Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis, Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes

Will China Decide to Reduce Tension in the South China Sea?

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The following piece was originally published on 31 May 2016 by The Straits Times. It is republished here with the authors’ permission. It may be read in its original form here.

By James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo

On May 19, The Straits Times published an article written by Xu Bu, China’s Ambassador to Asean, that criticises US involvement in the South China Sea (“US ‘rebalancing’ is fishing in S. China Sea’s troubled waters”).

Ambassador Xu accused the United States of being the “driving force” behind increased tensions in the region, but his rhetoric is based on faulty assumptions and misinterpretations of the facts and the law.

Mr. Xu suggests that after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the region in 2009, the region “evolved into a disturbing… hot spot,” and that her visit encouraged states to change their policies to confront China.

But China’s problems in the South China Sea were created by conscious decisions in Beijing to insistently use coercion to advance its expansive and unlawful claims, alarming China’s neighbours. And the Philippines and Vietnam clarified their claims in the South China Sea not because of Mrs. Clinton’s visit, but to comply with international law – something China might well consider for itself.

The Philippines did not enact a new baseline law in March 2009 “to claim sovereignty over… Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) and some of the Nansha (Spratly)Islands.”

In fact, Republic Act 9522 was passed to bring the Philippines’ archipelagic baseline system into full compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
ST_20160531_STREBUTTAL_2330015
Filipino students holding anti-Chinese placards during a rally in Manila in March against Chinese vessels reportedly dropping anchor near a South China Sea atoll also claimed by the Philippines. Photo: Agence France-Presse.

Philippine sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal can be traced back to 1800, when the Philippine-based Spanish frigate Santa Lucia surveyed the shoal. Colonial Spain, and later the U.S., effectively administered the shoal and its surrounding waters until the Philippines gained its independence in 1946. Philippine claims to the Spratlys’ Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) date back to 1956; the KIG was formally annexed by Philippine Presidential Decree No. 1599 in 1978.

Similarly, Mr. Xu asserts that Vietnam’s May 2009 submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in which Hanoi claimed an extended continental shelf in the South China Sea and reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands, was somehow linked to Mrs. Clinton’s visit. In fact, Vietnam submitted its claim on May 6 and 7 in order to meet the UN-established deadline – May 13, 2009. Vietnam’s title to the Paracel and Spratly islands is well founded in history and law. Vietnam exercised peaceful, effective and continuous administration of the Paracel Islands from the early 18th century until 1974, when Vietnamese forces were ejected in a short, bloody attack by China – a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

Similarly, Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys can be traced to French annexation and peaceful occupation of the archipelago in the 1930s. Taiwan’s illegal seizure of Itu Aba Island in 1956 and China’s invasion of the Spratlys in 1988 violate Article 2(4) and do not confer lawful title to the Spratlys to either nation.

Turning to Coercion

The wedge between China and Asean with regard to the South China Sea emerged from China’s end to its “peaceful rise,” as it turned towards coercion to bully its neighbours. Noteworthy examples of Chinese aggression include – harassing Vietnamese and Philippine seismic survey ships by cutting their seismic cables and threatening use of force (2011-2012); preventing Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen from pursuing their livelihood in their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by ramming and sinking their boats (2014-2016); seizure of Scarborough Shoal (2012) and Jackson Atoll (2015); conducting military exercises on James Shoal (2013-2014); interfering with the humanitarian resupply of Filipino marines aboard the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal (2014) – a submerged feature on the Philippine continental shelf; conducting oil exploration with the deepwater oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in Vietnam’s EEZ (2014-2016); construction of massive, mid-ocean artificial islands (2013-2016); establishing military installations and radar sites on them, and building airstrips on the features capable of accommodating every military aircraft in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) inventory (2015-2016); and stationing surface-to-air missiles in the Paracels in order to expand its anti-access/area denial envelope (2016).

China took all of these actions and more despite its obligation to comply with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, in which the parties pledge to exercise self-restraint in conducting activities that could complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and to refrain from action of occupying presently uninhabited features.

While all South China Sea claimants reclaimed land to artificially enhance islands in the region, the speed and scale of China’s campaign, combined with aggressive policing of its extravagant nine-dash line claim, have inspired fear.

Since December 2013, China has reclaimed more than 1,295ha of artificial territory. By comparison, Vietnam has reclaimed approximately 32ha; Malaysia, 28ha; the Philippines, 6ha; and Taiwan, 3ha.

