Argentina Deploys New Patrol Vessels to Combat IUU Fishing

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

The Argentine Navy has deployed its two newest offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52), to monitor an international fishing fleet traveling close to the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) en route to the South Atlantic. While there have been no confirmed reports of these vessels engaging in illegal, unregulated, or unreported (IUU) fishing, recent history suggests that this is occurring or will occur soon.

Putting the new units to good use

Bouchard and Piedrabuena are assigned to the Argentine Navy’s maritime patrol division (División de Patrullado Marítimo: DVPM). Along with a Beechcraft B-200 Super King Air aircraft assigned to the naval air squadron for maritime surveillance (Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Vigilancia Marítima), the two units monitored vessels traveling through the Magellan Strait en route to open seas in the South Atlantic, according to a 23 December press release. After departing from Admiral Zar base in Trelew, Chubut Province, the B-200 flew over “the fishing fleet, in coordination with the patrol boats, maintaining surveillance… of the activities carried out by these ships of different nationalities.”

ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) conduct patrol and surveillance operations in the Argentine Sea (Photo credit: Argentine Navy)

The support vessel ARA Estrecho de San Carlos (A-22) has reportedly replaced Bouchard as the main vessel assigned to Ushuaia, the capital of Tierra del Fuego province, which is near the Beagle Channel and Argentina’s border with Chile.

Argentina has acquired four Gowind-class OPVs from France, manufactured by Naval Group. The third unit, ARA Storni (P-53), was delivered in October 2021, while the fourth and final ship, ARA Bartolomé Cordero, was launched in September 2021 and will likely be delivered sometime in early 2022. The four units will help the Argentine Navy improve its patrol and surveillance operations.

There have also been developments from a bureaucratic standpoint. In late February 2021, the Ministry of Defence created the Joint Maritime Command (Comando Conjunto Marítimo: CCM) to “patrol and control of [Argentina’s] maritime and fluvial areas.” The MoD announced that starting this past 1 January, the CCM assumed command of surveillance maritime operations, which includes monitoring the international fishing fleet that is sailing near the country’s EEZ.

Boarding teams from ARA Bouchard (P-51) and ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) inspect fishing vessels in the Argentine Sea (Photo credit: Argentine Navy)

Good and Bad News

The Argentine Navy will have additional air and surface units in the near future. In late December, the Argentine government announced that the local shipyard Tandanor will construct a new icebreaker for Antarctic operations to replace the aging icebreaker Almirante Irízar (Q-5). In the same month, the Ministry of Defence announced that two refurbished Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King medium helicopters will be acquired to improve capabilities and operations, including search and rescue, in the country’s southern areas and during Antarctic operations. The price of the two helicopters, including personnel training and spare parts, is USD 12.8 million.

Alas, the service still has no operational submarines. Moreover, apart from the four new OPVs, the rest of the fleet has yet to be modernized, which limits the service’s capabilities for constant, long-range patrol operations to monitor illegal activities by the international fishing fleet.

IUU Fishing

Argentina has a history of combating IUU fishing. For example, in 2016, the Mantilla-class patrol boat Prefecto Derbes (GC-28) shot and sank the Chinese fishing vessel Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010. The ship had reportedly ignored warning shots and attempted to flee, only to ram the Argentine patrol vessel. Lu Yan Yuan Yu was reportedly fishing without authorization in Argentina’s EEZ close to Chubut Province.

The author of this article has written several essays for CIMSEC about IUU fishing in Latin American waters (See 2016’s “Latin American Navies Combat Illegal Fishing,” and 2020’s “The Ecuadorian Navy’s Constant Struggle Against IUU Fishing.” Regional cooperation is vital to solving this security challenge, which can be achieved by modernizing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca: TIAR) into a 21st-century agreement that is also tasked with combating IUU fishing. Turning TIAR into TIAR 21, as the author suggested in a July 2021 Regional Insight paper for the William J. Perry Center for hemispheric Defense Studies at the US National Defense University, would be an essential step forward to more effectively monitor South America’s vast waters and prevent the ongoing maritime pillaging of precious marine resources by extra-regional fishing fleets.

An international fishing fleet, comprising vessels from countries such as China, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan, continuously operates throughout South America, moving with the season. For example, the same fleet operated around Ecuador, close to the Galapagos Islands, in July-August 2021, then traveled south through Peru and Ecuador. It is currently crossing the Magellan Strait to operate in the South Atlantic for the Summer months below the Equator. In Argentina, fishing vessels are focused on fishing squid, spider crab (centolla), and crab.

