How the Mad Foxes of Patrol Squadron FIVE are harnessing their most powerful resource – their people – in an effort to cut inefficiencies and improve productivity.
By Kenneth Flannery with Jared Wilhelm
The U.S. Military Academy’s Modern War Institute recently published a thorough primer by ML Cavanaugh on what it means to drive innovation in the military.The most important takeaway was the large difference between the simple buzzword “innovation,” and the people who actually do the dirty work of driving positive change – oft-cited as “innovation”– within the force: “defense entrepreneurs.” This series focuses on an operational U.S. Navy Maritime Patrol Squadron that is full of defense entrepreneurs, and how their unit is taking the “innovation imperative” from on high and translating it to the deckplate level. Part 1 focuses on the “Why? Who? And How?”; Part 2 reveals observed institutional barriers, challenges, and a how-to that other units could use to adapt the model to their own units.
The Innovation Imperative
Today, the U.S. Navy remains the most powerful seafaring force the world has ever known, but there is nothing destined about that position. To maintain this superior posture, we must find leverage that allows us to maintain an edge over our adversaries. One of our most powerful levers in the past has been our economy. We were once able to maintain supremacy simply by outspending our rivals on research, development and sheer production. While the United States still has the largest military budget of any nation, that budget is increasingly stretched to counter threats in a dizzying array of locales to include the South China Sea, Arabian Gulf, or even an increasingly vulnerable Arctic. Additionally, the rest of the world is catching up economically. Some assessments indicate that China will have the largest economy in the world by 2030 and they are already producing their own domestically-built aircraft carriers. It isn’t just China on our economic heels; by 2050 the United States could have slid to third place behind India as well. Finally, our adversaries’ continual embrace of technological theft and espionage involving some of our most expensive proprietary platforms has shrunk the technological gap that the U.S. enjoyed for multiple decades. These realities make it clear that the U.S. must find a new way to counter opponents besides technological advantage.
Much like the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia,” the Department of Defense is experiencing what some might call a “Pivot to Innovation.” Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s “Defense Innovation Initiative”and “Third Offset Strategy” both signal a reinvigorated focus on maintaining and advancing our military superiority over both unconventional actors and near-peer competitors alike.
In alignment with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson’s intent, VP-5 is investing time and manpower in the idea that that new counterweight will be the innovative ideas of our Sailors. Just as nuclear weapons and advancements like stealth and Global Positioning Systems kept the U.S. military on top during the conflicts of the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, it will be our ability to rapidly assess challenges and implement solutions that will guarantee our security in the future. This will require a reimagining of how we currently operate and how we are organized. Our squadron believes the key to this revolution lies with its junior enlisted and junior officer ranks.
Tapping the Innovative Ideas of the Everyday “Doers”
VP-5 is taking a multi-pronged approach to molding an innovation-friendly climate to best tap the ideas of those accomplishing the mission on a daily basis. Patrol Squadron FIVE (VP-5) is currently experimenting with a dedicated Innovation Department in our command structure, but this isn’t the first time that the squadron has embraced change to maintain the technological and fighting advantage over adversaries. The unit is based at the U.S. Navy’s Master Anti-submarine Warfare facility at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, where we became the second squadron Fleet-wide to transition from the P-3C Orion to the P-8A Poseidon aircraft. This successful transition was based on new training and simulation technologies, but also on a rich historythat spans from our founding in 1937 to involvement in World War II, Kennedy’s blockade of Cuba during the Cold War, the Balkan Conflict, and our recent involvement in the Middle East. Throughout this time, we have used no less than five different types of Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
Just as the transition in 1948 from the PBY-5A to the PV-2 brought new tools to the squadron’s warfighting capabilities, today we are augmenting the new technologies of the P-8A with a change to our organizational structure and business practices. A traditional operational naval aviation command administers a standard set of departments including Operations, Training, Safety/NATOPS (Standardization), and Maintenance. By implementing a new Innovation Department led by a warfare-qualified pilot or Naval Flight Officer lieutenant (O-3), VP-5 seeks to elevate the innovation construct to a position alongside the traditional departments required for squadron mission accomplishment. In addition to the lieutenant department head, the Innovation group is staffed by an additional lieutenant and a Senior Chief. Its mission statement reads:
“Lead Naval Aviation in accomplishing our mission by sustaining a culture based on process improvement and disruptive thinking. The force that knows the desired outcome, measures progress in real time, and adapts processes to overcome barriers has a sustainable advantage over adversaries who tolerate their deficiencies. Similarly, the force that can innovate transforms the battlespace to their advantage.”
The establishment of the Innovation Department sends a strong signal to the department heads and the senior enlisted that innovation is a priority, but it may not necessarily trickle down to the average junior enlisted Sailor that VP-5 is a different type of squadron. To ensure the culture reaches everyone, we have implemented large “Innovation Whiteboards” throughout the squadron and encourage all members to post ideas and suggestions. Sailors can see what others have posted and leave reactions of their own. Similar to the “CO’s Sticky Note Board” on the USS Benfold (DDG 65), the ideas written on the whiteboards are then compiled for further action by the Innovation Department.
Whether an idea has been generated via a whiteboard or suggested by means of a more traditional route, the next step in the process is to create a “Swarm Cell.” Swarm Cells are small groups of people that aim to rapidly implement solutions to the problem being addressed. These groups follow a predetermined set of procedures that begin with specifying the desired output. Starting with a clear description of the end result discourages the Cell from veering off course or diluting their product with superfluous features that do little to help the original problem. The Swarm Cells then move to address the actual problem or process for which they were created, all the while making sure that their efforts lead them toward the desired output. Next, the Cells measure their progress to decide if the desired output has been achieved. From there, the members of the group can choose to share their knowledge or revisit their solutions if they have determined that they have not met their output goals.
These Swarm Cells are not on an innovation island. The squadron strives to provide support and guidance for those working to realize their ideas and provides each Swarm Cell with an Innovation Accelerator. This Accelerator may be an official member of the Innovation Department, but is not necessarily so. If the Swarm Cell is like the train conductor, deciding the destination and exactly how fast to get there, the Innovation Accelerator is the train track, allowing room for minor deviations, but keeping the train on course to its final goal. Accelerators need not be intimately involved with the minutiae of their Swarm Cells, and as such may be facilitating two or three different Cells concurrently. By asking simple questions the Accelerator can refocus the team:
1. Has the Cell outlined a clearly defined output? 2. Is the Cell working to achieve that vision, or have they allowed distractions to creep in? 3. Are they continually measuring their progress along the way?
