Tag Archives: EEZ

Philippine Navy Frigate Program: An OPV by Any Other Name?

By Armando J. Heredia

The Philippine Navy has unveiled bidding specifications to purchase it’s first new major surface combatant in several decades. Titled “Frigate Acquisition Program,” this key milestone of the Capability Upgrade Program will reorient the nation’s military from decades of COIN operations and enable a credible defense against conventionally-armed opponents.

090906-N-0120R-068A closer look at the program’s bid specifications along with missions that are likely to be met by the platform, reflects the balancing act between cost and capability that all naval forces must perform when seeking mid-to-low assets. Is it really a frigate that they’re looking for? Or is it more of a corvette? Or even an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)?

It’s worth noting that at a functional view, the distinctions today between frigates, corvettes and OPVs are subtle; and in most cases, the label used is more about political expediency than clear-cut delineations about capabilities. For purposes of this article, an OPV leans towards enforcement or constabulary duties as opposed to being a dedicated combatant vessel, with a minimal weapons fit necessary to fulfill it’s function.

A Philippine Navy Desired Force Mix paper published in 2012 identified gaps in several operational specialties including Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW); roles traditionally filled by frigates and corvettes. The bid specifications at a high level paint a picture of a multi-role combatant with embarked helicopter that meets both those capabilities, plus a moderate surface warfare punch.

However, a closer look at the requirements calls into question if the program is really seeking a frigate:

  • Perform Economic Zone Protection Roles
  • Operate up to Sea State 6
  • Operational Range of 4,500 nautical miles @ 15 knots
  • 30 Days Endurance
  • Minimum upper speed of 25 knots

Starting at the top, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) specification combined with high endurance and rough sea-state handling gives signals that we’re looking more at a patrol vessel for primary use. The contemporary history of spats with China over the resource-rich Shoals and the Spratlys is a stark reminder that asserting claims in the maritime space is one of the Philippine’s political drivers for modernization. Currently, the Navy has only two vessels capable of sustained operations to the edges of the EEZ; namely the newly acquired High-Endurance Cutters (WHEC) from the U.S. Coast Guard. It’s logical that follow-on ships would enhance those same patrol and presence operations.

The lower speed range (most combatants top out at 30+ knots), large operating radius, modest cruise rate and long endurance time reinforce the idea of patrol rather than dedicated offensive operations. While a specific propulsion type is not mentioned, one of the reasons the Philippines did not leverage wide availability of gas-turbine ships in the used defense market is a concern for their high fuel consumption rates. That may be explained in some part by the doubling of the Navy’s Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants (POL) expenditure; seeming to coincide with the initial operating year of the gas-powered Hamilton WHECs. While the cutters by themselves cannot be the sole cause, it’s a reminder that with new acquisitions comes a increased overhead – there are no free lunches. Gas-turbine plants are also a novelty, having been introduced to the Fleet only on the WHECs – and an older model to boot. Given all that, it’s likely that the winning bid will be diesel-based. This is also a characteristic of patrol vessels, prioritizing fuel efficiency and a greater operating range while trading off reduced speeds for sprints, evasive maneuvers and transits.

Other aspects to consider:

  • Embarked helicopter and rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) facilities, including full hangar space for the aviation asset
  • Accommodations for special warfare or other occupants
  • Selection of a 2D air search radar and Electro-Optical (EO) sensors
  • A quadruple Surface-to-Air (SAM) launcher with infrared or semi-active homing missiles (5km minimum range)
  • Two dual-box Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Launchers (total of four missiles, 50 km minimum range)
  • 76mm main gun
  • One (1) secondary stabilized gun

Again, some subtle differences delineate this vessel’s requirements from a pure combat craft. Helos and RHIBs are common to both ship types – force multipliers that enable presence, intelligence-gathering and and if needed, kinetic reach well beyond the ship’s limits. Conversely, they can also be used for search-and-rescue (SAR) and law enforcement. A possible supporting indicator is whether the winning bid uses ramps versus davits. The latter method is more versatile and enables SAR operations in rougher seas that would swamp a ramp-equipped ship. The additional accommodations, while noted for special warfare detachments, can also double as holding areas for refugees, survivors or detainees.

