How The Indian Ocean Remains Central to India’s Emerging Aspirations

India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week

By Vidya Sagar Reddy

The visit of United States (US) Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter to India has provided grounds for once again debating the facts and history of bilateral relations between these two countries and the implications on relations with China and the emerging world order. The convergence between the two parties to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in the near future was the primary instrument of play in this debate. This visit has broader maritime relevance amid similar developments this month emphasizing India’s vision and attitude towards the Indian Ocean.

Sustaining present or higher growth trends for the coming three decades is the central economic strategy of New Delhi if India were to become an economic superpower. Maritime trade and connectivity is perhaps the critical enabler of this strategy, as it was historically when the subcontinent maintained one of the highest GDPs in the world. Enumerating this, India organised the first Maritime India Summit in Mumbai recently which featured about 240 projects with investment potential of $66 billion in the next five years. 

The National Perspective Plan for Sagaramala programme, a model of port-led development, has also been released. The Indian ports are undergoing modernisation along with their feeder transportation links – road, rail and inland waterways. These corridors will enable seamless transportation of goods and services from Indian hinterlands to overseas destinations.

Safe maritime connectivity, external trading, and overseas investments require India develop political confidence in its neighborhood and a dedicated navy to ensure secure seas. China is a key factor influencing India’s decisions regarding these domains of development.

India, Iran, and Afghanistan finalised the text for agreement on developing the port of Chabahar this month. This gateway port will boost regional trade and connectivity, and will allow India to secure access to Afghanistan where it is setting up basic infrastructure and shares Kabul’s security concerns.

On the other hand, the development of the Gwadar port by China in Pakistan has raised objections from the local people of Balochistan. India is concerned about the setting up of transportation links in the sensitive Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China, who is worried about the safety of its workers. The probability of Gwadar functioning as a naval base, forming a node in China’s String of Pearls, has negative implications to regional stability.

In a separate development, the Maldivian President declared on his visit to India an ‘India first’ foreign policy in an attempt to revive the souring relationship caused by internal political turmoil as well as the passing of a controversial law that would grant China rights to land reclamation.

In Sri Lanka, the Colombo Port City Project has now morphed into a financial, business, and logistics hub welcoming large scale Indian investments. The ratio of investments from Sri Lanka and China were clarified and the entities that will be in charge of operations were named. Clarifications on this project were aimed at addressing India’s security concerns due to increased presence of China’s economic and naval assets in the country and aimed to welcome India as a partner in the project.

Concept image of the Colombo Port City Project.
Concept image of the Colombo Port City Project.

The primary concern about China’s projects in the Indian Ocean under the Maritime Silk Road initiative is the possibility for turning these ports into strategic assets countering India’s natural advantages in the region. China could increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean while citing protection of investments, anti-piracy operations, and humanitarian assistance to its citizens while rejecting international cooperation.

China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea disregarding international norms and calls for peaceful settlement of boundary disputes go against India’s quest for maintaining the status quo and consenting to international adjudications on maritime boundary disputes, such as those peacefully resolved with Bangladesh. China continues to disregard India’s sensitivities with respect to Pakistan and PoK. It has yet to settle land border disputes with India despite concluding similar agreements with 12 other neighboring countries.

The Indian Navy (IN), the principal guarantor of India’s maritime security, has encountered threatening postures from China’s warships. Two Chinese destroyers and an anti-submarine helicopter allegedly forced an Indian submarine to surface near Somalia. There were 22 “contacts” with Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean through 2013, according to data provided by the US military.

In 2011, a Chinese fishing trawler was intercepted and pushed into international waters by the IN when it tried to monitor telemetry signals off Balasore, India’s missile testing range. India is also deeply aware of China’s unprofessional treatment of INS Airavat as it trasited the South China Sea (SCS) near Vietnam. China’s declarations like the “Indian Ocean is not India’s Ocean” certainly do not help build a positive environment.

These developments are factored into India’s decision to build a blue water navy with the Indian Ocean designated as its primary area of responsibility. Indian and American interests converge on protecting sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and upholding peace and stability in its littoral while adhering to international norms. As the US is in need of such a partner like India, India needs technological assistance that the US can provide for building an advanced network-centric navy capable of executing these objectives.

