Tag Archives: China

Crisis: Danger and Opportunity

One of the definitions of Crisis as an Ideogram is “Danger, mixed with Opportunity.”

You're well on your Wei.
You’re well on your Wei.

Woe betide nation-states and actors unable to navigate this tricky path. For the government of the Philippines, China, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), recent events have been a poster child for this concept, as evidenced by the dual crises at Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal and ashore in Zamboanga City.

The Zamboanga Crisis shows how maritime power is very much an enabler for non-state actors (NSAs). The entire Sulu island chain is one very large ratline; porous and a challenging region to monitor. The Moro National Liberation Front, as do many other NSAs, takes good advantage of the geography and the lack of patrol enforcement and coordination between the Philippines and Malaysia – easily slipping across the borders uncontested. The absence of law and order, as well as numerous informal economies make it ubiquitous that inhabitants travel in large, and in most cases armed groups. As a result, Nur Misuari’s MNLF was not only able to thrive in Sulu following the 1996 peace talks, but he was also able to build a large, and by all reports, well-equipped following in Malaysia’s Sabah peninsula. Undoubtedly, the thin security situation on the water and coastlines helped facilitate unhampered movement of his personnel as well as transshipment of logistics and arms.

It’s been all opportunity and no danger for China. The PRC is using Panatag Shoals as an expansion of it’s Nine-Dash Line Plan to gain control over what is considered integral territory.  Capitalizing upon ASEAN’s inability to reach consensus on security and cooperation over contested territory, China likely will  remain in physical possession of the seized islands well inside the Philippine EEZ. Beijing also benefits through Manila’s struggles to build a Credible Defense in a time of economic challenges, and is counting upon the lack of clear focus on Pacific foreign policy by the Obama Administration. The mixed signals of the “Pivot to the Pacific” coupled with US Secretary of Defense Hagel’s reiteration about US neutrality on issues of sovereignty are all green lights as far as the Chinese are concerned.

For Nur Misuari and the MNLF, the Zamboanga City attack is a last gasp. A lot of peril, but with corresponding big stakes. Having been locked out of the ongoing OIC talks, the aging but defiant Islamist revolutionary has nothing to lose. The attack is an attempt to bring attention back to his organization’s unresolved demands and buy him a seat at the table. The attack would have been more successful had he not chosen to use the densely trafficked (and monitored) Basilan Strait to land part of his troops on mainland MIndanao.

Strait up the middle!
Strait up the middle!

Even with a dearth of assets, Philippine Navy and National Police elements could not help but note a company-size movement on boats speedier and more well-equipped than local fishing traffic.  This miscalculation apparently threw the rebels’ timetable off as the insurgents already ashore were forced into a series of skirmishes in barangays (neighborhoods), short of their ultimate goal of taking the entire city. Misuari’s trump card may still be played; over 4,000 fighters encamped in Malaysia’s Sabah peninsula. If the MNLF chooses to restart fighting amongst the Palm Plantations, the resulting refugee crisis alone could overwhelm what little control both nations have over the area.

For the Armed Forces of the Philippines and in particular, the Navy, it’s been a mixed outcome. On the one hand, the fortuitous success of detecting MNLF movements spoiled what could have been a prominent rebel victory in government-held areas. On the other, PN  Flag Officer-in-Command Jose Luis Alvano is tasked with an impossible mission – to remove over eleven tons of concrete from Panatag with no assets or funding, AND keep the Shoals in Philippine hands. It’s the peak of Monsoon Season, and one of his only two platforms with enough range, speed and on-station endurance is in drydock until October. Confronting China Marine Surveillance with Navy ships brings it’s own set of concerns, and Defense Minister Voltaire Gazmin publicly admitted there’s no way to keep possession of the Shoals without occupying them – an intention that current capabilities cannot support.

Finally, for the Aquino Administration, there’s nothing like a rebel uprising as teachable moments:

Lesson 1: Infowars matter – the lack of maturity around how to handle Social Media coverage of the event is painfully evident – from broken boots, troops short of rations, to operational security and hobby-shop drones

Philippine Army Drone over Zamboanga - courtesy Yahoo! News
Philippine Army Drone over Zamboanga – courtesy Yahoo! News

– the government is learning how to manage crisis communications effectively in a school of hard knocks. At least Zamboanga City’s Twitter account was warning residents to stand clear of impending air strikes.

Lesson 2: Your enemies could be next to you, not in front of you. Prior to the conflict, Representative Rudolfo Biazon, Chairman of the House Committee on Security and National Defense, had been questioning all the big-ticket Modernization items the Administration was obtaining. Biazon’s soapbox issue is ditching the conventional arms purchases and focus more on Counter-insurgency (COIN) assets that could double up in times of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Recovery (HADR). The crisis can only provide more fodder for his call.  But that pales next to Vice-President Jejomar Binay’s trangression; unilaterally brokering a failed cease-fire with Misuari without Presidential authorization, all for the sake of grandstanding. Reputedly, Binay is seeking to distinguish himself from Aquino as part of a presidential election bid in 2016.