According to a December report by the Argentine daily La Nación, the “fishing season” commenced in early December, as some 180 vessels, “mostly from China,” crossed the Magellan Strait after operating in waters close to Chile and Peru. “By April, there will be approximately 500 ships operating in the area,” explained Major Néstor Alberto Kiferling, head of Argentina’s maritime traffic service. As modern as the Gowind class ships are, the international fishing fleet vastly outnumbers the Argentine Navy’s current capabilities, even with support from aerial units and other vessels.

Conclusion

It has been argued that Argentina is in a better situation vis-à-vis IUU fishing today compared to five years ago. Indeed, the Argentine Navy is putting its two new OPVs to good use by deploying them to the Magellan Strait to monitor the international fishing fleet crossing through the country’s EEZs en route to the South Atlantic. As with many other South American countries, one of Argentina’s major environmental challenges is IUU fishing, But while IUU Fishing is problematic when perpetrated at low-scale by fishing vessels from Argentina or a neighboring country, it can become truly catastrophic when done so by hundreds of international fishing vessels with no interest in preserving the maritime environment.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. The views expressed in this article belong the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Featured Image: ARA Piedrabuena (P-52) at Piriou’s Concarneau shipyard (Photo Credit: Naval Group)

Call for Articles: Russian Naval Power and Maritime Strategy

The terms of this call for articles have been updated. Read the new call for articles here.

Submissions Due: March 4, 2022
Topic Week Dates: March 14-18, 2022
Article Length: 1,000-3,000 words
Submit to: Content@cimsec.org

By Dmitry Filipoff

The current Russia-Ukraine crisis has cast a shadow over Europe as more than 100,000 Russian troops border Ukraine and 140 Russian Navy vessels exercise at sea. Russian naval power, especially forces in the Black Sea, could feature significantly in a major contingency involving Ukraine.

The preservation of Russian naval power featured prominently in the modern origins of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. As the homeport of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol came at risk of being under the control of a western-aligned Ukraine, Russia seized control of the Crimean peninsula in part to preserve its naval power. Now these same forces may be brought to bear against Ukraine in a new European conflict.

What is the state of Russia’s naval power today, and how could its naval forces be brought to bear against Ukraine? Or in an even more dire scenario, against NATO? How are Russian naval capabilities evolving, such as in the undersea domain and with respect to hypersonics? What is Russia’s maritime strategy and how are its maritime interests evolving?

Authors are invited to answer these questions and more as we consider the roles and evolution of Russian naval power and maritime strategy. Send all submissions to Content@cimsec.org

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Russian Navy ships of the Black Sea Fleet. (Photo via Sputnik/Vasily Batanov)

Flotilla SITREP: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and Surface Navy Sessions

By Dmitry Filipoff

There is even more than usual going on in the world of geopolitics and naval power, to say the least. This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be looking to discuss current events and recently published, hard-hitting critiques of Navy combat readiness.

Down below is a peek at the invites for our upcoming February discussions. Of special note may be the session on the naval dimensions of the brewing Russia-Ukraine crisis, and how Russian Black Sea naval power could feature in a contingency. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive invites to our upcoming off-the-record February sessions.

Last month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla held sessions focused on the Surface Navy, including discussions on tracking tactical skill in the surface fleet as well as how to maximize shipboard organization for combat effectiveness. These candid conversations revealed opportunities and shortfalls to be addressed, and helped connect like-minded individuals focused on advancing naval warfighting. 

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

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Upcoming February Sessions

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and The Role of Naval Power in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

The Russia-Ukraine crisis is brewing with more than 100,000 Russian troops alongside Ukraine’s borders and 140 Russian Navy vessels engaged in exercises. In the event of a significant Russian incursion, how could Russia’s Black Sea Fleet be brought to bear? What operations could be conducted and toward what objectives? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we contemplate the naval dimensions of this major crisis.

Read Ahead: “How Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Could Change the Equation in Ukraine,” by Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Sam Cranny-Evans
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Navy Cryptologic and Cyber Warfare Effectiveness

Cyber warfare has long been heralded by Navy and DoD leaders as a critical force multiplier and major arena of competition. But is the Navy well-structured to seize the opportunity of cyber, or effectively defend itself from threats emanating from this domain? To what extent does the Navy’s cryptologic and cyber communities have the resident expertise, training, and integration to be effective? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the Navy’s cyber effectiveness.