A maritime security dialogue will be initiated between the two countries. Regular discussions will be held on submarine safety and anti-submarine warfare techniques. India could acquire the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) from the US in ongoing discussions on aircraft carrier technology transfers. EMALS can launch a variety of manned and unmanned aircraft far more efficiently than the catapult system. India and the US will also exchange data on commercial shipping.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks with Indian Naval Officers as he tours Indian Naval Station Karwar as part of a visit to the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, April 11, 2016. Carter is visiting India to solidify the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.(Photo by Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz)(Released)
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks with Indian Naval Officers as he tours Indian Naval Station Karwar as part of a visit to the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, April 11, 2016. (Photo by Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz)(Released)

The LEMOA will simplify replenishment requests by either military at one another’s bases. It would help the American and Indian navies to respond swiftly to non-traditional threats like piracy and terrorism on high seas; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations across the Indian Ocean, especially West Asia; and enhance compatibility of personnel and systems. India’s concerns will be taken into consideration to include provisions that deny supply of armament as well as absolve it from supporting US military operations against friendly countries.

This multi-vectored maritime relationship aims to enhance India’s capacity for fulfilling its role as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean. This is the primary objective and therefore the rebuttal to considering joint patrols with the US in the SCS. India will assume its responsibility for upholding wider regional peace and stability after a careful assessment of its political priorities and relevant capacity commensurate with the dynamics of an emerging multipolar Asia within a multipolar world order.

Vidya Sagar Reddy is a researcher at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Featured Image: Indian Ocean by National Geographic.

India as the Pivotal Power of the 21st Century Security Order

India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week

By MAJ Chad M. Pillai

“As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the twenty-first century.  India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot state.”

Robert D. Kaplan (The Revenge of Geography)

I remember reading these words several years ago and thinking back to my trip to India in 1998 at the height of the nuclear testing crisis by India and Pakistan.  During that trip, I took the opportunity to interview several Indian scholars on India’s ascent as a nuclear power and its implications.  Those interviews produce two key themes:  (1) India’s nuclear weapons program was designed as a deterrent to China, not Pakistan as many claimed, since China went nuclear in the 1950s and fought a border war with India in 1962; and (2) a disbelief of U.S. relations with an Islamic military dictatorship in Pakistan and Communist China at the expense of the world’s largest democracy.[1]  In order to accept these two observations, especially if India becomes the strategic pivot nation, the U.S. must acknowledge India’s relationship with, as Seth Cropsey described in his New American Grand Strategy article, the triple hegemonic threats in the Eurasian landmass: Iran, Russia, and China.

India and Iran’s relationship dates thousands of years from when the ancient Persian Empires and Indian Empires ruled the territories from Mesopotamia to the tip of India – occasional rivals during the period of the Indian Mughal (Sunni) Empire. Modern day Afghanistan served as the buffer zone and trade route between these two civilizations.  During the period of the of Colonial British-Russian Rivalry (The Great Game), the landmass between the Persians and British India served as a strategic buffer, and later provided the foundation for India’s relationship with Russia after “The Partition of 1947” that split India and Pakistan.[2]

1814 map of Central Asia, where great power competition between Russia and the British became known as The Great Game.
1814 map of Central Asia, where great power competition between Russia and the British became known as The Great Game.Source: Wikipedia.

India’s relationship with Russia dates to the Cold War after it gained independence from the United Kingdom. Initially, India was a champion of the “Non-Aligned Movement” seeking not to get entangled between the two superpowers. The decline in U.S.-Indian relations during the Johnson administration pushed India into the Soviet sphere due to differences regarding the Vietnam War, India’s stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Indo-Pakistani tensions, and economic underperformance. The U.S. military relationship with Pakistan further alienated India which required India to invest heavily in Soviet armaments. India’s and Russia’s relationship has continued despite the end of the Cold War, primarily in foreign military sales and development (ex. Co-Russian and Indian joint Stealth Fighter venture). 

