By Dr. Ruxandra Bosilca
In this episode, Dr. John Shewood, U.S. Navy Historian at the Naval History and Heritage Command, joins Dr. Ruxandra Bosilca, CIMSEC’s Social Media Coordinator, to examine the EU and NATO response to the raging migration and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean.
Download Sea Control 155 – Humanity at Sea and Naval Responses with Dr. John Sherwood
Dr. Ruxandra Bosilca is CIMSEC’s Social Media Coordinator.
Contact the Sea Control podcast team at seacontrol@cimsec.org.
By Norman Polmar and Scott C. Truver
“How often can you be at the christening of a robot warship?” Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work asked the crowd at the baptism of the Navy’s Sea Hunter unmanned surface warship in 2016.1 “…You’re going to look back at this day just like… when the USS Nautilus was christened, or when the USS Enterprise was commissioned,” he said. “And you are going to look back on this and say, ‘I was part of history.'”
Also part of that history, President Trump and the Navy Department are in tenuous agreement that the U.S. Navy requires 355 manned and unmanned ships, a significant increase from the current force of some 290 ships. This requirement is in part based on great power competition with China and Russia, which involves a growing renaissance in naval and maritime activities. Further, the world situation continues to witness crises, terrorism, and civil wars raging across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Yet even in “peacetime” naval ships are invaluable to represent U.S. political and economic interests in many areas of the world. Considering this global political-military environment, innovative concepts are essential to sustaining U.S. sea power.
A family of large, medium, and small USVs will take advantage of new technologies – some only dimly perceived in early 2020 – to provide increased capabilities to the Fleet with reduced construction, maintenance, and manpower. Getting there from today’s fiscal environment is critically important, and there is still much work to do to increase trust and develop CONOPs, but the potential for these unmanned vehicles to transform the future Navy is astounding.
“But I got to tell you,” Vice Adm. Richard Brown, commander of Naval Surface Forces and Naval Surface Force Pacific, warned the Surface Navy Association, “the security environment isn’t getting any more secure, it’s getting less secure, and it’s a maritime security environment hands down. And when the United States Navy’s not there, it creates a sucking vacuum and people fill it in. And it’s usually not good people.”2
Significantly, in December 2019, during deliberations on the president’s budget, the Navy proposed a 287-ship force by fiscal year 2025. “But that level,” Bloomberg News explained, “which includes the decommissioning of 12 warships to save money, would be well below the long-term 308-ship target set by the Obama administration and even farther from President Trump’s goal of 355 ships.”3
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has directed the Navy and the Department of Defense to review force level goals, and reiterated the need for a “resource-informed plan to achieve a 355-ship combined fleet, including manned and unmanned ships, by 2030.” Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly issued a 6 December 2019 memo to his staff that was “in sync” with the White House/OMB directive. He called for a plan to achieve a fleet of 355 or more ships “for greater global naval power within ten years” that includes robust levels of unmanned systems.4
U.S. shipyards could deliver the additional ships, even taking into account the accelerated retirement of outdated ships, but it would not be easy. Several yards are short of skilled workers, contributing to increasing ship construction and maintenance times. There are other constraints listed by Bloomberg: “Looming over the push to accelerate shipbuilding is an inconvenient truth outlined on December 4 by the Government Accountability Office: “The Navy continues to face persistent and substantial maintenance delays that hinder its ability to stay ready for operations and training. Since fiscal year 2014, Navy ships have spent over 33,700 more days in maintenance than expected.’”5
Another problem with a larger fleet is the requirement for even more personnel: The Navy currently is short some 7,000 sailors. More ships will demand more sailors, a problem in the current, highly favorable U.S. economy.
“I think the number we identified matches the ownership costs that we identified,” said Rear Adm. Brian Luther, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, during congressional testimony.6 “So we grow in lead of some of the equipment because we have to train people ahead of when the ship arrives. It was a disciplined approach to ensure we didn’t procure a ship without people, [and] we didn’t procure a ship without armament. So, it’s a very balanced and disciplined approach.”7
A practical and near-term Surface Force solution is unmanned surface vessels (USVs). Successful testing of the DARPA and Office of Naval Research prototype Sea Hunter underscores the feasibility of USVs. During her evaluation, the 132-foot-long trimaran Sea Hunter sailed—unmanned—from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, and back, and conducted a variety of demonstrations, showcasing the ability to host a variety of mission payloads. While important lessons were learned, there were no significant problems during her 5,000-mile voyage.8 The Sea Hunter has since transitioned to the Navy’s Surface Development Squadron ONE (SURFDEVRON-1), and the Navy is testing two other USVs as part of the Pentagon-sponsored Ghost Fleet program.9
“Because it is big and it has a lot of payload capacity, and because it also has a lot of range and endurance, it can potentially carry out a range of different missions,” Scott Littlefield, former DARPA program manager in the tactical technology office, predicted in 2016.10
Follow-on USVs are now being developed and procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command to provide increased capabilities at reduced costs. The Navy is shaping multiple competitions for successors—a “family” of small, medium, and large USVs—that look to operationalize how a more advanced USV could be employed for a broad spectrum of missions and tasks. In December, the U.S. Fleet Forces Command (FFC) issued a notice asking the service’s surface force to develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the large and medium USVs in development.11
“The MUSV will initially focus on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) systems, while the LUSV will focus on surface warfare (SUW) and strike missions,” the FFC explained. “The fundamental capabilities of these platforms may necessitate changes in how Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups and Surface Action Groups conduct operations. The CONOPS will describe the capabilities at initial operating capability (IOC), the organization, manning, training, equipping, sustaining, and the introduction and operational integration of the Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle and Large Unmanned Surface Vessel with individual afloat units as well as with Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, and Surface Action Groups.”
