The Four Plus One and Global Mega Trends: General John Allen Addresses NAFAC

By Sally DeBoer

The Forestall Lecture series at the United States Naval Academy affords midshipmen and select guests an opportunity to listen to and learn from a diverse group of speakers, from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to former St. Louis Rams coach football coach Dick Vermeil. From the USNA Public Affairs Office:

The Forrestal Lecture Series was established at the Naval Academy in May 1970 in honor of the late James V. Forrestal who, as one of the foremost proponents of seapower of our era, was instrumental in the development of the modern Navy.

The purpose of this lecture series is to enhance the education, awareness, and appreciation of the members of the Brigade of Midshipmen in the social, political and cultural dimensions of the nation and the world. Featured are leading representatives from various walks of life – government, the arts, humor, literature, education, sports, politics, science, and other major fields on the national and international scene.

The Brigade of Midshipmen, some 4,000-plus strong, and delegates from NAFAC, gathered in Alumni Hall Tuesday night to hear from General John Allen, USMC (ret.), former Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and former Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.  Gen. Allen currently serves as the Chair of the Security and Strategy Department and as Distinguished Fellow in Residence for Foreign Policy at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution. 

Led by a hearty “yut” from what one can only presume was a midshipman who has selected Marine Corps, the brigade and NAFAC welcomed Gen. Allen to the stage. Gen. Allen’s experience in the Near East and East Asia informed his view that it is, indeed, a new era of great power competition – never before, he said, had he seen so many complex issues all at once.

Destabilizing Influences

The construct of the current international system is referred to, Gen. Allen told the Brigade, as the “four plus one,” the four being Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and the plus one representing the extremist jihadi network at large. Gen. Allen cited the annexation of Crimea, Chinese special operators dealing with both the Chinese populace and Uighur population, and the IRGC as destabilizing influences in the modern world. When we talk about these four challenges to the U.S., each has a quality of great power competition associated with it, he said, especially Russia. NAFAC represents an opportunity to take stock of the challenges we face for the road ahead.

The Plus One

“A generation of graduates have known nothing but war – and it may be while before that changes.” ISIS, Gen. Allen said, is merely the latest iteration of the global spread of extremism, and this larger issue is one that worries him the most. In the course of his advisory duties to the president, Gen. Allen expressed that his number one concern is that defeating ISIL physically is not, in fact, an end – they have spread around the world – but the problem of what they stand for is a failure of the human condition in so much of the world today. This dynamic is  due to sea changes in the nature of the world people live in. These changes, Allen explained, may rephrase the question of the international system – the era of great power competition will in fact be shaped by the world we live in and not the other way around.

Global Mega-Trends

The world in which midshipmen and delegates will serve, Gen. Allen warned, will be shaped by the forces affecting the world’s populations – reality is changing quickly and dramatically, and will shape politics, economic opportunity, and the security situation in the world. Gen. Allen familiarized attendees with five global mega-trends, paraphrased below:

  • Shift of Economic Power from West to East: Western states are losing economic clout to Asia. GDP growth in the East (China, India, Russia, Indonesia) will dwarf that of the West by 2050 by nearly 75 trillion dollars – this wealth will be available to be applied to education and armament. While this wealth is migrating, it leaves one country after another bereft of resources, which leads to the next trend, changes in demography.
  • Demographic Changes: The world’s population is changing in ways we must understand to lead forces in tomorrow’s world. Allen explained that the worldwide average age will increase by 8 years to 60 years of age in much of the developing world, leading to a smaller, less productive work force with huge strains on the social safety net and health care. In the developing world, the population will change in the opposite direction due to a “youth bulge” or “youth surge,” growth of the 15-29 age group is outstripping the rest of the population, leading to increased expectations for access to goods, education, and wealth – 129 million men and women around the world turn 16 each year, and 90 percent of these newly minted adults are in developing countries who are already struggling to provide for their populations. As these numbers grow and their nations become less capable of meeting demand, the disparity creates large groups of disaffected people – this is the “ticking time bomb” for radicalization, Gen. Allen contends, which creates huge reservoirs of easily recruited and vulnerable populations.
  • Rapid Urbanization: Rapid movement of people into cities is one of the greatest challenges we will face, specifically land forces, in tomorrow’s conflicts. A mega-city is by definition made up of 10 million or more; by 2030 50 percent of the world population will live in mega cities, and up to 75 percent by 2050. Eight of ten mega cities are in Asia, and of the top five, all are in Asia. Gen. Allen explained that the primary issue with this is the strain on the infrastructure of these cities – sanitation, electricity, waste, poor air quality, and more. The challenge of rapid urbanization demands the West help these populations prepare with urban planning, energy, and infrastructure. As these populations move to cities, we hear the term “mega slum,” an area attached to a city where the population lives off the grid and independent of governance. So-called “no go” areas are becoming prevalent. “Ungoverned space” is another oft-used term (though the General expressed a dislike for this term in particular). Such places, he concluded, become a haven and platform for criminals and extremists. Gen. Allen’s challenge in Afghanistan became, secondarily, to fight against highly and well organized criminal networks that “govern” in these ungoverned spaces – and plan tomorrow’s wars and attacks with impunity.
  • The Rise of Technology: Tech, Gen. Allen explained, has changed our lives rapidly in ways that are helpful and dynamic, but has also introduced associated national security challenges. The proliferation of network capable devices has brought a direct assault on the Western system of government. The Islamic State, for instance, has UAVs, some of which are armed. Non-state actors and extremists have sophisticated hacking capabilities that create ad hoc hacker armies to attack the U.S. and our allies. State actors are also using networks to exploit and penetrate the U.S. and our allies to interrupt democracy. Hacking at a state and non-state level will define tomorrow’s conflict. Gen. Allen warned: [we] can physically defeat a force, but defeating an idea rides on the internet of things and social media – we must be able to compete with [adversaries] in this domain. Al Qaeda was sophisticated, Gen. Allen recalled, but AQ never embraced tech the same way as the Islamic state – all the “plus ones” of the future will be powered by emerging tech.
  • Global Warming: Gen. Allen tackled the topic of climate change and coming resource scarcity unambiguously. “It’s not a theory, not abstract, it is happening…it is a fact, and not an alternative fact,” he stated plainly, leading to applause from the audience. For the Near East, North Africa, and Central and South Asia, the resulting desertification will further accelerate urbanization. Larger populations will demand more resources. Gen. Allen concluded: when we discuss great powers, it’s not a clash of values we should be worried about…in the 2050 world, the clash will be over will be over scarce resources.

Conclusion

When we consider the prospect of great power competition, we must consider these mega trends. Gen. Allen emphasized the need to study these forces, and soon, before the very different world of 2050 arrives.  Though the tone of his remarks was foreboding and serious, in a response to a question from an audience member, Gen. Allen addressed what the United States and its allies can do to prepare for and anticipate these coming challenges. He outlined some primary steps: 1) Embrace the changes and make global commitments to change. Examples include long-term and enforceable climate change agreements. 2) Work with states on urban planning, human services, and more to improve conditions in mega-slums, as well as help countries accumulate resources to provide for their populations. Germany’s Marshall Plan 2.0 provides an excellent example. These will require courage, cooperation, coalition, and sharing, he conceded, but these qualities will be necessary for tomorrow’s leaders.

Sally Deboer is serving as the President of CIMSEC for 2016-2017. She can be reached at president@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: General Allen addresses the Brigade and NAFAC on stage at the Naval Academy’s Alumni Hall. Photo credit: NAFAC PAO Staff, special thanks to MIDN Danny Vegel.

Sea Control 131 – Stefan Lundqvist on the Baltic Sea

Join the latest episode of Sea Control for an interview with Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist of the Swedish Defence University. Hosted by Adrian Neumann of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, the conversation examines the growing tensions in the Baltic Sea between Russia and Western countries.

Download Sea Control 131 – The Baltic Sea

LtCdr Stefan Lundqvist is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Åbo Akademi University, Finland, studying the post-Cold War Maritime Security changes among Western states. He is a teacher of Joint and Naval Operations at the Swedish Defence University, specialised in Operations Assessment. He joined the Royal Swedish Navy in 1987 and has served in various staff positions since 1998. His latest publications are “Why teaching comprehensive operations planning requires transformational learning” (2015), Defence Studies, 15(2): 175–201; “Cultivating Regional Maritime Security: Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea” (IOS-Press, 2015) (co-authored with J. J. Widen), in Chapsos I. and Kitchen C. (eds.) Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation; “From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens and National Economies: Current Changes in Maritime Security” (2013), Journal of Defence Studies, 7(3): 57–80.

