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Capability Analysis

Breaking the Mold: How to Build a 355-Ship Navy Today, Pt. 1

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“It shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships.”

-Section 1025, Para (A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (FY18 NDAA)

“Battle force ships are commissioned United States Ship (USS) warships capable of contributing to combat operations, or a United States Naval Ship that contributes directly to Navy warfighting or support missions, and shall be maintained in the Naval Vessel Register” –SECNAVINST 5030.8C

By Keith Patton

During the Reagan administration, it was the policy goal of the United States to build a 600-ship Navy. That goal came very close to being realized, but the end of the Cold War and the “peace dividend” resulted in a rapid contraction of U.S. battle force ship count. This is not to say the U.S. Navy became less powerful since current U.S. multi-mission destroyers are far more capable than their 80s predecessors, but the fleet can be in far fewer places at once and is less casualty tolerant.

In 2015, the Navy’s force level goal was 308 ships. In 2016, this was raised to 355. This policy goal was codified by Congress in the FY18 NDAA. Currently, the Navy has 286 battle force ships, or only 80 percent of its own and now the Congressionally stated requirement. Pursuant to FY18 NDAA, the Navy produced a report to Congress with a plan for achieving a 355-ship force level after 2050, but included options to achieve this level by 2030.

What if world circumstances or political decisions forced the U.S. to look at achieving a 355-ship Navy far sooner than in 11 to 30 years? Possibilities range from how to stretch or improve what already exists, to more radical notions of foreign warship procurement, armed merchantmen, and development of a U.S. Navy foreign legion type force.

Assumptions

Some of the current and proposed policies for fleet building are built on numerous assumptions. One, that a 355-ship Navy is necessary. This is codified in the FY18 NDAA, but some the forthcoming ideas will stretch the definition or purpose of a 355-ship Navy. Second, that the Navy is in a technological competition and simply adding hulls to the battle force count is insufficient. These hulls must be capable of adapting to emerging technology rather than simply using what is available today. However, some of the offered ideas focus on using current or less capable designs to reach 355 ships. Third, that it is feasible for the Navy to fund a commensurate increase in personnel and weapons procurement. This is also impacted by the type of ships procured. This assumption is not directly challenged, but is fundamental to manning and arming the fleet constructed. Finally, that the political will exists to champion these changes, which could threaten established programs, industrial bases, or voting blocks.

Stretching What We Have

The Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration has already been told by the Navy that, in the event of a major conflict, there will be insufficient ships to escort a sealift effort to Asia or Europe. Recalling Operation Drumbeat, or the “happy times” of the German U-boat force off the U.S. Atlantic coast in 1942, this is very concerning. 23 merchants were sunk off the U.S. coast by just five Type IX U-boats. For perspective, that is equivalent to 40 percent of the current ship inventory of the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet, which is tasked with transporting U.S. forces in wartime. During U-boat operations, 22 percent of the tanker fleet was sunk, and 232 ships total in seven months. This is more than the entire U.S. merchant marine fleet today. Raising the U.S. battle force ship strength to provide escorts for vital transport and logistics vessels would seem a logical first step.

A quick way to preserve and grow battle force ships is to stop decommissioning vessels and to execute service life extensions on them instead. These would include younger Los Angeles-class SSNs and DDGs. The FY18 NDAA already prohibits the Navy from retiring Avenger-class MCM (Sec 1046). By extending the life of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to 45 or 50 years, the Navy can reach its desired large surface combatant end strength by 2029. However, this is still 10 years away. Even with extending the lives of Los Angeles-class SSNs, the Navy does not reach its desired attack submarine count until after 2048. Stopping the bleeding is not sufficient to reach 355 in less than a few decades,if the Navy needs to find more hulls in the next few years.

The Navy also could draw upon a limited quantity of warships in Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facilities (NISMF) including two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, two destroyers, a score of frigates, amphibious assault ships, and auxiliaries. Appendix 6 of the Navy report to Congress on shipbuilding notes 66 battle force ships being retired, dismantled, or sunk in the next five years. Reactivating those ships would almost instantly reach the 355 vessel goal. A 355-ship fleet, therefore, might be quickly met by delaying decommissioning and returning old warships to active duty

There is a significant downside to both extending the life of existing ships and returning old ships to service. First, there is the upfront cost of nuclear refueling and updating combat systems. Some cost savings could be made, for instance not using the catapults or arresting gear of the old carriers, making them STOVL carriers for helicopters, Ospreys, and F-35Bs (and saving significant manning and maintenance costs) or not updating the combat systems of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and only using them for low-end counter-piracy or counter-narcotics missions. However, this would severely limit the combat capabilities of the ships to the battle force. They may be able to handle a low end mission and free more expensive assets for higher-threat theaters, but they would not be suitable for great power conflict. Upgrading them with modern combat systems would further increase their cost. Additionally, these old vessels were decommissioned for a reason. Taking old vessels back into service introduces assets that are less capable in modern warfare due to limited growth margins and worn out hulls, and adds significant maintenance costs to stretch their service for a few more years. Long term, this seems far less bang for the buck than procuring new, modern combatants with growth margins for emerging technology. It also violates the planning assumption that the Navy’s new hulls will need growth room for emerging technology to field new weapons and systems.

Building Smarter, Better and Faster

The Navy currently receives new warships from five large and two smaller private shipyards. The shipbuilding industry is not at capacity in the U.S. To achieve a 355-ship in a decade would require almost doubling new ship production.1 Additionally, buying more warships in a smaller interval of time drives down unit cost. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated 10 percent savings by doubling the production rate of combatants.2 The same report also estimated 5-10 percent savings by using multiyear procurement. By energizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry, the 355 battle force ship count can be achieved sooner.

However, U.S. shipbuilding can only achieve a 355-ship Navy slowly. Upon funding, it takes two years for long lead time components for a SSN to be produced, and five to six years for construction. Additional workers and production space would be needed before the five to six year construction phase began. Even with immediate funding, therefore, a decade might elapse before additional warships and specifically SSNs could join the fleet.

The Government Accountability Office 2018 report on Navy Shipbuilding does not give much room for optimism on meeting shipbuilding time or costs. It notes “construction during the last 10 years have often not achieved their cost, schedule, quality, and performance goals” and that the Navy has spent more on shipbuilding but has fifty fewer ships in the inventory than was planned in its 2007 shipbuilding plan.

Another consideration is that building more of existing designs does not allow margins for growth. The DDG-51 Flight III design does not have the growth margin or electrical generation to support projected future weapons, nor crew reductions. Procuring more DDG-51s at an accelerated rate provides a short-term advantage, but leaves the Navy with a large number of hulls that consume manpower and can’t adapt efficiently as new systems are developed. Designing a new combatant takes years, and this will delay the date when the Navy can achieve a 355-ship force. Simply building existing or projected future designs faster does not offer much hope of meeting a 355-ship battle force quickly.

Another consideration is the boom and bust effect of sudden surges in shipbuilding. Even if a 355-ship Navy could be built in three to five years, what would befall the warship industry in the following years? Once the goal was reached, unless there was a new, higher goal set, shipyards would have to massively trim the workforces they hired to support a surge in construction. A stable growth plan is more economical and sustainable than one based on sudden surges and decelerations. It would also be more politically palatable to the Congress that authorized it.

Increasing the Firepower of What We Have

If ships cannot be built or brought back into service in a timely or economical way, could there be a way to increase the fleets combat ability until a 355 ship force is achieved? This is “breaking the mold” of the first assumption – that a 355-ship navy is necessary. Can a more powerful force of what we have suffice in the interim until a true 355-ship fleet can be achieved? 

