Tag Archives: DDGs

Wrapping Up Alternatives to DDG Flight III

May 16, 2013 Guest Author 2 Comments

Last month we challenged contributors to take their best shot (or really any shot, so long as it was interesting) at articulating alternatives to the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class DDG Flight III. We originally intended the series to run a week, but never ones to reject late-but-coherent thoughts, we kept it going as long as the submissions kept coming in. The results were quite interesting, challenging force structure/projection assumptions, as well as following the assumptions in the chain of reasoning leading to the Flight III as currently conceived:

The U.S. needs to conduct ballistic missile defense (BMD)
U.S. BMD needs a sea-based component
The sea-based component needs to fit on a surface ship

Most of the hard looks questioned whether the (yet-to-be awarded) Air and Missile Defense Radar is the best way forward for the BMD mission and if so, whether the Flight III DDG is the best platform on which to base it.

Here are some parting shots that focus not on the BMD side of the house, but on ways to generate more of what a Flight III would accomplish with the rest of its mission set toolbox:

LT Patrick Kiefer, USN:

“One thing that we need more of on the destroyers is more helicopters… why we stop at 2 is a little baffling and then only a carrier has more…why not look to put 4 or 6 with simultaneous takeoff and landing? And when you look at everything the MH-60 brings, it is really a force multiplier that brings significant capabilities to the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surface warfare (SUW) missions, especially counter-swarm, and provides some limited support to anti-air warfare (AAW) and STRIKE.”

Sebastian Bruns, Germany:

The selection of the Flight III DDG or an alternative needs to be explained to the American people. Thoroughly. It is a grave irresponsibility to not lead a public discourse about the value of sea power in general, and the value and uses of certain platforms over others in particular.

More than a joke in need of a punchline: How many MH-60Rs can you fit on a DDG?

It follows from this that there must be a coherent policy – means selected to accomplish aims with due respect to timing and costs (“strategy”). This would serve as national security contract underpinning the use of the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) for the better of the nation. What do you want from a (probably Aegis-equipped?) ship? FIghting pirates off Somalia or intercepting ICBMs in the Mediterranean? Counter-narco ops in Mexico or deterrence of regional rouge states? This approach is easier said than done, but one needs bold characters and ideas to really make a strategy deserving of its name (as opposed to yet another doctrine, white paper, document, etc. that’s more platitudes than substance). Vague “AirSea Battle” concepts don’t buy public support, and they rarely serve as a 10- or 20-year outlook. 30-year shipbuilding plans, on the other hand, don’t mean much to many people (in fact, as a Hill staffer, I attended a hearing where the value of a three-decade plan was questioned and IMHO misleading arguments were made for a 10- or 20-year shipbuilding plan).

U.S. shipbuilding must get its act together, along with a trimmed procurement bureaucracy at the Pentagon and a coherent Congress that sets its priorities straight. This last item might, above all, be the most “wishful” of all my thinking, as politics will always be politics. But consider for a moment the extensive list of design failures, cost-overruns, ideas scuttled at the drawing board, and procurement problems vs. the “successes” of the past 25 years. There’s quite a negative imbalance, from the perspective of an outside observer. Competitiveness must be improved. Perhaps the U.S. needs to finally look abroad for designs that could be adapted for the U.S. Navy. A joint design, perhaps, with a trusted allied partner nation from Asia or Europe?

I am under the impression that the current pace of events (and, quite frankly, developments not really in favour of a strong defense budget) might well quickly overtake the discussions that naval specialists lead among themselves, rendering these conversations irrelevant. The end state? Pooling and sharing, leading from behind by default and necessity, without the negative political connotations.

LT H.Vic Allen, USN:

The ability to base 2 helos is non-negotiable. Helos expand a great deal – from situational awareness (SA) to the weapons systems envelope to flexibility; you name it. The capabilities of the MH-60R brings a ridiculous amount of SA to the CO/warfare commander.

Rethink the bridge watch team, a la LCS. For the vast majority of the time, there’s no reason why fly-by-wire and autopilots can’t do the work of a bridge team that is probably 200% too big.