NAFAC: RADM John Kirby’s Favorite Acronyms and Questioning U.S. Primacy

By Sally and Michael DeBoer

For the past fifty-six years, the United States Naval Academy has hosted the Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference (NAFAC). NAFAC, planned and executed by the midshipmen themselves, brings together outstanding undergraduate delegates as well as notable speakers, scholars, and subject matter experts from around the nation and the world to discuss a current and relevant international relations issue. The theme for this year’s conference,  A New Era of Great Power Competition?, seeks to explore the shifting dynamics of the international system, challenges to a U.S. – led world order, the nature of potential future conflicts, the challenge of proto-peer competitors and rising powers, as well as what steps the U.S. might take to remain the primary arbiter of the international system at large. As this topic is of great interest to CIMSEC’s readership, we are proud to partner with NAFAC to bring you a series of near real-time posts from the day’s events in Annapolis. CIMSEC would like to recognize MIDN 1/C Charlotte Asdal, NAFAC Director, and her staff for allowing us to participate in this year’s events and for inviting our readership to virtually share in the week’s rich academic and policy environment.

Keynote Address: RADM John Kirby (ret)

After introductory remarks from MIDN Charlotte Asdal, NAFAC Director, and VADM Walter E. Carter, Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy, the events of the conference kicked off in earnest with the LCDR J.J. Connell Keynote Address from Rear Admiral John Kirby (Ret), former Pentagon press secretary and State Department Spokesman. 

RADM Kirby’s address engaged delegates, midshipmen, and guests largely on the topic of “how the best decisions are reached and communicated.” In keeping with omnipresent military tradition, the admiral introduced his audience to a series of acronyms he suggested would aid future decision-makers faced with difficult decisions. His first example stemmed from his time in Afghanistan. In 2012, faced with escalating violence following a scandal, Kirby recalled his then-boss, Gen. John Allen kept an acronym in mind – NIDBIT – No Decision Before its Time. Artificial pressure to make a decision, he went on to describe, leads to mistakes, and decision-makers and leaders should not “rush to failure.” Reminding oneself of NIDBIT makes for better tactical and policy decisions, and sends a better strategic message, leading to a more credible organization. Not making a decision right away can buy space, allow leaders to define the principal issue, and let values guide their decision making process. Interests are more effectively secured, he elaborated, when they align with your values. 

RADM Kirby takes a question from the audience.

This point led the retired admiral to his next acronym, KIP – Keep it in Perspective. Kirby characterized the current environment as a post-audience world, meaning people are no longer satisfied by knowing what one is doing but why as well. RADM Kirby advised leaders to “stand back from the crush of headlines, the power of myth, and chart a course that when looked back upon reveals the wisdom of your leadership.” Drawing upon wisdom he had received, he surmised that the best leaders see themselves as part of a continuum of events, rather than problem solvers of the moment. 

RADM Kirby’s final acronym – WWTS – What Would They Say, informed much of his thought process as a public affairs professional in both a military and civilian context. By keeping an open mind and incorporating a variety of perspectives, even though they may be antithetical to one’s own views, allows a decision-maker to consider rebuttals to tough criticism and lends oneself to “sustainable policy and compromise, good sense, civility, and  practicality.” To this end, Admiral Kirby advised audience members to go about following someone they do not agree with on Twitter or some other social media outlet. Social media’s promise of an expanded worldview is a false one, Kirby articulated; indeed, the sheer volume of media and sources makes us self-select what information and perspective we consume – because we can – and this makes a decision-maker’s universe small and myopic. WWTS allows one to resist this.

Kirby’s remarks concluded with a period for questions from the audience. The most widely discussed question came from a delegate who inquired how decision-makers can best account for high degrees of ambiguity from a foreign policy perspective. Admiral Kirby responded that in the foreign policy realm, all actors come with their own interests and may not be as forthcoming [as the United States] – the Russian Federation is, in his experience, a case in point – when actors’ interests and values are not aligned, one must be able and willing to recognize and anticipate reactions. RADM Kirby’s statements set a tone of open-mindedness and questioning for the day ahead.