The bright light for the Administration is the quick and effective response to the MNLF attack – locking down a security cordon in Mindanao and preventing any escape, while balancing a difficult urban combat situation exacerbated by hostage-taking and literal town-burning.

Zamboanga City showing damage from the fighting. Courtesy GMA News/Samhyr
Zamboanga City showing damage from the fighting. Courtesy GMA News/Samhyr

But Panatag Shoals beckons like the hazard that it is, both from a navigational as well as foreign policy viewpoint. Aquino has shown willingness to confront the Chinese in the past, but without capabilities, all he can do is present an inconvenience to Beijing’s aspirations. His most powerful option is to compel international condemnation through the UNCLOS tribunal and hopefully bring China to the table over a real and substantive Code of Conduct.

Juramentado is the pseudonym for Armando J. Heredia, a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries.  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Who Is Ahead In Asia’s Carrier Arms Race?

Asia’s maritime arms race has again highlighted the emerging relevance of aircraft carriers. China, India and Japan made significant progress with their flattops. As all major powers in the region run for more and larger carriers, the question is: Who is ahead?

Japan

Japan Unveils Izumo Class Helicopter Destroyer (Light Aircraft Carrier)Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ah-64 sh-60 (1)    First of all, Tokyo, please stop these ridiculous wordplays. Carriers are carriers and not “helicopter destroyers”, no matter what official spokespersons are saying. Back in the Cold War, nobody believed the Soviet’s heavy flight deck cruisers were actually “cruisers”.

Japan’s present fleet includes two Hyuga-Class and one Izumo-Class helicopter carriers (CVH). Lacking a well deck, they have no amphibious role and are only able to operate helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. Such helicopters can either be used for any number of missions, from Search and Rescue (SAR), surface warfare (SUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), or troop movements. Moreover, purchasing some V-22 Ospreys is another option for Japan. Recent maneuvers with the US Navy showed, V-22s are able to operate from the Hyugas.

The main issue is whether Japan’s CVH can operate fixed wing STOVL aircraft, in particular Lockheed’s F-35B (STOVL – Short Take-off and Vertical Landing). Japan’s three CVH are not yet ready to host F-35B, though they could easily be converted into smaller carriers to operate V/STOL aircraft. Due to “no obvious technical obstacles“, the only issue left is the political decision.

The the F-35B has been critiqued for the poor performance of its STOVL variant: enormous fuel consumption during takeoff and landing, limited payload, limited range. In the maritime East Asia, distances are not so far that long range would be necessary. The F-35B may be superior to Chinese warplanes as a whole program, because China has presented prototypes rather than a factory-ready mass-produced model of its 5th generation carrier fighters.

Japan’s main obstacle is the complete absence of combat experience since 1945. However, its navy enjoys the opportunity to train with the US and perhaps Britain in the future: countries with proven combat experience. GlobalSecurity.org reports, moreover, that Japan may consider a program for a larger carrier starting in the 2020s. However, there current evidence says that Japan is about to go for STOBAR or CATOBAR carriers. Hence, Japan will play an important role in the carrier arms race. Maybe the F-35B will boost Japanese maritime power, if Tokyo decides to go for it. However, size and nature of Japan’s carrier program will not bring the country into leading position.

South Korea

article-1312184-0B3144C1000005DC-215_964x470Seoul’s flattop program is less developed than Japan’s. The South Korean Navy (ROKN) runs one Dokdo-class helicopter carrier and aims to operate three at the end of the decade. Like Japan, these flattops are said only to operate helicopters, but they could be modified to host F-35B. Drones could also be an option. Unlike Japan, the ROKN’s Dokdo has a well deck and can therefore be used for amphibious operations.

However, even though there are reports about South Korean interests in the F-35B, officially plans for converting the Dokdos into a small carrier have been denied. Such a political move is logical. In the U.S, the F-35B has proved to be a budget disaster and has yet to show its operational capabilities. Fortunately, China has not crossed the threshold of full operational capability; the LIAONING is still relatively green and there are no Chinese indigenous carriers. Seoul has still time to weigh its options.

South Korea will only keep regional military weight if Seoul broadens its pursuit of “blue-water ambitions“. In particular, this means spending much more money on an expeditionary navy to include additional flattops. With its sophisticated shipbuilding industry, South Korea would be able modify the Dokdos to small carriers or develop new indigenous carriers. However, the political consequence would be entrance into the great power competition between the navies of the US, China, India and Japan. The ROKN will definitely not take a lead, but do not count South Korea out. If things in maritime Asia get worse, Seoul made decide to follow the Japanese example.