In other words, China has reclaimed 17 times more artificial land in two years than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, which accounts for nearly 95 per cent of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.

Mr. Xu also claims Washington encouraged the Philippines to abandon bilateral negotiations with China in favour of litigation at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Philippines, however, neither sought nor needed U.S. approval, and was driven by its own frustration over 20 years of failed bilateral consultations and negotiations with China. The tribunal concurred, noting that “despite years of discussions aimed at resolving the… disputes, no settlement has been reached. If anything, the disputes have intensified.”

Freedom of Navigation Threat

The Ambassador suggests that the U.S. fabricated a threat to freedom of navigation and overflight, which he claims has never been at risk in the South China Sea. Since 2001, however, Chinese ships and aircraft have conducted countless provocative, dangerous and unprofessional challenges and intercepts of U.S. surveillance/ reconnaissance aircraft (such as EP-3 incident 2001, P-8 incident 2014, EP-3 incident 2016); U.S. warships (such as USS John S. McCain 2009, Cowpens 2013, Chancellorsville 2016); and U.S. military survey ships (such as USNS Bowditch 2001/2008, Sumner 2002, Impeccable 2009/2013, Victorious 2009).

China has also issued grave warnings to Indian warships (INS Airavat 2011 and Shivalik 2012) and Australian surveillance aircraft and warships (2015-2016) exercising high sea freedoms in the South China Sea.

Ironically, China is completely hemmed in by neighbouring EEZs, and the PLA Navy operates freely in its neighbours’ EEZs, as well as conducts spying in the U.S. EEZ off Hawaii and Guam.

The U.S. is a treaty alliance partner with five nations in the region – Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand.

Ambassador Xu claims that these long-standing relationships are militarising the region. But American naval force levels and those of its allies are essentially unchanged for 20 years.

Over the past five years, the U.S. transferred three repurposed U.S. ships to the Philippine Navy – BRP Gregorio del Pilar (2011), Ramon Alcaraz (2013) and Gregorio Velasquez (2016), while China launched three new warships in a single day last year! Likewise, the recent agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines to permit American forces occasional access to a handful of Philippine bases is part of the modest rebalance that arose after 15 years of breathtaking increases in the quality and quantity of Chinese warships and military aircraft.

The economic prosperity of the people of South-east Asia is best assured by the peace and security of enduring partnerships between the United States and its friends and allies, and a commitment by all states to a rule-based order in the world’s oceans.

If China is indeed a “strong supporter of a rule-based international order,” as the Ambassador claims, then Beijing has to act as though international law binds and restrains powerful states as well as the weak.

Until that occurs, China will never win the respect of those responsible nations who truly seek peace and prosperity in the Indo-Asia Pacific region.

Raul Pedrozo is a non-resident scholar in the Stockton Centre for the Study of International Law at the US Naval War College. James Kraska is a professor in the centre.

Featured Image: DigitalGlobe, via CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: May 2016 Part Two

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to part two of the May 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past two weeks CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including the future role of the Littoral Combat Ship in the U.S. Navy, the continued development of the U.S. military’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the possibility of reducing tensions in the Western Pacific with an international Standing Naval Group, and the development of an undersea second strike capability for India’s nuclear forces. Read Part One here.

Beginning the roundup with a discussion on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Jerry Hendrix for Defense One argues that the U.S. Navy must adapt a procurement strategy that will emphasize a larger fleet and focus on providing the capacity to maintain a sustainable forward presence in multiple contentious maritime environments. Considering current budgetary constraints and the high costs associated with advanced capability ships, such as a $15 billion dollar aircraft carrier or a $2 billion dollar destroyer, acquiring enhanced LCS’s can provide the Navy with a relatively low-cost yet capable platform suitable for growing the size of the fleet. Mr. Hendrix suggests that to achieve an appropriate fleet size of 350 ships (currently 272) and to continue to promote global maritime stability the LCS should be recognized as a priority for the Navy to deploy in significant numbers.

Dave Majumdar, at The National Interest, provides an overview of the Ohio-class Replacement Program (ORP). Mr. Majumdar notes that Electric Boat will be responsible for about 80 percent of the submarines design and production while Huntington Ingalls Newport News will take on the other 20 percent of design and production work. To reduce costs and inefficiencies affiliated with previous ballistic missile submarine construction, the ships’ designers have applied several technologies and systems used in the Virginia-class ­submarines for the ORP. Mr. Majumdar explains that these cost reductions, in addition to the common missile compartment (CMC), will allow for the ORP to be constructed with minimal delays, which should also limit typical cost overruns associated with nuclear submarine production.