“Knowing what’s going on out there is extremely important,” Admiral James Foggo, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa and NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples, remarked in December. “So, for unmanned systems, [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] is probably one of our limitations and we could use more of it. Indications and warnings are important. If you could put an unmanned system up, then there’s less of a risk, less of a threat.”12
Speaking at the U.S. Naval Institute’s defense forum in December 2019, the new Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday said that unmanned systems will be part of the Navy’s Integrated Force Structure Assessment expected in early 2020. “I know the future force has to include a mix of unmanned systems. We can’t wrap $2 billion platforms around missiles.”13
There has been programmatic success that looks to invigorate the USV family. According to Defense News, the Navy will get two large unmanned surface vessels (LUSVs) in 2020.14 The 2020 Defense appropriations bill funds the two LUSVs that the Navy requested, but prohibits funding for integrating/testing of vertical launch systems on those vessels, which is the heart of the LUSV mission. Congress also directed the service to prepare a comprehensive unmanned surface vessel plan before it charges ahead.
In that context, the White House and OMB told the Navy to develop a proposal for counting at least some of its unmanned surface vessels and underwater vehicles among its “Battle Force,” the portion of its fleet that has historically included larger, manned warships, such as aircraft carriers and destroyers, and support ships, according to The Drive.15 “This would be a major shift that would create a more realistic path for the service to meeting the ambitious congressionally mandated goal of a 355-ship Battle Force fleet and would help solidify the already growing importance of unmanned platforms in its future concepts of operation.”
The U.S. Navy is on the threshold of a new era in maritime-naval operations. “I think it’s well within the possibility that we’ll fight fleet on fleet with unmanned surface vessels deep into that fight,” Vice Adm. Brown predicted, “calling it a fundamental change to how the fleet fights akin to the introduction of carrier-based aviation to a battleship-centric fleet ahead of World War II.”
“[I]n in the United States Air Force, there are airplanes and drones,” Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work remarked. “The Navy cannot make that mistake. There have to be warships. And it doesn’t matter whether they are manned or unmanned. They will take the fight to the enemy.”
Norman Polmar is a naval analyst, historian, and author. He is a consultant to Leidos on naval and maritime issues.
Dr. Scott Truver is a Washington-based naval analyst.
References
1. Bob Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, Remarks at the ACTUV “Seahunter” Christening Ceremony, April 7, 2016, Portland, OR, 779197.
2. Meghan Eckstein, “VADM Brown: Future Fleet Must be Bigger, Leverage Unmanned Vessel Vessels, USNI News, 13 January 2020.
3. Tony Capaccio, “White House Presses Navy to Stick with Trump’s 355-Ship Target,” Bloomberg News, 20 December 2019.
4. David B. Lartner, “US Navy to add 46 Ships in five years, but 355 ships won’t come for a long time,” Navy Times, 12 February 2018.
5. Ibid. See also, David Sharp and Lolita Baldor, “Navy Considers Shipbuilding Cuts for Upcoming Budget,” Associated Press, 28 December 2019.
6. Lartner, “US Navy to add 46 Ships in five years, but 355 ships won’t come for a long time,” Navy Times, 12 February 2018.
7. Eckstein, “Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy Testing as NAVSEA Moves Forward with Draft RFP,” USNI News, 29 April 2019.
8. Ibid.
9. “US Navy starts second phase of Ghost Fleet Overlord Programmed,” Naval Technology, 3 October 2019.
10. Adam Stone, ‘ACTUV on Track for Navy Success Story,” C4ISRNET, 21 December 2016.
11. Nathan Gain, “US Navy Issues Request for LUSV/MUSV CONOPS Development,” Naval News, 6 January 2020.
12. Epstein, “Foggo: Navy Needs Unmanned ISR, Tankers to Counter Russia,” USNI News, 18 December 2019.
13. Matthew Cox, “The new acting Navy secretary wants a fleet larger than the current 355-hull plan,” Military.com, 10 December 2019.
