatic interests against security interests, while simultaneously recognizing that the preferred balance will be different depending on the individual country.

European Diplomatic Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Maritime Domain

The divisions are not limited to economics. Politically, the EU has struggled to speak with one voice regarding issues within the Asia-Pacific. The EU’s presence in the Asia-Pacific is a complex web of arrangements, policies, dialogues, and statements that seek to balance the competing interests of individual members while advancing a comprehensive and unified stance. Starting in 2007, there have been a number of policy developments pertaining to the EU’s development of a comprehensive maritime strategy. In 2007, the adoption of the Blue Book, an Integrated Maritime Policy laid the groundwork for operational cooperation among member states. While not specifically addressing security concerns, the focus on trade and fisheries provided a template for future maritime security initiatives.8 A series of initiatives followed—Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008) and the Limassol Declaration (2012)—that recognized the significance of dialogue and cooperation within the regional and international maritime realm as well as the importance of the legal framework laid out by UNCLOS. These policy trends expanded and in 2012, the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia proffered guidelines for resolving disputes within the framework of UNCLOS and stresses the importance of freedom of navigation.9 The policy also notes the economic interdependence between the EU and East Asia, the potentially negative impact of competitive nationalism represented by the South China Sea issues, and the complexity of trans-Atlantic relations with the United States and extra-regional partners like Russia, Australia, New Zealand, and India.10 Furthermore, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which the EU signed in July 2012, provides the framework for peaceful interactions in the region. Taken together these policies clearly articulate that EU interests are closely tied to those of the Asia-Pacific and the international maritime legal framework.

May 31, 2015 – 14th Asia Security Summit, Singapore– High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini gives a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. ( Frédérick Moulin 2015 – EU2015 – EEAS)

Beyond policies, the EU maintains a public dialogue—albeit uneven—that further emphasizes and recognizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific and an international maritime framework. It was at the 2013 Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore that the EU was represented as a whole for the first time by High Representative Catherine Ashton. During the dialogues, she referred to the EU’s long-term security plans and comprehensive approach in Asia. Missing from the 2014 dialogues, the EU’s message was one that prioritized concerns in Ukraine, the Middle East, and North Africa over those in far off Asia. While this prioritization of time and resources is notable, even wise, it did little to assuage Asian nations that may be looking to the EU as a model of multilateralism and an alternative to the United States. A notably different tone was struck in the 2015 dialogues, as EU High Representative Federica Mogherini discussed the EU’s, “strong interest in global security.”11 Representative Mogherini made specific mention of freedom of navigation, SLOCs, international law and the importance of promoting cooperation of confrontation and the need for “everyone to play by the same rules.”12

In addition to the Shangri-La dialogues, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, and U.K. signed the G-7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security which declares their commitment to “freedoms of navigation and over flight” and to an “international maritime order based upon the principles of international law, in particular as reflected in UNCLOS.”13 At the 2016 G7 Summit in Japan, members reiterated concern “about the situation in the East and South China Seas” and emphasized “the fundamental importance of peaceful management and settlement of disputes.”14 Unsurprisingly, the 2016 Shangri-La dialogues a month later discussed “China’s continued land reclamation and military build-up in the strategic maritime area” at length.i Within this context, the French Defense Minister made clear that joint EU patrols were forthcoming.15 However, a month later, the UN tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines saw the EU struggle to issue a joint statement. And to say the resulting statement was benign is an understatement; among other things it failed to make any mention of sovereignty. Since then, the EU has been notably silent regarding the South China Sea despite growing evidence of China’s continued militarization of a number of islands.

European Presence in the Asia Pacific

Despite the attempts at providing a unified response under a common defense policy, the most active aspects of Europe’s involvement in the Asia Pacific come in bilateral terms. France has made numerous overtures toward supporting FONOPs in the South China Sea. The UK’s Royal Navy has perhaps the largest and most codified presence in the Asia-Pacific, though it is a shadow of the presence that it was until the waning years of the last century. The Five Power Defense Arrangement, the most notable European-Asian arrangement, is a multilateral agreement between the Commonwealth counties of U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia whereby all powers will consult one another in the event of an attack (actual or threatened) against Malaysia or Singapore. This consultation brings no promise of military action or support, but nonetheless is pertinent for its formal acknowledgement of European-Asian mutual interests. Furthermore, four European countries—Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K.—are members of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).16 ReCAAP, a multilateral counter-piracy operation that stretches from the Gulf of Aden to the East China Sea illustrates the naval capability of some European powers.17 Additionally, in 2016 Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K. participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime warfare exercise, signaling their support for Asian maritime security.18 Additionally, there are multilateral examples of EU maritime involvement: the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, the Fukushima tsunami that occurred in 2010, and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2014 all saw EU involvement.