Read Ahead: “Navy Cryptologic Warfare Officers Cannot Do Cyber,” by LCDR Derek Bernsen, USNR
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Going from Short Term “Can-Do” to “Combat Ready”

The Navy has long operated under a “can-do” logic that sought to maximize the availability of the fleet for operational tasking. But after operating under such logic for decades, many fundamentals of combat readiness have atrophied. How can the Navy restore more balance to the relationship between its availability and readiness? What practices have been corroded by can-do culture, and what opportunities could be seized with a culture change? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the effects of “can-do” culture on the Navy’s combat readiness.

Read Ahead: “Change Can-do to Combat Ready,” by LCDR Aaron Marchant, USN
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Completed January Sessions

How to Measure Tactical Skill and Experience in the Surface Fleet

The Surface Navy, with the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) in the lead, is trialing a new system of measuring tactical experience and skill— the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC). What sort of criteria should be used, and what sorts of experience should be tracked? How should this data be used to inform shipboard management and career tracks? Join us to discuss how the surface fleet can better measure tactical skill and harness the data.

Read Ahead: “Surface Navy to Kick Off Program to Track, Assess Sailors Combat Skills,” by Megan Eckstein
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New Shipboard Organizations for Surface Warships

The shipboard organization of surface ships has a direct bearing on leaders’ ability to cultivate tactical proficiency. Could new shipboard organizations and delineations of duties allow leaders to focus more deeply on developing warfighting skills? What could such reorganizations look like and how can they be trialed? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the relationship between shipboard organization and tactical focus in the surface fleet.

Read Ahead: “Time for a New Shipboard Organization,” by Lieutenant Colin Barnard
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Embracing Failure in Warfighter Culture

Failure is a critical part of learning and development. But within certain cultures and organizations, failure can carry a stigma that inhibits its effective use. How can warfighters better embrace failure as a force of learning and progress? How can aversion to failure mask important shortfalls and sideline opportunities to innovate? What is the role of leaders in setting a constructive tone around the value of failure? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the role of failure in furthering warfighting excellence.

Read Ahead: “Embrace the F-Word,” by Captain Roger G. Herbert Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Employing Unmanned Surface Vehicles To Guard Ports and Harbors

By George Galdorisi

“Globalization” instantly brings to mind the flow of international trade that has both lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and delivered abundant choices to consumers. Almost all of this thrumming trade moves on the high seas, which is where I thought of it throughout my career as an active-duty U.S. naval officer. That blue-water framing changed in August 2020, when deadly explosions rocked the harbor in Beirut, Lebanon. Lost among the headlines that dominated the international news for weeks was the importance of ports and harbors to global commerce.

I live in an American city astride a major U.S. port, and now see it for what it is: a critical node for global trade. While many people focus on the importance of ships in carrying this seaborne trade, they often forget that the critical nodes that support globalization and world trade are the world’s ports and harbors. From Shanghai, to Antwerp, to Rotterdam, to Shenzhen, to Los Angeles, to other mega-ports, as well as hundreds of smaller ports, these ports are critical to world prosperity.

A disaster in one of these ports similar to what happened in the harbor in Beirut—an explosion in port, a fire on a large oil tanker, or any of a host of other events—could close one of these ports indefinitely, with catastrophic economic and ecological effects. More recently, the supply-chain backups at the U.S. ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach demonstrate the ripple effects of even a slowdown at a major port. A complete closure of one of these ports for even a few days would have dire consequences that would be difficult to mitigate without extraordinary effort.

The repercussions of slowdowns and stoppages justify wide-reaching preventative measures, but the magnitude of providing comprehensive security for an average size port—let alone some of the world’s mega-ports—can lure port authorities into wishing away the challenge. Ports present an all-too-inviting target for terrorists, other non-state actors, and even state-backed sabotage, and so ports must be vigilantly defended.

Faced with this challenge, port authorities must ensure security twenty-four hours a day, every day. This task includes continuous inspection of port assets, threat detection and security response, as well as on-demand inspections after storms or other disasters, ongoing surveys to ensure navigable waterways, hull inspections, and a wide-range of other missions.

Unmanned surface vessels can fill this gap better than legacy approaches.