When selecting a sensor suite for a frigate, there are no advantages to having a 2D radar versus a more capable 3D radar that facilitates, among other things, effective anti-air warfare. Coupled with the minimal SAM armament that is purely defensive in capability, this cannot be one of the ships meeting the AAW role. The under specification of the SSMs (eight missiles are nominally found on most warships) is another indicator of the balance between versatility and weapons fit, potentially indicating that deckspace is either at a premium or needs to be freed for other purposes. The 76mm main gun leverages operational and maintenance commonality, as the Oto-Melara is present on other ships in the fleet. It is also just about the largest caliber that can be found on patrol vessels. No explicit Close-In Weapons System, a staple in modern warfare against missile-equipped opponents, is another tell. Very rarely are OPVs armed with last-ditch defense systems, and their secondary gun is usually a slower-firing weapon in the 20-35mm range rather than high-speed multi-barrelled Phalanxes or GoalKeepers.

Of the eleven prospective bidders, what are some of the offerings that might fit? The tight budget requirement really drives baselines to be a small hull, likely accompanied by a custom sensor/weapons fit that may not tick all the boxes.

Navatia’s Avante 1800 is an excellent candidate, ticking and in most cases, exceeding the requirement checkboxes. South Korea could be sitting pretty, as the pending sale of FA-50 fighters could put them at the top of the list to leverage same-source efficiencies. But it will take a lot of corner-cutting to get Hyundai’s Incheon-class frigate down-specified to fit the bill. While not in the prospective bidders list, other close alternatives are BAE’s Amazonas-class OPV, and ST Marine’s Fearless baseline platform. Other alternatives may be immediately disqualified on the basis that they must be “proven vessels,” – i.e., previous successful sales of the platform in the past ten years.

Given the short period that has passed since publication of the technical specifications, it’s not surprising that the bidding deadline moved to the end of November, granting interested parties more time to build competitive proposals. Of all the hurdles they face, the one that may be most daunting is the projected total budget of roughly USD400 Million for both units plus integrated logistics support. The situation is further complicated by the notorious 2-Stage Bid Process that has derailed previous acquisition programs.

A term that will likely puzzle and frustrate the bid analysis is “Fitted for but not with” – meaning, “yes, we’d like to have Feature X, but if your bid doesn’t have it, it might still be okay and we might actually have the money for it but we can’t tell you right now.” It’s a very big symptom of the program’s tone of uncertainty. If no changes are issued to the technical specifications, then only pre-bid Q&A will enable prospective companies to tailor their offerings.

The program could quickly run out of steam if winning bids don’t emerge. If that happens, the bid process resets with accompanying waiting periods. Several factors are lining up that would make such delays to a successful signed contract fatal. For starters, the monies allocated will need to eventually be reset if not spent, requiring passage again through an already lengthy and onerous legislative process. President Benigno Aquino III’s term will end in 2016, and there is no guarantee that the following administration will be as supportive of military modernization. Finally, there is growing call for a rejection of purchases that are not addressing immediate security needs such as the Sabah and Zamboanga crises. Assuming a bid makes it past, they will still have to reckon with Stage 2, where potentially something as small as a documentation omission or error could force a reset back to the beginning as well.

To succeed, the Frigate Acquisition Program needs to move away from a minimums-only approach on technical specifications. A Request-for-Proposal that states minimums exclusively will beget minimums – driving the bidders to a cost-sensitive solution. By emphasizing what this platform really should excel at (i.e., surface warfare or AAW), this gives maneuvering room for the suppliers to build in additional selling points under the bottom line. This gives the Philippine Navy a solution that should satisfy cost limitations and deliver the most value.

Armando J. Heredia is a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Indonesia’s Strategic Flexibility

This post was cross-posted by permission from The Security Scholar and is republished with permission. It may be read in its original form here.

By Natalie Sambhi

Brad Nelson has a neat overview in the Jakarta Globe earlier this month of Indonesia’s strategic options vis-à-vis China and the U.S. Enabled by what he calls ‘strategic flexibility’ (which I think is actually an extension of Indonesia’s so-called ‘dynamic equilibrium’ approach), Indonesia can stay neutral, pick China or the U.S., be a mediator/conduit or play the big kids off against one another.