The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a product of a joint venture between Indian and Russian defense firms. Source: Wikipedia.
The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a product of a joint venture between Indian and Russian defense firms. Source: Wikipedia.

India has expanded military relations with the United States as it sees China as a growing security challenge. Additionally, Indians prefer their cultural (Bollywood and Hollywood) and linguistic (large Indian English speaking population) similarities to the United States.[3] In fact, C. Raja Mohan wrote a statement in his book Crossing the Rubicon by then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh issued ahead of President Clinton’s visit of ‘five wasted decades’ and his “reflection on the fact that the world’s two great democracies found it impossible to engage in any substantive cooperation-either economic or political in the country’s first  fifty years.” 

As the two most populous nations on earth, the unique and recent strategic rivalry between India and China, as Robert Kaplan stated, has no history behind it.  They are two ancient civilizations separated by the Himalayan Mountain range that traded, passed religious and cultural knowledge back and forth in the peripheral zones (Afghan region of the Silk and Spice Route and South East Asia where we see a mixed Indian-Chinese influence among populations, linguistics, and cuisine), but have no known history of major warfare between the two save for brief conflict in 1962.  What is driving the emerging competition between India and China is their re-emergence on top of the global economy. As Robyn Meredith states in her book The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise of India and China and What it Means for All of Us that “after a centurylong hiatus, India and China are moving back toward their historic equilibrium in the global economy, and that this is producing tectonic shifts in economics as well as in geopolitics.” It is projected that India’s population will exceed China’s and both will continue to modernize and create ever greater demand for consumer goods to meet the needs and desires of their vast populations. As a result, the Achilles Heel and source of emerging friction is the need to secure access to energy from Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to fuel their economic growth. 

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and moved from second-largest net importer of oil to the largest in 2014.”  Meanwhile, “India was the fourth-largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products in the world in 2013, after the United States, China, and Japan. The country depends heavily on imported crude oil, mostly from the Middle East.” While much has been written of China’s activities in Africa to secure energy and mineral rights, less has been shared about India’s competition, though less successful, in the same arena. A significant lag in its competitiveness is China’s reliance on state-owned enterprises that offer better terms due to government guarantee vs. India’s reliance on its private sector and smaller state owned enterprises.  Despite this, India has also been working with Central Asian States and Iran to develop the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline and the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline with recent Indian investment ventures in Iranian oil and gas fields in the range of $20 billion. To offset the competition for energy, both countries have invested heavily in renewable energy resources such as wind and solar.

India’s strategic geography provides it a long-term competitive advantage over China due to its position between the world’s key energy chokepoints.  According to the IEA World Oil Transit Chokepoints Report, “world chokepoints for maritime transit of oil are a critical part of global energy security. About 63% of the world’s oil production moves on maritime routes. The Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are the world’s most important strategic chokepoints by volume of oil transit.”  India’s strategic relationship with Iran and South East Asian nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia, along with its control of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, place it in a formidable position to disrupt China’s access to its energy markets in the Middle East and Africa. China has been trying to offset its ‘Malacca Dilemma” by establishing economic-security ventures known as its “String of Pearls” to include expanded ventures with Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka. 

shipmap_image
India’s geography provides it excellent positioning to influence critical sea lines of communication. Source: Shipmap.org.

The ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and ‘String of Pearls” will drive each nation to invest in their missile arsenal (nuclear and non-nuclear), naval power, and airpower.  According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 2016, China accounts for 41% and India for 13.5% of all defense spending in Asia. Further comparisons between the two show China spent $145 Billion (US Dollars) vs. India’s $47 Billion (US Dollars) in 2015.  Analyzing their naval power, China has the edge in numbers with more submarines (61 = 4 SSBNs and 57 SSNs), more combatant ships (74 including one carrier), and mine warfare (49).  India currently fields a navy with 14 submarines, 28 combatant (two carriers to China’s one), and 6 mine warfare ships.  However, its ability to influence the Strait of Malacca provides India the competitive advantage, especially if its efforts are combined with U.S., Australian, Japanese, and coalition nations to offset China’s numerical superiority.  Additionally, China will face its own A2/AD threat environment in the India Ocean as India expands its medium and long range missiles.