Australia

2005_S1237_02.JPGThe two forthcoming Canberra-Class LHDs would able to operate F-35B. The ski-jump on prow is credible evidence. However, right now Australia has no intention to go for the F-35B. Needless to say, political landscapes can quickly change. We will see what happens in Canberra after the F-35B has proven its operational abilities and the carrier arms race continues. Australia could also operate UAVs from her carriers.

We will not see high-profile patrols of Australian LHDs in the East and South China Sea. The Royal Australian Navy may use Canberras for joint exercises with the US, Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines. In terms of operations, the use of the LHD will be to underline Australia’s hegemonial role in the Pacific Islands, disaster relief, and potentially in tackling the refugee issue.

Thailand

As long as Thailand does not seriously invest in its single carrier, the Chakri Naruebet will be nothing else than the “Royal Yacht“. Thailand’s carrier rarely operates and the crews have rare practical experience. Do not bet on Thailand. The Thai carrier will only make a difference in disaster relief.


Singapore

Singapore has yet to jump for a flattop. However, due its very limited space for air force bases, the tiny city-state seriously considers an F-35B purchase. In the future, LHD or small Izumo-style carriers could be an option for Singapore. Basing the fighters offshore would save urgently needed space on land. Nevertheless, there is no credible evidence yet that Singapore is really planning to buy warships like the Izumo (if anybody comes across news regarding this issue, please drop me a line). Thus, Singapore remains a known unknown. What would make Singaporean carrier very relevant is its geographic location close to Malacca Strait and southern end of the South China Sea.

Russia

From the four Mistral LHDs Russia’s navy is about to commission, two will be based in the Pacific. There are no indications that Russia is planning to develop a new STOVL aircraft, although the country’s industry would be capable of doing so (Yak-38, YAK-141). Thus, the Mistrals will only be outfitted with helicopters and, therefore, not make a significant difference in the Indo-Pacific’s maritime balance of power.

Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that Russia use the new LHDs in waters other than the Pacific. Recently, the Russian Navy deployed warships from its Pacific Fleet to the Mediterranean for a show of force offshore Syria.

New Russian aircraft carriers are only discussed, but far away from being realized. If the Russians would start to build new carriers, they would first replace the aging Kuznetsov and, thereafter, strengthen their Northern Fleet to protect their interests in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

India

130812065726-01-ins-vikrant-0812-horizontal-galleryThe Indian Navy should definitely be taken into account for a front position. Due to the operational experience of its single operational carrier INS Viraat and its soon to be commissioned two new STOBAR carriers INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant, India is now Asia’s number one in maritime aviation. In the 2020’s, an even larger carrier INS Vishal is in the works; perhaps a CATOBAR design, which would provide far better striking capabilities, and maybe even nuclear powered. While future expansion has yet to be determined, in the present India is going to build up a sophisticated three-carrier fleet. The Indian Navy will be able to maintain always one carrier battle group at sea and to project power in the western Pacific.

However, India lacks access to a carrier-capable 5th generation fighter. There is no carrier-version of Indo-Russian Suchoi PAK FA under development. Joining India’s forces in the early 2020, the PAK FA will only be available as a land based fighter. India’s Mig-29 and the potential Rafale are definitely combat capable aircraft, but surely behind the F-35’s abilities and probably, too, behind China’s J-31. Once other Indo-Pacific powers operate their 5th generation fighters from carriers, India will fall behind in quality if not quantity.

In addition, operating different fighter and carrier models, as India is about to do, increases maintenance costs significantly. Nevertheless, just by the numbers of operational vessels and the operational experience, India will take the lead in Asia’s carrier arms race for this decade and maybe also in the early 2020s, but not longer.

China

carrier_liaoningAs much has been written about China, we keep it brief here. Given China’s “Two-Ocean-Strategy”, seeking to operate always one carrier in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the PLAN will need up to 5-6 flattops. We have physical evidence now for what everybody knew before: Chinas is commencing an indigenous aircraft carrier program. The hot issue is, for which design China will go. Will they re-build LIAONING‘s STOBAR design? Alternatively, will they go straight for a more advanced CATOBAR design?

Probably the first and second indigenous Chinese carrier will be a conventional powered STOBAR flattop. Thereafter, we may either see conventional or even nuclear powered CATOBAR carriers. Beside military requirements, for political prestige Beijing will not accept its carrier fleet to be behind the level of India. Instead, after the “century of humiliation” China will seek for clear superiority over India, Japan, and other potential Asian naval powers.

Who is ahead?