Again, in VP-5 innovation belongs to everyone. Sailors of all ranks and pedigrees are encouraged and expected to turn a critical eye to established procedures in an effort to push our squadron into the twenty-first century. However, change for the sake of change is not one of our objectives. To guard against this, the product or design is subjected to an internal Shark Tank once each Swarm Cell is sufficiently satisfied with their work. These Shark Tank events are open to all hands and are designed to prod for weak spots in the proposal and introduce the idea to the whole team. The Swarm Cell’s program or improvement is critiqued from every angle to determine its overall benefit and structural integrity. These sessions are designed to be thorough in order to weed out underdeveloped initiatives or those that may not provide a quantifiable benefit. If a program passes muster, it continues in whatever form is appropriate, whether that is a new or revised squadron instruction or perhaps a meeting further up the chain of command.
Our modest foray into innovation has already begun to bear fruit. One of the most promising results of the innovation process has been the development of a dedicated command smartphone application called Quarterdeck. What started as a search for a better way to communicate has blossomed into a robust “app” which boasts capability far beyond that which was initially envisioned. Currently available on the Droid and Apple App stores, the application meets or exceeds DoD information assurance requirements and includes features like flight schedule postings and peer-to-peer instant messaging, among many others. Thanks to motivated junior officers who attended the 2016 Aviation Mission Support Tactical Advancements for the Next Generation (TANG) at Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Silicon Valley, the Adobe Company is now conducting market research, has shown interest in acquiring the hosting rights for the app, and is currently developing a professional version based on the VP-5 prototype.
Another of our most promising innovation programs appeared to be headed toward realization before being dismissed due to concerns about running afoul of the Program Management Aviation (PMA) office. The plan was to implement an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) to replace the existing system of paper flight publications. This innovation would use tablet computers and digital flight publication subscriptions to save each squadron approximately $17,000 annually. PMA is currently developing a parallel program, but the estimated fleet delivery date was still at least a year away at the time our project was initiated. Our program would be able to deliver tablets within months. Every detail of the program had been meticulously researched, and drew heavily upon long established, similar programs used by the airlines.
The EFB program was widely supported among VP-5 junior officers, Fleet Replacement Squadron instructors, our own CO and XO, reserve unit squadrons manned by commercial airline pilots, and even had the interest of Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group (CPRG). Unfortunately, information security concerns rooted in a risk averse culture combined with the lack of official approval from higher authorities halted the project prior to purchase. Even though our organic EFB proposal was not accepted, our efforts to address the issue sparked broader interest and pressured PMA to move up its timeline. It is a testament to the power of this innovation process that it could conceive and develop a product that rivaled a parallel effort of the standard acquisition pipeline and a regular program office. Tablets are now forecast to be delivered to the fleet by the end of this year.
Other achievements include a redesign of the Petty Officer Indoctrination course, a Command Volunteer Service Day suggested, planned, and led by an E-3, and an “Aircrew Olympics” which pitted two combat aircrews against each other in a variety of mission-related tasks. These ideas were all generated and executed from within the junior enlisted ranks.
We do not intend to suggest that a smartphone application or volunteer service holds the key to dismantling Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear program or China’s grip on the South China Sea. What we are trying to do is develop a framework in which creative solutions can be cultivated. Not every idea is going to be a grand slam, but before you can hit a grand slam you have to get people on base. The most important point we’ve learned is that the ideas are out there, we can cultivate them, and we’ve so far proven that we have “defense entrepreneurs” that can see these innovative ideas through from the white boards to implementation.
Formalizing an innovation process within a squadron is a new way of doing things and this new approach has been met with a variety of challenges. From stubborn, bureaucratic restrictions to “innovation stagnation,” the innovation construct at VP-5 has faced hurdles along the way and been forced to adapt. In the next installment of this series, we will explore some of these obstacles and describe the ways in which the Innovation Department has evolved as a result.
Lieutenant Ken Flannery is a P-8A Poseidon Instructor Tactical Coordinator at Patrol Squadron FIVE (VP-5). He may be contacted at email@example.com.
Lieutenant Commander Jared Wilhelm is the Operations Officer at Unmanned Patrol Squadron One Nine (VUP-19), a P-3C Orion Instructor Pilot and a 2014 Department of Defense Olmsted Scholar. Hey may be contacted at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Featured Image: A P-8 assigned to VP-5 (U.S. Navy photo)
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By W. Alejandro Sanchez
In mid-August the Ecuadorian Coast Guard detained a Chinese vessel off the Galapagos Islands, an inspection revealed the ship was transporting approximately 300 tons of fish, some of which were endangered species. This is yet another high-profile incident involving Chinese ships fishing without authorization in Latin American waters and ongoing efforts by regional naval forces to stop this crime. (This commentary follows up a previous report by the author for CIMSEC entitled “Latin American Navies Combat Illegal Fishing.”)
The most recent incident occurred on 13 August when an Ecuadorian Coast Guard vessel and a supporting helicopter detained the Chinese vessel Fu Yuang Yu Leng 999 within the Galapagos Islands Marine Reserve. The vessel was escorted to Puerto Baquerizo Moreno, where an inspection discovered over 300 tons of a variety of fishes, particularly hammerhead and silky sharks as well as other endangered species. The vessel was a factory ship, which was fed fishes that were caught by other vessels. The country’s Ministry of Defense has stated that the Chinese fleet operating around Ecuador may number as many as 300 vessels. The incident prompted non-violent protests in front of the Chinese embassy in Quito as well as in Santa Cruz Island. At the time of this writing Ecuadorian authorities have put the crew on trial and have also sent a letter of protest to the Chinese government.
Previous to this case, the most notable illegal fishing-related incident in the region (so far) occurred in Argentina last year. In March 2016, the Argentine Coast Guard located a Chinese fleet fishing in its territorial waters by Chubut, southeast of the country. Security vessels were deployed, and the Coast Guard shot at the vessel Lu Yan Yuan Yu to prevent it from fleeing to international waters. Rather than stopping, the Chinese ship tried to ram one of the vessels.