As the United States increasingly faces challenges to its global power by Iran, Russia, and China, its relationship with India will grow in strategic importance.  While India may never become a true ally of the U.S. due to its strategic relations with the other three powers, its role as a strategic pivot or fulcrum can provide a source of stability and balance.  Its democratic and cultural values align it with the United States and the West, but geography and history place India squarely within the context of its Eurasian neighbors. 

MAJ Chad M. Pillai is a U.S. Army Strategist.  He has published articles and blogs in Military Review, Small Wars Journal, Infinity Journal, The Strategy Bridge, Offizier, War on the Rocks, and CIMSEC.  He received his Masters in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2009.  This article was influenced by his Asian Energy Security and South Asian International Relations courses at SAIS. 

[1] In 1998, I took a trip to India for my adopted father’s mother’s death that coincided with the nuclear testing.  As a result, I proposed an extra credit project for my ROTC instructor to study the security implications and worked on it further during my internship at the Department of State that summer semester. 

[2] The strategic implications of the 1947 Partition continue in today’s conflict in Afghanistan as Pakistan views India’s relationship with the Afghan Government with suspicion and fears Indian encirclement if it loses its strategic maneuver space among the Afghan Pashtu regions.  Recommend “The Great Defile” by Diana Preston to learn more of the British Indian (manned primarily by Punjabis – Modern Pakistanis) Army’s misadventures during the Afghan Wars of 1838-1842.

[3] Indians prefer to study in the United States and migrate.  One current state governor and one former state governor are of Indian descent.

Featured Image: Prime Minister Modi speaks from the Red Fort in New Delhi on India’s 69th Independence Day in 2015.

India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week Kicks off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC is running a topic week on India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific. Authors responded to our Call for Articles with publications featuring in-depth analysis on Indian strategic thinking, Chinese and Indian counterbalancing power plays, and factors driving India’s rise as a regional titan. We thank our contributors for their quality contributions.

Below is a list of articles featuring during the topic week. It will be updated as the topic week rolls out and as additional publications are finalized.

India as the Pivotal Power of the 21st Century Security Order by MAJ Chad Pillai
How The Indian Ocean Remains Central to India’s Emerging Aspirations by Vidya Sagar Reddy
India-China Competition Across the Indo-Pacific by David Scott
Sino-India Strategic Rivalry: Misperception or Reality by Ching Chang
Diluting the Concentration of Regional Power Players in Maldives by MAJ Ahmed Mujuthaba
Strategic Maritime Balancing in Sino-Indian Foreign Policy by Ryan Kuhns
India in the Asia-Pacific: Roles as a ‘Balancer’ and Net Security Provider by Ajaya Kumar Das
Modi’s Asia-Pacific Push by Vivek Mishra
Understanding Sino-Indian Relations – A Theoretical Perspective by Byron Chong
India as a Net Security-Provider in the Indian Ocean and Beyond by VADM Pradeep Chauhan (ret)

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Reach the CIMSEC editorial team at Nextwar@cimsec.org.

Sea Control 116 – Indonesia, A History of Violence and Horror Fiction

983650568_bfdf96be73_zIn this week’s episode of Sea Control: Asia Pacific, Natalie Sambhi chats with Nadia Bulkin, a Senior Associate at The Asia Group, on Indonesia’s history of violence, its turn towards democratic nationalism and what that means for the country today. They delve into legacies and policy implications of military rule and colonialism. Natalie and Nadia also discuss the recent confrontation between Indonesian and Chinese coast guards in the South China Sea. Lastly, they explore Nadia’s passion for writing ‘socio-political horror’ fiction and what literature and film can teach us about understanding Indonesia’s psychology.

DOWNLOAD: CIMSEC Bulkin Indonesia

Nadia Bulkin is a Senior Associate at The Asia Group where she is the defense industrial team lead. Nadia holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service and graduated summa cum laude from Barnard College with a B.A. in Political Science and a double-minor in Economics and Environmental Science. She is fluent in Indonesian. Read her fiction writing here.

Image courtesy of Flickr user Chez Julius Livre 1.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.