The Expeditionary Sea Base as a Nucleus for Regional Maritime Security Learning and Cooperation

By Commander Daniel T. Murphy, U.S. Navy

Knowing How to Coalesce

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment has yet again predicted an increasingly complex global security environment and recommends that U.S. military services collaborate more with regional allies.1 In recent years, U.S. forces conducted additional and more extensive bilateral and multilateral joint training, exercises, and operations across all geographic combatant commands, especially in the maritime domain. As a result, the world’s waterways remained relatively safe. When threats did emerge or increase in specific localities (as now in the Red Sea), regional coalition navies, already regularly training and exercising together, responded with scaled-up operations, adjusted their tactics as necessary, and imposed a settling of the security situation. Sometimes, we (U.S. forces) take a leading role, and other times, we do not. Either way, the world’s maritime services seem to intuitively know how to coalesce. This is good news because the ability to coalesce can be built upon, especially in the problematic regions of the world. So, what enables that coalescence?

Expeditionary Sea Bases as an Organizational Learning Nucleus

A 2019 study explored how organizational learning within the U.S. maritime services (both Navy and Coast Guard) and with partner countries is partly the reason for that coalescence. Organizational learning is a theory, a body of frameworks and methods by which organizations or groups of larger enterprise-level organizations learn and improve over time. The study presented evidence that organizational learning in the maritime security domain evolves in stages, and the evolution can be accelerated through purposefully dedicated organizational learning elements or “nuclei.” Over time, “nuclei” inject and normalize organizational learning principles and methods into an organization’s day-to-day routines. Some examples are the Navy’s various schoolhouses dedicated to specific mission areas and jobs (rates), the Naval War College, and afloat training groups.2 The study suggests more can be accomplished by placing organizational learning centers in multiple geographic regions.

The Navy’s expeditionary sea base (ESB) is exactly the right platform to serve as an organizational learning nucleus in each regional combatant command. The 90,000-ton ESB has an overall length of 785 feet, a 164-foot beam, a 40-foot draft, a 15-knot speed, and a range of 9,500 nautical miles. According to Navy documents, the ESB serves as a sea-based platform for airborne mine countermeasures, special operations forces staging, and a “transfer vessel,” or “lily pad,” for moving equipment and cargo between ships and shore when a land base is unavailable.3

The ESB has one of the largest flight decks in the Navy, with four rotary-wing landing spots. Beneath the flight deck is a mission deck that can accommodate a multitude of special, coastal, and mine warfare vessels. The mission deck provides 25,000 square feet for containerized “plug-and-play” modules like command and control or battle management, living quarters, medical facilities, and weapons. Weapon modules could include the venerable high-mobility artillery rocket system. Other potential payloads include heavy equipment and supplies.

An ESB is crewed by civilians from Military Sealift Command and military personnel commanded by a Navy Captain. The ESB’s aft superstructure includes workspaces and berthing for 44 civilian mariners responsible for the ship’s navigation, deck operations, maintenance, and damage control. The ship’s forward superstructure houses 100 Navy officers and sailors, accommodations for 250 embarked personnel, multiple networked workspaces, a large helicopter hangar, and several sizeable armories and magazines. The Navy crew and embarked personnel are responsible for all operational command and control, air operations, weapons handling and management, mission deck operations, and force protection. Four ESBs have been delivered to the Navy thus far, with the fifth, the USS Robert E. Siamnek (ESB-7), currently under construction.4

The Expeditionary Sea Base USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4) sails in the Atlantic Ocean, Oct. 17, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo)

The ship’s ability to carry embarked personnel and its large flight and mission deck make the ESB a potentially significant organizational learning nucleus. The following vignette will provide an example use case in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations. The ESB can accommodate more than twice the number of partner country liaison personnel that typically come together yearly to participate in regional exercises such as Panamax. With its numerous workspaces, the ESB would accommodate all joint staff and partner country liaison elements. The flight deck would serve every rotary wing aircraft type flown by partner nations. These capabilities are demonstrated. During its 2020 deployment in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean, USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3) operated nine different types of aircraft and unmanned systems from multiple joint and coalition partners. By deployment’s end, more than 1,200 launches and recoveries were executed.5

Similarly, the ESB’s mission deck would provide a rafting and support platform for virtually every coalition partner patrol vessel in Southern Command. For example, Colombia’s new fourth-generation Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial riverine vessel and Mexico’s Tenochtitlan and Interceptor-class coastal patrol vessels. Partner navies could potentially develop dedicated containerized mission support centers and berthing compounds to integrate with the ESB’s mission deck. Recent ESB deployments in Central Command and European Command demonstrated the ship’s ability to raft and support various patrol craft-sized vessels.