The SSGN conversion of four SSBNs gave the Navy four stealthy, high-capacity, long-range, strike platforms. Each can be equipped with up to 154 cruise missiles and other payloads, more than a  cruiser, and offers far more offensive capability when one considers that many of the cruiser’s tubes are filled with defensive weaponry. What if the Navy converted the remaining 14 Ohios? This would provide an 18 percent increase in missile tubes (or firepower) available to the  battle force, when the 355 battle force count goal is a 20 percent increase in hulls. This seems to close the capability gap, for strike anyway, with what is available. The question is, would 18 Ohio SSGNs roaming the oceans provide a greater conventional deterrent, and an effective platform in worst case A2AD environments than more of other ships? For high-end warfare and strike, likely yes. But there are many missions a submarine does not do well, like air and ballistic missile defense, presence, and maritime interdiction. The SSGNs would also be a stop gap since they are aging out. To replace the Ohio SSGNs as they age out, the new Columbia-class SSBN could be repurposed as SSGN as well.

This would dramatically alter U.S. nuclear posture by removing the SSBN leg of the triad. However, this could be mitigated to an extent by the already announced plan to put nuclear-tipped Tomahawks back on U.S. submarines. As hypersonic or smaller intermediate range ballistic missiles became available, nuclear armed versions of these weapons on all the SSGN would provide a survivable nuclear response to underpin US deterrence. The Navy could also consider spreading nuclear Tomahawks or successor systems across more than just the submarine fleet. Instead of a few, high capacity SSBNs, the naval leg of the triad would become a dispersed force of ships and subs with a few weapons each, much as it was during the Cold War.

While far less survivable than a submarine, missile tubes could also be added to existing combat logistics force ships or even amphibious assault ships. The San Antonio-class LPD was originally designed with a 16-cell Mk 41 VLS forward. The Navy has considered back fitting it. However useful, the entire fleet of LPDs outfitted with VLS would yield fewer missiles than two SSGNs, and be less survivable. Another concept would be to take the San Antonio follow on and build them as missile ships with large radars and extensive VLS capability. Huntington Ingalls has produced a model of this concept, with twice the missile firepower of a U.S. cruiser. This would allow the Navy to close the firepower gap between a 355-ship Navy and now with fewer than 355 ships.

While these ideas do not produce a 355-battle force ship fleet any sooner, they do produce a fleet that is more survivable, with more firepower, sooner, than the official ship building plans call for. The cost is shifting and ceding some capability in nuclear deterrence and amphibious lift. Each of these would be controversial alone. Even together, they may be insufficient should the U.S. feel it needs a 355 battle force ship equivalent sooner rather than later.

Change in Deployment Methodology/Theater Specific Ships

While not directly increasing the battle force ship count, changing Navy deployment methodology could allow the force to be more capable as the size grows. This methodology is similar to the report published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments as part of the Navy’s fleet architecture study. This report suggested the Navy be divided into two forces. First was a deterrence force, sub-divided among COCOMs, with the capacity to provide prompt, high capacity fires to punish an adversary should their existence fail to deter them. These ships would be tasked to support a particular COCOM rather than CONUS-based forces rotating between them. In low-threat SOUTHCOM, LCS and reactivated Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, Coast Guard, or newly designed ships could focus on low-end missions and free up high end warships for other theaters. In CENTCOM, the ships assigned would focus on FAC/FIAC threats and air and missile defense. Ships assigned to PACOM or EUCOM would focus on high end missions. Ships could be built, manned, and trained around these priorities, in contrast to current operations where ships focus on all warfare areas and multiple AORs, risking becoming jacks of all trades but masters of none. While this may have been adequate during a low naval threat period, with the return of great power competition, specialization may be needed again. The SSGN conversions in particular might be outstanding vessels for the deterrence force in EUCOM and PACOM. Difficult to detect and counter, and with two or three perhaps on station at any time able to bring high capacity fires against an adversary’s aggression, the could depart the theater to reload and join the maneuver force.

Theater-specific ships could also be homeported in their AOR, reducing transit time and acting as a force multiplier. CRS estimated it takes 42 additional warships to keep eight additional ones on station in the Mediterranean if home ported in CONUS.3 If homeported in the Mediterranean, only 14 warships would be required. This could reduce the need for a 355-ship force, or allow those 28 warships to be tasked to other missions.

The second part of the fleet would be a maneuver force consisting of a multiple carrier strike groups and larger amphibious vessels that would relieve and replace the deterrence force and provide sustained combat power. By keeping the multi-carrier maneuver force together and away from the immediate area of crisis, it could conduct more high-end training and not be at risk in the initial stage of conflict. This would also mesh with the enduring Mahanian desire to keep a large portion of the fleet concentrated and surge capable. This contrasts with the current deployment methodology where ships frequently shift COCOM and tasking, and carriers don’t consistently operate together as they may have to in wartime to provide 24/7 effects and protection.

All of these ideas, deterrence/maneuver force, theater-specific ships, or greatly increasing overseas homeporting, breaks the mold of U.S. deployments and acquisition. However, they fail to increase the battle force ship count. They simply hold the dream of making the existing ships more efficient, available, or capable for specific missions.

Change in Battle Force Ship Definition

Another idea would be to change SECNAVINST 5030.8C, specifically enclosures (1) and (2) to assign more vessels from the category of Auxiliary to Combatant. The combatant category, which counts toward the 355-ship goal, already includes afloat forward staging bases, cargo and ammunition vessels, expeditionary sea bases, fast transports, fleet tugs, surveillance ships, and towing and salvage vessels. Adding in oceanographic research vessels and survey ships (both similar to surveillance ships), transport oilers and aviation logistics support (both similar to combat logistics ships) and high speed transports (very similar to expeditionary fast transports) could immediately add vessels to the battle force ship count with the stroke of a pen.

Doing this, while breaking the mold in the definition of a battle force ship, seems to be going against the spirit and intent of Congressional policy and U.S. Navy desire to increase force strength. While it could be argued some of the ships listed as auxiliaries provide very similar support to ships listed as “Fleet Support” or “Expeditionary Support,” reclassifying is simply smoke and mirrors while not increasing capability. Even if weapon systems were added to these platforms to make them more plausible as “battle force ships” the increase in Navy power and capability would be far less than battle force ships as listed under current definitions.

CDR Patton is deputy chairman for the U.S. Naval War College’s Strategic and Operational Research (SORD) Department. SORD produces innovative strategic research and analysis for the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the broader national security community.  CDR Patton was commissioned in 1995 from Tufts University NROTC, with degrees in history and political science and has served four tours conducting airborne nuclear command and control missions aboard the US Navy E-6B Mercury aircraft, and two tours as Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and Combat Direction Center Officer (CDCO) aboard the carriers USS KITTY HAWK and USS NIMITZ. 

The opinions and ideas above do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, or the Naval War College. The ideas expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the principal author either. They were drawn from the Breaking the Mold II workshop held at the U.S. Naval War College with invited participants from military, industry, government and academic institutions. The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule, so these ideas will not be attributed to their originator. Some ideas were specific enough that they are not included here because the idea itself might identify the originator and violate the Chatham House rule.