Round Tables

Round tables, held daily over the three-day span of the conference, provide midshipmen and their peer delegates an opportunity to present their own research and thoughts on a variety of topics germane to the discussion of great power competition in the 21st century. On Tuesday, CIMSEC representatives attended two of these discussions – Springtime for Putin: The Reawakening of the Russian Bear and Anyplace, Anywhere, Anytime: Power Projection and Sea Control in a Multipolar World. Readers can look for select publications from the Round Tables next week, when CIMSEC will share outstanding research essays from delegates. 

Panel Discussion: Are We Actually in a New Era of Great Power Competition?

Note: The following information is paraphrased from the panelists’ remarks – their thoughts, remarks, and research are their own and are reproduced here for the information of our audience only.

Moderated by Lt Col (Ret) Scott Cooper, USMC, the first panel of the conference tackled the central question of the week; subject matter expert panelists, including William Ruger, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO institute, Shawn Brimley, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, and Brigadier General Se Woo Pyo, Republic of South Korea Defense Attache to the United States, characterized the current direction of the international system as it relates to our contemporary understanding of relationships between great powers. Each panelist was given an opportunity to provide foundational remarks in response to an open ended question, followed by a period of questions from the audience. 

The CATO Institute’s Mr. William Ruger was asked to elaborate on an assertion he made in his August 2016 piece published on War on the Rocks in which he and his co-author Christopher Preble stated: For decades, U.S. foreign policy has followed a quixotic goal of primacy, or global hegemony. It presumes that the United States is the indispensable nation, and that every problem, in any part of the world, must be resolved by U.S. leadership or else will impact American safety

Ruger contended that the U.S. has been following a policy of liberal hegemony to preserve its role in the world, and key features of this pursuit include the assumption that most problems in the world are threats to American safety and interests. In this view, he went on to explain, all problems are interconnected, there are no seams, and this assumption requires the U.S. to show resolve and provide leadership on threats proactively and reactively. This policy also requires, Ruger went on to articulate, the U.S. to challenge potential regional hegemons and also aim to spread U.S. values even through use of force, requiring a very large, expensive, and globally deployed military as well as a vast network of allies. Lastly, it requires occasional warfighting to extinguish threats.

The U.S. is a great country, Ruger said, but need not be seen as indispensable to protect and defend its interests. Ruger expressed his doubts regarding the value of primacy based on three major factors, paraphrased below:

1) Washington, DC is a “threat inflation machine,” any kind of problem is inflated, realists see the world as it is and do not engage in threat inflation or naivety, instead choosing to see things “as they are.”

2) Though the U.S. is actually very secure in terms of the global history of great powers, we have internalized a security view that doesn’t check with this reality. The U.S. spends as much as the next eight countries combined on defense, and three times as much as Russia and China combined. Further, nuclear weapons play a key role in reducing any threat to the homeland, and this is unique to this period in history. U.S. conventional deterrence is also high.

3) Geography still matters, and it is still difficult to project power across oceans. We have weak or nonthreatening neighbors, something other great powers in history have not enjoyed.

Mr. Ruger concluded his opening remarks by expressing his doubt that Russia and China are unlikely to become truly peer competitors to the U.S anytime soon. Russia’s economy, for instance, dependent on natural resources, is limping, and so they lack an engine to drive the necessary growth. This is complicated by a deepening demographic crisis. China is a rising power, he conceded, but it still has low per capita GDP, corruption problems, cronyism, environmental challenges, ethnic conflict potential, and no blue water navy comparable to the United States’ current force. The nature of the architecture of A2/AD forces will prevent China from moving from the first island chain. The situation for the U.S. and their allies is actually quite good, Ruger concluded. 

Shawn Brimley, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, was prompted to discuss his War on the Rocks column: For an Audience of One: Re-booting Agenda SecDef, which is explicitly directed to the Secretary of Defense.

L to R – William Ruger, Sean Brimley, Brig. Gen Pyo, and Moderator Lt Col (Ret) Scott Cooper, USMC. 