New Platform + Paradigm Shift = Force Multiplier

The ESB is uniquely qualified for the role proposed in this article; however, the author would like to emphasize that the recommendation is not only the repurposing or reorienting of a type of ship. The idea is to use the ESB as a nucleus for something new and transformational. To begin with, the vessel would become the centerpiece of most annual large-scale exercises like Panamax. Between exercises, the ESB would visit partner nations and participate in regular day-to-day operations, potentially helping those countries extend the range, endurance, and capabilities of their patrol vessels and aircraft (including unmanned systems) for enforcement activities like combatting piracy, drug smuggling, and illegal fishing. While these enforcement activities seem a low priority for U.S. naval assets, such activities enforce sovereignty, elevate the legitimacy of local governments, and provide area stabilization with increased maritime domain awareness.

From a personnel standpoint, the ESB should carry a permanently embarked multi-national organizational learning team of three to four members to provide a battle-rhythmic, regionally focused lessons-learned capability. The team would observe daily operations, facilitate assessment and reflective sessions, and develop and disseminate refined tactics, techniques, and procedures to all coalition partners. The goal is to significantly sharpen interoperability. While the team might include a combatant command’s knowledge manager or a Joint Lessons Learned Information System operator, the group would be led by a senior naval officer. This naval officer must understand the idea of the ESB mission as something big, new, and transformational. The team leader role could rotate between countries, as does leadership with other combined commands, such as Combined Task Force 153. Reservists could also play a significant role in reducing the burden on already stretched active-duty crews.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 19, 2021) Sailors assigned to expeditionary sea base USS Miguel Keith (ESB 5) stand in formation on the flight deck as the ship sails in the Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Hector Carrera)

Imagine a Scenario

Imagine a 2004 large-scale natural disaster, like a Tsunami, somewhere in the developing world. The disaster devastated multiple countries, with hundreds of thousands of people missing, displaced, starving, and in need of medical assistance. A prepositioned ESB becomes the disaster response’s central command and control node. Liaison elements from each affected country fly directly to the ESB using their and U.S. aircraft. Dedicated containerized command and control modules and berthing areas, some either developed by or jointly with the affected partner nations, are already on the mission deck. Because of past exercises with the ESB, fly-on partner teams are already familiar and seamlessly integrated. Liaison elements arrive from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Red Cross, and other non-governmental organizations. The United Nations 11 Global Cluster Coordinators arrive to coordinate food security, health, nutrition, shelter, and other disaster essentials. United Nation’s coordinators, too, stand up the workspaces with which they are already familiar.

Search and rescue aircraft, surface vessels from the affected countries, and assisting countries begin arriving and departing around the clock. Coast guard, navy, and law enforcement agency vessels from multiple countries raft up nightly to the ESB for rest, stores replenishment, and refueling from the nearly half-million gallons of ESB reserve fuel storage. This allows lower-endurance coastal vessels to remain on or near the station without returning to port. The ESB’s capability as a logistics node (aka “lily pad”) is displayed as food, water, and medicine move through complex supply chains from global sources to delivery points ashore. The security detachment aboard maintains force protection of the vessel during the entire evolution, a necessary detail if in waters contested by militias or pirates.

Now, with multiple partner country liaison elements working alongside one another in the ESB’s workspaces and mission deck, imagine that Country A needs something specific from Country B. Perhaps they need to request urban search and rescue (USAR) assistance for a collapsed building. They would not need to waste time struggling to establish phone connections on land-based networks that may be overloaded or damaged by the event. Instead, Country A’s liaison officer simply walks across the mission deck to Country B’s “compound,” knocks on the container door, and says, “We need some help from your USAR guys.” This is essentially the vision for how the United Nation’s 11 Cluster System and the U.S.’s emergency response framework system are intended to work in a traditional onshore construct like the Federal Emergency Management Agency operations center. In many austere or semi-permissive environments, the challenge in responding to disaster is getting the command-and-control personnel in place quickly, housed, fed, and connected. To that end:

  • The ESB is a heliport, allowing liaison elements to quickly fly aboard using diverse military or civilian-type rotary-wing aircraft.
  • The ESB contains ready networks and information technology infrastructure, allowing liaison elements to quickly establish connectivity between embarked parties, home agencies ashore, and overseas.
  • The ESB provides substantial messing and berthing, allowing long-term sustained support for deployed personnel.
  • ESB would provide familiarity. It would be the platform on which we regularly exercise and learn together and the platform where we coalesce in times of crisis. Thus, responders would know where to go and what to do when they get there.