Argentina Coast Guard footage of Chinese fishing vessel Lu Yan Yuan Yu in March 2016.
There have been other incidents in the past couple of years involving Chinese fishing fleets. A final example occurred in 2015, when the Chilean Navy stopped a number of Chinese vessels off the Bio Bio region in Chile’s exclusive economic zone. The concern was that they were fishing for shrimp. An 11 July 2015 Navy press release explains that said vessels were inspected and no illegal cargo was found.
In December 2016, the Peruvian media reported the presence of large fleets from Asian nations (China, Korea, Taiwan). Similar articles explaining how these fleets hurt Peru’s fishing industry were also published in May to continue to raise awareness among the population. It is important to stress that apart from the 2016 incident in Argentina, there have been no other reports regarding violent maneuvers by Chinese fishing vessels when in contact with Latin American security forces (at least none that the author could verify).
Leaving aside the governmental response to these incidents, regional naval security forces now must demonstrate that they are capable of monitoring and controlling their nation’s territorial waters. For example, after the Galapagos Islands incident, the Ecuadorian Navy carried out naval exercises aimed at combating transnational maritime crimes. The 209/1300 submarine Huancavilca participated in the maneuvers, along with three coast guard vessels and a helicopter. A civilian fishing vessel and crew were also utilized as the target for said maneuvers. Days after the exercises, the Ecuadorian media reported that Huancavilca had departed for the Galapagos Islands to help with patrolling the area against illegal fishing activities.
It is also worth noting that Ecuador and other nations are obtaining new naval platforms, particularly offshore patrol vessels (OPV), to monitor their maritime territory. For example, IHS Jane’s has reported that on 31 July the Argentine government passed a decree “authorizing state credit to finance some of the major defense acquisition programs included in the 2017 budget.” The acquisitions program includes OPVs, Beechcraft T-6C+ Texan II aircraft, among others. It is unclear if the OPV acquisition was motivated by the 2016 incident, but it stands to reason that this incident provided even more evidence that the Argentine Navy requires new platforms for maritime control.
Discussing unauthorized Chinese fishing is complicated as alarmism must be avoided. The incidents between Chinese fishing fleets and security forces in Latin American waters have been few – at least from what has been reported. And apart from the 2016 incident in Argentina, none other has been violent.
Nevertheless, there are a plethora of reports regarding Chinese fleets operating without authorization in Latin America and other parts of the world, particularly in Africa: just this past June, Senegal detained seven Chinese trawlers for illegally fishing in its waters. Moreover, it is correct to assume that these fleets will continue to attempt to operate in Latin American waters in the near future, particularly as domestic demand for maritime resources prompts them to be bolder when it comes to the areas that they travel to. It is also important to mention that not all the fish China captures are for internal consumption, as the Wilson Center’s report “Fishing for Answers” explains: “most of China’s high-value species and about half the overall catch are exported to the EU, the United States, and Japan, and the other half is brought back to China and sold domestically.” (While this article is focusing on illegal fishing by Chinese fleets, we must keep in mind how growing global demand for fish is affecting the fishing industry in general).
Thus one concern looking toward the future is whether there will be more violent confrontations between illegal fishing fleets and security forces given a growing demand for maritime resources. So far, the vessels have either attempted to flee or surrendered to authorities, but the Argentine incident raises the question: would some of these crews one day decide to fight back in order to avoid capture and protect their profit?
Finally, the possible ramifications of future incidents like this must be considered. China is a global economic force, and most nations, including developing nations such as those in Latin America, would not want to take Beijing head on. This is arguably the reason why the incidents mentioned in this article have not somehow evolved into some type of trade or diplomatic crisis. In fact, just this past March, the Argentine government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese company Ali Baba to sell products like wine, meat, and (somewhat ironically) fish. Similarly, in spite of the December 2016 reports about the Chinese fishing fleet in its territorial waters, Chinese-Peruvian trade remains strong as the latest data by the Peruvian government states that trade grew by 30 percent in the first half of 2017 compared to the same period last year.
How Ecuador reacts to this latest incident will be interesting as Quito-Beijing ties are not only strong due to commerce but also on other areas. For example, Ecuador has acquired “709 4×4 and 6×6 multipurpose trucks, 6×4 fuel and water trucks, and different types of buses in a deal reportedly worth USD81 million,” according to IHS Jane’s. On 4 September, Ecuador’s daily El Telegrafo reported that China’s Ministry of Agriculture has proposed the establishment of an “intergovernmental communication mechanism” between Quito and Beijing to “exchange information and jointly protect” maritime resources and crack down on illegal fishing activities. At the time of this writing there have been no reports about how the Ecuadorian government will respond to this proposal but, if previous incidents in other countries are a precedent, the Galapagos Islands incident will probably be minimized in order to protect Quito-Beijing partnerships in other areas.
Demographic growth and scarcer maritime resources are a catalyst for more frequent clashes at sea. In recent years there have been various reports about Chinese fishing fleets operating in international waters and also crossing into a country’s maritime territory to carry out unauthorized fishing activities. The most recent August incident off the Galapagos Islands is another example of this problem, one which has gained prominence in Latin America since the March 2016 incident in Argentina.
New platforms like OPVs will help regional navies to more efficiently patrol their maritime territory and intercept unauthorized fishing fleets in the near future; however this is just half of the equation. The second part is how Latin American governments will adapt their relations (particularly trade) with China since most violating fishing fleets appear to be Chinese. Combating illegal fishing is a complex issue, as it involves modern (and numerous) platforms for surveillance and interception, as well as a skilled judicial system to prosecute the culprits. Adding the future of a country’s relations with China will not make the problem any easier.
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
Featured Image: Ecuadorian Navy photo of intercept of Chinese fishing vessel FU YUAN YU LENG 999.
Most Navy bridge watchstanders have had the experience of adjusting their surface-search radar to eliminate sea clutter or rain. In relation to the task of detecting surface ships, these artifacts represent “noise,” just as when one tunes out unwanted transmissions or static to improve radio communications.
However, information can be gleaned indirectly from unintentionally received signals such as these to yield details about the operating environment, and it may reveal the presence, capabilities, and even intent of an adversary. This “electromagnetic bycatch” is a potential gold mine for the Navy’s information warfare community (IWC) in its drive to achieve battlespace awareness, and represents a largely untapped source of competitive advantage in the Navy’s execution of electromagnetic maneuver warfare (EMW).