In Conclusion: It’s Time to Grab a Seat at the Table

Despite policies, dialogues, and statements, the EU lacks a consistent presence in the region, which undermines their ability to influence political and economic events as they unfold. Alongside the 2016 UN tribunal ruling and discussions for a South China Sea Code of Conduct, the EU is losing its seat at the table as the maritime picture takes shape. If the EU expects to maintain influence in the Asia-Pacific it must accept that the geopolitical instability that defines the South China Sea and Asia-Pacific region requires a naval presence to manage risk, promote international order, and decrease the chances of armed conflict.

Setting aside EU institutional politics, there are a number of EU members who have navies capable of global power projection—France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and Spain. While some members may need to operate in a coalition due to refueling limitations, the capability remains. Overall, the European picture reveals a maritime mindset more focused on the near than the far. This is shortsighted in terms of politics, economics, and military capabilities. Not least because any significant rebalance toward Asia without a corresponding increase in shipbuilding would require a considerable shift in resource allocation. Reversing the current decline in shipbuilding across Europe will take significant and immediate initiative. The EU should take advantage of their long-standing relationship with the U.S. concerning maritime security and their experience working alongside global partners to engender a workable maritime strategy in the South China Sea and the Asia Pacific. With the U.S. increasing its presence in the Europe, there is opportunity for Europe to reinvigorate the Transatlantic Partnership that has defined U.S.-European relations for decades.

Politically, no entity is better poised than the EU to understand the power dynamics and challenges that a regional organization faces when countering the influence of a rising—or in the case of Russia—resurgent hegemonic power. There are relevant lessons to be drawn from the territorial aggression that Russia exhibited in the annexation of the Ukraine. Most notably, that a nation that feels compelled to assume power in a region that they historically view as theirs will not be thwarted by politics alone. Reactionary policies are no substitute for proactive plans. The European Union’s hodgepodge of arrangements, policies, dialogues, and statements regarding the South China Sea, coupled with Chinese economic influence, declining naval power, and an inability to speak and act with one voice are eroding European influence at a time when a new regional order is taking shape in the Asia-Pacific region. To counter this erosion of influence the EU needs a strategy that moves past mere statements that support international norms and the rules laid out in UNCLOS and establish a maritime presence that protects SLOCs throughout the Asia-Pacific.

LT David M. Andre is a former Intelligence Specialist, and has served as an Intelligence Officer and Liaison Officer assigned to AFRICOM. He is currently serving as N2 for COMDESRON SEVEN in Singapore. He can be reached at dma.usn@gmail.com.

The views expressed above are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official views and are not endorsed by the United States Navy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other body of the United States Government.

References

1. “What is Europe’s role in Asia-Pacific?” European Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_is_europes_role_in_asia_pacific

2. Bruce Farthing, Farthing on International Shipping, Business of Shipping Series, LLP, London Hong Kong, 1997, p. 7.

3. In comparison, the United States has 19,924 km of coastline, while Russia has 37,653 km.

4. European Commission, “European Union Maritime Security Strategy: Responding Together to Global Challenges,” https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security_en

5. “Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered in the Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China,” European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/15-south-china-sea-arbitration/

6. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy paper. Good Order at Sea. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PR090427_Good_Order_at_Sea_in_SEA.pdf

7. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Policy Paper. China’s Maritime Silk Road. https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/China_Maritime_Silk_Road.pdf.

8. Internaitonal Maritime Security Law by James Kraska, Raul Pedrozo, p. 62.

9. EU-Asia Centre, “South China Sea: Background Note,” http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/uploads/pub_112_south_china_sea_background_note.pdf.

10. “Guidelines on the EU’S Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia”, Council of European Union, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/asia/docs/guidelines_eu_foreign_sec_pol_east_asia_en.pdf

11. Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6254_en

12. Ibid.

13. G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security in Lübeck, 15 April 2015, Federal Foreign Office, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2015/150415_G7_Maritime_Security.html?nn=479796.