References

1. Congressional Budget Office “Costs of Building a 355-Ship Navy”, April 2017 pg.9

2. Ronald O’Rourke, “Options and Considerations for Achieving a 355-Ship Navy” July 25, 2017. Pg. 3

3. Ronald O’Rourke, “Options and Considerations for Achieving a 355-Ship Navy” July 25, 2017. Pg. 11

Featured Image: DARDANELLES STRAIT (Jan. 19, 2019) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) transits the Dardanelles Strait, en route to the Black Sea, Jan. 19, 2019. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ford Williams/Released) 190119-N-JI086-050

Space

The Space Force Needs Policy and Strategy, Part 3

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By Tuan N. Pham

Part one of this three-part series revisited past recommendations for a new space policy and strategy in terms of ends, ways, and means. It made the case for America to guarantee the freedom of space, embrace space preeminence, and adopt a broader and more complete approach toward space deterrence.

Part two took a step back for strategic context and re-examined a conceptual framework characterizing the dynamics that contribute to instability and stability in the space domain. All in all, instability arises when there is a real or perceived lack of order and security, while stability arises when there is a real or perceived sense of order and security.

Part three concludes the series and completes the circle with a relook on how America (through the Space Force) can mitigate instability and strengthen stability in space, while prolonging U.S. space preeminence into the 21st century.

Challenges for the Space Force

Preeminence Puzzle. As the guarantor of the global economy and provider of security, stability, and leadership because of its powerful military and vast network of allies and partners, the United States delivers global public services that others cannot. Thus, there is a strong need going forward for a comparable guarantor of the freedom of space to ensure the free flow of space commerce. If so, just as maritime preeminence is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the seas, so too is space preeminence needed to guarantee the freedom of space. The puzzle for American policymakers is whether it may be more cost-effective to invest now and maintain space preeminence or pay more later to make up for diminished space capabilities and capacities while accepting greater strategic risk in the interim and possibly ceding space preeminence to strategic competitors like China (and Russia) in the long term. If the former, then the answer to the puzzle is the Space Force, whose preeminent presence – enabled by a vast network of allies and partners – guarantees the freedom of space and ensures the free flow of space commerce for all.

Domain Dilemma. America fundamentally has two space deterrent and response options – threaten to respond (or actively respond) in the same domain, or threaten cross-domain retaliation to underwrite the deterrence of attacks on U.S. space capabilities (or respond across domains as retaliation). The scope, nature, and degree of these two courses of action must ultimately strike the delicate balance between the need to demonstrate the willingness to escalate and the imperative to not provoke further escalation in order to maintain space stability. The dilemma for the United States is where, when, and how best to deter; and if deterrence fails, where, when, and how best to respond. The Space Force lessens the dilemma by providing a flexible and capable deterrent and response force to keep the common peace.   

Reliance/Resilience Riddle. Enhancing and securing space-enabled services is essential to U.S. national security, a daunting task considering that space has become more and more “congested, contested, and competitive,” less and less permissive for the United States, and increasingly disproportionate in reliance on space capabilities and vulnerable to growing attack vectors. The riddle for America is how best to manage the dichotomy between reliance and vulnerability through resilience. The Space Force tackles the riddle by better and more informed management of and advocacy for mission-focused space requirements to enhance and protect U.S. critical capabilities in space.      

Offensive Counter-Space (OCS) Conundrum. Space warfare is intrinsically offense-inclined due to the vulnerability, predictability, and fragility of space assets. Ever-increasing OCS capabilities are able to threaten and destroy space systems. The latter can be destabilizing (warfighting capability) or stabilizing (deterrence) depending on one’s perspective. Hence, the conundrum for the United States is not whether or not to possess OCS capabilities, but how best to use them to deter and retaliate if deterrence fails. The United States must consider what type, how much, and to what extent should OCS capabilities be publicly disclosed, and how to leverage the existing international legal framework and accepted norms of behavior to manage them without constraining or hindering one’s own freedom of action. OCS capabilities continue to grow in number and sophistication driven by the “offense-offense” and “defense-offense” competition spirals. OCS developments to defeat defensive counter-space (DCS) measures drive further OCS developments for fear of falling behind in offensive capabilities and encouraging a first strike by an adversary, while DCS developments to mitigate OCS measures drive further OCS developments to remain viable as deterrent and offensive tools. The Space Force addresses the conundrum by providing a strategic framework to better direct and synchronize OCS and DCS operations (balanced management).  

Opportunities for the Space Force

Sustain and Enhance Space Preeminence. Just as maritime preeminence is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the seas, so too is space preeminence needed to guarantee the freedom of space. To do otherwise invites strategic misalignment and  miscommunications and encourages strategic competitors to further advance their counter-balancing efforts. Put simply, if the United States does not preserve its current strategic advantages in space through a Space Force, a rising power like China may gradually eclipse America as the preeminent power in space which will have cascading strategic ramifications on Earth. Recall that China already has a Space Force – the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.

Develop Cross-Domain Deterrence Options. Deterrence across the interconnected domains may offer the best opportunity to deter attacks on U.S. space capabilities, and if deterrence fails, retaliate across domains to deter further attacks. Prudence then suggests the need for some level of active planning prior to the onset of increased tensions and hostilities. American policymakers and defense planners should have on hand a broad set of potential cross-domain responses to the threats of space attack or the space attack itself for timely execution by the Space Force. 

Strengthen Space Governance. Since the elimination of OCS capabilities is unlikely, attention and efforts should be placed on managing them instead. The extant international legal framework and accepted norms of behavior offer some ways and means to reduce OCS capabilities to a manageable level, restrict their proliferation, and establish constraints and restraints on their employment. Space powers should review the existing international agreements (treaties) and legal principles, and determine what additional conventions or provisions are needed to set the acceptable limits of OCS capabilities. This can include efforts to establish confidence building measures to include verification, and limit the possession of OCS capabilities to select space powers and out of the hands of space “pariah” states (North Korea and Iran) and undesirable non-state actors (terrorist, criminal, and business groups). The Space Force, dedicated and committed to monitoring and checking emerging threats in the space domain, will better inform U.S. policymakers and diplomats as they navigate the legal and diplomatic minefields to establish new international agreements to further universal space stability and safeguard U.S. national interests.

Continue to Invest in OCS Capabilities. The heart of the matter remains what type of OCS capabilities (reversible, irreversible, or both) and how much may be needed by the Space Force. Regarding the latter, some argue none or limited quantities are required while others call for robust OCS capabilities. Whatever the right answer may be, it is difficult to see how the Space Force can deter or retaliate if deterrence fails without “some” OCS capabilities, especially considering that strategic competitors like China (and Russia) are actively developing their own OCS capabilities to challenge U.S. space preeminence and by extension U.S. terrestrial preeminence. 

Continue to Increase Resiliency. Strengthening the resiliency of the U.S. national security space architecture may offset the offensive inclination of space warfare by lessening the vulnerability and fragility of space assets, assuring retaliatory capabilities, and denying the benefits of OCS operations. Hence, three suggested resilience lines of operations for the Space Force can include building up space protection capabilities to decrease the vulnerability and fragility of high-value space assets by presenting more targets, hiding targets and maneuvering targets, and ensuring mission continuity in a disrupted space environment.  

Continue to Expand Partnerships. The extant strategic guidance calls for building enduring partnerships with other space-faring nations, civil space organizations, and commercial space entities to share benefits, costs, and risks. Strategic guidance also encourages efforts to strengthen existing alliances through increased cooperation across the various space sectors, spreading space services reliance to others, and providing greater space deterrence and stability through collective defense. That being said, partnerships also carry with them opposing risks and concerns. Risks include the unpredictability of horizontal escalation and greater potential damages and unintended consequences. Concerns center around autonomy, operational security, legality, and the interoperability of disparate space systems. All things considered though, the benefits outweigh the costs, risks and concerns are manageable in varying degree, and partnerships can ultimately be a stabilizing influence if done right. The Space Force, where the rubber meets the road, can help get it right. The Space Force will ultimately be where the preponderance of the complex working relations between allies and partners will be managed on a day-to-day basis. Future U.S. space leaders (military and civilian) and foreign counterparts will now have intersecting careers paths (touchpoints) to meet and cultivate enduring friendships that will translate into deeper international collaboration.