The term electromagnetic bycatch describes signals that Navy sensors receive unintentionally. These signals are not the intended target of the sensors and usually are disregarded as noise. This is analogous to the bycatch of the commercial fishing industry, defined as “fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use, and includes economic discards [edible but not commercially viable for the local market] and regulatory discards [prohibited to keep based on species, sex, or size].”1
The amount of fisheries bycatch is significant, with annual global estimates reaching twenty million tons.2 Navy sensor systems also receive a significant volume of bycatch, as evidenced by efforts to drive down false-alarm rates, operator training to recognize and discard artifacts on system displays, and the extensive use of processing algorithms to filter and clean sensor data and extract the desired signal. Noise in the sensor’s internal components may necessitate some of this processing, but many algorithms aim to remove artifacts from outside the sensor (i.e., the sensor is detecting some sort of phenomenon in addition to the targeted one).
U.S. and international efforts are underway to reduce fishing bycatch by using more-selective fishing gear and methods.3 Likewise, there are efforts to reduce electromagnetic bycatch, with modifications to Navy sensors and processing algorithms via new installations, patches, and upgrades. However, it is unlikely that either form of bycatch ever will be eliminated completely. Recognition of this within the fishing industry has given rise to innovative efforts such as Alaska’s “bycatch to food banks” program that allows fishermen to donate their bycatch to feed the hungry instead of discarding it at sea.4 This begs the question: Can the Navy repurpose its electromagnetic bycatch too?
The answer is yes. Navy leaders have called for innovative ideas to help meet twenty-first century challenges, and do to so in a constrained fiscal environment. At the Sea-Air-Space Symposium in 2015, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, then-Chief of Naval Operations, called for the Navy to reuse and repurpose what it already has on hand.5 Past materiel examples include converting ballistic-missile submarines to guided-missile submarines; converting Alaska-class tankers to expeditionary transfer docks (ESDs), then to expeditionary mobile bases (ESBs); and, more recently, repurposing the SM-6 missile from an anti-air to an anti-surface and anti-ballistic missile role.6 However, the Navy needs to go even further, extending this mindset from the materiel world to the realm of raw sensor data to repurpose electromagnetic bycatch.
Over The River and To The Moon
The potential value of bycatch that U.S. fisheries alone discard exceeds one billion dollars annually (for context, the annual U.S. fisheries catch is valued at about five billion dollars).7 Likewise, the Navy previously has found high-value signals in its electromagnetic bycatch.
In 1922, Albert Taylor and Leo Young, two engineers working at the Naval Aircraft Radio Laboratory in Washington, DC, were exploring the use of high-frequency waves as new communication channels for the Navy. They deployed their equipment on the two sides of the Potomac River and observed the communication signals between them. Soon the signals began to fade in and out slowly. The engineers realized that the source of the interference was ships moving past on the river.8 Taylor forwarded a letter to the Bureau of Engineering that described a proposed application of this discovery:
If it is possible to detect, with stations one half mile apart, the passage of a wooden vessel, it is believed that with suitable parabolic reflectors at transmitter and receiver, using a concentrated instead of a diffused beam, the passage of vessels, particularly of steel vessels (warships) could be noted at much greater distances. Possibly an arrangement could be worked out whereby destroyers located on a line a number of miles apart could be immediately aware of the passage of an enemy vessel between any two destroyers in the line, irrespective of fog, darkness or smoke screen. It is impossible to say whether this idea is a practical one at the present stage of the work, but it seems worthy of investigation.9
However, this appeal fell on deaf ears; the idea was not considered worthy of additional study. Later, in 1930, after it was demonstrated that aircraft also could be detected, the newly formed Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) moved forward and developed the early pulsed radio detection systems whose successors are still in use today.10 What started as degradations in radio communication signals (owing to objects blocking the propagation path) evolved to being the signal of interest itself. Today that bycatch is used extensively for revealing the presence of adversaries, navigating safely, and enforcing the speed limit. It is known as RAdio Detection And Ranging, or simply by its acronym: RADAR.
During World War II, Navy radar and radio receivers became increasingly sensitive and began picking up stray signals from around the world. Instead of discarding these signals, the Navy set out to collect them. The NRL Radio Division had been investigating this phenomenon since the mid-1920s, and in 1945 NRL established a Countermeasures Branch, which had an interest in gathering random signals arriving via these “anomalous propagation” paths.11 By 1947, it had erected antennas at its Washington, DC, field site to intercept anomalous signals from Europe and the Soviet Union.12 Just the year before, the Army Signal Corps had detected radio waves bounced off the moon. The convergence of these events set the stage for one of the most innovative operations of the Cold War.
NRL engineer James Trexler, a member of the Countermeasures Branch, advocated exploiting the moon-bounce phenomenon for electronic intelligence (ELINT). He outlined his idea in a 1948 notebook entry:
From the RCM [Radio Counter Measures] point of view this system hold[s] promise as a communication and radar intercept device for signals that cannot be studied at close range where normal propagation is possible. It might be well to point out that many radars are very close to the theoretical possibility of contacting the Moon (the MEW [actually BMEWS, for Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] for example) and hence the practicability of building a system capable of intercepting these systems by reflections from the Moon is not beyond the realm of possibility.13
Trexler’s idea addressed a particular intelligence gap, namely the parameters of air- and missile-defense radars located deep within the Soviet border. With an understanding of these parameters, the capabilities of the systems could be inferred. This was information of strategic importance. As friendly ground and airborne collection systems could not achieve the required proximity to intercept these particular radar signals, the moon-bounce method provided a way ahead. All that was required was for both the Soviet radar and the distant collection site to have the moon in view at the same time. What followed were NRL’s Passive Moon Relay experiments (known as PAMOR) and ultimately the Intelligence Community’s Moon Bounce ELINT program, which enjoyed long success at collecting intelligence on multiple Soviet systems.14
Around this time, the Navy grew concerned about ionospheric disturbances that affected long-range communications.15 So the service employed the new moon-bounce propagation path to yield another Navy capability, the communications moon relay. This enabled reliable communications between Washington, DC, and Hawaii, and later the capability to communicate to ships at sea.16 Thus, what started as bycatch led to a search for the sources of stray signals, revealed adversary air- and missile-defense capabilities, and ultimately led to new communications capabilities for the Navy.