14. Whitehouse, “G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration,” https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/27/g7-ise-shima-leaders-declaration.

15. Kelvin Wong: Reflections on the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue, https://www.iiss.org/en/shangri-la%20voices/blogsections/2016-588c/kelvin-wong—reflections-on-the-2016-shangri-la-dialogue-2789.

16. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx.

17. “Bridging Asia and Europe Through Maritime Connectivity China’s Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia’s Maritime Axis” European Institute for Asian Studies. March 2015. http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Bridging_Asia_Europe_2015.pdf

Featured Image: Members of the welcoming ceremony band play as British Royal Navy destroyer HMS Daring arrives at a port area of Huangpu River in Shanghai December 10, 2013. (Photo by Yang Yi/Asianewsphoto)

Europe

The Baltic: Grey-Zone Threats on NATO’s Northern Flank

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European Maritime Security Topic Week

By Martin N. Murphy, PhD and Gary Schaub, Jr. PhD

Hybrid Warfare

The governments and peoples of the Baltic States recognize that, following Russia’s takeover of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, they are once again in the Kremlin’s sights facing the prospect of Russian destabilization and even outright invasion.

NATO’s leadership termed Russian strategy “hybrid warfare,” defining it as warfare in which “a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.”1  Questions were raised immediately about the suitability of the designation, as the label NATO adopted fails to adequately capture the reality of what Russia inflicted on Ukraine—and may inflict on states in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) in the near future.

Russian successes in Crimea reinvigorated two longstanding instruments of its power: its armed forces and its capacity for intensive information warfare.2 “Grey-zone” perhaps captures the orchestrated multidimensional nature of Russian actions calibrated to gain specified strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of overt conflict and exploit Western concepts of war and peace as two distinct conditions.3 Any conflict between NATO and Russia will likely occur at the Article 4 rather than the Article 5 level, complicating any Western response.4

Hybrid War in the BSR: Political and Information Warfare Dimensions          

It is possible to count all the fighters, bombers, troops and ships in the Baltic and arrive at a correlation of forces. But the BSR is a peripheral region, and only three things matter when it comes to its security:

  • The commitment of core NATO powers – especially the U.S. – to the region’s defense;
  • Russia’s determination to restore its sphere of influence in the region; and
  • Russia’s desire to probe for Western weakness.

Russia is interested less in territory than in effect. NATO’s focus on military measures to defend the Baltic States may overlook the challenge posed by all arms of Russian power to identify and exploit political, social, economic, and military vulnerabilities in its target states and the Western alliance.

These dimensions have been underplayed in NATO thinking, a tendency reinforced by the military nature of its Charter and institutional culture. Questions remain as to whether NATO’s own legal framework and traditional instruments are sufficient to deal with these non-military challenges, and certainly whether they can respond to a fast-changing situation. The means Russia is prepared to use in order to deceive and confuse NATO are based on the same tools it used during the Cold War, but it has adapted them to the mores of the social media age, which lacks the experience to judge the import of Russian messaging or actions.

Applying the Hybrid Model to Warfare at Sea

Russia’s high-end forces would not constitute the first movers in a hybrid conflict. They should be regarded as deterrents to local resistance and intervention by NATO and other Nordic states. It would rather pursue more ambiguous methods.

Broadly speaking, two scenarios for a Russian campaign in the BSR appear possible:

1. A low-key, possibly opportunistic, campaign that exploits real or manufactured discontent among Russian compatriots to destabilize one or more of the Baltic States, creating a “frozen conflict” that undermines NATO’s credibility; or

2. A more structured, high-tempo campaign to achieve the same objectives against NATO power in the BSR and also render Nordic defense cooperation redundant.

It is reasonable to assume that the Baltic Sea Fleet and other organs of Russian maritime power will play supporting rather than leading roles in any such conflict.

Aside from Moscow’s ability to manipulate the loyalty of Russian expatriate communities in the Baltic states, many of the points where it can apply pressure lie on or under the Baltic Sea itself. These include:

Geographically Isolated Islands and Disputed Borders

The Bornholm, Gotland and the Aland group are respectably Danish, Swedish, and Finnish islands that have considerable strategic significance in the BSR. Many are ideal as bases, supply points, staging areas, and jumping off points for SOF operations and ambushes, while bays, fjords, and peninsulas provide hiding places and launch points for fast raiders.