The Current State of Port and Harbor Security

Port and harbor security has changed little in a generation. Most large ports rely on cameras placed at strategic locations and monitored by watch-standers to spot trouble. Port officials also provide security with a variety of manned surface vessels on regular patrols. This traditional approach is good, but it stresses the ability of port authorities to provide around-the-clock security and can lead to gaps in coverage, rendering ports less secure than they could be. 

Cameras seem to offer a cheap and effective solution, but someone — often several people —must monitor the video feeds. A port maintaining scores of cameras requires a command center and enough watch-standers, in rotating shifts, to monitor the video in real-time, twenty-four hours a day.

Similar issues accompany the use of manned craft to patrol a harbor of any size—let alone mega-ports. Manned vessel operations are increasingly expensive, are often limited by weather and water conditions. These small craft must be manned, typically by two or more people at a time, who must cope with the physical toll of riding a small vessel for hours on end. Unlike watch-standers on land who might be able to work shifts as long as eight or even twelve hours, pounding through an often-choppy harbor in a RHIB or other small craft means that a watch rotation of three to four hours is about all most people can endure.

With such short watch rotations, providing round-the-clock security is a costly endeavor under ideal conditions. Add rain, wind, waves, fog and other natural phenomena that often reduce visibility and slow patrol speeds, the need for more craft and more people can multiply significantly, often without warning, thereby further driving the need for standby crews. All-in-all, this is an expensive undertaking.

Additionally, there are many shallow areas throughout ports that are beyond the reach of typical manned vessels. Even limited draft craft like RHIBs draw some water when they are loaded with people, communications equipment, weapons and the like. A manned vessel pushing too close to shore also runs the risk of impaling itself—as well as its crew—against visible or invisible hazards. This risk is compounded at night and during dense fog and other adverse weather conditions.

Given the manifest challenges of providing adequate—let alone comprehensive—security for ports with current state-of-the-art systems and capabilities, it is little wonder that port officials are searching for technology solutions that will enable them to provide better security, at lower costs, and importantly, without putting humans at risk.

The Port of Los Angeles: A Mega-Port with a Mega-Challenge

The Port of Los Angeles (POLA) is the busiest port in the United States. This mega-port comprises 3,200 acres (42 square miles) of water, 43 miles of waterfront, 26 passenger and cargo terminals and 86 ship-to-shore container cranes. POLA handled over 9.3 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of cargo last year (up from 8.8 million TEUs the previous year and predicted to increase year-over-year).

Current capabilities to secure the Port of Los Angeles’ 42 square miles of water involve monitoring the video provided by 500 cameras throughout the port, as well as patrolling the ports’ expanse of water with a fleet of manned vessels. This methodology stresses the ability of POLA authorities to provide the necessary 24/7/365 security. Additionally, POLA has a large number of shallow areas throughout its 43 miles of waterfront that are beyond the reach of any of the manned vessels.

For these reasons, Port of Los Angeles officials decided to explore the use of unmanned surface vehicles to enhance the security of the port. To that end, port officials invited Maritime Tactical Systems Inc. (MARTAC) to visit and demonstrate the capabilities of their MANTAS USV. MANTAS is a high-performance, commercial off-the-shelf USV built on a catamaran-style hull, and comes in a number of variants ranging in size from six-foot to 50-foot. A demonstration was conducted using a 12-foot MANTAS.

The 12-foot MANTAS (otherwise known as the T12) has a length of twelve feet and a width of three feet. It is fourteen inches high and draws only seven inches of water. The MANTAS can be equipped with a wide variety of above-surface sensors (EO/IR/thermal video) and below-surface sensors (sonars and echo-sounders), as well as other devices such as chem/bio/nuclear sensors, water quality monitors, and above/below surface environmental sensors.

Leveraging Previous Successful Demonstrations

POLA authorities requested the MANTAS demonstration principally because the system had performed so well in an earlier port security demonstration, the Mobile Ocean Terminal Concept Demonstration in Concord, CA, conducted by the U.S. Army’s Physical Security Enterprise & Analysis Group.