Extracting the Electromagnetic Terrain
Signals in the electromagnetic spectrum do not propagate in straight lines. Rather, they refract or bend on the basis of their frequency and variations in the atmospheric properties of humidity, temperature, and pressure. Signals can encounter conditions that direct them upward into space, bend them downward over the horizon, or trap them in ducts that act as wave guides. Knowing this electromagnetic terrain is critical to success in EMW, and can prove instrumental in countering adversary anti-access/area-denial capabilities.
Variation in electromagnetic propagation paths can lead to shortened or extended radar and communications ranges. Depending on the mission and the situation, this can be an advantage or a vulnerability. Shortened ranges may lead to holes or blind spots in radar coverage. This information could drive a decision for an alternate laydown of forces to mitigate these blind spots. It also could aid spectrum management, allowing multiple users of the same frequency to operate in closer proximity without affecting one another. Alternatively, extended radar ranges can allow one to “see” farther, pushing out the range at which one can detect, classify, and identify contacts. Signals of interest could be collected from more distant emitters. However, the adversary also can take advantage of extended ranges and detect friendly forces at a greater distance via radar, or passively collect friendly emissions. Identifying this situation could prompt one to sector, reduce power, or secure the emitter.
As the weather constantly changes, so too does signal propagation and the resultant benefit or vulnerability. Understanding these effects is critical to making informed decisions on managing emitters and balancing sensor coverage against the signature presented to the adversary. However, all these applications rely on sufficient meteorological data, which typically is sparse in space and time. More frequent and more distributed atmospheric sampling would give the U.S. Navy more-complete awareness of changing conditions and increase its competitive advantage.
Luckily, Navy radar sensors already collect a meteorological bycatch. Normally it is filtered out as noise, but emerging systems can extract it. The Hazardous Weather Detection and Display Capability (HWDDC) is a system that takes a passive tap from the output of the SPS-48 air-search radar (located on most big-deck amphibious ships and carriers) and repurposes it like a Doppler weather radar.17 Besides providing real-time weather information to support operations and flight safety, it can stream data to the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center in Monterey, California, to feed atmospheric models. With this data, the models can generate better weather forecasts and drive electromagnetic propagation models for prediction of radar and communications-system performance.18 The Tactical Environmental Processor (TEP) will perform the same function by extracting atmospheric data from the SPY-1 radar.19
By passively using the existing radar feeds, HWDDC and TEP provide new capabilities while avoiding additional requirements for power, space, frequency deconfliction, and overall system integration that would be associated with adding a new radar, antenna, or weather sensor. There also is the potential to extract refractivity data from the radar returns of sea clutter.20 The multitude of radar platforms in the Navy’s inventory represents an untapped opportunity to conduct “through the sensor” environmental data collection in support of battlespace awareness.
Likewise, the Global Positioning System (GPS) also collects meteorological bycatch. As GPS signals pass through the atmosphere, they are affected by the presence of water vapor, leading to errors in positioning. The receiver or processing software makes corrections, modeling the water vapor effect to compensate, thereby obtaining accurate receiver positions. However, water vapor is a key meteorological variable. If the receiver location is already known, the error can be analyzed to extract information about the water vapor, and by using multiple receivers, its three-dimensional distribution can be reconstructed.21 Instead of dumping the bycatch of water vapor, it can be (and is) assimilated into numerical weather prediction models for improved short-range (three-, six-, and twelve-hour) precipitation forecasts.22
Do Not Adjust Your Set
There is also great potential to harvest bycatch from routine broadcast signals. While a traditional radar system emits its own pulse of energy that bounces back to indicate the presence of an object, passive systems take advantage of signals already present in the environment, such as television and radio broadcasts or even signals from cell towers or GPS.23 These signals propagate, encounter objects, and reflect off. This leads to the “multipath effect,” in which a transmitted signal bounces off different objects, then arrives at the same receiver at slightly different times owing to the varied distances traveled. (This is what used to cause the “ghost” effect on television, in which an old image seemed to remain on screen momentarily even as the new image was displayed.) Variations in this effect can be used to infer the presence or movement of an object that was reflecting the signals.
In a related concept, “multistatic” systems collect these reflections with multiple, geographically separated receivers, then process the signals to detect, locate, and track these objects in real time.24 These systems have proved effective. In a 2002 demonstration, Lockheed Martin’s Silent Sentry system tracked all the air traffic over Washington, DC, using only FM radio and television signal echoes.25 More recently, another passive system went beyond simple tracking and actually classified a contact as a small, single-propeller aircraft by using ambient FM radio signals to determine its propeller rotation rate.26 This level of detail, combined with maneuvering behavior, operating profiles, and deviations from associated pattern-of-life trends, could even give clues to adversary intent.
Passive radar systems have many advantages. They emit no energy of their own, which increases their survivability because they do not reveal friendly platform location and are not susceptible to anti-radiation weapons. They do not add to a crowded spectrum, nor do they need to be deconflicted from other systems because of electromagnetic interference. The receivers can be mounted on multiple fixed or mobile platforms. Technological advances in processing and computing power have taken much of the guesswork out of using passive systems by automating correlation and identification. Moving forward, there is great potential to leverage radar-like passive detection systems.
That being said, operators of the passive radar systems described may require extensive training to achieve proficiency. Even though the systems are algorithm- and processing-intensive, they may require a significant level of operator interaction to select the best signals to use and to reconfigure the network of receivers continually, particularly in a dynamic combat environment when various broadcasts begin to go offline. Likewise, the acquisition, distribution, placement, and management of the many receivers for multistatic systems (and their associated communications links) is a fundamental departure from the traditional employment of radar, and will require new concepts of operations and doctrine for employment and optimization. These efforts could be informed by ongoing work or lessons learned from the surface warfare community’s “distributed lethality” concept, which also involves managing dispersed platforms and capabilities.27
Challenges and Opportunities
Among the services, the Navy in particular has the potential to gain much from harvesting the electromagnetic bycatch. During war or peace, the Navy operates forward around the world, providing it unique access to many remote locations that are particularly sparse on data. Use of ships provides significant dwell time on station without requiring basing rights. Navy platforms tend to be sensor intensive, and so provide the means for extensive data collection. This extends from automated, routine meteorological observations that feed near-term forecasts and long-term environmental databases to preconflict intelligence-gathering applications that include mapping out indigenous signals for passive systems to use later.28 The mobility of Navy platforms allows for multiple units to be brought to bear, scaling up the effect to create increased capacity when necessary.