Map indicating large islands within the Baltic Sea. (Heritage Foundation)

Undersea Cables

Modern economies depend upon a remarkably vulnerable information and communications infrastructure. Roughly 95 percent of intercontinental communications traffic—e-mails, phone calls, money transfers, and so on—pass through fiber-optic cables that “lack even basic defenses, both on the seabed and at a small number of poorly guarded landing points.”5

When it comes to the Baltic Sea particularly, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia have only a few nodes that need be severed, while Estonia, the Nordic countries, and Germany have much more redundancy in their connections. Still, the economic disruption caused by severing these undersea cables would be considerable in time and cost and be difficult to mitigate, even for those countries with multiple nodes. They would therefore be a prime target in a hybrid warfare campaign.            

Energy Supplies

It has long been recognized that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland depend upon Russian energy. This exposes them to the possibility of economic coercion. These states have reduced their dependence on Russian supplies, but diversification has been difficult given the cost of replacing existing infrastructure and vulnerabilities remain.

Port and Supply Chain

Ports and ships could be subject to sabotage and strikes using SOF as part of a hybrid offensive. Yet the most serious threat could come from cyberattacks, a concern that already animates much of the landward resilience debate. Modern ports could not operate absent sophisticated computer systems, while modern ships are increasingly automated to cut crew costs. Any prolonged interference with the region’s maritime trade could severely impact industrial production flows and economic security.

Why Would Russia Disrupt the BSR?

Russia is a revisionist power. Internationally, it wants to revise the existing regional order at the least possible political and military cost to itself, diminish U.S. power, and further a multipolar world. Domestically, Putin’s government requires an enemy to divert attention from internal troubles. The Baltic States lie at the point where American power is most extended and Russian power can be concentrated most easily. As Russia is under no illusion it can fight the U.S. directly, or a coalition of America’s core allies, its challenges will stay below the level of direct confrontation.

The Soviet Union invested around fifty percent of its shipbuilding capacity in the St. Petersburg area. A second vital facility is located in the Kaliningrad Oblast. The Baltic Sea has also become a vital conduit for Russian trade. Prolonged interruptions in flows of energy and goods would inflict considerable damage on Russia’s poorly diversified economy. During 2015, 52 percent of Russian container traffic passed through St. Petersburg. Europe remains a major customer for Russian crude oil shipped by tanker from ports near St. Petersburg. On the seabed is the Nord Stream gas pipeline. A second pipeline–Nord Stream 2–has been proposed that would double the capacity. This connection reinforces the dependency and mutual interest that already exists between the EU and Russia and risks compromising Western European responses to possible Russian aggression in CEE.

The Baltic Sea Region has plentiful points of vulnerability where Russia can test Western resolve. While these are not confined to the Baltic States, the most obvious point of leverage is the Russian minorities who reside in each one with concentrations in port cities and other maritime areas.6 Nor are the Baltics removed from Russia’s deeply ingrained sense of insecurity arising out of its loss of strategic depth. Advancing the Russian right flank to the Baltic Sea would right a perceived wrong, prevent the encirclement of Kaliningrad, the main base of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet, and provide a platform from where Russia could threaten the entire Baltic Sea littoral.

Sweden and Finland are clearly concerned about this possibility. Sweden has returned its army garrison to the strategically important island of Gotland, while towns and cities across Sweden have been told to make preparations against a possible military attack.7 Conscription has also been reintroduced.8 However, any move by either to join NATO could “provoke Russia to launch a pre-emptive provocation in order to demonstrate the alliance’s weakness” and deter either country from proceeding with its application.9

Russian Military Capability

Despite the importance of the Baltic Sea routes, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet is the weakest of Russia’s four fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific, and Northern). It continues to have the lowest priority for new units.

That does not mean modernization has not taken place. Since 2007, the fleet has been upgraded with two new classes of corvette equipped with land-attack missiles, a capability that is new to the Baltic Sea fleet.10 However, the fleet’s submarines have not been modernized and remain inferior to German and Swedish boats. Lacking AIP propulsion, which Russian industry is having problems mastering, they are also likely to be noisier. The fleet’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine counter-measures (MCM) capabilities are also limited.