Sam LaGrone, at U.S. Naval Institute News, highlights the continued development of Lockheed Martin’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and the current $321 million dollar contract from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Lockheed is operating under to complete the missile’s critical design review (CDR). After completion of the CDR, testing for use of the air-launch variant of the missile by the Boeing B-1B Lancer supersonic bomber and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter will begin. Mr. LaGrone explains that the LRASM program is part of the Pentagon’s process of substantially improving the military’s decades-old gap in anti-surface weapons.

Entering the Asia-Pacific, Lauren Dickey and Natalie Sambhi at Foreign Entanglements discuss cross-strait developments in the context of Taiwan’s new President while also unpacking China’s security policy beyond the South China Sea. The discussion highlighted the attributes of the current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and how her recent public rejection and criticism of mainland China’s one-child policy reflects the pragmatic and pro-independence perspective that she will likely articulate throughout her time in office. Ms. Dickey and Ms. Sambhi also raised the possibility of increased counterterrorism operations in China to meet heightened domestic security concerns in addition to examining China’s role in driving U.S.-Australian relations.

Steven Wills and his colleague Ronald Harris, at U.S. Naval Institute News, discuss the need for an international solution focused on reducing tensions in the Western Pacific. Mr. Wills and Mr. Harris suggest that establishing a Standing Indo-Pacific Maritime Group (SIPMG) for the purposes of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR), counter-piracy patrols, and general assistance to mariners in distress in international waters can provide a medium through which countries with competing territorial claims in the region can still cooperate and maintain channels of communication. The article explains that the SIPMG would primarily consist of limited capability ships focused on low-threat security operations while the Group’s command structure could be based off of the proven national rotation system used by the Standing North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Maritime Groups.

To conclude the roundup, Harry Kazianis for The Asia Times examines the DF-21D ASBM threat and whether the publicity surrounding the missile in defense circles is warranted. The article references the US-China Economic Security Review Commission Report to highlight the unproven capabilities of the missile, particularly in successfully hitting a moving ship from hundreds or thousands of miles away while the ship is implementing a wide-range of defense and countermeasures against the missile and its targeting systems. The article provides an interesting comparison between the Soviet Union’s development of a submarine-launched ASBM in the 1970’s and China’s current attempt to develop the same long-range ASBM capability. Mr. Kazianis notes that the Soviet Union cancelled the development of the missile due to terminal targeting difficulties, which is an end result that may soon reflect China’s ASBM program. Mr. Kazianis suggests that all contingencies should be prepared for considering Beijing’s access to an advanced satellite and ballistic missile technology base that the USSR lacked over 40 years ago.

CIMSEC Members were active elsewhere in May:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies, international law and defense policy.

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Capability Analysis, Tactical Concepts

Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Part Two

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The following article is part of our cross-posting partnership with Information Dissemination‘s Jon Solomon. It is republished here with the author’s permission. It can be read it in its original form here.

Read part one of this series here.

By Jon Solomon

Was U.S. Navy Tactical Deception Effective?

Since Backfire needed pathfinder support, the U.S. Navy’s key to disrupting if not decapitating a raid by the former was to defeat the latter. As part of my thesis research, I came across much circumstantial evidence that the U.S. Navy’s combination of strict Emission Control (EMCON) discipline, decentralized command and control doctrine, occasional use of lower campaign-value warships to simulate high campaign-value warships, and perhaps even occasional use of electronic jamming gave SOSS controllers and Soviet reconnaissance assets fits during real-world operations. Still, I did not come across any authoritative Russian perspectives on whether or how these U.S. Navy counter-targeting efforts affected Soviet doctrine, tactics, or confidence. That’s what makes the following comment from Tokarev so interesting:

“Moreover, knowing the position of the carrier task force is not the same as knowing the position of the carrier itself. There were at least two cases when in the center of the formation there was, instead of the carrier, a large fleet oiler or replenishment vessel with an enhanced radar signature (making it look as large on the Backfires’ radar screens as a carrier) and a radiating tactical air navigation system. The carrier itself, contrary to routine procedures, was steaming completely alone, not even trailing the formation. To know for sure the carrier’s position, it was desirable to observe it visually.”(Tokarev, Pg. 77)