14. Lartner, “The U.S. Navy Gets Its Large Unmanned Surface Vessels In 2020 With Strings Attached,” Defense News, 21 December 2019.
15. Joseph Trevithick “White House Asks Navy To Include New Unmanned Vessels In Its Ambitious 355 Ship Fleet Plan,” The Drive, 20 December 2019.
Featured Image: The unmanned Sea Hunter vessel during testing. (Still image from DARPA video)
By Jared Samuelson
CAPT Bill Shafley discusses his September 2018 article on new forms of naval operational planning, Corbett’s many subtle levels, and the impact of Wayne Hughes.
Download Sea Control 154: CAPT Bill Shafley on New Forms of Naval Operational Planning
1. CAPT Bill Shafley’s September 2018 article, “New Forms of Naval Operational Planing for Earning Command of the Seas.”
2. Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.
3. Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Operations.
4. While not dedicated specifically to the Composite Warfare Commander construct, Major Kevin M. Stepp’s Master’s Thesis, Composite Warfare Doctrine – Providing the JFMCC with the Optimal Command and Control Method for Amphibious Operations, does an excellent job describing the concept.
By Dmitry Filipoff
CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss with Rear Admiral Fred Kacher and Commander Doug Robb their new book, the Naval Officer’s Guide to the Pentagon. In this conversation they discuss what naval officers need to know when reporting to the Pentagon, how this book can serve as an excellent reference for a variety of roles, and what is unique about serving in the nation’s capital.
The introduction notes that this is the first ever edition of this book. What motivated you to take on this project, and how do you see a need for this book?
The U.S. Naval Institute’s Blue and Gold professional series has for years provided naval professionals—officers, enlisted, civilians, and their families—with helpful guides designed to ease acclimation to life and work in the Navy. This project was borne from a similar desire to help.
Initially, USNI envisioned a slightly narrower guide designed to help naval officers bound for the Pentagon’s Joint Staff. But as we thought about which jobs young leaders from the Fleet head to when they report to the Pentagon, we realized we needed to broaden the focus. As we looked around, there seemed to be only a single relevant preparatory book—Assignment Pentagon by retired Air Force Major General Perry Smith, first published in the late 1980s. It contained valuable information, but wasn’t geared specifically to naval officers or a Navy crowd. So we set out to describe the types of things—a history of the building, how to get around it, the different staffs and assignments one may be detailed to, other government branches and organizations, and information about the area—that a junior or mid-grade naval officer coming to Washington for perhaps the first time would need to know to really make an impact soon after reporting.
Although both of us remember our first tours at the Pentagon well, we also quickly realized that we didn’t have all the answers, so we sought out people from across the service whose professional backgrounds, past experiences, writing acumen, and desire to help made them natural partners for this project. The result is an anthology of sorts where some true subject matter experts break down complex topics in a way that will be useful to Washington-bound naval officers and civilians alike.
The Pentagon is the headquarters of the massive bureaucracy that is the Department of Defense. What key organizations and processes can someone familiarize themselves with to get a sense of who the key players are and understand the regular business of the building?
The answer to this question really lies in the way we’ve organized the book. In it, we describe the different staffs within the Pentagon with which naval officers or civilians work or interact, including the Navy (OPNAV) Staff, the Secretariat, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff. Additionally, chapters describe the types of jobs one may find themselves in, whether as an action officer or helping shepherd a senior leader through their day as a member of their staff.
One chapter in particular—on the budget process—translates what is often described as an arcane or confusing system into plain English. And as we’ve observed firsthand, there’s a lot about working in the Pentagon that is different from serving on a ship or in a squadron. It can seem like business is being conducted in a foreign language. As just one small example, we include 13 pages—13 whole pages—listing the various acronyms someone working in the Pentagon will need to be familiar with. It’s emblematic of how we tried to design the content in the book to help “flatten” the learning curve for newly-reporting officers and civilians and provide a resource they’ll find useful to consult during their tour.
Nearly every job in the Pentagon or in Washington requires an understanding of organizations and actors outside of the Pentagon—the Executive Branch (e.g. the White House and National Security Council), the interagency, Congress, think tanks, and others—and we delve into those, as well.
To newcomers, entering the Pentagon can be a daunting experience. What can someone do to hit the ground running in their new role?
For this book, we don’t anticipate many people will sit down and read it cover-to-cover—we certainly don’t expect them to. Rather, we think of it as a “ready reference” for folks to keep handy and consult when they need a quick fact or want to learn more about a particular topic or role.
For people reporting for the first time, a good place to start is Chapter 2, “Navigating the Pentagon.” This includes Frommer’s Travel Guide-like logistical details about how to plan your commute, where to enter the building, how to traverse its corridors by making sense of the building signs and naming conventions, where to eat, and where to find other services.