Three Buyan-class Corvettes, seen above, are expected to augment the Baltic Fleet by 2020. (Murad Sezer/Reuters)

That said, the Baltic Sea is relatively small with an average width of only 193km (120 mi). The sea and surrounding littoral can–and almost certainly would–be dominated by air power and air-deployable ground forces in any high intensity conflict. In particular, Russia is able to effectively dominate large areas of the Baltic Sea and air space using missile forces based in the Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts.11 The Iskander-M mobile ballistic missile is capable of hitting targets in much of Sweden and from southern Poland to central Finland, whether fixed or mobile.

NATO movement would be affected in all environments: air transports bringing reinforcements into theater would be at risk from manned interceptors and a layered, air-and-missile defensive system equipped with the S-300 and the highly-capable S-400 systems. Movements by sea would be threatened by the Bastion-P coastal defense system based on the supersonic 300km-range P-800 Yakhont anti-ship missile, which Russia has announced will shortly be deployed to the Kaliningrad Oblast.12

NATO ground forces, meanwhile, would need to travel further than Russian units to reach the capitals of the Baltic states and throughout the transit could be subjected to long-range air and ground-based bombardment.

Naval “Hybrid Warfare”

Hybrid warfare as deployed by Russia in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has received considerable analytical coverage; hybrid warfare at sea less so.13 The geography of the Crimea and Ukrainian theaters, and the circumstances of the incursions, meant the naval role was limited in both. However, Russia appears to have taken note of the success China has achieved with hybrid warfare tactics in the South China Sea, including its harassing behavior as multiple incidents have taken place on and over the Baltic and Black Seas.14 At the same time, Russia has resumed Soviet-style probing missions against NATO countries, while the Baltic states, Sweden, and Finland have all had their territorial waters and airspace compromised.15

The Chinese have made extensive use of their maritime paramilitary forces to assert maritime claims and to deny neighboring states access to waters for fishing and resource extraction purposes. The opportunities for the disruptive use of coast guard and border forces appear to be less in the BSR yet Russian behavior–for instance withholding ratification of the Narva Bay and Gulf of Finland Treaty–demonstrates that they are maintaining the potential for disruption inherent in the handful of disputes that remain.16

Mitigation Measures

Given the essentially political nature of hybrid war, mitigation measures should focus on political, economic, and information outcomes. Still, Russia needs to be convinced that all BSR states are committed to challenging Russian aggression at sea. The maritime component of NATO’s 2014 Readiness Action Plan includes intensified naval patrols in the Baltic built around the Standing NATO Maritime and Mine Countermeasures Groups, increased sorties by maritime patrol aircraft, and an expansion of the annual BALTOPS naval and amphibious exercise.17 However, BALTOPS in large measure still reflects the Alliance’s focus on high-end military operations. Changes have been made that broaden its focus and these need to be maintained and expanded in order to continuing raising maritime readiness and interoperability standards at all stages along the deterrence-to-conflict continuum. In addition, both Baltic and NATO navies need to exercise lower-end maritime security, VBSS, fishery protection, and SAR missions, while regional navies need to demonstrate they can act seamlessly with regional coast guards and border forces, port authorities and other maritime agencies, police forces and intelligence services. Furthermore, cooperation in intelligence sharing and analysis through a BSR Hybrid Threats Fusion Cell coupled with a strategic communications response capability to provide swift and consistent factual responses to false narratives would contribute to building societal resilience.

Societal resilience also requires less dependence on Russian energy supplies. A new facility for the import and regasification of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has been built at Klaipeda in Lithuania. Ensuring its security is vital. Further diversification could be achieved if additional terminals were to be built in Estonia and Latvia with reversible-flow pipelines linking all three. Ideally, a trans-Baltic pipeline should be built to link the Baltic States with the Swedish system.18 These pipelines would supplement the “NordBalt” power cable laid between Sweden and Lithuania. Notably, this link was interfered with by Russian warships on three occasions during the course of its construction. Finally, BSR states need to place a strong emphasis on port and supply chain security. This must include defenses against cyber-attacks. Protecting this largely maritime infrastructure would place a premium on effective Baltic Sea maritime domain awareness (MDA).

Conclusion

Russia considers itself to be a maritime power. It has always sought to control the seas that give it access to the world ocean. The Baltic Sea is vital in this regard. Despite this perception, Russian power, when compared to its Soviet predecessor, is sadly diminished. It is therefore understandable that it should continue to augment its remaining military power with the measures of influence, deception, and covert action that were so characteristic of the Soviet approach to inter-state relations.