Conclusion

All major space-faring nations increasingly rely on space capabilities, but none more so than the United States. America presently has a lot more to lose, and therefore must take all necessary measures to protect its critical strengths in space and preserve its economic prosperity on Earth. Hence, to direct and guide the new Space Force, U.S. policymakers must develop a new space policy and strategy to sustain and enhance U.S. space preeminence in accordance with the new muscular National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Otherwise, America risks losing in space and consequently losing on Earth.

Tuan Pham has extensive professional experience in the Indo-Pacific, and is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. The views expressed are his own.

Featured Image: View of a rocket launch from the rocket garden of Cape Canaveral museum. (USAF Museum)

History

The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War

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By Christian H. Heller

Introduction

The 1973 Yom Kippur War shocked Israel and the world. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) complacency led to days of panic as Egyptian and Syrian forces threatened the very existence of Israel and triggered the potential “demise of the ‘third temple.'”1 Emergency American aid supported the Jewish defenders and averted a possible superpower confrontation reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Politically, the war reset a diplomatic stalemate between the Arabs and Israel and led to the negotiations at the Camp David summit. Militarily, the naval battles of the Yom Kippur War played almost no part in its outcome. They did, however, initiate a technological and tactical maritime revolution. The battles proved the effectiveness of missile and anti-missile systems to control the seas, and ushered in the missile age of naval warfare.

Breakout of War

The origins of the Yom Kippur War lie in the Arab humiliation during the previous war with Israel, nearly six years earlier. The overwhelming Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War created a political stalemate in which both sides were unwilling to negotiate from their resultant positions.2 Israel occupied the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Arabs knew their territory could not be recaptured via direct conflict.3 The new territory gave Israel the defensible borders and strategic depth it previously lacked and it refused to give them up.4 In Egypt, Anwar Sadat faced domestic unrest from a serious lack of state revenue due to the loss of the Suez Canal.5 The Egyptian population demanded “redemption” for their humiliation in the 1967 war.6

Egypt carefully planned for a limited war to achieve modest gains and reset the balance at the negotiating table. The main barrier to their plans was the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Most of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was destroyed on a single day in 1967 and Egypt’s air defenses were incapable of defending against the advanced Israeli planes.7 With the help of Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems like the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6, Egypt created a “layered anti-aircraft missile defense force” and increased its anti-aircraft (AA) missile force fourfold.8 The AA umbrella could both deter Israeli preemptive strikes and protect Egyptian forces while crossing the Suez Canal and invading the Sinai.9 Egypt also obtained new anti-tank weapons like Sagger missiles and armored vehicles to mitigate Israel’s superiority in armor assets and neutralize their counterattack capabilities in the Sinai.10 Together, with an impressive misinformation campaign, Soviet support for resupplies, and close coordination with Syria, the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a successful surprise invasion of Israel on the night of 6 October 1973.

Israel and its military were caught unprepared for the attack. Their leaders believed, “there was no chance for an Egyptian victory, thus no rational reason to resort to force.”11 Without a capable air force to negate the IAF’s advantage, leaders in Tel Aviv assumed they would be free from Egyptian military action until at least 1974.12 The night of 8 October, during which Egyptian anti-tank missiles destroyed an entire Israeli armor division in the Sinai, was one of the worst situations Israel has ever faced. Some records indicate that nuclear weapons were prepared, and on 9 October Prime Minister Golda Meir intended to fly to Washington, D.C. to personally request American help.13,14 American military aid flowed into Tel Aviv to avert an international crisis and potential nuclear war, and within a few days Israel again had the upper-hand in the conflict.15

Israeli Naval Preparations

The Israeli Navy was the only service prepared to fight and win the war from its initiation. While 1967 was an overwhelming victory for the army and air force, the navy found itself outgunned by Egypt’s Soviet-built missile boats. Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat with anti-ship missiles from its small, maneuverable, and heavily-armed missile boats. Israel’s navy traditionally had an inferior status domestically compared to the other military services and the deaths of 47 sailors on the Eilat reinforced that public opinion.16 The attack had a “traumatic effect” on the Israeli Navy whose leaders set about enacting immediate reforms.17

INS Eilat, Ex Royal Navy Z Class destroyer sold to Israel in 1955. (Wikimedia Commons)

Events on the other side of the Middle East reinforced Israel’s desire to improve its navy. Soviet missile boat technology demonstrated promise during the India-Pakistan War of 1971. The Indian Navy purchased Osa-class boats from the Soviet Union and trained with them at the port of Okha, near the Pakistani port of Karachi.18 The Soviet Navy led the world in littoral small craft development at the time. In 1975, the Soviet Navy had more “small combat craft” than the combined total throughout the rest of the world.19 The 130-ft Osa-class was the most well-known of the littoral ships. A standard vessel carried four Styx missile launchers and cruised at a top speed of 32 knots.20

The development of an anti-ship cruise missile became a Soviet goal after World War II. The U.S. Navy on the other hand, led by aviators with knowledge of bombing and torpedoes, believed their weapons to be the perfect anti-ship weapon. In contrast, the Soviet Navy developed multiple versions of cruise missiles to compensate for its lack of naval aviation.21

The missile boats’ speed, agility, and striking capability in the littoral waters along the two nations meant the squadron could reach Pakistani naval targets at Karachi immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. On 4 December, Indian missiles sank one Pakistani destroyer, one Pakistani minesweeper, one merchant ship, and damaged some oil storage facilities. Due to a possible aircraft counterattack, the Indian missile boats withdrew. While Indian naval leaders welcomed the victory, questions emerged about pressing the offensive and taking advantage of weak Pakistani defenses in the region.22 The Indian Navy launched a second strike four days later that destroyed another oil tanker and damaged two commercial tankers.23 The attacks demonstrated the possibilities of missile technology for offensive strikes and controlling an enemy’s naval capabilities as the Pakistani Navy restricted its movements outside of the Karachi harbor after the Indian victories. 

Soviet Osa I Class fast attack craft-missile underway. (Wikimedia Commons)

The Israeli Navy took notice of the India-Pakistan conflict and decided that small boats with advanced missiles had a greater advantage over large ships like destroyers and frigates in the littoral waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea.24 The increase in Israeli territory with the capture of the Sinai Peninsula in 1967 meant more coastline for the navy to protect, and a blue water navy composed of ocean going vessels was unnecessary when their main operating area was the littorals.25

Israeli missile boat procurement began in 1962 when Egypt and Syria obtained Soviet missile boats but accelerated drastically after 1967.26 By the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Navy consisted of fourteen Sa’ar-class missile boats.27 It was the first non-Soviet allied nation in the world to enter the anti-ship missile age.28 They faced significant numbers of enemy vessels. Egypt’s surface-craft consisted of twelve Osa-class missile boats, twenty-six torpedo boats, three destroyers, two frigates and various other vessels.29 Syria’s navy consisted of three Osa– and six older Komar-class missile boats, eleven torpedo boats, and two minesweepers.30

The small size of the missile boats was intended to minimize their target signature and add to the ships’ survivability, but raised questions about their potential firepower. The sinking of a fishing vessel by the Egyptians with a Soviet-built Styx missile in 1967 showcased both the ships’ capabilities and the threat to the Israeli Navy. The Styx missiles of Syria and Egypt also had a range of 25 nautical miles compared to the 12 nautical mile range of Israel’s Gabriel missiles.31 Despite Israel’s new ships, training, and preparations, its navy was still “out-ranged in missiles and outnumbered more than two to one” at the beginning of the conflict.32 In response, Israel accelerated its development of advanced electronic countermeasures to provide a greater defensive buffer for its new fleet.33 Israeli naval leaders also war gamed and experimented with new tactics to add additional defensive capabilities to their ships.34

Operationally, Israeli naval commanders learned from the lessons of the previous wars about limited flexibility and unclear tasking. They assigned three objectives to the navy in the Mediterranean: coastal defense, the elimination of the threat from Arab missile boats, and to support ground troops.35 The navy decided their offensive strategy would focus on the enemy missile boats.36 An active pursuit of the enemy’s naval assets would secondarily support the other two objectives.