Natuna Islands
                            The disputed Natuna Islands

Nelson rightly identifies Indonesia as attempting to pursue a ‘conduit’-type role. In fact, to be an effective conduit and exert real influence on the U.S. and China, Nelson prescribes Indonesia build goodwill as a conflict mediator and regional problem-solver.

In theory, it’s a sensible option but I have my misgivings about how it’s presented in relatively unproblematic terms. I say this because I’m reminded of comments made at a recent workshop by a participant challenging Indonesia’s image as a neutral party in South China Sea disputes. They asked, how could Indonesia be a legitimate mediator if it refuses mediation itself on issues such as the Natuna Islands?

Not being an expert on Indonesia’s territorial disputes, I dug up some of I Made Andi Arsana’s writing to work out how much of an issue Natuna is. Arsana’s overview of the history around the Natuna Island EEZ reveals a complicated picture (excerpt):

On the other hand, China seems to have a different view. In 2010, for example, Chinese fishermen were caught fishing in waters off the Natuna Islands, which Indonesia unilaterally considers as part of its EEZ. When patrolling Indonesian officers approached to arrest the vessels, a large Chinese vessel arrived and demanded that the vessels be released.

This gives the impression that the fishing vessels were guarded by a large vessel known as the “Chinese fishery administration vessel”. It can be inferred that China has extended its maritime claim up to the area that Indonesia believes to be its.

The aforementioned incident implies that Indonesia is not totally free from the SCS conflict.

Nelson approach isn’t incorrect but it requires more detail than its current form to be a true representation of Indonesia’s strategic options. It might be strengthened by addressing questions about China–Indonesia strategic relations, found in other writings of Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Greta Nabbs-Keller, to name a few. With reports earlier this year of the Indonesian navy on alert for possible Chinese claims to Natuna waters, it seems like this isn’t over yet.

Natalie Sambhi is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, editor of The Strategist and co-editor of Security Scholar. She is also a Hedley Bull Scholar and graduate of the Australian National University.

Europa Universalis at Sea – Strategizing Gibraltar

Royal Navy destroyer HMS Dauntless, the Spanish navy air defense frigate Almirante Juan de Borbon operate together
Royal Navy destroyer HMS Dauntless (D33) and Spanish navy air defense frigate Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102) operating together.

Following Kyle Mizokami’s own shot at war simulation, I apply the exercise to European waters by focusing on a potential clash over Gibraltar.

Much has been written about the so-called frozen conflicts of Eastern Europe but few pay attention to the crystallized conflicts of Western Europe.  There are border disputes between Portugal and Spain, Spain and Morocco, France and Italy, Ireland and the UK, Netherlands and Germany, Serbia and many of the post-Yugoslav republics, etc.  Perhaps the one that most often elicits media attention is Gibraltar – with rival claims by the UK and Spain unresolved to this day.

Periodically clashes occur between British and Spanish forces in the territorial waters (with 28 Spanish ‘incursions’ in Jan alone) – and more rarely in the land border crossing – of ‘the rock’.  This article addresses from a military perspective the potential for conflict as well as the likely outcome of one.

Imminent War?

Is there a threat of imminent war?  In short the answer is a resounding ‘no’.  Using the Falklands conflict as analogy one can conclude that Gibraltar is not as economically important as the Falklands – with its fishing banks, a large EEZ and potential oil and gas reserves – and Spain is not as politically populist as Argentina – whose politicians are ever-tempted to use the Falklands as a ‘rally to the flag’ instrument in times of economic downturn.  Nor is Gibraltar that far from Great-Britain and hence as strategically vulnerable.  Then there are the catastrophic diplomatic and political consequences of a conflict between two EU and NATO member-states, and the underlining fact that Madrid is much more militarily on par with London than Buenos Aires could ever hope to be in the foreseeable future – the UK spends around $60 billion ($17 billion goes to the Royal Navy) to Spain’s $14 billion ($2 billion goes to the Armada) in their respective militaries, but both spend far more than Argentina’s meager $3 billion in overall military expenditure.