However, there are many challenges to overcome. The Navy soon may find itself “swimming in sensors and drowning in data”; managing this information will require careful consideration.29 Returning to the fishing analogy, to avoid wasting bycatch fishermen need to identify what they have caught in their nets, find someone who can use it, temporarily store it, transport it back to port, and get it to the customer before it spoils. Likewise, the Navy needs to dig into the sensor data and figure out exactly what extra information it has gathered, identify possible applications, determine how to store it, transfer it to customers, and exploit it while it is still actionable.
This hinges most on the identification of electromagnetic bycatch in the first place. As automation increases, sensor feeds should be monitored continuously for anomalies. Besides serving to notify operators when feeds are running outside normal parameters, such anomalous data streams should be archived and analyzed periodically by the scientists and engineers of the relevant systems command (SYSCOM) to determine the presence, nature, and identity of unexpected signals. Once a signal is identified, the SYSCOM team would need to cast a wide net to determine whether the signal has a possible application, with priority given to satisfying existing information needs, intelligence requirements, and science and technology objectives.30
History has shown that this is a nontrivial task; remember that the original discovery and proposed application of radar were dismissed. If the unplanned signal is determined to have no current use, it should be noted for possible future exploitation. Subsequent sensor upgrades, algorithm improvements, and software patches then should strive to eliminate the signal from future incidental collection. If there is potential value in the incidental signal, upgrades, algorithms, and patches should optimize its continued reception along with the original signal via the same sensor, or possibly even demonstrate a requirement for a new sensor optimized for the new signal. The identified uses for the electromagnetic bycatch will drive the follow-on considerations of what and how much data to store for later exploitation and what data needs to be offloaded immediately within the limited bandwidth owing to its value or time sensitivity.
The analogy to fisheries bycatch also raises a regulatory aspect. Much as a fisherman may find that he has caught a prohibited catch (possibly even an endangered species) that he cannot retain, the same holds true for electromagnetic bycatch. It is possible that an incidental signal might reveal information about U.S. citizens or entities. Once the signal is identified, intelligence oversight (IO) requirements would drive subsequent actions. Navy IO programs regulate all Navy intelligence activities, operations, and programs, ensuring that they function in compliance with applicable U.S. laws, directives, and policies.31 IO requirements likely would force the SYSCOM to alter the sensor’s mode of operation or develop upgrades, algorithms, and patches to avoid future collection of the signal.
The Role of the Information Warfare Community
The Navy’s IWC is ideally suited to play a key role in responding to these challenges. Its personnel have experience across the diverse disciplines of intelligence, cryptology, electronic warfare, meteorology and oceanography (METOC), communications, and space operations, and assembling these different viewpoints might reveal instances in which one group can use another’s bycatch for a completely different application. IWC officers now come together to make connections and exchange expertise in formal settings such as the Information Warfare Basic Course and the Information Warfare Officer Milestone and Department Head Course. Further cross-pollination is increasing owing to the cross-detailing of officers among commands of different designators. Recent reorganization of carrier strike group staffs under the Information Warfare Commander construct has increased and institutionalized collaboration in operational settings. Restructuring has trickled down even to the platform level, where, for example, the METOC division has been realigned under the Intelligence Department across the carrier force. As a net result of these changes, the IWC has a unique opportunity to have new eyes looking at the flows of sensor data, providing warfighter perspectives in addition to the SYSCOM sensor review described above.
The Navy also can capitalize on the collective IWC’s extensive experience and expertise with issues pertaining to data collection, processing, transport, bandwidth management, archiving, and exploitation. Furthermore, the different components of the IWC share a SYSCOM (the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, or SPAWAR); a resource sponsor (OPNAV N2/N6); a type commander (Navy Information Forces); a warfighting-development center (the Navy Information Warfighting Development Center); and a training group (the Navy Information Warfare Training Group will be established by the end of 2017). This positions the IWC to collaborate across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. This will support shared ideas and unified approaches regarding the employment of emerging capabilities such as the machine-learning and “big-data” analytics that will sift through future electromagnetic bycatch. Ultimately, the members of the IWC can forge a unified way forward to develop the next generation of sensors, data assimilators, and processors.
While the Navy might not recognize exactly what it has, its sensors are collecting significant amounts of electromagnetic bycatch. The Navy’s forward presence positions it to collect volumes of unique data with untold potential. The associated electromagnetic bycatch is being used now, previously has yielded game-changing capabilities, and could do so again with future applications. Instead of stripping and discarding it during data processing, the Navy needs to take an objective look at what it can salvage and repurpose to gain competitive advantage. The fishing bycatch dumped every year could feed millions of people; the Navy needs to use its electromagnetic bycatch to feed new capabilities. Don’t dump it!
Tim McGeehan is a U.S. Navy Officer currently serving in Washington.
The ideas presented are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.
 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (2) (1976), available at www.law.cornell.edu/.
 United Nations, International Guidelines on Bycatch Management and Reduction of Discards (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011), p. 2, available at www.fao.org/.
 Ibid., p. 13; Lee R. Benaka et al., eds., U.S. National Bycatch Report First Edition Update 1 (Silver Spring, MD: NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, December 2013), available at www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/.
 Laine Welch, “Gulf Bycatch Will Help Feed the Hungry,” Alaska Dispatch News, June 4, 2011, www.adn.com/; Laine Welch, “Bycatch to Food Banks Outgrows Its Beginnings,” Alaska Fish Radio, August 3, 2016, www.alaskafishradio.com/.
 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Tablets & Tomahawks: Navy, Marines Scramble to Innovate,” Breaking Defense, April 13, 2015, breakingdefense.com/.
 Sam Lagrone, “SECDEF Carter Confirms Navy Developing Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile for Cruisers, Destroyers,” USNI News, February 4, 2016, news.usni.org/; Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Conducts SM-6 MRBM Intercept Test,” news release, December 14, 2016, www.mda.mil/.