Keep VLS. Even a 32-cell install is very useful.

Hybrid power plants that support kinetic and directed energy weapons. GTGs won’t cut it anymore.

Incorporate a wide array of UAVs. Undersea unmanned vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) don’t provide enough bang for the buck – a DDG is very visible, so stealthy insertion of UUVs isn’t going to help, and USVs just don’t have the range/speed necessary to make them competitive with UAVs. I foresee close-in (<10nm), local (10-100nm) and long-range (>100 nm) UAVs as assisting DDGs with their missions.

Note: The views expressed above are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their governments, militaries, or the Center for International Maritime Security.

Future War

The View from the Cheap Seats: Alternatives to DDG-51 Flight III

May 2, 2013 Juramentado Leave a comment

As a civilian observer of naval affairs, I’m forever fascinated by the churn that surrounds every major platform design or acquisition. The nice thing about viewing all this from the cheap seats is a wider perspective – you get to look around just because you’re that much removed from the action on the floor. The downside is a lack of resolving power when it comes to details.

Man, we're gonna have to double the number of grills for Steel Beach day! — Yes, but where does the hot tub module go?

From the view up here in the nose-bleed section, I see some tantalizing glimpses. One that caught my eye recently was Huntington Ingall’s proposed LPD Flight II, which had among it’s variants, a very large Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) platform. Does such a configuration make sense? Based on displacement alone, such an LPD doesn’t appear to be as constrained by hull space or power plant as the proposed Flight III, squeezing everything in. While the LPD Flight II wasn’t pitched as a arsenal ship, that’s a lot of deck space that could be filled with VLS packs or laser arrays. I can only imagine what additional strike capability might be gained should the Long-range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM) come to fruition.

Speaking of arsenal ships, the Navy should consider building a ship that can deliver naval gunfire and heavy strike missions. While the Zumwalt is a very expensive technology demonstrator, it will deliver base capabilities that should make it’s way into the next large combatant. It’s Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), tumblehome waveform, and the Advanced Gun System (AGS) all bring us one step closer to reaching those strike-mission goals. Whether or not we are facing the same threats for which the DDG-1000 was originally envisioned is another question – nonetheless, the Burke doesn’t have the capacity to fulfill those missions, period.

As for missions, Flight III is supposed to do two things well: BMD and Anti-Air Warfare (AAW). This brings us to the other half of the operational dilemma – it can’t do all the other missions the Navy must execute – certainly not well enough to justify putting it into a theater for the purpose of executing those other missions, where smaller or better equipped ships would suffice. The elephant in the room: there HAVE to be alternatives for operational commanders to the DDG-51 because it can’t do everything. It’s a specialist, and in the Navy’s “office”, the “all other duties” falls upon another class. For the forseeable future – that’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

But this doesn’t mean Flight III is stuck in a rut. As unmanned aircraft and vessels make greater strides in autonomous performance, DDG-51 in a pinch could conceivably deploy in a limited operational zone, standing off safely while allowing it’s robotic minions to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and other critical functions. And while it doesn’t meet the “payloads not platforms” call to a ‘T’, it does allow the venerable Burke design to remain versatile for the near future.

Other considerations: shipbuilding and the secondary/tertiary supply tiers that support the technology behind a modern military vessel are very perishable bases. It is vital to preserve this knowledge and the structure behind it in order to deliver sophisticated ships in the future. The only way to do so is to keep building complex weapons platforms; certainly a self-fulfilling prophecy (or a vicious cycle), but that is the operational reality. In the end, it really doesn’t matter if it’s Flight III or some other combatant, it just has to be built in frequent enough batches to sustain the industrial base.

You should see my other gun at home... — My other gun is a railgun.