Descubierta-class frigate Elena (SPS
      Descubierta-class frigate Elena (P-76)

Strategically the case against belligerence grows even stronger if one considers the relative advantage Spain would enjoy fighting a war in its own turf.  The UK would be forced to fight this war – if one assumes the UK would want to fight in the Mediterranean – 2000 km away from its shores (if, of course, one does not include Gibraltar itself).  This means the Royal Air Force would be of little or no use, especially considering that neither air force enjoys advantages in aerial warfare – both Spain and Britain deploy the Eurofighter Typhoon as air superiority fighter – and that Britain no longer flies strategic bombers, which might have helped target Spanish installations with cruise missiles.  That said, Britain would still have a distinct advantage in numbers with its 5 destroyers, 13 frigates, 11 submarines, and 2 amphibious assault ships.  In operational terms, this means London could continuously deploy a task-force comprising 6 surface combatants, 3 submarines and probably 1 assault ship.  Madrid operates 5 destroyers, 6 frigates, 3 submarines and 3 assault ships but without the hindrance of force projection, it could probably operate half of them continuously.  This means in turn that together with the aid of the Spanish Air Force and with the Armada’s 10+ coastal patrol vessels, it could very possibly keep the Royal Navy away from its continental shores.  An important factor would be the gap that the Portuguese coast represents in separating Spain’s Atlantic fleet from its Mediterranean ones: no fighting would be tolerated in Portuguese territorial waters and EEZ which means that while Spain could theoretically move its ships through Portuguese waters, the British would also be able to shadow them, and this would imply a great risk.  More dubious would be its defense of the Canary Islands which would be vulnerable to British submarine warfare and thus tactical isolation.  The two nations’ maritime concerns throughout the world, from fishing fleets to oil tankers, would be equally vulnerable to interference from occasional minor naval sorties from either fleet – conceivably the British could capture Spanish trawlers in the Atlantic and the Spaniards could intercept British oil tankers out of the Middle East.  Spain would be able to prevent the British navy from crossing the strait of Gibraltar and could then deploy the occasional warship to the Red and Arabian seas while Britain could do the same but with much longer lines of supply.  The Royal Navy could also force Madrid’s Atlantic fleet into coastal defense, and pick off Spanish civilian vessels one at a time in the Atlantic Rim.

The result of a conventional conflict would thus be a draw, with no side able to win without spilling too much blood and treasury to prove the issue.  More likely than all-out war might be a single clash: one bad enough to bring both parties to a halt and later on to the negotiation table.

Single Engagement

Most clashes in the area of Gibraltar occur between Royal Gibraltar Police and the Royal Navy’s Gibraltar Squadron small craft on one side, and on the other small craft of Spain’s Guardia Civil – a paramilitary force which is also used as the Spanish Customs Surveillance Service – and most often, Spanish fishing vessels.  None of these is heavily armed and none could go beyond exchanging gunfire.

Among the reported incidents involving the Spanish Armada itself, the biggest vessels to date were the 27 crewed Anaga-class ship Tagomago and the 100+ crewed Descubierta-class corvette Vencedora. The Royal Navy in turn deploys periodically to Gibraltar, with warships transiting through the Mediterranean – generally frigates such as the 180+ crewed Duke-class HMS Argyll – in an attempt to deter the Spaniards from further incursions in what London calls “Gibraltar territorial waters”.

If a major exchange were to happen – be it carefully planned or as a result of hotheads – these would likely be the type of vessels involved.  Who then would get the upper hand?

Combat Tactics

HMS Argyll (F231)
                                HMS Argyll (F231)

For the purpose of this scenario we’ll give only a cursory look at the Tagomago aside and go instead with the corvette Vencedora since the former would have no means of counter-attack due to its lack of heavy armament.  A Harpoon-missile attack from the Argyll on Tagomago would actually be overkill since one missile alone suffices to disable a frigate and to use it against a patrol boat would likely disintegrate the craft’s structure.  On the other hand, if the Argyll’s crew couldn’t obtain radar lock (the Harpoon needs a minimum firing range of 3km) or decided to switch to the frigate’s 114mm Mark 8 gun, the result would still be disproportionately bad for the Tagomagowhich would sustain the hits of heavier shells fired from a longer range and guided by an automatic targeting system; the Spanish ship would not be able to respond in kind with either of its 76 mm Mk22 or Oerlikon Mod. 5 TG 20 mm cannons and it would be facing a much bigger target.