Often, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard operate in concert with partners in areas of the world that possess less sophisticated platform capabilities. These platforms are optimized for their local, littoral battlespaces and possess less capable weapons and sensors. This creates integration issues due to endurance and classification. U.S. destroyers, littoral combat ships, and national security cutters are overqualified for such missions; their robust sensor suites and classified networks limit efficacy in these engagements. Considering that alliances are the true generation of power projection for the U.S. military, this is where the ESB can unburden U.S. tier-one combatants while providing more meaningful integration opportunities to less capable navies and coast guards.

Final Thought – Marketing Matters

In recent years, the world’s waterways have remained relatively safe from conflict. One of the reasons for that safety is that global maritime services seem to intuitively know how to coalesce as regional maritime security enterprises. Organizational learning is a significant enabler of that coalescence, and purposefully dedicated organizational elements (nuclei) help accelerate organizational learning. The ESB is the perfect platform to be a regional nucleus for the U.S. Navy and partner country military entities and coast guards. We just need to reposition the ESBs to the right locations, “market” them appropriately to military decision-makers, and use them in bigger and more creative ways.

Commander Daniel T. Murphy is the Senior Intelligence Officer at the U.S. Navy Fourth Fleet Reserve, an Adjunct Professor of National Security and Intelligence Studies at Northeastern University, and a scholar on how organizational learning enables maritime security.

References

1. Annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023.

2. Daniel T. Murphy. “How Combined Navies and Coast Guards Coalesce: A Maritime Forces Learning Model,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), April 10th, 2019. The 2019 study built on 80+ years of organizational learning by a multitude of researchers, including Dewey (1938), Lewin and Lewin (1948); Schon (1983); Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996); Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985); Revans (1980, 1982); Senge (1990); and Watkins and Marsick (1993, 1999). While scholars have not sufficiently studied ATG’s organizational learning role in the Navy, the Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has been studied by numerous scholars, including Margaret and Wheatley (1994), Gerras (2002), Williams (2007), and DiBella (2010).

3. U.S. Navy. Expeditionary Sea Base Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2015.

4. General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO). ESB Program, 2021.

5. Daryle Cardone, Ben Coyle, & Daniel Murphy. “Assessing the Expeditionary Sea Base,” USNI Proceedings, January 2023. Pg. 149, 439.

Featured Image: U.S. Marines aboard rigid hull, inflatable boats prepare to deploy a team onto the expeditionary sea base USS Miguel Keith (ESB-5) during a visit board search and seizure exercise in the Philippine Sea, Aug. 17, 2022. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Christopher W. England

Sea Control 506 – What Wargames Reveal with Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider

By Ed Salo

Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider rejoins the podcast to discuss her article on what wargames reveal. Dr. Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia.

Download Sea Control 506 – What Wargames Reveal with Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider

Links

1. “What Wargames Really Reveal: Outcomes Matter Less Than Who Pays and Who Plays,” by Jacquelyn Schneider, Foreign Affairs, December 26, 2023.  

2. Stanford University Wargaming and Crisis Simulation Initiative.

Ed Salo is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Johann Porisch.

Sea Control 505 – Pirates of the Slave Trade with Dr. Angela Sutton

By Jared Samuelson 

Dr. Angela Sutton joins the program to discuss her book, Pirates of the Slave Trade – The Battle of Cape Lopez and the Birth of an American Institution. Angela is a social and digital historian of the Atlantic World interested in the tools and methods that preserve and widen access to the sources that help refine and redefine popular understandings of American slavery and its modern consequences.

Download Sea Control 505 – Pirates of the Slave Trade with Dr. Angela Sutton

Links

1. Pirates of the Slave Trade – The Battle of Cape Lopez and the Birth of an American Institution, by Angela C. Sutton, Prometheus Books, 2023. 

2. Angela Sutton’s website.

Jared Samuelson is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Jim Jarvie.

