By Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack Introduction On a late June morning in 2014, Vietnamese fisheries inspection vessel KN 951 approached HYSY 981 (海洋石油981), a Chinese-owned mobile oil platform operating within Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Three Chinese state-owned commercial vessels retaliated by spraying, ramming, and chasing KN 951 for approximately 11.5 nautical miles, … Continue reading Ships of State: Chinese Civil-Military Fusion and the HYSY 981 Standoff→
Read Pt. 1 on Combat Training. By Dmitry Filipoff The Navy’s tactical ignorance is built into its arsenal. Currently some of the Navy’s most important weapons development programs are not just evolutionary, but revolutionary in the possibilities they open up. This is not due to innovation, but instead many of these noteworthy and foundational capabilities … Continue reading How the Fleet Forgot to Fight, Pt. 2: Firepower→
By Dmitry Filipoff Series Introduction “Fleet level processes and procedures designed for safe and effective operations were increasingly relaxed due to time and fiscal constraints, and the ‘normalization-of-deviation’ began to take root in the culture of the fleet. Leaders and organizations began to lose sight of what ‘right’ looked like, and to accept these altered … Continue reading How the Fleet Forgot to Fight, Pt. 1: Combat Training→
Sea Control Topic Week By LT Adam Humayun, USN From the dawn of naval war through the mid-twentieth century, sea control served political ends only indirectly. A force that exercised sufficient control of waterways could bombard, assault, withdraw, and feint from the sea, but could not (unless fighting an island enemy) produce war-ending consequences, absent … Continue reading Sea Control at the Tactical Level of War→