Brimley began by characterizing the situation the Trump Administration inherited. On the positive side, Brimley explained, the killing of Osama Bin Laden showed the growth of the special ops community and their capabilities, alliances in the Asia-Pacific are stronger and more resilient after the Obama Administration’s rebalance, and finally, the international system is currently free of outright great power conflict. On the negative side, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan rage on and continue to be complicated, the reduction of forces in Iraq was possibly too steep and sowed seeds for the rise of ISIS, and the United States’ strategy in Syria remains opaque, particularly with regard to the fate of the Assad regime.

With respect to Russia and China, Brimley expressed concern but not surprise at their actions, as he believes them to be rational actors pursuing their respective interests. Russia, he explained, is testing the limits of their ambitions, but remains a deeply weak country – the problem as Brimley sees it is how to deal with Russia as a declining world power. As for China, Brimley concluded that they are indeed an emerging great power, but articulated that China isn’t seeking to create tension for tension’s sake, but rather in the pursuit of  perceived real national interests. China’s assertive behavior, Brimley summarized, is rational and predictable.

Mr. Brimley went on to typify the military operational environment. He explained that the modest increase in the defense budget proposed by the Trump Administration won’t eliminate tough choices for DoD. For instance, the Navy must decide on what it wants as a service, as must the other services, and no amount of money will preclude these choices. Lastly, Brimley explained that the days of uncontested technological superiority are over for the U.S. – the world has changed and decision-makers must internalize this – qualitative superiority is no longer assured. Mass as an element of warfare, he concluded, will be increasingly important in an age of precise munitions.

Brigadier General Se Woo Pyo, Republic of South Korea Defense Attache to the United States and 1990 graduate of West Point, was queried on how the world had changed in the 30 years since he began his service in defense of the Republic of Korea. His answer, which he characterized as almost “too easy,” was that the situation on the Korean Peninsula had not actually changed much at all. The strategic environment has not changed, he said; the Cold War still exists on the Korean Peninsula and along the DMZ – the two sides have been at a tense standoff this entire time. The cost has been high for South Koreans: North Korea (DPRK) sunk the South Korean Corvette Cheonan, bombarded the South Korean Western Islands, and precipitated other incidents in which South Korean lives were lost. The Republic of Korea was determined to retaliate, General Brigadier General Se Woo Pyo explained, and field commanders were given authority to fire on DPRK positions in response to incoming rounds.

ROK soldier preparing for counter fire after the surprise shelling by North Korea, November 23, 2010. (ROK MND)

The intent of this South Korean posture is not to start a war but to deter – “[they] are very careful to deter by showing willingness and  capability [to act], but simultaneously resisting a skirmish that would move into full-scale war. This kind of environment, Brigadier General Se Woo Pyo went on to describe, informs the sensitivity of ROK leaders and citizens to action against North Korean provocation.

With regard to the recent movement of the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the General emphasized concern and close communications between U.S. and Korean leadership. When the CSG moves into the Western Pacific, however, speculation occurs in the South Korean press regarding unilateral action by the U.S., crisis and war, despite these close consultations. The public perception in South Korea, he articulated,  does not reflect this reality and is hard to control. Indeed, the Korean Peninsula still experiences Cold War concerns and dynamics to this day.

The general was also careful to point out changes since the Cold War. The rise of China and continued influence over neighboring states is the primary concern of Koreans, he stated, while Russia is no longer a huge concern or determining factor in Korean decision-making. Competition between China and the U.S. will shape almost all foreign policy decisions for other nations. General Se Woo Pyo was careful to point out that he doesn’t think China espouses one core value that other nations will strive for. Hardware doesn’t lend great power status – “software” remains extremely important, and in that sense, he explained, the U.S. has the advantage. 

Conclusion

While the morning keynote came off as light, digestible, and thoughtful, the afternoon panel’s tone proved more somber and a little surprising. In some ways, the spoken points of Dr. Ruger and Dr. Brimley echoed the foreign policy debates of the election cycle. Ruger repeatedly reasserted his misgivings about the U.S.-led alliance system, but did not clearly articulate what those misgivings were. Likewise, Dr. Brimley, while appearing more mainstream in his views of the use of American power abroad, forwarded his own dreary assessment of the likelihood of funding the defense accounts to a level that would assure continued American access. Of the three, it appeared Brigadier Pyo maintained the most nuanced view, reciting a vivid recollection of the shared U.S.-Korean experience and what the alliance meant to his people and to stability in East Asia.  