The naval battles of the Yom Kippur War were remarkable for two historic developments. They were the first battles in history in which both combatants possessed ship-to-ship missiles, as well as the first time electronic countermeasures were used to defend against missile attacks.37 Two battles in particular highlight these historic changes in naval warfare: Latakia and Baltim.

The Battles

On the night of 6 October, 1973, at the outset of the war, a flotilla of five Israeli missile boats cruised off the coast of Syria attempting to draw the Syrian Navy into battle.38 They identified a Syrian torpedo boat, pursued it east towards shore, and sunk it. While sailing south along the coast opposite Latakia, a main Syrian harbor and naval base, the INS Reshef sank a Syrian minesweeper. The flotilla then identified three Syrian missile boats and deduced that the torpedo boat and minesweeper were naval decoys or observation posts.39 The Syrian ships launched eight Styx missiles at the Israeli squadron, but each was defeated with chaff launches which pulled the Styx targeting system away from the Israeli ships.40

The Israeli vessels advanced quickly and “sandwiched” the Syrian boats between them.41 In total, the Israeli flotilla launched 11 Gabriel missiles, six of which hit their targets.42 In only 25 minutes the navy sank three Syrian vessels. Israel resoundingly won the first naval missile battle in history with no casualties.43 Five Syrian ships were sunk and the Israeli Navy’s offensive and defensive developments tentatively proved themselves in battle.

Two days later on the night of 8 October, six Israeli vessels cruised towards Egypt in two columns after the devastating defeat of Israel’s tank-led counterattack in the Sinai.44 The squadron’s initial intent was to target military facilities just west of the Suez Canal.45 Four Egyptian boats attacked at midnight. The Egyptian Osa missile boats fired 16 missiles near their maximum range, then turned and ran. The Israeli ships shot twelve Gabriel missiles while pursuing. Six hit their targets and three Egyptian ships sank.46

The one-sided results from the battles frightened the Egyptian and Syrian leaders who restricted their navies to the waters nearest their harbors, just as Pakistan did two years earlier. The war involved subsequent smaller battles such as the Second Battle of Latakia. However, these battles involved Arab navies shooting their missiles from afar while relying on protection from merchant ships or coastal defenses.47 Fighting on land continued for almost three more weeks, but the war for the littorals was over.

Israeli Naval Raids, from Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, pg. 313

Tactical and Technical Developments

Israel developed tactics and technology specifically suited to its own needs. The small state knew who its enemy was and where its future conflicts would take place. The combination of domestically produced ships, new missiles, and original tactics was “one of the clearest cases of Israel’s tailoring its forces to those of the Arabs.”48 It developed ships and crews able to conduct advanced scouting activities, execute effective command and control, and employ overbearing firepower on its enemy. Each of these advancements helped the Israeli Navy overcome major deficits in numbers and range. The combination of surprise, initiative, and a boldness to use new capabilities became hallmarks of the Israeli littoral squadrons.49

The Sa’ar-class vessels combined the “maximum firepower possible” in a small, fast vessel perfectly suited for Eastern Mediterranean.50 Israel’s Gabriel missiles destroyed eight Arab ships, including six of their seven missile boats, despite their short range.51 The concentration of firepower onboard the Sa’ar was key to victory. During Latakia, the Israeli ships possessed 26 missiles each compared to Syria’s eight. In Baltim, the Israeli ships carried as many as 34 missiles compared to 16 on each Egyptian boat.52 Additionally, the Arabs made themselves easy to identify and target by keeping their radars turned on and talking frequently over open radio.53

Saar-class missile boat of the Israeli Navy (Wikimedia Commons)

Israel’s experimental tactics were simple. The Israeli boats turned toward the enemy to face them head on and charge at full speed to minimize their target profile and launched chaff decoys early to entice the enemy to launch their missiles at the furthest range. When the Arabs shot their missiles at the full 25 nautical miles, the Israelis were gifted with the maximum time possible to detect and avoid them while in flight.54 Then, using electronic countermeasures and more chaff, the Israeli boats could close with the enemy while evading the incoming missiles until within range of the Gabriels.55

Israeli defensive advancements achieved similar success. The Israeli Navy had no aircraft for reconnaissance and target identification but relied on electronic detection systems which could track the enemy’s radar without betraying their own position.56 The “multiple tricks” of long-range chaff, electronic jammers, high-speed maneuvers, radar-absorbing coating on the bows of the ships, and close-range chaff saved the Israeli fleet.57,58 The Egyptian and Syrian navies shot 52 missiles at the Israeli ships, and all of them missed.59

Israel also maximized its littoral geography and short lines of communications for speedy re-fueling and re-supply. The Israeli sustainment system was so efficient for the navy that it operationally turned a fleet of 14 ships into 24.60

Missile developments emerged on land during the war as well, adding to the impact which these new technologies could have on warfare. The success of “one of the densest missile walls in the world,” built by Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, demonstrated that control over the air could originate from below.61 Over 100 IAF aircraft were destroyed by Soviet-built SAM systems.62 The Egyptian army’s new anti-tank equipment paid off when the Israeli armored counterattack was “simply destroyed.”63 Within 24 hours of the invasion, the Israeli defenders in the Sinai lost over two-thirds of their 270 tanks to Egyptian anti-tank weapons.64 The world was paying attention, and these developments reshaped modern warfare.

The Impact

Due to years of technical and tactical preparation combined with thousands of simulations and wargames, the Israeli Navy was the country’s only service ready to fight and win on October 6, 1973.65 Israeli naval leaders had instituted and carried-out a ten-year plan to directly tailor their naval capabilities to take advantage of the Egyptian and Syrian weaknesses.66 In the end the naval battles of the Yom Kippur War had no significance toward the outcome of the conflict, but its military impact was substantial and long-lasting.

Israeli successes in offensive and defensive missile technology marked the beginning of the missile age for naval warfare, especially for littoral combat power. The size of the ship and its guns mattered far less than its missiles and their accuracy. Defensive countermeasures like chaff, electronic jamming, and radar-absorbent paint became necessities as ships now acted under the premise of first-to-see, first-to-kill. Such offensive and defensive measures are mandatory in today’s naval operating spaces where anti-access/area-denial strategies and over-the-horizon systems are prolific, especially with regard to the littorals and close operating areas of the Pacific and Middle Eastern theaters.