 Amanda Keledjian et al., “Wasted Cash: The Price of Waste in the U.S. Fishing Industry,” Oceana (2014), p. 1, available at oceana.org/.
 David Kite Allison, New Eye for the Navy: The Origin of Radar at the Naval Research Laboratory, NRL Report 8466 (Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory, 1981), p. 39, available at www.dtic.mil/.
 Ibid, p. 40.
 “Development of the Radar Principle,” U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, n.d., www.nrl.navy.mil/.
 David K. van Keuren, “Moon in Their Eyes: Moon Communication Relay at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1951–1962,” in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew J. Butrica (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1995), available at history.nasa.gov/.
 Frank Eliot, “Moon Bounce ELINT,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 2, 1996, www.cia.gov/.
 Van Keuren, “Moon in Their Eyes.”
 Pennsylvania State Univ., From the Sea to the Stars: A Chronicle of the U.S. Navy’s Space and Space-Related Activities, 1944–2009 (State College, PA: Applied Research Laboratory, 2010), available at edocs.nps.edu/; Van Keuren, “Moon in Their Eyes.”
 SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific, “Hazardous Weather Detection & Display Capability (HWDDC),” news release, n.d., www.public.navy.mil/; Timothy Maese et al., “Hazardous Weather Detection and Display Capability for US Navy Ships” (paper presented at the 87th annual meeting of the American Meteorological Society, San Antonio, TX, January 16, 2007), available at ams.confex.com/.
 Tim Maese and Randy Case, “Extracting Weather Data from a Hybrid PAR” (presentation, Second National Symposium on Multifunction Phased Array Radar, Norman, OK, November 18, 2009), available at bcisensors.com/.
 Richard B. Langley, “Innovation: Better Weather Prediction Using GPS,” GPS World, July 1, 2010, gpsworld.com/.
 Steven Businger, “Applications of GPS in Meteorology” (presentation, CGSIC Regional Meeting, Honolulu, HI, June 23–24, 2009), available at www.gps.gov/; Tracy Lorraine Smith et al., “Short-Range Forecast Impact from Assimilation of GPS-IPW Observations into the Rapid Update Cycle,” Monthly Weather Review 135 (August 2007), available at journals.ametsoc.org/; Hans-Stefan Bauer et al., “Operational Assimilation of GPS Slant Path Delay Measurements into the MM5 4DVAR System,” Tellus A 63 (2011), available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.
 Lockheed Martin Corp., “Lockheed Martin Announces ‘Silent Sentry(TM)’ Surveillance System; Passive System Uses TV-Radio Signals to Detect, Track Airborne Objects,” PR Newswire, October 12, 1998, www.prnewswire.com/; Otis Port, “Super-Radar, Done Dirt Cheap,” Bloomberg, October 20, 2003, www.bloomberg.com/.
 Lockheed Martin Corp., “Silent Sentry: Innovative Technology for Passive, Persistent Surveillance,” news release, 2005, available at www.mobileradar.org/.
 Port, “Super-Radar, Done Dirt Cheap.”
 F. D. V. Maasdorp et al., “Simulation and Measurement of Propeller Modulation Using FM Broadcast Band Commensal Radar,” Electronics Letters 49, no. 23 (November 2013), pp. 1481–82, available at ieeexplore.ieee.org/.
 Thomas Rowden [Vice Adm., USN], Peter Gumataotao [Rear Adm., USN], and Peter Fanta [Rear Adm., USN], “Distributed Lethality,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141/1/1,343 (January 2015), available at www.usni.org/.
 Stew Magnuson, “Military ‘Swimming in Sensors and Drowning in Data,’” National Defense, January 2010; www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/.
 U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Science and Technology Strategy: Innovations for the Future Force (Arlington, VA: Office of Naval Research, 2015), available at www.navy.mil/.
 “Intelligence Oversight Division,” Department of the Navy, Office of Inspector General, n.d., www.secnav.navy.mil/.
Featured Image: ARABIAN GULF (March 4, 2016) Electronics Technician 3rd Class Jordan Issler conducts maintenance on a radar aboard aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Justin R. Pacheco/Released)
Michael Green’s latest contribution to the field of strategic studies is, first and foremost, a history. By More Than Providence (Columbia University Press, 2017), the first comprehensive history of U.S. statecraft in the Asia-Pacific since Tyler Dennett’s Americans in Eastern Asia (1922), is a much-needed attempt to answer the question: can the U.S. have a grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific? Green does this by asking whether the U.S. has ever had a grand strategy in this region.
Green concludes that U.S. grand strategy may have been “episodic and inefficient,” but not only does it exist, “in the aggregate[,] it has been effective.” Furthermore, he argues, whether or not the U.S. was able to “[muster] the willpower, focus, and resources to prevail when access to an open order in the region [had] been fundamentally challenged” depended not on the U.S.’s “preponderance of power,” but on “[U.S.] leaders’ clarity of purpose and deliberate identification of ends, ways, and means.” He reaches this conclusion through 15 superbly well-researched chapters.
American Strategy In Asia
Beginning from the 1780s to the present day, each chapter is similarly structured, opening with the introduction of the main cast of characters in the administration under study. Green tastefully offers vignettes of each individual, covering a range of information that shaped the individual’s worldview in policy-relevant ways, whether it is where the statesman grew up, what schools the statesman attended, or what religion they practiced. Each chapter also delivers solid overviews of the interpersonal and interagency dynamics that facilitated – or hindered – the administration’s ability to craft and implement a coherent grand strategy.
From there, Green delves into the narrative of events, interspersed with surveys of what other historians have had to say on the subject, sharing insights from classics, such as David Halberstam’s The Best and Brightest on the Vietnam War, to the most cutting-edge research, including Rana Mitter’s Forgotten Ally on the Sino-Japanese War.
But the book’s real strength is in each chapter’s concluding evaluation of the effectiveness of the administration under study’s grand strategy. 548 pages of this sweeping history is thematically tied together by the five “tensions” that Green identifies and traces over time.
The five tensions in U.S. grand strategy are: Europe versus Asia; continental (China) versus maritime (Japan); forward defense versus Pacific depth; self-determination versus universal values; and protectionism versus free trade. Green does not leave readers guessing how these tensions ought to be resolved – he forcefully advocates for a U.S. grand strategy that appreciates the preeminence of Asia in world affairs, elevates the importance of the U.S. relationship with Japan, does not allow for any retreat, loudly proclaims the ultimate triumph of democratic values, and vigorously pursues an open trading order.