More to follow from NAFAC.

Sally DeBoer is the President of CIMSEC for 2016-2017. She can be reached at president@cimsec.org.

Mike DeBoer is a naval officer and regular contributor to CIMSEC.

Special thanks to the MIDN Danny Vegel and his Midshipmen PAO staff for the photos used in this post.

Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security in 2016

By Dirk Steffen

2016 witnessed a marked increase in maritime security incidents over the previous year, irrespective of the counting standards. Denmark-based Risk Intelligence counted 119 verified attacks by criminals on all kinds of vessels in West Africa (Senegal to Angola) – compared with 82 in 2015. The vast majority of attacks in 2016 were perpetrated by Nigerian criminals, including all of the 84 that were concentrated in and around Nigerian waters.

However, as alarming as such figures may seem, 2016 was neither unusually busy nor were there any significant changes to the patterns of maritime crime in West Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea, when assessed in the long term. Over a 9-year period (since 2007), the average number of maritime security incidents for West Africa is 122 – typically ranging between 80 and 140 per year. Of this figure, Nigerian waters alone account for an average of 87 attacks per year.

Annual pirate and piracy-related attacks against shipping in West Africa (Senegal to Angola) 2007-2016. (MaRisk by Risk Intelligence)

Throughout this period, maritime kidnappings steadily increased and focused almost exclusively on Nigerian waters. Since 2013, maritime kidnappings have accounted for around 30 percent of all attacks (including failed attacks) off Nigeria. In 2016, most successful kidnappings were concentrated in two cycles of attacks: the first in January to mid-May 2016 (mirroring almost exactly the development of 2013), the second in the last two months of the year. Hijackings, a common feature during the MEND insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2006-2009, and again during the period of tanker hijackings between late 2010 and 2013, have all but stopped, following the successful intervention of the Nigerian Navy against the hijackers of the tanker MAXIMUS in February 2016.

The real strategic concern for the Nigerian government in 2016 was the resurgent Niger Delta insurgency. It was spearheaded by a group called the “Niger Delta Avengers,” whose campaign of oil and gas infrastructure disruption reduced the Nigerian oil output to a historic low of 1.1m barrels per day (bpd) (vis-à-vis the projected 2.2-2.4m bbpd and the average 1.75m bbpd on average in 2015) during the summer of 2016. One impact on maritime security was the disruption of crude oil loading and an increased demand for petroleum products (due to Nigerian refineries being cut off from their crude oil supplies), thus creating, at least in theory, a more target-rich environment. However, the dynamics of maritime insecurity in Nigeria are historically driven by other factors. As the insurgency went through its customary cycles of issuing threats, militant action, and “cease-fires” to regroup and reiterate demands, the maritime security situation displayed an inverse correlation: the spate of attacks reminiscent of the first 4 months of 2013 swept across the seas off the Niger Delta between March and mid-May 2016, followed by a lull as militant groups were actively engaged in onshore violence throughout the summer. Offshore attacks returned to the waters outside the Niger Delta in November and December 2016 because of calmer weather, cyclical pre-Christmas criminal activity, and lower onshore militancy. This pattern suggests that at the tactical level, the “attackers” ,when not employed in militancy, oil theft, illegal bunkering or gang warfare, engage in piracy to cover some of their funding needs.

The wider Gulf of Guinea was less affected by these developments than it was when the tanker hijackings originating from Nigeria peaked in 2011-12. While the capability to enforce security even in very limited parts of their territorial waters remains constrained for some nations, like Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Liberia or Sierra Leone, organized piracy has not really taken hold in any of those places. In Guinea-Conakry, however, members of the armed forces are engaged in armed robbery at sea and extortion of foreign fishing vessels, even in neighboring Sierra Leone. Ghana experienced a spate of petty thefts at Takoradi anchorage, which gave it some bad press, but no violence against crews was reported. By and large, when speaking of “Gulf of Guinea piracy” as a problem for international shipping, it is Nigerian piracy that we mean. Other forms of maritime crime, on the other hand, such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), smuggling of oil, drugs, agricultural products and other goods were – and are – the more pressing day-to-day challenges for coastal nations in the region.