Just as naval artillery transitioned from cannons to breech-loading artillery and fleet structure shifted from battleships to aircraft carriers, the Yom Kippur War ushered in the age of the missile, the missile boat, and modern littoral naval combat. Limited American experimentation with cruise missiles morphed into a complete fervor following the Yom Kippur War. The Harpoon missile research program, initiated in 1969, escalated with the U.S. Navy’s purchase of 150 missiles in 1974. The U.S. Navy formalized production in 1975. By 1979, 1,000 Harpoons had been delivered to the Navy with more in waiting.67

There is no modern definition for a missile boat, but most tend to be less than 1,000 tons (for reference, the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship weighs in at 3,500 tons), shorter than 90 meters, sails at a high speed, and carries an armament of cruise missiles and search radar to find targets.68 Their purpose is to be a cheap, mobile launching platform that achieves a high return-on-investment through the destruction of much larger, more expensive enemy ships. The capability—potential and realized—of a small fishing-boat sized warship to sink larger vessels like frigates, corvettes, tankers, or possibly aircraft carriers, has allowed smaller nations to field formidable naval threats in their home waters.

Most naval professionals are at least loosely familiar with the threat from Iranian fast attack craft in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. This technology, combined with geographic chokepoints, coastal geography, numerous staging areas, and defensive capabilities, permits Iran to pose a heavyweight threat with a lightweight force.69 Iran’s exploitation of its littoral advantages and unique offensive and defensive capabilities allows it to apply a doctrine of asymmetric naval warfare which could produce, “highly destabilizing and surprising results.”70 

Regardless of naming convention or location, fast, lightweight, heavily armed ships will remain an enticing option for navies around the world, especially those without the finances to deploy blue-water fleets or with naturally supportive geography. The Israeli Navy proved the efficacy of such a strategy in 1973 when a few insignificant naval battles changed naval warfare forever.

Christian Heller is an active duty intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps. He is an honors graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Oxford University, and was a Rhodes Scholar.

References

[1] Avner Cohen, “When Israel Stepped Back From the Brink”, The New York Times, 3 October 2013, Accessed online at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.html

[2] Tomis Kapitan, “Arab-Israeli Wars”, Encyclopedia of War and Ethics, edited by Donald A. Wells (Greenwood, 1996), 21

[3] David T. Buckwalter, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War”, Case Studies in Policy Making & Implementation from Naval War College, 119, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/

[4] Ibid., 120

[5] Ibid.

[6] Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 418

[7] Mohamed Kadry Said, “Layered Defense, Layered Attack: The Missile Race in the Middle East”, The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2002, 37

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 229

[11] Buckwalter, “The 1973,” 130

[12] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 227

[13] Elizabeth Stephens, “The Yom Kippur War”, History Today 58 is. 10 (October 2008): 5

[14] Buckwalter, “The 1973,” 130

[15] Stephens, “The Yom,” 5-8

[16] Adam B. Green, “The Israeli Navy’s Application of Operational Art in the Yom Kippur War: A Study in Operational Design”, Naval War College, 12 May, 2017, 1-4

[17] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Overview and Analysis of the Conflict”, September 1975, 113, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf

[18] Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph, Excerpt, 1 November 2017, Accessed at  http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/1971-war-the-first-missile-attack-on-karachi/

[19] “A Look at the Soviet Navy”, All Hands, September 1975, 11, Accessed online at http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/archpdf/ah197509.pdf

[20] Ibib.

[21] Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Alabama: Air University Press, 1985), 150

[22] Hiranandani

[23] “Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi”, Bharat Rakshak, 7 July 2004, Accessed at https://web.archive.org/web/20141119181622/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/44-Attacks-On-Karachi.html?start=1

[24] Ibid.

[25] Green, “The Israeli,” 3

[26] Ibid.

[27] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 311

[28] Green, “The Israeli,” 4

[29] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 311

[30] Ibid.

[31] John C. Schulte, “An Analysis of the historical effectiveness of anti-ship cruise missiles in littoral warfare”, Naval Post-Graduate School, September 1994, 5

[32] Green, “The Israeli,” 1

[33] Green, “The Israeli,” 4

[34] CIA, “The 1973,” 113-114

[35] Green, “The Israeli,” 8

[36] Ibid.

[37] Yao Ming Tiah, “An Analysis of small navy tactics using a modified Hughes’ Salvo Model”, Naval Post-Graduate School, March 2007, 52

[38]Tiah, “An Analysis,” 52

[39] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 311-312

[40] Schulte, “An Analysis,” 5

[41] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312

[42] Schulte, “An Analysis,” 5

[43] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312

[44] Tiah, “An Analysis,” 53

[45] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312

[46] Schulte, “An Analysis,” 6

[47] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 312-313

[48] CIA, “The 1973,” 113

[49] Tiah, “An Analysis,” xxi

[50] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 314

[51] Tiah, “An Analysis,” 52

[52] Ibid., 54

[53] CIA, “The 1973,” 114

[54] Ibid.

[55] Jonathan F. Solomon, “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks”, Naval War College Review 66, no. 4, 2013, 13

[56] Tiah, “An Analysis,”, 54

[57] Solomon, “Maritime Deception,” 13 3

[58] CIA, “The 1973,” 113

[59] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli, 314

[60] Green, “The Israeli,” 11

[61] Herzog, The Arab-Israeli,, 227

[62] Robert S. Bolia, “Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study,” Parameters, Summer 2004, 53

[63] Charles F. Doroski, “The Fourth Arab-Israeli War: A Clausewitzian Victory for Egypt in Seventy-Three?” Naval War College, 16 May 1995, 10

[64] Buckwalter, “The 1973,” 126

[65] Green, “The Israeli,” 8

[66] CIA, “The 1973,” 114

[67] Werrell, The Evolution, 151

[68] “Analysis: Are Missile Boats Still Relevant in Modern Warfare”, Defencyclopedia, 17 November 2016, Accessed online at https://defencyclopedia.com/2016/11/17/analysis-are-missile-boats-still-relevant-in-modern-warfare/

[69] Fariborz Haghshenass, “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #87, September 2008, 7-11

[70] Haghsenass, 25

Featured Image: Saar3 missile boat. (Wikimedia Commons)

Current Operations, Indo-Asia-Pacific

China’s Far Seas Naval Operations, from the Year of the Snake to the Year of the Pig

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By Ryan D. Martinson

Every year, about this time, the leaders of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) send their regards to Chinese sailors deployed overseas during the Lunar New Year. Every year these messages are covered by the Chinese press. Few in China pay attention to these reports. Fewer foreign observers even know of them, but they should. This annual ritual tells the story of China’s emergence as a global naval power.

A Tradition is Born

PLAN leaders made their first Lunar New Year’s call in the second year of China’s anti-piracy escort mission in the Gulf of Aden. On the afternoon of February 11, 2010 PLAN Commander Wu Shengli and Political Commissar Liu Xiaojiang met in the PLAN Operations Command Center. There they held a video teleconference (VTC) with the members of China’s 4th escort task force. According to Chinese press reports, the two leaders expressed their “holiday wishes” and “enthusiastic regards” to all Chinese sailors who were “fighting on the frontlines” in China’s anti-piracy mission.1

This VTC established the pattern for future lunar salutations. Admiral Wu praised the sailors for all that they had achieved while abroad. After 105 days, they had escorted 359 commercial ships, rescuing three from pirate attack. In doing their duty, they had portrayed an image of China as a responsible great power and “won wide acclaim both at home and abroad.” Wu entreated his sailors to faithfully implement the policies and instructions of the Central Military Commission and its Chairman, Hu Jintao. He warned them against complacence—they can and should strive to do better. Liu Xiaojiang followed with more praise, and orders for the task force commander to arrange fun activities so that sailors could have a safe, auspicious, and happy Spring Festival.2

During the two years that followed, only the anti-piracy mission kept Chinese sailors in the “far seas” (远海) during the Lunar New Year.3 From their station off the Horn of Africa, these forces helped protect Chinese commercial vessels and personnel transiting the Gulf of Aden. They also performed other non-combat operations, such as evacuating Chinese citizens from Yemen in 2015. Meanwhile, the Chinese Navy was developing another far seas mission set—high-intensity combat operations east of the first island chain. In 2013, this objective brought Chinese sailors to sea on the most important holiday of the year.