Any repetition of the Crimean model is likely to be a whole-of-government effort of political subversion and destabilization in which the conventional military—as opposed to SOF and proxy militia—will play a largely passive role until the last minute, or unless the political campaign fails and can only be redeemed using conventional military force. Whole-of-government aggression demands a whole-of-government response.

In this sense, there is no such thing as maritime hybrid warfare, certainly in Russian political or military doctrine or practice. What states in the BSR may be confronting even now, however, is a long-term campaign of politically motivated societal disruption, aspects of which may occur in, through, or from the maritime domain. The seaborne aspects of the campaign will be maritime rather than exclusively naval in that what takes place could involve any of the ways people use the sea, the seabed, and the airspace over the sea. It will involve warships, submarines, and military aircraft but also include fisheries, shipping and ports, coast guards, and border forces along the way. Conventional naval forces are likely to play an analogous background role in any disruptive campaign at sea in the Baltic, as they did during the Crimea invasion and Ukraine intervention.

Martin N. Murphy, PhD is a Visiting Fellow at Corbett Centre for Maritime Studies at King’s College London. He has held similar positions with CSBA and the Atlantic Council in the U.S. He is the author of three books and numerous book chapters and articles on maritime security and unconventional warfare at sea. His next book, On Maritime Power, is due for publication in 2018.

Gary Schaub, Jr., PhD, is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. Before that he held a number of academic positions in the U.S. including Assistant Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Air War College.

References

1. NATO. ‘Wales Summit Declaration’. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5th September 2014.

2. Kier Giles, et al. ‘The Russian Challenge’, Chatham House Report, June 2015, p. 46. NATO Article 4 states that “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” NATO, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, last updated 21st March 2016.

3. For clear definitions of “hybrid” and “grey-zone” conflicts, and comparisons between the two, see Frank Hoffman. ‘The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare and Key Challenges’. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 22nd March 2017.

4. Stephen F. Larrabee, et al. Russia and the West after the Ukrainian Crisis: European Vulnerabilities to Russian Pressures. Santa Monica: RAND, 2017, pp. 10-11.

5. Robert Martinage. “Under the Sea: The Vulnerability of the Commons,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 1, January/February 2015, p. 117.

6. Martin N. Murphy, Frank G. Hoffman and Gary Schaub, Jr. ‘Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region’. Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, November 2016, pp. 11-14.

7. Richard Orange. ‘Swedish towns told to “make preparations regarding the threat of war and conflict” with Russia’. Daily Telegraph, 15th December 2016.

8. Daniel Dickson; and Bjorn Rundstrom. ‘Sweden returns draft amid security worries and soldier shortage’. Reuters, 2nd March 2017.

9. Edward Lucas. ‘The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report’. Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, June 2015, p. 4.

10. ‘Russia reinforces Baltic Fleet with ships armed with long-range cruise missiles in ‘worrying’ response to Nato build-up’. Daily Telegraph, 26th October 2016.

11. Kaas. ‘Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region’.

12. ‘Russia deploys “Bastion” coastal missile complex to the Kaliningrad region’. UAWire, 22nd November 2016.

13. Charles K. Bartles and Roger N. McDermott. ‘Russia’s Military Operation in Crimea: Road-Testing Rapid Reaction Capabilities’. Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 61, No. 6, November–December 2014, pp. 46–63; Admiral James Stavridis, USN (rtd.). ‘Maritime Hybrid Warfare is Coming’. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 142, No. 12, December 2016, pp. 30-33.

14. For example, Julian E. Barnes and Gordon Lubold. ‘Russian Warplanes Buzz U.S. Navy Destroyer, Polish Helicopter’. Wall Street Journal, 13th April 2016.

15. Thomas Frear, Łukasz Kulesa and Ian Kearns. ‘Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters between Russia and the West in 2014’. European Leadership Network Policy Brief, November 2014.

16. ‘Russian envoy: Ratification of border treaty with Estonia obstructed by bad relations’. The Baltic Times, 9th July 2016.

17. NATO. ‘NATO’s Readiness Action Plan’. NATO Fact Sheet, May 2015; Megan Eckstein. ‘U.S. Led BALTOPS 2015 begins with heftier presence than last year’s exercise,” USNI News, 5th June 2015; Megan Eckstein.‘Foggo: BALTOPS 2016 includes more anti-sub, more challenging amphibious operations’. USNI News, 15th June 2016.