Finally, all talk of the cruiser-destroyer gap aside, there’s an emotional response to the idea that the U.S. Navy is shrinking. Coupled with the perception that a spanking new surface combatant is unable to adequately show the flag and you a have a situation that’s hard to stomach. And let’s face it – reputation risk is just as important as other operational risks. Carriers may overwhelm by their presence, but cruisers and destroyers deliver the diplomacy of gunboats – elegant and graceful when visiting solo but menacing enough to remind everyone watching about realpolitik.

Juramentado is the pseudonym for Armando J. Heredia, a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Future War

Flight III – A Piece in The Surface Combatant Puzzle

May 1, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

A Lockheed Martin AMDR conceptual depiction. — A conceptual depiction of the Flight III and AMDR.

For a distant observer, commenting on alternatives to the DDG Flight III would be difficult without the well written documents by Congressional Research Service writer Ronald O’Rourke. His Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress lists most of the program’s considered possible alternatives, reducing the scope of the issue to selecting evaluation criteria and identifying a specific solution. Besides the considered options there is also a recommendation that could broaden the scope of the discussion:

Conduct a thorough [Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)] in accordance with DOD acquisition guidance for its future surface combatant program to include:
(c) implications of the ability of the preferred ship to accommodate new technologies on future capabilities to determine the most suitable ship to carry [The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)] and meet near-term [Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)] requirements and provide a path to far-term capabilities;
(d) implications on future fleet composition;

With the gradual disappearance of frigates from the Navy’s service, the truncation of DDG-1000 to three units, and LCS under critics’ fire, Arleigh Burke is slowly becoming the sole “can-do-all” class of surface combatant. There is an interesting critique of a homogenous ship class force structure related to the history of the Canadian Navy, with the judgment rendered thus:

“Force structure planners should be aware that the history of the RCN shows that naval flexibility cannot be derived from a uniform fleet.”

The author, Kenneth Hansen further elaborates his thesis in another article, concluding that “If the strategic context is complicated, changing, or uncertain, a diversified fleet structure is required.” Armed with such knowledge, let’s step back and reconsider Navy assumptions for its old Future Surface Combatant Program. This envisioned:
– A DD(X) destroyer for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire missions;
– A CG(X) cruiser for the air defense and ballistic missile defense missions; and
– A smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft (boat swarms), and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.

Many things have caused the cruiser as originally conceived to become unaffordable, the destroyer (DDG-1000) has grown to the cruiser’s price and size, and LCS is suffering badly from a lack of operable modules. But the concept itself is not dead. The original requirements, changed under the pressures of the economy and a drive for efficiency, asked for an AMDR with a relative capability described as “SPY+30.” The new solution for DDG Flight III has a relative capability of “SPY +15”, called in a GAO report “marginally adequate“. At the same time Ronald O’Rourke reports states:

As part of the [Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces (MAMDJF)] AOA, the Navy identified that DDG 1000 can accommodate a SPY+25 radar. As part of a technical submission to the Navy, BIW, the lead designer for DDG 1000 also identified a possible design for a 21-foot radar on DDG 1000. The Navy did not include a variant with this size radar in the Radar/Hull Study.

Another conclusion from MAMDJF AOA study was that a smaller number of higher performance ships is preferable to networking less-capable but more numerous ships. On the other hand such a former approach deepens the deficit of cruiser/destroyers. Is there a way out of this trap? As controversial as it seems, it is theoretically possible to reintroduce a hi-lo mix into the surface fleet, consisting of cruisers and frigates. The aim would be to acquire one cruiser and two frigates for a price of two DDG Flight III. The result would be a Navy with a high-capability ship focused on IAMD undistracted by other tasks, such as ASW, with dedicated escorts in numbers allowing it to close the gap in surface combatants hulls. The fleet structure could therefore consist of:

1. Cruisers with the IAMD mission. If DDG-1000 fills this role it can retain its striking capability. Its towed sonar would be eventually cancelled and ASW mission limited to self-defense and shorter ranges. As an intermediate step toward future capabilities, an extant volume search radar could be retrofitted to the three hulls under construction, allowing more time for BMD software development and integration. This cruiser would represent a scaled-down version of CG(X).