Piracy and maritime security incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (Ivory Coast to Gabon) in 2016. (MaRisk by Risk Intelligence)

It is important to understand that many acts of Nigerian “piracy” also have a hidden context that the uncritical reporting in the international press is unaware of. Locally trading product tankers are often attacked, and crew members kidnapped or cargo stolen, as a part of criminal “turf” wars or other disputes between criminal parties. The kidnapping of crew members from fishing (and refrigerated cargo) vessels is often related to extortion within the criminal business of illegal fishing and transhipment of catch. This may, for example, have been the case on 27 November 2016, when the SARONIC BREEZE was attacked 80 nm off Cotonou. The Panama-flagged vessel, according to the Benin Navy, was in a different place than where it should have been (at the anchorage) when it was attacked and three crew members kidnapped.

Regional Cooperation

Against this slightly disconcerting backdrop, there is the gradual increase of political will and ability by some West African nations to take ownership of maritime security. Following the successful rescue of the MAXIMUS, the Nigerian Navy launched Operation ‘Tsare Teku’ in the face of intense pirate activity, and prolonged the operation throughout summer, while being engaged in counterinsurgency operations at the same time. While the impact of the operation was assessed as modest even by Nigerian planners, it demonstrated that the Nigerians were, for the first time, publicly owning up to the problem of maritime piracy emanating from their country. More recently, the flag officer commanding the Eastern Naval Command, Rear Adm. James Oluwole, quite rightly pointed out that the lack of prosecution reduced any effectiveness the Navy might have in the battle against maritime criminals.

Naval police stand guard as suspected pirates are paraded aboard a naval ship after their arrest by the Nigerian Navy at a defense jetty in Lagos, August 20, 2013. (Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye)

The lack of prosecution, and in many cases the lack of legislation that permits prosecution of pirates, is still one of the shortfalls of the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as it came under review in mid-2016, when its initial three-year trial period ended. Information sharing, maritime domain awareness, and maritime law enforcement capacities and capabilities vary sharply throughout the region, and are by and large wholly insufficient, although measurable progress has been made in all fields. Nigeria, as the main country of origin for serious criminals in maritime piracy, is in the process of passing a law that will allow it to prosecute pirates who had hitherto gone unpunished or were indicted for lesser crimes.

The Role of Private Maritime Security

Gulf of Guinea states remain wary of private security solutions, yet various models of private-public security partnerships exist in the region. In Benin and Togo, both navies operate “secured anchorages,” in addition to providing embarked teams of navy troops through agents and local security companies. In Ghana and Cameroon, naval or, in the case of Cameroon’s Battalion d’Intervention Rapide (BIR), army protection can be obtained through direct liaison with those nations’ militaries.

The most unusual arrangement though has evolved in Nigeria. Although various models have been employed by security companies and shipping companies, not always with authorization by the Nigerian government, the pre-eminent security solution is the security vessel or patrol boat. Security vessels have a long history that date back to the early 2000s, when the first armed unrest spread onto the creeks and off the Niger Delta. Typically, the security vessels of that era were ordinary offshore support vessels with four to six embarked soldiers. These vessels were (and still are) predictably ineffective against groups of heavily armed attackers, who engage with two to three large speedboats, often with one or two general purpose machine guns between them.

Converted offshore service vessels with improvised firing positions, like these two fast crew and supply boats at Borokiri (Port Harcourt), form the bulk of Nigeria’s privately contracted “auxiliary” navy. (Dirk Steffen)

The model of choice though, originally conceived at the height of the Niger Delta insurgency between 2006 and 2009, was for private companies to supply and maintain patrol boats, which would be put at the disposal of the then dysfunctional Nigerian Navy. When not on military business, those vessels and their Nigerian Navy gun crews with mounted weapons and ammunition would be available for protection missions for commercial clients. Sixteen Nigerian companies entered such an agreement with the Nigerian Navy in 2016 under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), effectively providing the bulk of offshore oil field security, and increasing the amount of merchant vessel protection in- and outbound from Nigerian ports. A privately operated joint venture also manages the secure anchorage off Lagos, the only such dedicated area in the region officially promulgated on admiralty charts.