18. Milda Seputyte. ‘Lithuania grabs LNG in effort to curb Russian dominance’. Bloomberg, 27th October 2014; ‘Sweden gets new LNG terminal’. World Maritime News, 20th October 2014.

Featured Image: Soldiers sit atop of amphibious vehicles as NATO troops participate in the NATO sea exercises BALTOPS 2015 that are to reassure the Baltic Sea region allies in the face of a resurgent Russia, in Ustka, Poland, Wednesday, June 17, 2015. (AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)

Capability Analysis, Europe

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Buildup and Modernization

1 Comment

European Maritime Security Topic Week

By Alex Schneider

A Neglected Black Sea Fleet

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s naval fleets have been severely neglected. Corruption, defense budget shortfalls, and higher military priorities are among the factors that have prevented the modernization and buildup of the Russian navy. Of the four separate naval fleets—the Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific Fleets—Russia’s Black Sea Fleet remains one of the most neglected and obsolete. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war revealed to Russia the need to modernize and increase the size of its Black Sea Fleet, which was reinforced during the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea when NATO naval presence increased in the region.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea was an authoritative strategic coup by Russia that had two immediate effects: it removed Kiev’s ability to constrain Russia’s Black Sea Fleet buildup and modernization, and it increased the size and strength of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Prior to Crimea’s annexation, Kiev and Moscow had an agreement known as the Kharkov Agreement, which was signed into effect on April 21, 2010 by Dmitry Medvedev, then the Russian president, and Viktor Yanukovych, then the Ukrainian president. Under the Kharkov Agreement, Russia leased the Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine, which was primarily located in Ukraine’s Sevastopol naval port on Crimea. Through the conditions of the lease, Kiev was able to prevent any buildup or modernization of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from occurring. By annexing Crimea, however, Russia forcefully freed the Black Sea Fleet from Kiev’s restrictive conditions.

Current Composition and Limitations

The Black Sea Fleet currently consists of 45 warships and 7 submarines stationed principally out of Sevastopol, located on the west side of the Crimea, and Novorossiysk, located on the west bank of Russia proper. The fleet’s warships constitute 21 percent of total Russian naval warships in service and 10 percent of the total submarine force. With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia regained the acclaimed strategic port of Sevastopol on the Crimea, which is home to approximately 80 percent of the total tonnage of the Black Sea Fleet, and which is the only year-round ice-free and deep water port the Russians own in the region that is able to moor large warships. Crimea also offers the port of Feodossia that hosts approximately nine percent of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. With approximately 90 percent of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea, the significance of Crimea’s annexation by Russia becomes abundantly clear:  it provides Russia with greater security structures and freedom of maneuver for the vast majority of its Black Sea Fleet.

Furthermore, Russia’s navy is comprised largely of Soviet legacy ships that are considerably outdated and in need of much maintenance and repair due to neglect throughout the 1990s and into the mid-2000s. For instance, the Office of Naval Intelligence assesses that the majority of Russia’s ships and submarines are aged well over 20 years, and were built with a 25-year service life. Currently, the Soviet legacy ships of the Black Sea Fleet are mostly only capable of green water missions that support local defense within the Black Sea and have limited blue water capability for deployment beyond the region.

It is clear that Russia’s Soviet legacy ships have come near the end of their lifespans. As a result, many will be decommissioned in the coming years. With proper maintenance and modern upgrades, however, the operational lives of these ships can be extended 15 to 20 years. Russia recognizes its predicament and knows that in order to claim the status of a great power within the Black Sea region it must repair and modernize its current warships, as well as commission new ships into service with the most current technology available.

Naval Buildup and Modernization

Due to the state of their naval fleets, Russia is ambitiously pursuing its State Armaments Procurement Program for 2011-2020 (SAP-2020) initiative, which plans to modernize and increase the size of its naval fleets. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet has been allocated much of the funding and materiel because Moscow considers it to be one of the top priorities of the initiative, whereas it provides the Navy with the equivalent of 112.4 billion euros of the Russian defense budget to reach its goal by the year 2020. As many as 18 new warships are anticipated to be commissioned into the Black Sea Fleet by 2020, with more to come in the years after. Funding is also being allocated to the Sevastopol and Novorossiysk naval bases to upgrade their facilities for greater operational readiness.