The Unsung Joint Operational Success at Midway

By Dale A. Jenkins, with contributions from Dr. Steve Wills

The Battle of Midway in June 1942 is best known for the brave actions of U.S. Navy carrier pilots who, despite heavy losses and uncoordinated action, were able to find and destroy four Japanese carriers, hundreds of Japanese naval aircraft, and hundreds of irreplaceable Japanese aviators and deck crews. What is not often remembered is that the defense of Midway was a joint effort with Marine Corps and Army aircraft also playing a brave role in the defense of the island against Japanese attack. Today, the U.S. military almost always fights in a joint context, and the Battle of Midway, especially in the key decision of the Japanese strike commander to rearm his reserve force for a second attack a Midway, highlight that even a small joint contribution can force an opponent to make fateful decisions. In this case, joint action contributed to a decision that cost the Imperial Japanese Navy victory and likely sealed the fate of its four-carrier task force and the lives of thousands of Japanese sailors.

A Joint but Disorganized American Team

By May 27, 1942, a week prior to the Battle of Midway, the code breakers at Pearl Harbor  were able to advise Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz that the Japanese Striking Force, which included at least four aircraft carriers, would launch an air attack at first light on June 4th against the defenses on Midway Island to prepare for an amphibious landing on the island. Nimitz reinforced Midway with every plane he could mobilize to defend the island: old Buffalo fighters and a few new Wildcats, Avenger torpedo planes, B-26 and B-17 bombers, Marine Dauntless dive bombers, Vindicators, and amphibious PBY Catalina patrol aircraft. Among these aircraft were a number of Marine Corps and Army aircraft. Nimitz planned to have three Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers, Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown in a flanking position northeast of the projected southeast Japanese track aimed directly at Midway, and then to coordinate with the land-based aircraft to concentrate his aircraft over the Striking Force for a simultaneous attack on the Japanese forces.

Poorly Coordinated Air Battle

While Army and Marine Corps aircraft did not make up the majority of the combat aircraft, they had the vital role of supporting Navy patrol aircraft by expanding the search around Midway Island and providing more early warning. Without the Army B-17 bombers performing maritime search, fewer Navy aircraft would have been less to patrol around the carrier task force. Although Navy patrol aircraft ultimately detected the Japanese occupation and striking forces, the additional patrol space provided by Army aircraft helped ensure the detection and warning to Midway before the attack.

At 0430 on June 4, the Japanese carriers launched 108 planes, half of their total force, to attack the Pacific Fleet shore defenses on Midway Island. The remaining planes constituted a reserve force: attack planes armed with anti-ship torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs, and a large complement of Zero fighters. At 0603, a U.S. PBY patrol aircraft from Midway located the Japanese carrier fleet. Strike aircraft from Midway flew to intercept the Japanese carriers and land-based Buffalo and Wildcat fighters rose to defend the island. Marine Corps gunners on Midway fired antiaircraft guns at the attacking Japanese aircraft. The military facilities on Midway were heavily damaged in the attack with hangers and barracks destroyed. Casualties among the Midway aircraft defending Midway were equally heavy. Of the 26 Marine Corps F2F Buffalo and F3F Wildcat aircraft that opposed the Japanese strike on Midway, fifteen were lost in combat. At the end of the battle only two air defense fighters were still operational to defend the island.

The joint attackers flying against the Japanese carriers fared little better than the joint air defense fighters. Six Avenger torpedo planes and four B-26s were the first to reach the Japanese carriers just after 0700 and were opposed by thirty Japanese Zeros. Five of the six Avenger torpedo planes were shot down trying to attack a Japanese carrier. Two B-26 aircraft targeted another carrier, and one was shot down, and two escaped after their ineffective torpedo drops. The fourth B-26 was on fire, and the pilot may have attempted a suicide crash into the bridge of Japanese flagship Akagi, but he narrowly missed and ended up in the ocean. During this encounter, the carriers were forced to maneuver, and although the attacks from the Midway planes failed to score any hits, they caused alarm and confusion in the Japanese command. Aircraft from the Pacific Fleet carriers, however, failed to appear because the carriers at 0600 were over sixty miles away from their expected position, were beyond their operating range and did not launch. As a result, Admiral Nimitz’s plan for a concentrated attack failed. Joint coordination of fires is an absolute necessity in operations and the resulting failure of the Midway-based joint air attack to inflict damage is a good example of what happens when coordination is not present.