He goes on to describe a special reconnaissance-attack group of sacrificial bombers that might be detached from an inbound raid to penetrate a naval formation and visually identify the primary targets. Only with positive target designations from these pathfinders, or perhaps from TU-95RT Bear-D reconnaissance aircraft preceding the raid, could Backfire crews have any confidence the single missile they each carried was aimed at a valid and valuable target (Tokarev, Pg. 72, 77). Even then, he observes that “Contrary to widespread opinion, no considerable belief was placed in the ability of launched missiles to resist ECM efforts” (Tokarev, Pg. 75), indicating recognition that the countertargeting battle hardly ended with missile launch.

The one exception to the above contact classification and identification problems would have been a war-opening first salvo attack, in which targeting-quality cues could have been provided to Backfires or other anti-ship missile-carrying assets by any tattletale ships following a carrier closely. While noting the tattletale tactic’s high potential efficacy, Tokarev makes clear it could only be used in peacetime and would never again be possible following hostilities’ outbreak:

“Despite the existence of air reconnaissance systems such as Uspekh, satellite systems like Legenda, and other forms of intelligence and observation, the most reliable source of targeting of carriers at sea was the direct-tracking ship. Indeed, if you see a carrier in plain sight, the only problem to solve is how to radio reliably the reports and targeting data against the U.S. electronic countermeasures. Ironically, since the time lag of Soviet military communication systems compared to the NATO ones is quite clear, the old Morse wireless telegraph used by the Soviet ships was the long-established way to solve that problem. With properly trained operators, Morse keying is the only method able to resist active jamming in the HF band… But the direct tracker was definitely no more than another kind of kamikaze. It was extremely clear that if a war started, these ships would be sent to the bottom immediately. Given that, the commanding officer of each had orders to behave like a rat caught in a corner: at the moment of war declaration or when specifically ordered, after sending the carrier’s position by radio, he would shell the carrier’s flight deck with gunfire, just to break up the takeoff of prepared strikes, fresh CAP patrols, or anything else.” (Tokarev, Pg. 80)

Preventing a tattletale from maintaining track on a carrier accordingly reduced the chances for successfully striking that carrier. Additionally, since not all carriers would be operating forward at the time of the first salvo, those withheld in areas tattletales could not readily access would be more or less immune from large-scale attacks. This would leave the Backfires overwhelmingly dependent upon pathfinders in any later raid attempt.

It should be obvious that EW (and its contemporary cousin, cyber warfare) or tactical deception capabilities on their own are not going to deter an adversary from embarking upon some form of conventional aggression. The adversary’s decision to seek war will always be politically-driven, and the possibility of aggression out of desperation vice opportunism cannot be discounted. To the extent that political and military leaders’ latent psychological perceptions of their forces’ strengths and weaknesses influence their war making calculus, though, efforts to erode an opponent’s confidence in his most doctrinally important military capabilities can induce him to raise his political threshold for resorting to war. Tokarev’s observations therefore imply that Soviet commanders understood the likely cost in their crews’ lives that would be necessary just to provide a raid a chance at success, and that complicating variables such as the U.S. Navy’s demonstrated counter-targeting competencies only made the whole endeavor seem more uncertain and costly. The impact upon general deterrence, while immeasurable in any real sense, obviously was not insignificant.

In part three of the series, an examination of the deception tactics that might have been employed by Backfire raids.

Jon Solomon is a Senior Systems and Technology Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at jfsolo107@gmail.com. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

Future Tech

Naval Applications for Slack: The Collaboration Tool

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Naval Applications of Tech

The following article is the first in CIMSEC’s newest column: Naval Applications of Tech. Written by Terence Bennett, Naval Applications of Tech will discuss how emerging and disruptive technologies can be used to make the U.S. Navy more effective. It will examine potential and evolving developments in the tech industry, communication platforms, computer software and hardware, mechanical systems, power generation, and other areas.

“The most damaging phrase in the language is ‘We’ve always done it this way!’” — Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper in an interview in Information Week, March 9, 1987, p. 52

By Terence Bennett

The Navy has spent many years looking at how to bring the newest information technology to operating forces. A U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article from 1998 criticized the Navy’s resistance to change and recommended setting up local slack-logo_large-1024x403area networks (LAN) using the built-in capabilities of Win95.[1] Technology has come a long way since then, but the use of floppy disks aboard this author’s ship in 2012 indicates that the Navy still has some progress to make. An application, Slack, may be just what the Navy needs.