Though unapologetically realist while critiquing administrations that failed to understand the hard logic of balance of power, Green also brings a nuanced appreciation of the importance of ideas to the table.
For example, while Green praises Theodore Roosevelt for “[achieving] an effective balance of realism and idealism,” he faults the “blatant hypocrisy” of the U.S.’s position in Asia during Roosevelt and William McKinley’s administration. McKinley annexed Hawaii over the opposition of native Hawaiians, and Guam and Samoa went decades without self-government. The U.S.’s repression of Filipinos fighting for independence also hurt the U.S.’s image as a democracy promoter. As such, “the anti-imperialist tradition in American political culture created a vulnerable center of gravity that could be targeted by insurgents – as Ho Chi Minh did to great effect six decades later.”
Green credits Woodrow Wilson for being on the “right side of history” for recognizing the Republic of China and setting the Philippines on course for independence, noting that the problem was not with Wilson’s push for such ideals, but pushing for such ideals in a unilateral and piecemeal manner that left Asian leaders ranging from Yoshinda Shigeru to Ho Chi Minh disillusioned with “American moral leadership.”
The U.S. fared less well under Dwight Eisenhower, when the U.S. could only be “reactive and ineffective” due to a failure to understand the power of ideas – of the nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment sweeping the region. A division soon emerged in Japan policy, between those policymakers who wanted a Japan that was “liberal but neutral” and those who saw Japan as “a critical asset in the struggle against the Soviet Union.” Though the immediate postwar era saw the first group ascendant, the priority gradually shifted towards fostering Japan’s economic growth to bolster Japan’s own defense. While the U.S. never gave up its goal of remaking Japan as a democracy, and in this, achieved some success, the U.S.’s Japan policy during this period was characterized by the sobering recognition that Japan’s security was tied to access to its former imperial spaces in Korea and Southeast Asia.
In his effusive praise for Reagan, Green highlights Reagan’s ability to “fuse interests and ideals; to focus on strengthening the institutions of freedom rather than just weakening the hold of authoritarian leaders; to ensure that allies were better governed at home so that they would be more resilient against imperialism from abroad; and to stay on the right side of history.” While Reagan had come into office a critic of Jimmy Carter’s human rights-focused approach, at least in Asia, Reagan found himself increasingly supporting democratization of key allies – such as South Korea and the Philippines.
Speaking of the George W. Bush administration, in which Green served on the National Security Council (2001-05), he raises the examples of the U.S. response to crises in Nepal, Vietnam, and Burma to argue that “We saw no contradiction between American idealism and self-interest.” He is harsh, but articulately so, on the Obama administration for signaling that violations of human rights and democratic principles would not impose costs on the violator’s relationship with the U.S. And this, perhaps, ought to concern us most about the current U.S. administration’s Asia policy (or more accurately, lack thereof).
Strategic Themes from the Current Administration
Donald Trump dismayed human rights advocates when a leaked transcript of his call with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte showed that he had made remarks praising Duterte’s controversial and violent war on drugs, which has killed more than 7,000 Filipinos. Trump said to Duterte: “I just wanted to congratulate you because I am hearing of the unbelievable job on the drug problem. Many countries have the problem, we have a problem, but what a great job you are doing and I just wanted to call and tell you that.” The call ended with an open-ended invitation to the Oval Office.
Similarly, Trump’s invitation to Thai Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who came to a power in a military coup, is causing consternation. Though Prayuth had initially promised elections in late 2014, they are unlikely to be held until 2018 at the earliest. Even when the elections are held, democratic government will be diminished as the new constitution provides a role for the junta in the unelected upper house, investing it with authority to invoke emergency powers, and restricts the power of the elected lower house. Politicians and activists have been detained, and Amnesty International scrapped a planned report on torture after receiving threats from the police.
The lack of contact between Trump and Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi is unsettling for the opposite reason – because Myanmarhas been taking steps towards democratization. While concerns about Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence on the abuses and atrocities directed against Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State are valid, Myanmar is a successful case of U.S. engagement encouraging democratization. If Trump does not reach out to Aung San Suu Kyi, offering continued U.S. support despite the bumps on the road toward democratization, we could easily see Myanmar falling back into Beijing’s orbit. The pattern that emerges under the new administration is not a pretty one.
This is not to say that the U.S. had a perfect, or even remotely perfect, track record on the issue before Donald Trump. Historically, the U.S. has condoned extrajudicial killings and violations of democratic principles when it meant advancing U.S. security interests. Morally, the U.S. is reaching bankruptcy – both abroad and domestically. But that is no excuse to stop pushing for the democratic ideals that the U.S. professes.
Balance of power is the hard logic that has most often led to success in crafting U.S. grand strategy in the region. It disciplined resource allocation, and focused U.S. leaders on the appropriate opportunities. The U.S. doesn’t have a perfect track record when it comes to upholding ideals, and its credibility is declining in the region. However, in the present day, as the U.S. becomes stretched thinner, it must consider how it can best utilize non-material sources of power – such as ideals and principles – to pursue its objectives as well.
In the coming decades, our alliances will only become more important to dissuade a challenge by the rising hegemon. Japan, South Korea, Australia – all our allies and partners want the U.S. to stay engaged not only because of the U.S.’s capabilities to balance China, but also because they inherently prefer the U.S. as a partner because of what the U.S. has stood for as the world’s first democracy. If the U.S. wants to remain the preferred partner of states that will help us balance against China, the U.S. also needs to take a position in the balance of ideas shaping Asia today.
Mina Pollmann’s research interests focus on Japan’s security and diplomacy, U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. She received her Bachelor’s from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and will be beginning her PhD studies at MIT’s Department of Political Science this fall. She also writes for The Diplomat’sTokyo Report. Follow her on Twitter @MinaPollmann.
Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 10, 2010) U.S. Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) ships underway in formation as part of a photo exercise on the final day of Keen Sword 2011. The exercise enhances the Japan-U.S. alliance which remains a key strategic relationship in the Northeast Asia Pacific region. Keen Sword caps the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. alliance as an “alliance of equals.” (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jacob D. Moore/Released)