In addition to upgrading many of the older Soviet legacy ships to remain operational into the near future, the initiative further plans to add many new warships and submarines to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Some of these units have already been commissioned and are now operational, and more are expected to follow by 2020. The following naval vessels are believed to be on the agenda for commissioning into the Black Sea Fleet by 2020: six multi-purpose Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, one or two high-sea multi-purpose Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates, one or two Yastreb–class frigates, six Kilo-class submarines, one or two Ivan Gren-class amphibious landing ships, and up to four missile corvettes for near-shore operations.

Some limitations to the SAP-2020 initiative do exist, however. For instance, similar initiatives in the recent past have failed to come to fruition due to the high level of corruption and a lack of financing. Multiple reports have been released outlining how an estimated 50 percent of the Russian military’s procurement money is spent on general corruption, especially bribes. In 2009 alone, corruption resulted in the loss of one billion rubles of its military procurement money, according to the Russian Audit Chamber.

A Russian Navy vessel is anchored at a base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, Ukraine. (Reuters)

Furthermore, since the Russian defense budget is tied to the prosperity of the country’s oil and gas exports that make up such a large portion of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a continuation of the SAP-2020 budget will depend on steady and rising prices for these export commodities in the future. Should the economy stagnate and exports decrease, the full budget allocated for the initiative may be reduced, with funds reallocated to more pressing needs within the civilian sector of the state. 

With the acquisition of Crimean oil and gas fields, as well as a crackdown on the corruption of military spending in recent years, the initiative may still prove successful.  Many of the planned ships have already been commissioned, proving Russia’s dedication to see it through. Once these ships are commissioned, the Black Sea Fleet will prove a formidable naval power in the Black Sea region and beyond.

The Future Black Sea Fleet

Once the SAP-2020 initiative is fulfilled, it is expected that Russia will continue its naval buildup for at least the next 10 to 20 years, placing more modern and advanced ships at the disposal of the Black Sea Fleet commander—currently Admiral Aleksandr Vitko. This is evident since Russia has already been working on plans for its next procurement cycle that spans from 2018 to 2025. Russia intends to release SAP-2025 in 2018, which will allocate further funding to continue the buildup and modernization of the Black Sea Fleet through 2025. In the following years, the Black Sea Fleet will become even more capable of acting as an instrument of state supporting Russian national interests in the region.

The primary missions of the Black Sea Fleet are not expected to change drastically in the near future, whereas the SAP-2020 initiative will serve to better support the current missions; the SAP-2025 initiative is expected to follow suit. These missions include, but are not limited to, protecting the enlarged Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), securing navigation and sea lines of communication, exercising military and political control in the region, promoting and protecting Russian economic and security interests in and around the Mediterranean and Black Seas, supporting other Russian fleets operating in the Mediterranean Sea, and maintaining military dominance against perceived U.S. and NATO threats in the Black Sea.

The enhanced Black Sea Fleet will also be more capable of providing Russia with a strategic layered defense that only its navy has the ability to provide. The new Kilo-class submarines and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates will be able to provide forward defense by deploying in order to threaten missile-launching platforms. The Black Sea Fleet will probably be most effective in intermediate and close-in defense, however. In this respect, the new platforms will provide a bolstered missile defense shield around Russia’s southern flank, as well as anti-ship cruise missiles for coastal defense.

Conclusion

The Black Sea Fleet modernization and buildup initiative is going to provide Russia with the capability to access the greater oceans and to exert its influence throughout areas located along the world’s major shipping lanes. Russia’s increased presence around the world’s oceans will present new challenges for the United States and its NATO Allies, while presenting further opportunity for Russia in pursuit of its protracted interests. An enlarged and more advanced Black Sea Fleet has the potential to provoke substantial tension with the United States and NATO, especially in the Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, it also has the potential to act as a security partner for the Alliance for operations against regional—and cross-regional—terrorism, trafficking, and piracy. The pursuit of regional cooperation would be beneficial to all parties; however, continued modernization and buildup of its Black Sea Fleet signals that Russian interests are not running a parallel course to the interests of the United States and its NATO Allies.

LT Alex D. Schneider is a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer. He holds master’s degrees from Bowie State University and the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently finishing training and studies as an Amphibious Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI). He can be contacted at paula_alex@live.com. The opinions and views expressed in this article are personal in nature and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Featured Image: Russian navy ships, including the ‘Khmelnitsky’ former Ukrainian, now Russian, ASW corvette, are moored in the bay of the Crimean port of Sevastopol on April 1, 2014. (AFP photo\Olga Maltseva)