Year of the Snake (2013)

On February 6, 2013, Wu Shengli and Liu Xiaojiang held two VTCs—a first in the history of New Year’s salutations. They called Task Force 570, which was conducting escort operations in the Gulf of Aden, China’s 13th escort task force to date. For their second call, they connected with Task Force 113, then doing far seas training in the Philippine Sea. It comprised three vessels from the North Sea Fleet: the destroyer Qingdao and two frigates, the Yantai and Yancheng.4

Deployments to the Philippine Sea were not unusual. The PLAN routinized operations east of the first island chain in 2007. Task Force 113 represented just one of six (or more) far seas deployments in 2013, and it was certainly not the biggest. Indeed, in October of that year elements of all three PLAN fleets—North, East, and South—congregated in the Philippine Sea for MANEUVER-5, the PLAN’s first large-scale confrontation exercise in the far seas. But Task Force 113 was the first to conduct far seas training during the Spring Festival. With this decision, Wu and Liu showed that China was serious about its plans to transform the PLAN into a force capable of conducting high-intensity operations east of the first island chain, against the only potential adversary that could conceivably be there—the U.S. Navy.5 The years since have seen a dramatic acceleration in the pace of this transformation.

Year of the Horse (2014)

As Chinese citizens prepared to celebrate the year of the horse, hundreds of PLAN personnel were abroad. Wu and Liu made two calls on January 27, 2014. Aside from the 16th escort task force, they talked to Task Force 989, then pioneering a new model for far seas training.6 Up until then, PLAN far seas training mostly involved forays into the Philippine Sea. Task Force 989 conducted the PLAN’s first “two-ocean” (两洋) deployment. The task force—which comprised three surface combatants from the South Sea Fleet—departed Sanya, Hainan on January 20th.7 It sailed through the South China Sea, where it drilled with China’s submarine force, sharpening skills and tactics needed to break an enemy blockade. After that, the task force continued south, lingering at the James Shoal to hold a ceremony marking the southernmost extent of claimed Chinese territory. It then sailed through the Sunda Strait, into the Indian Ocean. After training in waters south of Java, the three ships next proceeded north into the western Pacific via the Lombok Strait, Makassar Strait, and Celebes Sea. After operating in the Philippine Sea, Task Force 989 crossed the first island chain at the Miyako Strait, before heading home to Zhanjiang, Guangdong, where it arrived on February 11th. During its 23-day deployment, the task force conducted “realistic” (实战化) training along the strategically-important waterways connecting the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean.8

The “Two-Ocean” Deployment of Task Force 989 (January 20-February 11, 2014)

Year of the Goat (2015) and Year of the Monkey (2016)

The years 2015 and 2016 saw increased emphasis on noncombat operations in the far seas. In the past, anti-piracy escort task forces relieved before the Lunar New Year always arrived home before the holiday. This changed in the year of the goat. When Admiral Wu and the new PLAN Political Commissar, Miao Hua, called the navy’s overseas forces on February 15, 2014, Task force 547 was on its third month of escort operations in the Gulf of Aden.9 Meanwhile, the 18th escort task force was then in Piraeus, Greece, on a four-day port visit.10 It would not arrive home until March 19, 2015. Wu and Miao also connected with Task Force 138, led by the East Sea Fleet’s Sovremenny-class destroyer Taizhou, which spent the Lunar New Year training in the Philippine Sea.

The year of the monkey looked much the same. When Wu and Miao called on the afternoon of February 2nd, they spoke to three different PLAN task forces operating abroad. Task Force 57, the 21st escort task force, was then just pulling into India to participate in an international fleet review. Its relief, Task Force 576, was conducting anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, a task force led by the North Sea Fleet’s destroyer Harbin was deployed somewhere in the Western Pacific.11

Year of the Rooster (2017)

No PLAN surface forces operated east of the first island chain during the 2017 Lunar New Year—at least none that Beijing cared to admit.12 The PLAN’s new Commander, Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, and Political Commissar Miao Hua made the annual New Year’s call on the morning of January 20, 2017. They spoke to two escort task forces: the 24th (then preparing to arrive in Qatar), and the 25th (on station off the Horn of Africa).13 Shen and Miao inaugurated a new tradition on this day. They held a VTC with PLAN personnel involved in the construction of China’s massive new military bases in the disputed Spratly Islands. In his remarks, Shen described them as operating “on the front lines of island/reef construction.” He praised the sailors for “resolutely implementing Chairman Xi’s policy” and achieving the “strategic aims” (战略目标) of the new construction, which he did not define.

Why did Shen and Miao conduct a VTC with sailors in the Spratly Islands in 2017, when PLAN personnel had been there since the 1980s? Why only the Spratlys, not the Paracel Islands, which were also in the midst of a construction boom, or naval forces operating along other parts of China’s maritime frontier? This decision suggests that PLAN leaders regarded the new Spratly bases as more than just installations with which to influence events in the South China Sea, but also as key components of the Navy’s far seas force structure.

Year of the Dog (2018)

On the afternoon of February 12, 2018, PLAN leaders held four VTCs—more than ever before.14 Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong and new Political Commissar Qin Shengxiang talked to the 28th escort task force, which had just completed an escort mission to Kenya. They also called Task Force 173, then in the eastern Indian Ocean conducting a “two ocean” deployment.15 This task force comprised four ships from the South Sea Fleet—the destroyer Changsha, frigate Hengyang, LPD Jinggangshan, and supply ship Luomahu. After the call, it would sail north into the Philippine Sea, disappointing widespread media speculation that it might head to the Maldives during the climax of that country’s political crisis. Task Force 173 arrived home on February 25, 2018.

Shen and Qin also called PLAN sailors stationed at China’s first overseas military base. According to Chinese reporting, Shen praised the sailors for “blazing the path for overseas base construction,” clearly indicating that while Djibouti may be the first, it would not be the last. Shen and Qin also called Chinese sailors stationed in the Spratly Islands, which they now called the “Spratly Garrison” (南沙守备部队). Shen thanked them for “their important contributions to guarding and constructing the Spratlys.”16

Shen and Qin made four calls on that day; but they should have made a fifth. Chinese reporting on the VTC excludes any mention of Task Force 171 (i.e., the 27th escort task force). It comprised three vessels—the destroyer Haikou, the frigate Yueyang, and the supply ship Qinghaihu. In the second half of January 2018, after making port visits to Tunisia and Algeria, Task Force 171 passed through the Strait of Gibraltar before navigating south along the west coast of Africa. On February 7th, the warships held anti-piracy exercises somewhere in the Gulf of Guinea.17 Reporting on Task Force 171 then went quiet for 12 days, until February 19, when the ships arrived in Cape Town, South Africa, for a two-day port visit. This timeline indicates that when Shen and Qin made their calls on February 12, Task Force 171 was somewhere in the South Atlantic.

Shen and Qin almost certainly called Task Force 171—why would they exclude them? But if so, why choose not to publicize the call? There is no clear answer. Was the mere presence of the task force in the Atlantic judged too sensitive? Unlikely, since this was not the first time that PLAN ships had been there. Just six months earlier, Task Force 174 took the long way home from the Baltic, where it had held exercises with the Russian Navy.18 In mid-August 2017, it conducted simulated “missile attack exercises” somewhere in the Atlantic.19 But its activities were only publicized in the PLAN press, not the wider media, as New Year’s salutations always are. Perhaps the problem was that allowing press coverage of the VTC would require that PLAN leaders publicly explain what the task force was doing in the Atlantic, and why.