Over time, after you’ve settled into your office and begin to understand your role and how it fits into the broader organization and processes around you, other chapters can help accelerate your understanding and “de-code” some topics that folks before you have found important but perhaps a tad foreign when they were first encountered.
Finally, opportunities often arise for seasoned and high-performing officers to shift offices or positions within the Pentagon, so pulling this book off the shelf could help someone learn about a new job, prepare for an interview, or execute a new assignment.
A key theme that many of the authors touch on is the importance of working well with others outside the usual naval milieu, such as those from another service, a different agency, and from other countries. Why is the ability to work across these divides so important?
It sounds clichéd but in Washington, D.C. it truly is all about relationships. Perhaps one reason for this is that the scope of issues on which people work on in Washington are so broad that no one person—whether an action officer managing a portfolio or a senior leader responsible for a large organization—can affect change on their own. As a result, having a friend or colleague to call for advice, help, support, or advocacy can be invaluable as you seek to “move your ball down the field.”
But building those relationships and establishing trust takes a great deal of time—in fact, it often spans the entire length of one’s tour. Consequently, by starting a job having already done some preparatory reading on your new role, how your organization fits into the broader scheme, and the general processes that govern your job —in other words, the information we focus on in this book—you can start developing those relationships on Day One.
While most of the book focuses on serving at the Pentagon a significant part of it looks at roles “across the river,” where a person in uniform may be embedded within civilian staff and institutions. These can range from working at the White House, in a think tank, or with congress. What is valuable about these kinds of roles and experiences?
Just as the Pentagon could be considered the military’s “corporate headquarters,” so too is Washington, D.C. the center of all national policy- and decision-making (which extends well beyond just military matters). And so as Admiral Jim Stavridis (ret.) mentions in the book’s foreword, one of the rewarding things about service in Washington, D.C.—even for uniformed service-members—is the opportunity to work with, or even within, other organizations that impact our government and country.
Active duty personnel are assigned to the White House, National Security Council, State Department, Capitol Hill, think tanks, research organizations, and academic institutions—and are exposed to the deliberations, inner workings, and decisions that will affect the nation and, in some cases, the world. While these experiences are valuable, sending this cadre of officers back to the Fleet can not only help the Navy contribute more effectively to the interagency, but will also position these folks to take on greater responsibility in our organizations in the future.
It is noted throughout the book that a tour at the Pentagon and in the Washington D.C. area can be an especially rewarding experience. What is unique about the professional experience that can be earned through these tours?
While both of us enjoyed our first tours in the Pentagon, the reality is that like other officers we came from—and returned to—the operational Navy. One of the neat things about the United States Navy is that most warfare community career paths are designed so that officers have the opportunity to “do something different” ashore after serving at sea. As a result, working in the Pentagon and Washington, D.C. area not only provides naval officers a chance to learn how our “corporate headquarters” works, but also how the other instruments of power play a role in our country’s direction. To echo Fleet Admiral Ernest King, who once said, “Where the power is that is where the headquarters have to be,” it is important to understand how and why major decisions are made in the capital. But it is equally if not more important to take those insights back to the waterfront or flight line.
Finally, although you’ll hear an awful lot about D.C. highway traffic and Pentagon bureaucracy, the D.C. metropolitan area is also a really vibrant area with a Stanley Cup-winning hockey team, a World Series-champion baseball team, museums, restaurants, universities, great history, and some great and varied communities to live in.
Any final thoughts you would like to share?
Simply put, we wrote this book to help future young naval leaders coming to the Pentagon from the Fleet succeed and thrive. At sea, there is an old adage that leaders should leave a ship “better than they found it” and this book is our effort to do the same for those heading to the Pentagon. We hope that in helping the next generation of D.C.-bound naval leaders, we will also help build a cadre of officers who better serve the needs and interests of the naval profession. Because at the end of the day, the quality of the work and advocacy done in Pentagon directly impacts the Fleet and our Sailors where the real work of the Navy happens.
RDML Fred W. Kacher, USN, is an active duty naval officer who has commanded USS Stockdale (DDG 106), Destroyer Squadron Seven and is currently in command of Expeditionary Strike Group Seven, forward deployed to the Pacific. He is the author of the Newly Commissioned Naval Officers Guide, 1st and 2nd editions, in addition to numerous articles on naval leadership and management. He has also served at the White House and in multiple tours at the Pentagon.
CDR Douglas A. Robb, USN, is an active duty surface warfare officer whose next assignment is as Executive Officer in USS Spruance (DDG 111), homeported in San Diego, California. He attended graduate school in Washington and has subsequently served three tours there, including on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: The Pentagon, headquarters of the United States Department of Defense, taken from an airplane in January 2008. (David B. Gleason via Wikimedia Commons)