Operational and Tactical Effects of Indecision

The operational effect on the Battle of Midway from their disjointed Marine Corps and Army aircraft, and later those of U.S. carrier torpedo squadrons, however, was significant. Japanese Striking Force commander Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo received a message earlier from the commander of the Midway attack force recommending another attack on Midway but was slow in deciding how to respond. Because of the desperate attacks from Midway, and his personal narrow escape on the Akagi bridge, Nagumo decided the reserve force needed to launch a second attack on Midway. At 0715 he ordered a change in the ordnance of the reserve planes from torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs to the high explosive impact bombs used on land targets. At 0728, a Japanese scout plane sent a message – ten enemy ships sighted; ship types not disclosed.

Now Nagumo was presented with a dilemma, he had two different targets – the facilities on Midway Island and the now-spotted ships. He decided to let his returning Midway strike force land first and then launch his reserve force armed with torpedoes to attack American ships. This required changing the ordnance loaded on his reserve aircraft back to torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs from the weapons loaded to attack Midway a second time. This difficult and time-consuming operation would cause a substantial delay in getting the aircraft airborne.

The disruption of the Japanese air planning cycle by Marine Corps and Army aircraft yielded key tactical results as well. The Japanese planes that had attacked Midway returned as planned, beginning at 0830. They all landed by 0917, but an attack of all four refueled and rearmed air groups against the Pacific Fleet carriers would not be ready to launch until about 1045, at the earliest. Authors Jonathan Tully and Anthony Parshall noted, “the ceaseless American air attacks had destroyed any reasonable possibility of “spotting the decks” (preparing for strike aircraft recovery before Tomonaga’s (the commander of the Japanese Midway bombing attack force) return because of the constant launch and recovery of combat air patrol (CAP) fighters,” needed to intercept the attacking Army and Marine aircraft from Midway. This Japanese loss of tempo in Japanese carrier operations due to these attacks would prove fatal of the Japanese force.

Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, in command of carriers Enterprise and Hornet, had closed the range and dispatched full air groups from both carriers at about 0710. At 1025, Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise, running extremely low on fuel, found and destroyed two Japanese carriers. At the same time Yorktown dive bombers destroyed a third carrier. Several hours later Enterprise dive bombers destroyed the fourth carrier, but not before its attack on Yorktown led to the loss of that ship. At the end of the day, Pacific Fleet carrier pilots had scored a major victory that marked a turning point in the Pacific War.

The attacks of the Midway-based aircraft had not scored any damage on the Japanese carriers or their escorts, but they contributed to the overall victory by keeping both the Japanese aircraft and ships engaged and unable to re-arm effectively for another Midway attack, or a strike on the American carriers. The delays in preparing this strike, and some luck left Japanese aircraft re-arming and refueling below decks when U.S. carrier-based dive bombers attacked, and they hits they scored on those planes caused conflagrations on the Japanese flattops that could not be extinguished.

Joint Lessons

The attacks by the Midway-based joint strike failed in their tactical mission but yielded later successful tactical and operational results. The Navy recognized the value of the B-17 in a scouting role to the point that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King ordered a number of Army aircraft for naval service. The Army believed that the B-17’s from Midway had inflicted damage on the Japanese fleet, but the failed horizontal bombing attacks by the big Army bombers convinced the Japanese to ignore the Army planes in the future. Failures in hitting Japanese ships later in the Solomons campaign caused the Army to re-assess the B-17’s ability to attack ships. The Army later discovered that “skip bombing,” a process developed with the Australians was a more effective means through which Army aircraft could attack ships.

The joint aspect of Midway’s defense continued as Army Air Force aircraft provided defense of the island well into 1943 due to shortages of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft committed elsewhere in the Pacific War. The Marine Corps 6th Defense battalion remained in garrison on Midway until the end of the war, and the idea of Marine Air/Ground forces engaged in sea control warfare is returning to the Marine Corps in the form of Marine Littoral Regiments in Force Design 2030. The value in understanding the Battle of Midway from a joint perspective is that even the smallest amount of joint action at a crucial phase can fundamentally improve the odds of joint force success.

Dale A. Jenkins is the author of Diplomats & Admirals, 402 pages, Aubrey Publishing Co., New York, Dec. 2022.

Dr. Steve Wills is a navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy

Featured Image: Torpedo Squadron Six (VT-6) TBD-1 aircraft are prepared for launching on USS Enterprise (CV-6) at about 0730-0740 hrs, June 4, 1942. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.