More than 100 such privately contracted security vessels are in operation in Nigerian waters. No one knows the exact number – not even the Nigerian Navy. The quality of these vessels varies – ranging from purpose-built law-enforcement and patrol boats to hastily converted offshore support vessels (or vessels with embarked troops only.) While this contractor fleet provides a welcome relief for the Nigerian Navy, which has only a few assets capable of patrolling the exclusive economic zone, it also presents a major headache for the Nigerian Navy’s operations department to monitor the activities of these contracted patrol boats and supply men, weapons, and ammunition to them and ensure compliance with the terms of the MoU.

NNS GBEDE, a privately contracted patrol boat, returns to Port Harcourt from sea trials on the Bonny River (Nigeria). These boats are examples of the type of vessels envisaged by the Nigerian Navy’s Memorandum of Understanding with private maritime security companies. (Dirk Steffen)

The document envisages a partnership between the Nigerian Navy and the private companies for maintenance, training, welfare, and information sharing, thus leveraging the Navy’s “investment” in terms of hard-to-get trained personnel and weapons into the public-private partnerships. Unfortunately, most companies appear to consider the partnership as an “optional” element of their relationship with the Navy. This is compounded by commercial and contractual pressures that preclude many security vessels from rendering assistance to attacks or incidents other than those involving their clients. Unless the MoU is enforced more rigorously, it is therefore unlikely that anyone except for a handful of commercial clients with sufficiently deep pockets will benefit from this arrangement.

Conclusion

Despite the brief surges of offshore piracy in 2016, the Gulf of Guinea remains “business as usual” in terms of maritime security, with incidents in Nigerian waters or emanating from Nigeria accounting for the lion’s share of incidents. For the other West African countries, with a few exceptions, piracy is persistent, but one of the lesser problems in a region characterized by weak maritime governance.

For Nigeria, 2016 was one of the hardest years since the county’s return to democracy in 1999, politically and economically. While the “Niger Delta Avengers” failed to incite a broad-based insurgency in the Niger Delta, their pinpoint targeting of critical oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta was more effective than MEND ever was in that respect; even the temporary loss of control of considerable territory in the northeast to Boko Haram in 2013-14 was strategically less significant.

The onshore security situation in the Niger Delta had a direct impact on the maritime security situation in Nigerian waters and the wider Gulf of Guinea. The seesaw between onshore violence and surges of offshore piracy underlines that while Buhari and his government have made some inroads against the “godfather” system, the latter is far from defeated. It continues to bind criminal, economic, and political interests in Nigeria together. Nigeria will thus remain the nexus for organized crime in western Africa and any regional efforts can only contain the maritime element of this threat until the problem is solved in Nigeria.

Private maritime security will likely remain the (expensive) sticking plaster to fix the situation for commercial ship operators in the short term. However, few of the models in use, short of purpose-built and suitably armed patrol boats, are likely to provide any meaningful deterrent against Nigerian pirates in particular, who are both capable and willing to overcome armed resistance. Except for Ghana and Cameroon (where the use of naval/army assets for commercial purposes is severely circumscribed), none of the “private” or public-private maritime security solutions is likely to enhance the scarce maritime security assets and capabilities of the West African nations.

Dirk Steffen is a Commander (senior grade) in the German Naval Reserve with 12 years of active service between 1988 and 2000. He took part in the African Partnership Station exercises OBANGAME EXPRESS 2014, 2015 and 2016 at sea and ashore for the boarding-team training and as a Liaison Naval Officer on the exercise staff. He is normally Director Maritime Security at Risk Intelligence (Denmark) when not on loan to the German Navy. He has been covering the Gulf of Guinea as a consultant and analyst since 2004. The opinions expressed in this article are his alone, and do not represent those of any German military or governmental institutions.

Featured Image: A Nigerian Marine Police checkpoint on the Bonny River designed to intercept illegally refined petroleum products from being marketed in Port Harcourt. Endemic corruption in Nigeria’s police force casts some doubt on the effectiveness of such measures. Photo: Dirk Steffen.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.