For these missions, three MANTAS vessels, T6, T8 and T12, were used to perform different operations. The MANTAS T6 was utilized as an intercept vessel to quickly address potential threats at high-speeds of up to 55 knots. This T6 was equipped with a standard electro/optical camera focused on rapid interdiction and threat identification. The second vessel was a MANTAS T8 equipped with a FLIR M232 thermal camera. Its role was as a forward-looking harbor vessel situational awareness asset. The final vessel was a MANTAS T12 tasked with prosecuting above and below surveillance operations to detect and identify intruder vessels, or other threats to harbor assets. The sensor kit included a SeaFlir 230 for above surface ISR capabilities and a Teledyne M900 for subsurface diver/swimmer detection.

The Port of Los Angeles Unique Requirements

During the visit to the Port of Los Angeles, MARTAC representatives provided a comprehensive briefing on MANTAS capabilities, took a three-hour boat tour to observe the entirety of POLA authorities’ span of operations, and then provided a remote demonstration where port officials controlled and observed a MANTAS T12 operating off the eastern coast of Florida. The demonstration validated the going-in assumption that employing a thoroughly tested and proven USV is a viable solution that POLA is keen to pursue.

The Devil Ray USV (Photo by Jack Rowley)

After observing the MANTAS remote demonstration, officials from the Port of Los Angeles determined that the capabilities of this USV met the requirements for the port’s wide variety of missions. That said, port officials asked MARTAC to scale-up the MANTAS to a 24-foot and 38-foot version, reflecting a concert that the 12-foot MANTAS was so stealthy that ships in transit would not see it. Additionally, the larger T24 and T38 could operate for longer periods and carry additional sensors. The T38 MANTAS has now been demonstrated in several U.S. Navy exercises, and conducted another port security demonstration in the Port of Tampa with similar results.

MANTAS has an open architecture and modular design, which facilities the rapid changing of payload and sensor components to provide day-to-day port security as well as on-demand inspections. Additionally, if a longer endurance or an increased mission payload sensor profile was desired by the port, the modularity of the MANTAS system will easily allow for increasing the size of the craft from the battery powered electric motor 12-foot T12 to a marine diesel fueled 24-foot T24 or 38-foot T38. This transition would eliminate the necessity for battery replacement/recharging on the T12 after each of the shorter missions.

This demonstration certified that commercial-off-the-shelf unmanned surface vehicles can ably conduct a comprehensive harbor security inspection of a mega-port such as the Port of Los Angeles. As a facility with a longstanding need to augment its manned vessel patrol activities with emergent technology in the form of unmanned surface vehicles, the Port of Los Angeles demonstration provided a best practices example of the art-of-the-possible for augmenting port security.

 

Enhancing the Effectiveness of Port and Harbor Security

The reliable, adaptable and affordable USV support to port security as described in this article has only been evaluated recently because the technology simply did not exist just a few years ago. 

In an article in the January 2020 issue of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Commander Rob Brodie noted: “When the Navy and Marine Corps consider innovation, they usually focus on technology they do not possess and not on how to make better use of the technology they already have.” Extrapolating his assertion to the multiple entities responsible for port and harbor security at mega-ports such as the Port of Los Angeles, one must ask if maritime professionals are to slow to leverage an innovative solution that can be grasped immediately.

This technology is available today with commercial off-the-shelf unmanned surface vessels, and these can be employed to increase the effectiveness of port protection if we do as Commander Brodie suggests and “make better use of the technology we already have.” And given the enormous personnel costs associated with monitoring cameras and patrolling with manned vehicles, this innovative solution designed to supplement current capabilities will drive down acquisition and life cycle costs while resulting in shorter times for a return on investment (ROI).

This Port of Los Angeles demonstration and subsequent Port of Tampa validation certified that commercial-off-the-shelf unmanned surface vehicles can ably conduct a comprehensive security inspection of a mega-port. As a facility with a longstanding need to augment its manned vessel patrol activities with emergent technology in the form of unmanned surface vehicles, the Port of Los Angeles demonstration provided a best practices example of the art-of-the-possible for enhancing port security.

As the world continues to come to grips with the human and economic impact of the Beirut harbor disaster, all nations would be well-served to leverage emerging technology to enhance the security of the ports and harbors that make the global economy hum. To fail to do so would be inviting a disaster that is eminently preventable.

Captain George Galdorisi (USN – retired) is a career naval aviator whose thirty years of active duty service included four command tours and five years as a carrier strike group chief of staff. He began his writing career in 1978 with an article in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. He is the Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Futures at the Navy’s Command and Control Center of Excellence in San Diego, California. The views presented are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.

Featured Image: The Devil Ray USV (Photo by Jack Rowley)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.