Year of the Pig (2019)

February 2, 2019 was a very busy day at the PLAN Operations Command Center. On the eve of the lunar holiday, Shen Jinlong and Qin Shengxiang called five different Chinese task forces operating abroad. Only one anti-piracy escort task force was on their list—the 31st. The 30th escort task force had arrived in Qingdao on January 27, just in time to celebrate the Lunar New Year. As in 2018, Shen and Qin called the Spratly Garrison and the PLAN’s base in Djibouti. However, for the first time in PLAN history, two task forces conducted far seas training deployments during the Spring Festival. The first comprised a task force led by the East Sea Fleet destroyer Zhengzhou. Chinese press coverage did not indicate where Task Force 151 was, or what it was doing.

The Chinese media did cover the movements of the other far seas training task force then at sea. Task Force 174 left Zhanjiang, Guangdong on January 16. It comprised the destroyer Hefei, frigate Yuncheng, LPD Changbaishan, and supply ship Honghu. When Shen and Qin contacted them, they were not in the Philippine Sea, but somewhere in the Central Pacific—that is, somewhere in the vast expanse of ocean between Guam and Hawaii.

Also new, the Chinese press described Task Force 174 as a “far seas joint training task force” (远海联合训练编队). It was working in conjunction with other services under the Southern Theater Command—the PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force. Official Chinese media sources revealed that one of their aims was to “explore methods and approaches for building joint operations combat capabilities to win modern war at sea.”

Conclusion

The information shared in the PLAN’s annual New Year’s greetings does not account for everything the service is doing abroad. The case of Task Force 171 proves that. These short news reports tell us nothing about the expansion of Chinese submarine operations into the Indian Ocean. Nor do they acknowledge other naval activities best kept secret, such as intelligence collection and hydrographic surveys.

Still, the short history of China’s Lunar New Year’s deployments tells us much about the key events in China’s rise as a global naval power. This history shows a growing emphasis on both the combat and non-combat elements of China’s far seas naval strategy. It highlights the geographic expansion of China’s overseas deployments—where once Chinese ships were concentrated in the northwest Indian Ocean and the Philippine Sea, they now operate as far away as the Atlantic Ocean and the Central Pacific.

In the year of the snake, China’s far seas force structure comprised small task forces largely reliant on at-sea replenishment and the expensive hospitality of foreign ports. In the year of the pig, it included significant shore-based infrastructure, including the country’s first—but not last—overseas military base in Djibouti and colossal new installations in the Spratly Islands. This chronicle of the PLAN’s New Year’s deployments also shows how China’s growing emphasis on jointness is affecting naval operations abroad, and informing Beijing’s preparations for high-end conflict at sea. All of these things have happened in a single decade.

This history is far from over. By all accounts, the Chinese Navy has a long way to go before fully realizing its nautical ambitions. Xi Jinping has told the PLAN to set its sights on becoming a “world-class navy” by mid-century. What that means is impossible to tell. The PLAN has not shared its benchmarks for success. What is clear is that the decisions of PLAN commanders on the eve of each Lunar New Year will continue to serve as a useful gauge for progress in this journey, wherever it ends up.

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

References

1. 袁珍军 [Yuan Zhenjun] 海军首长视频慰问525编队全体官兵 [“Head of the Navy Holds a Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to All Officers and Enlisted of Task Force 525”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 12, 2010, p. 1.

2. Ibid

3. In Chinese military discourse, the term “near seas” (近海) refers to the Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. The term “far seas” refers to all waters beyond the near seas.

4. 蒲海洋 [Pu Haiyang] 海军首长视频慰问570，113 编队官兵 [“Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to the Officers and Enlisted of Task Force 570 and Task Force 113”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 8, 2013, p. 1.

5. During the VTC, Admiral Wu told the sailors that their sacrifice “held important significance for strengthening the concept of readiness embodied in the phrase ‘being able to fight and win’ exploring and putting into practice a mechanism for normalizing far seas training, exercising and improving the service’s ability to conduct far seas missions and tasks, and realizing a good start to the surface fleet’s annual far seas training.” See Pu Haiyang, “Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference,” op. cit.

6. 梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong] 海军首长视频慰问546，989编队官兵 [“Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to the Officers and Enlisted of Task Force 546 and Task Force 989”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] January 28, 2014, p. 1.

7. The task force included the LPD Changbaishan, the destroyer Haikou and the destroyer Wuhan.

8. 高毅 [Gao Yi], 南海舰队远海训练编队返港, 海军副政委王森泰到码头迎接并讲话 [“Far Seas Training Task Force from the South Sea Fleet Returns to Port, Deputy Political Commissar of the Navy Wang Sentai Meets Them Pier Side and Gives a Speech”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], February 12, 2014, p. 1.

9. 王元元 [Wang Yuanyuan] 海军首长视频慰问547，138编队 [“Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to the Officers and Enlisted of Task Force 547 and Task Force 138”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 16, 2015, p. 1.

10. The task force was in Greece from February 16-20, 2015. Perhaps because the crew were too busy ashore, Wu and Miao sent their New Year’s salutations via written message. See Wang Yuayuan, “Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference,” op. cit.

11. 王元元 [Wang Yuanyuan] 海军首长视频慰问海上任务编队 [“Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to Task Forces at Sea”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 2, 2016, p. 1.

12. A task force departed Sanya, Hainan for a “two-ocean” training deployment on February 10, just after the holiday ended.

13. 梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong] 海军首长视频慰问112，568编队和岛礁建设部队官兵 [“Head of Navy Holds Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to Officers and Enlisted from Task Force 112, Task Force 568, and Island/Reef Construction Unit”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] January 23, 2017, p. 1.

14. 王元元 [Wang Yuanyuan] 海军领导视频慰问海上任务编队，驻南沙岛礁和海外保障基地官兵 [“Navy Leaders Hold Video-Teleconference to Send Regards to Sailors from Task Forces at Sea, Located at Spratly Islands/Reefs, and Overseas Support Base”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 13, 2018, p. 1.

15. The People’s Navy newspaper reports that on February 13, 2018 the task force was operating in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean, doing an anti-piracy exercise. See 周启青 [Zhou Qiqing] 大洋深处的”飓风营救” [“A ‘Hurricane Rescue’ in the Depths of the Ocean”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 26, 2018, p. 1.

16. Wang Yuanyuan, “Navy Leaders Hold Video-Teleconference,” op. cit.

17. 刘鑫 [Liu Xin] 我护航编队几内亚湾组织机动巡航训练 [“Navy Escort Task Force Holds Maneuver Patrol Training in the Gulf of Guinea”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] February 12, 2018, p. 1.

18. Task Force 174 comprised the Type 052D destroyer Hefei, Type 054A frigate Yuncheng, and supply ship Luomahu.

19. 梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong] 砺兵，万里航程真如铁—174舰艇编队远海大洋实战化练兵纪事 [“Grinding the Sailors, A Long Journey is Just Like Iron—A Chronicle of Task Force 174’s Realistic Far Seas Training”] 人民海军 [People’s Navy] September 27, 2017, p. 1.

Featured Image: Leading by the amphibious dock landing ship Kunlunshan (Hull 998), vessels attached to a landing ship flotilla with the South China Sea Fleet under the PLA Navy steam in formation during the maritime live-fire training in waters of the South China Sea from January 17 to 19, 2018. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Liu Jian)