Microsoft gave us Outlook and PowerPoint and the Navy has not questioned their dominance for 20 years. This author argues that traditional email services are no longer helping a ship’s crew effectively communicate. Leaders may be familiar with sitting in their stateroom or office to send and receive emails, but it is no longer an effective or efficient form of communication. Many organizations, the Navy included, have outgrown this tool for much of its internal communication, though they may not be aware of this. McKinsey, a consultancy, estimated that high-skill knowledge workers (including managers) spend 28 percent of the workweek managing email and 20 percent of the day looking for internal information or tracking down individuals who can help with a specific task (doesn’t that sound familiar…at least we have the 1MC.)[2]

Navy leadership takes pride in the autonomy and independence of a Commanding Officer at sea. But the autonomy of leadership is challenged by the business of meeting the bureaucratic operational and training standards of today’s navy. Leaders are so burdened by relentless requirements and tasks, they are forced to ‘fight the closest fire.’ This is not only a Navy problem. Many civilian companies struggle under the burden of hundreds of emails a day and the reactionary mindset such an environment creates. The McKinsey report finds, “when companies use social media internally, messages become content; a searchable record of knowledge can reduce, by as much as 35 percent, the time employees spend searching for company information.”[3] Slack, an application already available on the open market, facilitates this.

slack-desktop-integrations.0 (1)
Sample Slack window. Image: The Verge.

Slack is a communication tool set  designed by software engineers to streamline their own team’s communication. In that spirit, it is very deliberately built, intuitive to use, and efficiently designed. More relevant to any commander or unit leader looking to streamline their team’s communication, Slack works without the need for any installation or system integration. Users log in and build a team through the Slack website. That’s it.

Time magazine enthusiastically uses Slack in its office, stating:

“Venture-capital darlings Airbnb, BuzzFeed and Blue Bottle Coffee use it. So do Fortune 500 firms like Comcast and Walmart. Teams at NASA and the State Department are on Slack. (More than 2,000 people use Slack at Time Inc., which publishes this magazine and many others.) Not in a generation has a new tool been adopted more quickly by a wider variety of businesses or with such joy.”[4]

Email messages are often hard to follow, thus making tracing decision-making logic more difficult. Email can become especially cumbersome when checking in with teammates, getting updates, or when trying to get a quick ‘RGR.’ Slack is literally changing the way companies operate. It allows all communication to be controlled in one place, integrated cheaply and easily over commercial web browsers on existing architecture. Imagine if all of a ship’s internal email communication was immediately pre-categorized into channels that were searchable. Companies that have successfully integrated Slack now use traditional email only for external communication. As with chat software, organizations use big public channels, private groups, and one-on-one channels. Although many of the embedding features for mobile users and coders may not be useful for the Navy, there are exciting ways to integrate cloud storage, like Dropbox, in the future. The enterprise pricing options start at $8 per month and scale upward.

One big impetus for a shift to Slack is its mobile integration. With the Navy’s move towards the eSailors program and making ships wireless, leaders will have opportunities to stay mobile and work on the move. Putting a tablet in the hands of every Sailor will likely change some of our operations and maintenance procedures. Such connectivity will undoubtedly change the way we communicate and organize. Slack can be the first controlled step towards bringing the Navy into this new and empowering world. Leadership challenges in the Navy may become increasingly difficult under budget constraints and operational requirements, but the new Sailors enlisting in the Navy today have the technological skills to face those challenges. Leadership has an obligation to give them the tools and opportunities to do just that.

LT Bennett is a former Surface Warfare Officer and current Intelligence Officer. The views express herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.

[1] Michael Junge, “Paperless Navy …Pshaw!“, 124 Proceedings Magazine, Jul. 1998.

[2] Michael Chui, James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Charles Roxburgh, Hugo Sarrazin, Geoffrey Sands, and Magdalena Westergren; The Social Economy: Unlocking Value and Productivity Through Social Technologies, McKinsey Gloval Institute, July 2012.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Samuel Jacobs, “How E-mail killer Slack Will Change the Future of Work“, Time Magazine, Oct. 29, 2015.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.