Right now India is definitely ahead due to operational experience and the number of vessels. Regarding technology, Japan is likely to be number one. However, both will be surpassed by China either at the end of his decade or surely within the 2020s. South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and Singapore are economically too weak to be a maritime game changer. However, it will be interesting to watch how these and other countries are seeking for maritime alliances to balance China. Russia will not play a major role in maritime Asia, especially not with carriers, because its core interests are located elsewhere.

 

After Obama scrapped US foreign policy almost entirely in the last years, what will a weakened America do in the Indo-Pacific? States like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia will rely on US security guarantees. However doubts remain as to whether Obama and his successors are willing to deliver should serious conflicts occur. For a clear message to China, the US needs a credible and increased forward presence throughout the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, Washington should leave theaters like the western Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to the Europeans as much as possible. If necessary, let Europe learn the hard way that in the Indo-Pacific Century, the times of US military bailouts are over and Europe has to do carry its share of the load.

Felix Seidler is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel, Germany, and a German security affairs writer. This article appeared in original form at his website, Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik.

China’s Defense Budget Getting Fatter on the Big Mac Index

“Show me the money” is the mantra of those analyzing Chinese defense budgets, searching for every defense dollar hidden behind state-owned defense enterprises and construction projects. But perhaps what they should be asking is, “where’s the beef?”

Every traveler knows that money is only as good as what it can buy. What you find on the dollar menu on one side of the border may cost $2.05 on the other. A lack of this purchasing-power-parity perspective is a major flaw in standard comparisons of annual defense spending. Analysis of the U.S. and Chinese defense budgets should not concentrate on dollar-vs-dollar, but rather the meat of what those budgets can buy.

For a quick non-scientific assessment of defense budgets weighted by purchasing-power, we look to the Big Mac Index (BMI, no pun intended). In 1986, the Economist developed the BMI as a humorous way of gauging the accuracy of currency valuations world-wide. What started out as educational humor became a serious academic endeavor. The BMI is so effective that the infamous currency manipulating government of Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has passed laws regulating the sale and marketing of the Big Mac. Although the Economist has produced a “gourmet” version controlling for local factors such as differences in labor costs, it is those local market defects that make the raw BMI appropriate for defense budget analysis – the analysis is not of currency on the exchange floor, but on the shop floor.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China‘s raw defense budget of $166 billion is a mere 24% of the American defense budget at $682 billion (including so-called OCO funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars). In order to gain the purchasing power perspective, we can compare the budgets using the respective countries’ Big Mac Index prices – $2.61 in China and $4.56 in the United States. Weighted with the BMI, China’s defense budget value is 42% of its American rival, the equivalent of $287 billion. chinabudgetchart1

Depending on what source you use, the comparison worsens. A raw dollar-to-dollar comparison of DOD’s maximum assessment of China’s defense budget ($215 billion) and the U.S. budget without war funding ($593 billion) shows China at 35% of the U.S. level. Once you weight the budgets with the BMI index, the Chinese defense budget emerges at a robust 63% of the U.S., the equivalent of $376 billion.

chinabudgetchart2

The BMI is by no means a perfect method of showing the value-for-money comparison of Chinese and U.S. defense budgets. After all, burgers aren’t bombers, and fries aren’t frigates.

But using such purchasing power parity measures provides a useful perspective as the dirge of sequestration starts to play. The BMI illustrates how the value-for-money calculation tilts toward China. So, too, are the missions and challenges to which the value is applied. Because of its extensive cyber program and other means of industrial espionage, China must spend far less on R&D as it steals and copies designs and doctrines from its more advanced competitors. China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) focus provides a financial asymmetry as well as a technological one. After all, a DF-21 “carrier killer” missile is far cheaper than the U.S. supercarrier it’s designed to strike.

Secretary Hagel has noted that half of U.S. defense spending is obligated to pay, benefits, and retirement – not training, supplies, capital investment, procurement, or R&D as many assume. China does not treat their personnel nearly so well. Moreover, these “people costs” are consuming an increasing share of the defense dollar. Army Chief of Staff Ray Odierno recently predicted that compensation would consume 80% of the Army’s budget by 2023.

The BMI does hold out one glimmer of hope: the McDonald’s Theory of International Relations holds that no two nations hosting a McDonald’s franchise will ever go to war. But in the Asia-Pacific of the 21st Century, the United States cannot afford to rely on Mayor McCheese to guarantee the peace.

LT Matthew Hipple is the Executive Officer of PC Crew INDIA and the Director of the NEXTWAR blog. He is also a member of the U.S. Naval Institute and a contributor to Proceedings. While his opinions may not reflect those of the United States Navy, Department of Defense, or US Government.
Twitter: @AmericaHipple

This article was originally posted at Real Clear Defense.