The Vencedora would be a different proposition altogether as the Descubierta class can be deadly to a frigate in close proximity.  The good news for the British is that if Argyll fired first, the old corvette would likely not survive the impact, not least because it lacks a CIWS system.  On the other hand, what chance would the Vencedora have if it detected Argyll’s radar lock and preempted the missile attack with one of its own?  At a great distance Argyll’s air-defense Sea Wolf missiles and two 30mm DS30M Mark 2 Automated Small Caliber Guns should be able to intercept perhaps two incoming missiles, and lets optimistically discount another two lost to the British frigate’s electronic counter-measures.  However if the Spanish corvette fired a complete volley of its eight Harpoons the Argyll would surely not live to fight another day.  Yet a third possibility would be for Argyll’s helicopter to fire first on the Vencedora.  Every Duke-class vessel carries a helicopter, one usually intended for anti-submarine warfare, and HMS Argyll carries a Westland Lynx which can also be equipped with anti-ship missiles.  If the British wanted to sink the corvette, it might be preferable to risk a helicopter rather than a frigate.  If the British intended only to intimidate, the helicopter could also be a good option since it would send a message without exposing the lives of 180+ British sailors to a Spanish overreaction, even if the helicopter itself would become an easy target for the corvette’s Sea Sparrow air defense system.

A second possible type of engagement is the less dire possibility of the two ships exchanging cannon fire.  This would have the potential of avoiding de facto war by allowing both ships to attempt intimidation, save face, and avoid the complete destruction of ships and the death of hundreds.  Such an exchange would pit the Argyll’s 114 mm Mark 8 against the Vencedora’s Otobreda 76 mm.  The two guns have similar range and both fire High-Explosive shells; the difference is in the number of projectiles fired per minute which is higher in the 76mm and the size of the projectile which is bigger in the 114mm.  Another essential factor would be the top speed of each vessel which would give a competitive edge in maneuvering to the fastest ship, in this case the British frigate.  Because the British frigate would pack more of a punch and would be able to position itself better, the outcome of this encounter also leaves the British on top.

In addition, given the Spaniards task is essentially to provoke with their presence so as to deny acceptance of Britain’s local sovereignty fait accompli – it stands to reason that the British vessel would be the first one to fire.  The tactical advantage of initiative together with the British frigate’s superior weaponry would most likely punish the Spaniards for their trespass, even if at close distance the Spaniards would enjoy some equalizing edge.

Of course as previously mentioned the victory would be tactical rather than strategic.  Trading blows would be a media sensation and the electorates would almost certainly push for a real push for a permanent political settlement.

Miguel Silva is a Portuguese international relations analyst and regularly writes for the publications Eurasia Review, Small Wars Journal and the Atlantic Sentinel 

MFP: Navies for Archipelago Nations

The following is a guest post inspired by the questions in our Maritime Futures ProjectFor more information on the contributors, click here. Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.

Maritime Futures Project, Question 8: What advice would you give to a smaller nation on the maritime investments it should pursue, and why? 

Coming from the archipelagic nation of the Philippines with a 36,000 nautical mile coastline, 7,107 islands and islets, and a large population that depends on the sea as their lifeline, our maritime environment is a vital part of our strategic interests.

The Croation Mobilni Obalni Lanser system is an appropriate mobile ASM option for defending a multitude of coastlines.
The Croation Mobilni Obalni Lanser system is an appropriate mobile ASM option for defending a multitude of coastlines.

As a result, air, surface, and subsurface assets are of prime importance. Guided-missile frigates and corvettes for offshore control, and a large number of fast-missile and patrol gunboats for the littorals would be appropriate. Long-range maritime patrol aircraft, ship-based multi-purpose helicopters, and naval light-attack aircraft along with a system of land-based radars in central chokepoints would also be an indispensable investment in the protection of an archipelagic nation’s maritime domain. Adding a flotilla of submarines (of the shallow-water attack type) and forming coastal anti-ship missile batteries would further extend a nation’s strategy of defense in depth. This could all be supported by pooling and developing manpower resources and skills.

For island nations with smaller EEZs, development may be limited to capable patrol gunboats and multi-purpose ships for its Coast Guard, supported by rotary, fixed wing, and amphibious aircraft.  The creation and training of coast-watchers from shore based villages would also be a positive development.

LCDR Mark Condeno is a member of the Philippines Naval Auxiliaries.