2. Frigates would fill the escort mission focused on ASW and anti-air local area defense. For this purpose, a low-end Aegis could be used, possibly combined with a future, economy version of SPY-3 radar. Frigates should resemble the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen more than the Spanish Alvaro de Bazan-class with a the difference being a higher number of VLS cells. This class promises to be an affordable workhorse of the fleet, doubtful for the DDG Flight III, which looks more and more strategic.

3. DDG-51 and its follow-on class, which opens a discussion about the word “destroyer” in the U.S. Navy. In order to avoid a “can-do-it-all” syndrome, the follow-on class (a differently conceived Flight III perhaps) could specialize in strike and anti-air area defense capabilities without BMD, and limited ASW capabilities similar to the aforementioned cruisers. In other words, this class would represent a return to a more realistic representation of DD(X) idea. A flexible class would be a good companion both to carriers, supporting the strike mission, and to the corvettes below, providing air defense. It is also neutral towards follow-on decisions and permits the class to free up the extra room for needed growth margins.

4. Corvettes, with a mission to “clear littoral clutter” and focus on ASW, ASuW, MCM, and patrol tasks.

Such a mix would also open the path for new technologies like an all-electric drive, a Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), or Advanced Gun System (AGS) to develop in the Fleet. New technologies need enough numbers to evolve into something practical, otherwise they become unwanted expensive “gold-plating”. This four-tier structure also offers flexibility for forming surface task forces tailored to changing situations.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland. His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Future War

Whither The Flight III

April 29, 2013 Guest Author 1 Comment

Back in March our readers voted on topics they’d like us to cover for a week of analysis. The winner was “Alternatives to the U.S. Navy’s DDG-51 Flight III”. Alas not many have felt comfortable venturing outside their expertise comfort zones to weigh in on the issue. Those few brave writers who did accept the challenge have an interesting week for you and hopefully some food for thought.

The Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) first entered service in 1991 as the first “Aegis destroyer” – a multi-role combatant but notably synonymous with its anti-air warfare (AAW) radar. In 1998 the ship class morphed to the Flight II with USS Mahan (DDG-72), and has since DDG-79 used evolving variations of the USS Oscar Austin Flight IIA design. With the looming retirement of the U.S. cruisers and increasing AAW and ballistic missile defense (BMD) requirements, the U.S. Navy began planning for a tentatively named CG(X) cruiser ship class to fill the role (or integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) gap) with “a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).” However, in 2010 it opted for the DDG-51 Flight III with a “smaller and less powerful [AMDR] than the one envisaged for the CG(X)” as it was deemed cheaper to continue building on the DDG-51 frame.

As part of his coverage of the Navy’s FY13 budget submission, Ron O’Rourke at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in late March detailed in a very readable report the Navy’s intended program of record. As he states:

“The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2017 are also to be of the Flight III design… The Navy for FY2013 is requesting congressional approval to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for the nine DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2017.”

Some of the issues outlined in the CRS report (pg 18) include:

Whether there is an adequate analytical basis for procuring Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of the previously planned CG(X) cruiser
Whether the Flight III DDG-51 would have sufficient air and missile capability to adequately perform future air and missile defense missions
Cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 program
Whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life

To these unresolved points follow several more foundational questions:

Is the AMDR the right radar to fill the U.S. Navy’s future IAMD needs?
Is the DDG-51 the right shipframe to house the future IAMD radar, whether or not the AMDR? (in essence a roll-up of Ron’s 2nd and 4th points above). This question is especially salient in light of the reliance on the Arleigh Burke class to fill a multitude of roles beyond IAMD.
Is there another way to do AAW and/or BMD in the time frame for the procurement and service life of the Flight III?
Is there a way to divest the Flight IIIs of some of the other mission areas that they perform? How could this alter the distribution of ship numbers?
Is there are a way to change the assumptions the IAMD requirements are based on?

These are the questions we don’t expect to answer conclusively, but to use as starting points to offer possibilities. For another good take on the issues, check out friend-of-the-blog Bryan McGrath’s article at USNI News.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.